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Abstract 
 
This dissertation focuses on deportation practice throughout the 1920s and its social and 
cultural ramifications, arguing for the necessity of looking beyond the national policy frame to 
reveal the full significance of deportation in American society. The project highlights the 
intersecting ideas about race, political ideologies, civil liberties, criminology and pathology, and 
gender and sexual transgressions that informed the ways a variety of actors enacted deportation 
and negotiated its meaning on the ground. In so doing, it reveals how deportation served as a 
locus through which the politics of inclusion and exclusion was remapped. I illustrate what was 
behind the steady yearly rise in deportees, from 2,762 in 1920 to 16,631 by 1930, and in doing 
so, question the dominant periodization of deportation, which has often presented it as a series of 
hysterical, episodic outbursts of repression. Instead, I argue that it was a far more continuous and 
momentous process of social policing of the national body, and highlight the 1920s as a crucial 
period when exclusion and belonging were negotiated, not only through legislation, but in the 
streets, prisons, hospitals, asylums, and media discourse. As immigration officials and local 
authorities sought to enforce abstract policies, they ran up against the reality of migrants as 
embodied individuals and communities, whose national and racial identities, sexuality, mental 
and physical health did not fit within neatly prescribed legal categories.  
My dissertation is organized along the nesting scales of space at which deportation was 
practiced: global, national, local, institutional, and the body in detention and transportation. Each 
of these levels allows for a broader understanding of the intersecting points of authority and state 
control, ideology and pragmatics required for the building of an unprecedented deportation 
machinery. At the global level, I explore U.S. participation in international networks to 
coordinate deportations, the complexity of addressing shifting borders and imperial landscapes, 
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discourses around other nation’s deportation practices, and challenges posed by deportees whose 
trajectories did not fit simple migration patterns. The national level addresses the ways in which 
deportation served not only to create new delineations of potential citizen or undesirable migrant, 
but also to build the power of the state, even as it continued to be plagued by insufficient funding 
and struggles for greater consolidation. At the local level, I trace deportation into the nation’s 
heartland, arguing that while the law was federal, the enforcement was intensely shaped by local 
political agendas and police forces, ethnic and racial biases, and labor needs. The institutional 
chapter explores how the spaces where deportation operated--prisons, mental asylums, hospitals, 
juvenile reformatories--were all critical sites in the early twentieth century for the identification, 
surveillance, and punishment of individuals within hierarchies of racialized bodies. Finally, I go 
down to the level of embodied experience, as deportees underwent long periods of detention in 
county jails, private homes, and makeshift holding centers, train journeys to the ports for 
removal, and the complex logistics of shipping and ground transport abroad. Examined from 
these angles, deportation becomes far more than a tool of immigration policy at the borders. 
Indeed, deportation practice during the early 20th century expanded the reach of the bureaucratic 
state and brought the process of determining inclusion and exclusion into cities, towns, and 
institutions across the interior of the country.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Following migration from Smyrna, Turkey, Eftikia Perivolas, a young ethnically Greek 
woman was hospitalized in 1924 for tuberculosis in Springfield, Massachusetts. Four years later, 
in 1928, her family was still negotiating to prevent her deportation. Originally ordered because of 
her disease, her deportation was still pending because of her inability to pay the bill, a condition 
which had rendered her subject to the “likely to become a public charge” criteria of deportation 
law. One of five siblings residing in the United States, Eftikia (Epychia) had lost her parents to 
the Turkish army in 1922.1 The vast I.N.S. file for Eftikia Perivolas and her family is 
demonstrative of the multifaceted, complex interactions between the different levels of authority 
involved in enacting a deportation from start to finish. Her apprehension occurred at the point of 
contact with an ostensibly benevolent institution of the state, while local advocates intervened 
with the federal government and argued that if the city of Springfield did not initiate it, there 
should be no action. Meanwhile, the circumstances of her nation of birth (Turkey), and her ethnic 
nationality (Greek), at a point of violent conflict between the two called into question whether 
her removal could even be humanely effected, as it would require sending her to Athens, a city 
she had known only fleetingly as a refugee fleeing violence in Smyrna. Like so many of the 
cases interwoven throughout this dissertation, Eftikia’s predicament illuminates the vast 
logistical, international, and political questions behind the abstract policies of deportation law.  
Upon the termination of her treatment, Eftikia was more fortunate than many immigrants 
of the era. She was not immediately deported as a public charge for her reliance on state services, 
but the family was warned sternly that this relief could be taken away at any moment. Unlike so 
                                                          
1 Smyrna was occupied by Greece as part of the Greco-Turkish War following the First World War, but after the 
Turkish army regained control of the city in 1922, the city was subject to mass killings of Greek and Armenian 
residents.  
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many other deportees, Eftikia’s family had strong local contacts who intervened on her behalf 
and helped her eldest brother, Elias, arrange a gradual payment plan with the hospital 
administration for the overdue bill in order to prevent her from being categorized as a recipient 
of public welfare.  Writing in August 1924 on behalf of the Perivolas family, and Elias in 
particular, Dr. James A. Seaman explained that after their parents were killed by the Turkish 
army, Elias brought over his siblings and had demonstrated nothing but the most commendable 
behavior and qualifications for American belonging.  In spite of these endorsements, “the 
cancellation of warrant of arrest in the case of your sister,” the Commissioner of Immigration at 
Boston reminded Elias, “is predicated upon hospital expenses being paid. I have also been 
directed to inform you that deportation proceedings will be instituted in her case if she is allowed 
to become a public charge.” In a complicated set of negotiations which reveals the manifold 
points of authority at which deportation might be initiated (or, in this rare case, prevented), the 
Commissioner at Boston received permission from the Bureau of Immigration at Washington to 
grant a conditional cancellation of the deportation order, at which point he communicated with 
the Director of the Department of Public Welfare for the State of Massachusetts, who in turn 
relayed communication from the Springfield, Massachusetts Board of Health, which passed 
along the hospital’s bill.  
This convoluted network of contact led to the establishment of the fact that $40 had been 
paid on the original bill, and that a balance of $300.86 remained unpaid as of September, 1924. 
However, in spite of an arrangement between Perivolas family and the Springfield Board of 
Health that Elias would pay $10 a month until the hospital debt had been paid off, the family 
found itself in arrears by 1927, at which point the balance remained at $212.86, with no payment 
for several months. The family, as well as local advocates wrote in on their behalf, requesting a 
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reprieve and explaining the unique and tragic circumstances faced by the family. An interview 
with one of the sisters, Maria (Xantippe) Perivolas, in April of 1928 revealed that Eftikia was 
living in Springfield, Massachusetts with her sisters Maria and Atina, and her brother Savvos. 
Both Elias and Savvos had suffered from health issues and been out of work, but Savvos was 
receiving compensation for his injury of $16 per week, from which he was supporting the family, 
with the assistance of the third brother, Marinos, who was working as baker in New York City. 
Eftikia was taking evening courses at a high school and working as a housekeeper, while Atina 
and Maria were both minors and full time students.  
While Maria’s statement is moving, it is perhaps the letter from Attorney F.N. Newell 
advocating for the family that is most revealing for this study. It shines light on the persistent 
confusion over governmental jurisdiction over deportation cases and the various local, state, and 
federal actors involved in enforcing deportation statutes on the ground. “The City of Springfield 
by its Health Department knows the circumstances of the case and thus far has not desired to 
press the matter or even make a bill,” Newell wrote, questioning, “If the city does not call upon 
the state in the matter then why should ‘The Department’ press the matter.” His inquiry echoed 
multidirectional conflicts throughout the period between local officials and ‘The Department,’ or 
the Bureau of Immigration over who should institute deportation proceedings, why, and at whose 
expense. Beyond the concerns domestically, however, the complexities of deportation also lay in 
their international dimensions. Immigration officials who investigated the cases concluded that 
while Eftikia was a native of Turkey, at the moment, “Turkey will not issue passports to its 
citizens of Greek race to return there.” Thus, the U.S. found itself constrained by the reality that 
every deportation had another side and their power to deport was far from unilateral. Like so 
many deportees, past and present, Eftikia’s removal would have been to a “homeland” which 
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was not, in any true sense of the word, her own. As one of her attorney’s appealed to the 
sympathies of the immigration authorities, Greece was a land where the family had “no relatives, 
nor had they any friends… Greece is to them a foreign country and they have there no status, no 
home, no friends, and no way to live.”2 
This dissertation focuses on the practice of deportation during the 1920s and its social 
and cultural ramifications, arguing that it is necessary to look beyond the national policy frame to 
reveal the full significance of deportation for American society. It addresses how intersecting 
ideas about race, crime, radicalism, class, gender, sexuality, and Americanism shaped how 
deportation was practiced and negotiated on the ground throughout this period. Deportation was 
newly critical in the 1920s in drawing social boundaries, remapping the politics of inclusion and 
exclusion in American society, and creating the modern discourse of immigrant “illegality”. 
Through the policing of Americanism, political ideology, criminality, health, and race, 
deportation has played a fundamental role in determining how the United States has conceived of 
who is or can become an American, which immigrants are desirable and undesirable, and what 
factors pose a threat to the national body. At the same time, as the government negotiated the 
creation of a nascent infrastructure for actually enforcing and implementing deportation law, it 
ended the reach of the immigration state into the interior of the nation and redefined the 
relationship between the state and its foreign-born denizens.  
This project explores the different levels of space within which deportation practice was 
enacted. These spaces extend from the intensely local--the ethnic neighborhood, the urban 
streets, the local jail cell; to the global-- the inter-governmental disputes and agreements, the 
coordination and communication, and the international and imperial contexts which made U.S. 
                                                          
2 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Record Group 85, Box 4762, File 55211/603. 
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deportation proceedings a complex subject for those seeking to enforce it. These spaces, rather 
than the halls of congress, were where national aspirations of deportation became realities. While 
existing scholarship on deportation has focused largely on legislation, I insist that rather than a 
history of laws, deportation history must also be an account of deportees.3 As deportees 
underwent deportation, their trajectories and experiences were shaped by each of these levels of 
space. At the same time, as immigration officials and local authorities sought to enforce abstract 
policies, they ran up against the reality of migrants as embodied individuals who inhabited 
distinct and overlapping spaces, from the institutions they were gathered from to the global 
spaces throughout which they had traveled to arrive in the United States. They were also forced 
to grapple with them as complicated and often confounding individuals and communities, whose 
national and racial identities, sexuality, mental and physical health did not fit within neatly 
prescribed legal categories, nor clearly delineated national spaces. 
                                                          
3 Until very recently, deportation was treated almost exclusively from a policy angle and little scholarship focused 
exclusively on deportation as its own social phenomena, instead presenting it as a facet of enforcing immigration 
policy.  See William Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of Aliens: A Study in Administrative Law and 
Procedure (New York: Da Capo Press, 1971); Rodger Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration 
Policy and Immigrants since 1882 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004); Edward P. Hutchinson, Legislative History of 
American Immigration Policy, 1798-1965 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981); Daniel Tichenor, 
Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); 
Aristide Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy and the Fashioning of America (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation with Harvard University Press, 2006).  Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American 
History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) presents an important divergence, arguing that deportation is 
itself a distinct process and social project which must be viewed as more than an enforcement arm of exclusion law.  
Dorothee Schneider’s recent Crossing Borders: Migration and Citizenship in the Twentieth-Century United States 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) provides important attention to tracing the experience of immigrants 
through both inclusive and exclusionary stages of the migration process. Torrie Hester gives critical attention to the 
judicial processes involved in the development of immigration policy, and recognizes the importance of racial 
dynamics and Chinese exclusion in the trajectory of deportation history in her 2010 article “’Protection, not 
Punishment’: Legislative and Judicial Formation of U.S. Deportation Policy, 1882-1904,” Journal of American 
Ethnic History 30:1 (Fall, 2010).  Deidre Moloney’s National Insecurities: Immigrants and U.S. Deportation Policy 
since 1882 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011) insightfully explores the ways deportation 
reflected evolving thought about race, sexuality, religion, and health, but still remains within a basically policy-
driven framework, using case studies, but largely focusing on the policy level and ignoring local and regional 
context. 
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Nor was deportation in practice a mere exercise of American political will. It was also a 
pragmatic exercise in attempting to catch and capture, examine and diagnose, detain and 
imprison, and ultimately, transport immigrant bodies, which often depended more on fiscal 
practicality, local cooperation, and immigrant agency than on criteria for American belonging 
handed down from Congress. Again and again, deportation rotated around the realities of 
immigrant bodies and the challenges and complexities of policing, assessing and transporting 
them. These challenges did not occur solely in policy debates in Congress, but in city streets, 
homes of raided immigrants, detainee’s holding cells, doctor’s examining rooms, local courts, 
newspapers, and public discourse, and I explore these critical spaces at the center of an evolving 
politics of social control and boundary drawing in American society. 
My project makes a number of interconnected arguments about the significance of 
deportation practice during the 1920s, which contribute to a broader understanding of its 
centrality in American history.  I insist that examining post-entry deportation as a discrete topic 
from exclusions at the point of entry, not only in their legal outlines, but in their practical 
application is critical to understanding how growing immigration regime increasingly reached all 
across the interior of the nation. I also demonstrate that the patterns of the actual enforcement of 
post-entry deportation did not always run parallel to either the application of exclusion laws at 
the point of entry, or to the goals of the congressional authors of the legislation. Instead, they 
reflected a range of agendas emanating from local officials, law enforcement, carceral and 
charitable institutions, and individuals.  In doing so, I argue that it is necessary to question the 
spatial scales at which this process occurred, and to interrogate the idea of the nation as the only 
or most important determinant of deportation practice. While deportation policy dictates came 
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from above, their application and thus their lived impact, came from below, from a vast array of 
actors. 
Deportation was more than just a facet of immigration policy—it was an active project of 
state-building and social policing. The practice of deportation operated at the tense nexus 
between the stated goals and messy reality of the state’s efforts to determine its own boundaries. 
Throughout the 1920s, deportation was shaped by efforts to construct stricter categories of 
exclusion, to more firmly define the exclusionary benefits of citizenship, and to increase the 
reach of the bureaucratic state. In doing so, it created an increasingly coordinated network of 
bureaucratic field offices, institutions, local governmental officials, and the federal Immigration 
Service. However, at every turn, immigration officials were thwarted by the continued 
fungibility of categories of nationality, race, and race, as well as by the practical, logistical, and 
budgetary constraints on their efforts to more actively police the nation’s immigrant population. I 
highlight the fact that the 1920s, rather than a lapsed period between the “red scare” and the 
1930s, was in fact, a critical moment when deportation practice developed an expansive practical 
infrastructure, a more organized and intentional operation, and a wider spectrum of official and 
unofficial participants. In the process, deportation contributed to the evolution of modern 
citizenship as it was given meaning through technologies for the control of non-citizens and the 
consolidation of non-citizenship as a punitive identity.  
Most work on deportation tends to give a one-dimensional impression of the process, 
emphasizing the debates over passage of legislation, the administrative proceedings required to 
reach the deportation decision in individual cases, and tracing court cases and appeals against 
deportation.  Once the decision to deport is made, whether broadly, in terms of new categories of 
deportable aliens being added to law, or individually, in terms of individual migrant’s abilities to 
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negotiate the system and argue their cases against the government, the story tends to end there.  
It is important to recognize that for the thousands of immigrants caught up within the deportation 
machinery, the practice of deportation was far from over.  Furthermore, for the government, 
agencies, and institutions involved, deportation was more than a set of decisions—it was a 
practical and strategic challenge, and often a logistical nightmare.  Examining what occurred 
after the decision to deport an individual came down provides a critical corrective to the 
impression of the United States government and the INS as merely policy directors, and reminds 
us that their work was also a complicated administrative and bureaucratic practice on the ground.  
This practice brought them into new forms contact with railroad companies, prison guards, 
asylums, hospitals, detention centers and a wide range of other institutions and in the process, 
created new networks of administrative control and communication. 
By studying more than just the congressional debates and formal INS proclamations, it is 
possible to understand the broader centrality of deportation to American society, and more to 
fully understand its impact, not only on individual deportees, but on the nation as a whole. 
Beyond illuminating the history of immigration control, deportation provides new perspectives 
on other critical subjects. Deportation both reflected and contributed to evolving discourses on 
race, political ideologies and the limits of civil liberties, ideas regarding crime and criminal 
types, and fears about gender and sexual transgressions. It also served to shape definitions of 
citizenship and American identity, as well as to tighten the association between citizenship and 
the right of belonging in the nation.  As Daniel Kanstroom explains, “the modern deportation 
regime is also based on what has been called ‘citizenship as membership.’ This is the theory that 
citizens are fully members of United States’ constitutional community, whereas noncitizens are 
something less.” Deportation, I argue, is not only based on this idea, but is actively constitutive 
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of it, because it so clearly imposes a threat of non-membership, and the ever-present danger of 
being expelled from the national community.  
Deportation also brought together various strains of social examination, surveillance, and 
punishment which were uniquely prominent in this period.  In the early twentieth century, new 
social focus and study emerged on criminality and criminal types, deviant sexuality, mental 
illness, contagious disease, and dangerous political ideologies, all of which converged in 
discourse around deportation, and were intimately linked with debates around racial and ethnic 
traits, physical and mental superiority and inferiority, and eugenics.4 The spaces where the 
deportation dragnet fundamentally operated-- prisons, mental asylums, hospitals, juvenile 
reformatories—were all critical sites for the identification, surveillance, and punishment of 
individuals and communities within a hierarchy of racialized bodies. Deportation history, 
therefore, is uniquely revealing of how, supported by emerging “scientific” studies, local 
officials gained new powers of examination, regulation, and castigation of bodies deemed unfit 
within social hierarchies. During the decade, deportation became about more than excluding 
people at the borders. Instead, it was a process of sorting through bodies all around the interior 
and choosing which were a danger to the whole, requiring punishment through expulsion.   
This project expands upon the limited work on the actual practice of deportation: how 
local police authorities, political leaders, and INS employees identified deportable immigrants, 
raided their homes, workplaces, and community gathering spaces, and detained them, with 
                                                          
4 On the nature of exclusion politics and social scientific study in the early twentieth century, see Robert F. Zeidel, 
Immigrants, Progressives and Exclusion Politics: The Dillingham Commission, 1900-1927 (DeKalb: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 2006); Katherine Benton-Cohen, “Other Immigrants: Mexicans and the Dillingham 
Commission of 1907-1911,”Journal of American Ethnic History 30: 2 (Winter 2011); Lawrence H. Fuchs, 
“Immigration Reform in 1911 and 1981: The Role of Select Commissions,” Journal of American Ethnic History 3:1 
(Fall 1983); John Lund, “Boundaries of Restriction: The Dillingham Commission,” UVM History Review 6 (Dec., 
1994). 
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varying forms of treatment, legal access, and community support.  It particularly emphasizes 
how deportation was implemented in different localities and how local demographics, racial 
composition and prejudices, political motivations, labor realities, availability of funding, and 
social dynamics impacted the process of deportation.  Examined from these angles, deportation 
becomes a far more important subject than has been previously recognized.  Instead of an 
episodic tool of immigration policy at the national borders, deportation impacted the entirety of 
the nation’s heartland, and brought the process of determining inclusion and exclusion in the 
nation into towns, cities, farms, and labor camps across the interior of the country. 
One of the major interventions of this project is in questioning the dominant periodization 
of deportation, and highlighting the 1920s as a crucial period when processes of exclusion and 
American fitness and belonging were negotiated, not only through legislation, but in the streets, 
prisons, hospitals, institutions, and media discourse. While the scholarship on deportation has 
often presented it as a series of hysterical, episodic outbursts of repression, it was in fact a more 
continuous and perpetual process of social policing of the national body.5 This project focuses on 
the period between the commonly cited deportation episodes of the first red scare of 1919-1920 
and mass Mexican American repatriation in the 1930s.  In doing so, it illustrates what was 
behind the rapid yearly rise in deportees, from 2,762 in 1920 to 16,631 by 1930, a moment that 
has been noted as significant, but never explored fully.6 
                                                          
5 Some examples of the tendency to view deportation as a series of episodes, or “crisis” points, rather than as a 
continuous method of social definition and the negotiation of inclusion and exclusion include: Van Vleck, The 
Administrative Control of Aliens; Robert Murray, Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955); Nathaniel Hong, “The Origin of American Legislation to 
Exclude and Deport Aliens for their Political Beliefs, and its Initial Review by the Courts,” Journal of Ethnic 
Studies 18:2 (Summer 1990); William Preston, Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1922 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994). 
6 Jane Perry Clark, The Deportation of Aliens from the United States to Europe (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1931). 
11 
 
When I discuss this rise in deportations, I refer to a specific form of deportation which 
will be the focus of this project: removals which were effected after a particular immigrant had 
entered the country (not debarment at the border or port through which they entered), and which 
were enacted through official government warrant proceedings. This form of deportation was 
referred to as “deportations of aliens after entry” by the Immigration Service, and was enacted 
with increased frequency over the course of the decade.7 In part because of increased border 
security (including the creation of the Border Patrol in 1924) as well as the Quota Acts of 1921 
and 1924, which facilitated mass exclusion without intensive inspections, the Service shifted 
increasing attention to expelling “threats” which had already taken up residence in the country. 
In his 1924 annual report, W.W. Husband, the Commissioner General of Immigration explained 
that “The deportation of aliens found to be unlawfully in the United States is rapidly becoming 
one of the most important functions of the Immigration Service, and as the laws governing the 
admission of aliens become more restrictive in character the deportation problem becomes more 
difficult and exacting.”8 While this particular form of deportation expanded alongside, and in 
relation to a variety of forms of coercive or pressured departures, it remains a distinct subject. 
Much of the best and most thorough literature on deportation, such as Diedre Moloney’s 
National Insecurities, tends to obscure the distinctions between these forms of removals, and in 
doing so, assumes parallel motivations, processes, and discourses for removals at the point of 
entry and those after entry.9 Instead, I insist, the act of removing someone who has resided in the 
                                                          
7 Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1920). The Immigration Service also referred to this at times as “deportation of aliens under 
warrant,” because the practice required the issuance of an official warrant for deportation, and as “deportations 
(expulsions).” 
8 Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1924), 12. In the 1925 and 1926 annual reports the Commissioner echoed this sentiment nearly 
verbatim, and in 1927, stated “Ridding the country of undesirable aliens found to be unlawfully therein continues to 
be one of the most important functions of the Immigration Service.”  
9 Moloney, National Insecurities.  
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nation for a period of time (sometimes many years), is a critically different process than rejecting 
and removing someone at the moment of their attempted entry.  
Daniel Kanstroom explains the idea of social control deportation through his 
development of an important division between “extended border control,” which rejects 
immigrants at the border according to immigration restriction policies, and “post-entry social 
control deportation,” which he argues turned deportation from being an immigration policy to 
being a public policy of its own, with the opportunity for drawing lines of inclusion and 
exclusion along various agendas.10  While scholars such as Kanstroom and Ngai have skillfully 
demonstrated the ways in which deportation legislation was formative of social understandings 
of Americanism, desirability, belonging, and outsider status, there is still a need for further 
research on the ways in which this played out in on-the-ground practice and implementation over 
the course of the 1920s. Generally parallel policy guidelines existed for the exclusion and return 
of individuals at the point of entry and for the return of individuals who had resided in the 
country for some time, but this did not always produce parallel patterns of application.  
As this project navigates the various scales of space at which apprehended immigrants 
encountered governmental power and experienced their removals, it tackles a range of issues 
which were not part of the removal process for immigrants deported at the point of entry. 
Because the Immigration Service historically used the term “deportation” to refer to two discrete 
processes, it is particularly important to draw these distinctions clearly, while still remaining 
conscientious to how they existed in tandem in public policy, press, public understandings, as 
well as in the historical literature. For a father of American-born children who had been in the 
country for years before being removed as a criminal, or a woman who had worked in the 
                                                          
10 Kanstroom, Deportation Nation, 146. 
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country for months before becoming a public charge when seeking medical assistance, the 
experience of deportation was undoubtedly very different than that of an immigrant inspected 
and ultimately rejected at Ellis Island or the Mexican land border. This project is concerned with 
the experiences of the prior, and to the complicated paths their stories took, through varying 
levels of institutional, local, and national power, and across complex and often unclear global 
lines.  
 
Figure 1: Total Number of Individuals Deported from the United States by Year 
Year Deportations 
1920 2,762 
1921 4,517 
1922 4,345 
1923 3,661 
1924 6,409 
1925 9,495 
1926 10,904 
1927 12,055 
1928 11,625 
1929 12,908 
1930 16,631 
*Compiled from the Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920-1930). Note that this chart reflects only post-entry deportations 
enacted through official governmental warrant proceedings, and does not include debarment at the point of entry or 
additional exits through repatriation or voluntary departure.  
While it is rare for a decade to neatly bookend a distinctive period, in many ways the 
1920s were, in fact, a unique decade in terms of deportation. The immediate postwar period of 
1919-1920 reflected a distinctly different moment in terms of migrant control—one in which 
anti-radicalism and the suppression of labor organizing were tantamount in the minds of many, 
but also, just as importantly, when the United States was finally able to clear its institutions and 
detention centers of immigrants whose deportations had been impossible to carry out while the 
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war was in progress. Following that, and further diverging because of the passage of the 1921 
Immigration Act, the rest of the decade had its own distinct characteristics in terms of 
deportation, marked most clearly by systemization, institutional coordination, and the creation of 
a discrete infrastructure for post-entry expulsions. With the onset of the financial crisis and 
ensuing depression at the end of the decade, the nature of deportation practices shifted quickly, 
and a new, distinctive period of acceleration and transformation of the deportation regime began.  
The unique deportation state of the 1920s evolved at the intersection of a number of 
broader historical trends which enabled its growth, including new technologies of migrant 
documentation and international coordination, a growing global emphasis on controlling 
migration, and the legacy of an array of Progressive era institutional developments, studies, and 
efforts to alleviate the social problems posed by unmanaged migration.  As Elliot Young notes, 
this transformation was not unique to the United States, but was part of a global moment in 
which “the concept of alien became a formal bureaucratic status linked to increasingly complex 
immigration restrictions around the globe… Governments developed passports, visas, and 
residency certificates to track and control the movement of people across borders and within 
national territory.” Furthermore, he explains, the mere act of entering a nation without 
authorization and proper documentation “became a crime punishable by incarceration and 
possibly detention.”11 While these processes had begun as early as the late nineteenth century, it 
was only in the 1920s that they were fully systematized and centralized in regards to deportation 
practice in the United States.  
Although much scholarship on early deportation has focused on the congressional 
debates, court cases, and press coverage regarding deportations, in many ways, what set the 
                                                          
11 Elliot Young, Alien Nation: Chinese Migration in the Americas from the Coolie Era through World War II 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 271. 
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decade apart from practices that had come before was largely administrative and bureaucratic. 
With the growth of an effective enforcement apparatus, the deportation regime experienced 
unprecedented expansion. The Commissioner General of Immigration welcomed this new era 
eagerly in his 1920 report to the Secretary of Labor, in which he celebrated the fact that “during 
the past year the deportation work of the bureau has been systematized and coordinated by the 
organization of a deportation and transportation section.” This new unit, he explained, was 
headed up by Chief Inspector Leo B. Russell, and oversaw every part of the deportation process, 
“resulting in a marked degree of efficiency and economy.”12  In fact, he boasted, the “new 
system” not only coordinated transport of immigrants from their respective districts, but dealt 
with the securing of passport for return, and coordinated with the local institutions all around the 
nation in which migrants were a “burden” on the public.13 At the same time that he celebrated the 
transformative nature of the new system, he also articulated expansive and ambitious aspirations 
for what could be achieved under it. “Though a new service, it has already proved of great 
value,” the Commissioner explained, “and bids fair, as experience is gained, to produce 
practically a perfect system for the carrying out of the purposes for which it was established.”14 
While the complications, confusion, and steep learning curve in enforcing deportations that I 
illustrate throughout the following chapters will make the Commissioner’s goals of producing 
“practically a perfect system” seem laughable, it is important to take his claims seriously. At the 
onset of the decade, the chief authority over migration control triumphantly declared a radical 
new era in immigrant removal, and heralded the initiation of a new system for ensuring its 
growth. 
                                                          
12 Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration (1920), 11. 
13 Ibid, 12.  
14 Ibid, 11. 
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My project expands upon the work of scholars such as Kanstroom, who asks regarding 
deportation: “How should we understand this system?  Is it simply an instrument of immigration 
policy?” and responds “it is also a powerful tool of discretionary social control, a key feature of 
the national security state, and a most tangible component of the recurrent episodes of 
xenophobia that have bedeviled our nation of immigrants.  It is a mechanism of scapegoating, 
ostracism, family and community separation, and, of course, banishment.”15  The work of 
studying how that tool of discretionary social control has been wielded, and what impact it has 
had, particularly at local sites in the interior of the nation, still needs far more attention in order 
to create an understanding of how deeply this system has shaped American society. The exercise 
of social control throughout the nation has never been the sole prerogative of the national 
government, but instead, drew in a host of actors ranging from local neighborhood vigilantes, to 
hospital staff throughout the country, to matrons in detention centers, to international activists. 
To recognize this highlights the centrality of deportation, and how deeply the process of policing 
immigrant belonging reached into the heart of American society.  
Immigration scholar Mae Ngai asserts that “Deportation was not invented in the 1920s, 
but it was then that it came of age.”16  Her scholarship on the intersections of race, immigration 
policy, and deportation during the early twentieth century, along with that of others such as 
Kanstroom, Deidre Moloney, Torrie Hester, and Rachel Ida Buff, has begun to illuminate the 
importance of immigration restriction policy and practice in American society.  Among their 
most fruitful contributions has been an increasing awareness that the process by which certain 
bodies, groups, and racial categories have become marked as illegal, and have, in turn, shaped 
                                                          
15 Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History, 5. 
16 Mae Ngai, "The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United 
States, 1921-1965," Law and History Review 21:1 (2003): 72. 
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the way in which the nation understands itself, Americanism, and national belonging.  Ngai 
argues, “The illegal immigrant cannot be constituted without deportation—the possibility or 
threat of deportation, if not the fact.  The possibility derives from the actual existence of state 
machinery to apprehend and deport illegal aliens.”17 My work provides depth to this conclusion 
by demonstrating that not only the official state machinery of the INS determined this, but that it 
was a process negotiated and determined in local spaces around the nation, by authorities ranging 
from urban police officers, to local vigilantes informing on their neighbors, and globally, by 
consulates and shipping agents around the globe.  Its subject will not be the congressmen and 
senators who voted on changes in deportation laws, but instead will be those communities living 
under the threat that Ngai identifies.   
 One of this project’s most central interventions is reframing the periodization of 
deportation, which has so often entirely neglected the 1920s, or glossed over it as merely a 
transition point between episodes of crisis in immigration control. Instead, this decade, 
influenced by fervent appetite for deportation after World War I, which was often thwarted by 
the realities of deportation law, but also the capacity for its enforcement, was the moment at 
which the apparatus of the state for controlling immigrants was renegotiated. If one looks at 
nothing more than the train schedules for deportation “specials” going east and west across the 
nation for transport to the ports for removal abroad, it is possible to see the birth and evolution of 
a modern, streamlined, coordinated machinery for efficient expulsion. There was increasingly 
regularized contact between the Commission General of Immigration in Washington D.C. and 
dozens of sub-district offices all around the country, who in turn were expected to be in regular 
contact with all the local and state institutions of their districts. Together these changes reveal 
                                                          
17 Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton University Press, 
2005), 58.  
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that during the 1920s, deportation was one area where the state did in fact modernize, expand, 
and deepen its administrative reach, though in messy and inconsistent patterns. 
At the same time, the passage of the Quota Acts served to slowly change the discourse on 
immigration, as the “criminal alien” now became someone who had done nothing more than 
enter over quota, or without proper inspection. Once merely being a non-authorized resident in 
the nation was a deportable crime, and the protections and services of the state became more 
exclusively tied to national membership through citizenship, it is easier to understand how a 
discourse of immigrant “illegality” gained traction. The punitive nature of deportation, alongside 
its increasing visibility in the press, in raids of ethnic neighborhoods, in train depots, and in 
county jails, reshaped how the nation understood migration and the ever-present possibility of 
deportation. Because deportation law shifted to allow removal after more years of residence in 
the nation for certain crimes, it created a more expansive and elastic definition of the immigrant 
outsider, increasingly one whose perpetual precariousness rendered them unfit for inclusion in 
society. When combined with the actual apparatus for making congressional dictates a reality, 
this redefined the power of the state. While the deportations of the 1920s were rarely as 
sensationalized as those of 1919, and they lacked the sheer numbers of the 1930s (particularly 
when voluntary or coercive repatriation are considered), they represented a steep and steady 
trudge toward the modern deportation regime.  
While my project emphasizes the rise in deportations throughout the decade and 
interrogates the forces behind the rapid acceleration of removals, it also echoes the recent stress 
among historians on the rise of “deportability,” as well as of actual deportations. As Natalie 
Peutz and Nicholas De Genova explain in their edited collection on deportation, the goal of the 
state was to create the condition of “deportability” rather than deportation per se. By imposing a 
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shadow of precarity over the non-citizen population, the state effectively achieved many of the 
goals of deportation without actually having to expend the resources required for physical 
removals and cross-oceanic shipping. They explain, “the formulation and emphatic reaffirmation 
of state sovereignty itself,” is the greater stake of deportation.18 The socio-legal production of 
“deportable” people, they assert, actively serves to reify the divisions of nation states. Creating 
“deportable” people, scholars argue, has not only normalized the modern nation-state, but has 
also established various rights and privileges of the state as the exclusive purview of citizens. 
Walters introduces the additional assertion that deportation in this period not only becomes 
“nationalized,” by virtue of reinforcing the nation state, but in fact “socialized,” by its agenda of 
governing the welfare of the population through the removal of foreign labor during economic 
downturn.19 
Other scholars have explored how deportation, along with other forms of migration 
control led to the construction of “statelessness.” As Linda Kerber explains, this could take the 
form of either “the legally (de jure) stateless” and the “de facto stateless (those who lack 
effective nationality),” though these categories often blurred into one another. These categories 
include varied forms of denizens, from asylum seekers to undocumented migrants.  As 
deportability and other forms of precarious residence were solidified within the modern nation 
state, Kerber asserts, the age of imperial expansion presented a particular set of ambiguous 
spaces, which were notable for their “great potential for statelessness.” The territories of 
American empire in the early twentieth century, I argue in Chapter Two, were particularly 
striking examples of the ambiguity that Kerber identifies between “the national and the 
                                                          
18 Nicholas De Genova and Natalie Peutz, eds., The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of 
Movement (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).  
19 William Walters, “Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens,” in The Deportation Regime, 
eds. Peutz and De Genova.  
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international, between sovereignty and subjugation.” 20 As the U.S. expanded its boundaries, it 
felt the need to reinforce those boundaries against the racial threats posed by the peoples of its 
new possessions. One of the greatest protections lay in the possibility of deportability.  
In an expansive article on the historical trajectory of the “deportation terror,” Rachel Ida 
Buff provides one of the most succinct distillations of the deportation agenda, explaining, “Part 
of the business of maintaining a nation, then, is instilling terror in people potentially subject to 
forcible removal by the state.”21 This point, while remarkably basic, has only begun to be truly 
explored, and the ramifications of the capacity for removal for the development of the modern 
nation state have only begun to be outlined. Dorothee Schneider explains that deportation’s 
importance for the control of non-native populations is far more significant than previously 
recognized, and its practice was critical to the nation’s ability to present itself as a self-selecting 
population.  “After all,” she argues, “the state’s power to select whom it admitted was at the core 
of border control, as newcomers knew all too well.  But selective admission only worked if it 
was tied to mechanisms of rejection and deportation.”22  It is the on-the-ground implementation 
and utilization of these mechanisms in their formative years which concerns much of this project, 
particularly the search and establishment of a unified and coordinated machinery for effectively 
removing deportees once they had been selected for ejection.   
As William Walters, Daniel Kanstroom, Gerald Neumann, and others have asserted, 
deportation may have presented as a clearly national prerogative by the late twentieth century, 
but its origins as a practice of removing unwanted denizens emerged from outside the category 
                                                          
20 Linda Kerber, “Toward a History of Statelessness in America,” American Quarterly 57:3 (2005): 727-749. 
21 Rachel Ida Buff, “The Deportation Terror,” American Quarterly 60:3 (Sep. 2008): 523-551. 
22 Schneider, Crossing Borders: Migration and Citizenship in the Twentieth-Century United States, 113-114. 
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of the modern-nation state.23 Walters argues many historians “fail to appreciate that for many 
centuries the expulsion of people has played out not across spaces of states but rather within 
empires, out of parishes and cities, from estates and commons.” Indeed, he explains, what sets 
modern deportation apart starting in the late 19th century was the fact that it became both a 
“product of the state system and… one of a number of techniques for the ongoing management 
of a world population that is divided into states.”24 Deportation in practice, however, as I explore 
in Chapter One, reveals that the project of dividing the world into clearly demarcated states and 
just as importantly, identifying where individuals belonged within those demarcations, was still 
incomplete by the 1920s (and indeed, has arguably never been completed). As U.S. officials 
sought to consolidate and reinforce the edges of the nation through deportation by bringing the 
project of policing immigration into the interior, they built upon earlier traditions of removal.  
Deportation must be understood alongside other historical forms of forced migration, not 
least because that is how historical actors of the time made sense of this still-new variant of state 
control over individual mobility. In understanding the deportation drives against Sicilian 
immigrants in Chicago, it is telling that observers, deportees, and officials frequently made sense 
of these practices against the concurrent backdrop of exile as criminal punishment in Mussolini’s 
Italy. Furthermore, anti-deportation activists and critics of all political stripes employed 
comparisons to practices of banishment of dissenters in other nations, most commonly the Soviet 
Union or Fascist Italy. However, they were not alone in looking outward to understand the 
nation’s growing penchant for administrative removals. While preparing for escalated drives 
against foreign-born denizens, U.S. congressmen also debated the possibility of creating a 
                                                          
23 Gerald L. Neuman, “The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875),” Columbia Law Review 93:8 
(Dec., 1993): 1833-1901; William Walters, “Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens,” 
Citizenship Studies 6:3 (2002); and Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History. 
24 Walters, “Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens,” 275.  
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system of exile and removal of American-born citizens. Quite notably, these schemes were 
imagined to take place in some of the furthest outposts of the American empire, as Chapter 2 will 
examine. 
As scholarship on deportation has expanded in recent years, so too have studies of other 
forms of restricted mobility or forced migration, and historians have increasingly put deportation 
into conversation with topics such as involuntary labor and coercive guest-worker programs, 
forced statelessness, and indigenous displacement. Richard Bessel and Claudia Haake’s edited 
collection Removing Peoples: Forced Removal in the Modern World, published in 2009, makes 
the claim that the encompassing term “forced removal”, as opposed to traditionally used terms 
such as “expulsion, deportation, or forced migration” suggests “that these very same processes 
have often been shaped by actors and agents other than just the state.”25  Furthermore, they 
explain, the motivations for the involvement of non-state actors “often diverged significantly 
from those of governments,” and were also part of a discourse in which targets of removal were 
more than passive victims.26  The essays Bessel and Haake bring together highlight an important, 
and until recently, overlooked aspect of deportation scholarship—the fact that American 
deportation practice grew up in a global landscape of enhanced emphasis on the removal of 
undesirable peoples.  Across the globe, they point out, the modern world was marked by a rising 
concern with delineating the boundaries of the population through physical transportation of 
unwanted individuals and communities in its midst.27   
                                                          
25 Richard Bessel and Claudia B. Haake, “Introduction: Forced Removal in the Modern World,” in Removing 
Peoples: Forced Removal in the Modern World, eds. Richard Bessel and Claudia B. Haake (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009): 6. 
26 Ibid, 9.   
27 For more general discussion of the global rise of immigration control, see Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, 
Drawing the Global Colour Line (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2008); Wayne Cornelius, Philip L. 
Martin, and James F. Hollingfield, eds., Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994); and Aristide Zolberg, “Global Movements, Global Walls: Responses to Migration, 1885-
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Similarly, in explaining the basis for their collection, Exile and the Politics of Exclusion 
in the Americas, Luis Roniger, James N. Green and Pablo Yankelevich argue that “Societies 
construct various boundaries of membership and participation, build rules of inclusion and 
exclusion… these vary from society to society, and yet all human societies have created such 
boundaries, rules, and mechanisms to define themselves and organize interactions and 
institutions.”28  Ranging across the Western Hemisphere, these essays similarly stress that 
knowledge about state building through expulsion did not grow up in any single country alone, 
but was built simultaneously across the region in both similar and divergent ways. Importantly, 
Roniger, Green, and Yankelevich highlight the organization of “interactions and institutions,” 
and it is these processes that motivate my attention in Chapter 4 to the development of 
institutional networks and coordination to identify unwanted denizens. It was at the point of the 
institution, the nexus of contact between the state and the individual, that deportees were 
increasingly identified during this period. In doing so, the deportation state renegotiated the 
privileges of the state and its institutions to be tightly bound up with legal citizenship in new and 
critical ways.  
In Deportation Nation, one of the first full-scale treatments of American deportation 
history, Kanstroom interrogates modern definitions of deportation and puts the evolving practice 
in conversation with earlier forms of forced mobility within the United States, including the 
violent removal of Native Americans, and the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of 
movement of slaves and former slaves. Furthermore, he explores the relationship between the 
development of early deportation practice and the legacies of British poor law and practices of 
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controlling the mobility of paupers.29 Like Bessel and Haake, he undermines the category of the 
state actor as the only natural initiator of forced migration, and critically for this project, 
questions which state actors were most salient in enforcing migration at different points in U.S. 
history. By the 1920s, I argue, though the federal government had staked its claim as the arbiter 
of deportation policy, with several decades of legislative success to back it up, it remained 
incapable of wielding sole power over the actual application, and thus the impact, of the growing 
deportation machinery. 
Kanstroom’s work builds off of scholars like Gerald Neumann, who have illuminated 
early forms of migration control before the imposition of federal, congressional restriction 
legislation during the 1870s and 1880s. As Neumann points out, throughout what he calls the 
“lost century of American immigration law,” restrictions were generally not imposed by the 
federal government, but instead, a network of state based provisions for restricting entry and for 
expelling unwanted migrants (both from abroad, and in some instances, from other states of the 
nation) existed and evolved.30 While state and local governments no longer possessed the official 
capacity to set the deportation law after the advent of federal deportation legislation in the 1880s 
and 1890s, their power to set the agenda for who would be deported, what criteria they would be 
deported for, and when they would be deported remained immense. These local agendas, shaped 
at every level from state governors to city police forces, from prison and hospital superintendents 
to local organized, have been surprisingly sparse in the scholarship on deportation and form one 
of the most insistent departures of this project.  
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Recent scholarship on deportation has provided crucial attention to how the policing of 
national inclusion through migration control has served as a process of racial formation. In a 
myriad of overt and circuitous ways, immigration policy throughout the early twentieth century 
was motivated by the creation and enforcement of racial hierarchies and a contested national 
project of demographic control. “When people in the early twentieth century discussed 
immigration,” Natalia Molina explains, “they perceived races in hierarchies and they made their 
decisions about which groups to admit and which to restrict based on their past knowledge and 
experience with immigrants.”31 Furthermore, she argues, the weight of changing immigration 
policy reached beyond its actual passage, and even when laws did not get approved, they 
“shaped daily practices,” and perceptions of not only particular groups of immigrants, but the 
very nature of the relationship between the state and the non-citizen. However, she points out, 
while law and policy operated at the federal level, the process of racial formation through 
immigration control often were negotiated at the local level. Federal laws, she insists, were 
“implemented quite unevenly at the local level because of regional difference, such as labor 
needs, varying demographics, localized understandings of race, and proximity to the U.S.-
Mexico border. Thus to look just at major immigration landmarks or events only begins to 
scratch the surface of how the immigration regime shaped U.S. society.”32 By bringing the 
process of policing boundaries of immigrant belonging into the interior of the nation through 
post-entry removals, I argue, the deportation regime shaped U.S. society in related, but distinct 
ways from other forms of immigration control. 
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Deportation enforcement provides insight into how immigrant bodies were classed and 
racialized through the policing of entry and continued residence. The assessment “Likely to 
Become a Public Charge” was common, and, far from a neutral designation, this decision was 
racially fraught. Among other groups, Jewish immigrants were disproportionately excluded 
along these lines, with their bodies described as “weak”, “frail” “prematurely aged”, or 
displaying a “lack in physical and sexual development.”33 These bodily assessments were 
conflated with potential earning power and gender conformity and used as the grounds for 
demarcating boundaries around appropriate, potentially American bodies, and undesirable, 
foreign bodies. Impoverished, undernourished bodies from Southern and Eastern Europe were 
utilized as examples of the weakening of American stock, while Nordic and Anglo-Saxon bodies 
were often deemed too “well-built” or “wholesome in appearance” to be classed with the rest of 
the deportable menace and touted as evidence of the need for a more discretionary deportation 
policy for examining and filtering through immigrant bodies. Often, defenses of higher class 
immigrants under deportation proceedings focused on their backgrounds, breeding, “noble 
bearing” and fine bodies, and the disgrace of putting them in proximity with poor, diseased, and 
dangerously inferior immigrant bodies in detention. Even as it posed a potential tool for sorting 
immigrant bodies in accordance with hierarchies of racial acceptability, deportation also operated 
as some of the most racially heterogenous institutional spaces of the nation, and immigration 
officials were eager to impose order upon these spaces. 
 The policing of racialized migrant bodies through detention and deportation was not 
limited to considerations of bodily strength and potential for labor, but also found voice in a 
rising concern with immigration, ethnicity, and public health. During the early twentieth century, 
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as disease (both mental and physical) gained traction as a criterion for both exclusion and 
expulsion, health concerns often came to be coded as foreign, and the imagined menace of the 
unsanitary, infectious immigrant body loomed large for many. These fears and the subsequent 
persecution of immigrants were often locally specific to particular ethnic groups. As immigration 
officials sought justifications for their desired agendas of exclusion and removal, the category of 
“loathsome and contagious” diseases was frequently questioned and its flexibility and reach was 
tested and renegotiated.34 
Deirdre Moloney, in perhaps the most comprehensive monograph on the general 
transformation of deportation policy and practice throughout the early twentieth century has 
illustrated the tremendous rise over this period in the use of the “likely to become a public 
charge,” clause for not only border control at the point of entry, but also as a tactic for removing 
unwanted denizens long after their arrival in the nation.35 Moloney and other historians have 
emphasized the interrelationship between the rise of public dependency and the rise of 
deportations among women and entire families, and pointed out that dependency was used as an 
elastic provision to police the sexuality and independence of female migrants as well as to bar 
potentially non-productive immigrant bodies. Policing public dependency among women was 
more than an economic practicality for the state, it was also a critical tool for reifying the power 
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of the nuclear family, the male breadwinner, and the female dependent, as scholars such as Anna 
Igra have demonstrated.36 This process, Natalia Molina points out, was not only gendered, but 
also heavily racialized, and the flexibility of the category made it particularly powerful for 
controlling Mexican immigrants, who were not subject to numerical quotas, and thus were 
apprehended along other lines.37  This project will explore deportation both as a system of labor-
management on a broad supply scale, but also as a system for managing the laboring body. 
Individual states had exercised their own forms of immigration control since the colonial 
era, but it was not until the 1870s and 1880s that the United States consolidated its first federal 
immigration laws. The nation did so in line with accelerating and diversifying migration, as well 
as rising industrialization and increased global mobility of unskilled labor migrants. The 1875 
Page Act, the first exclusion law enacted by the federal government was designed as a labor 
control act, barring “alien convicts,” prostitutes, and “coolies.” In 1882, the federal government 
extended the excludable classes to include “any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to 
take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge,” as well as creating the first 
federal legal infrastructure for removing and returning undesirable migrants and banning most 
Chinese migrants. It should perhaps be noted at this point that in the early decades of the 20th 
century, the authority for immigrant removals was vested with the Secretary of Labor, and that it 
was not until 1940 that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (formerly the Bureau of 
Immigration) was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice rather than the 
Department of Labor. While and dramatic deportations of suspected radicals have had the most 
                                                          
36 Anna R. Igra. “Likely to Become a Public Charge: Deserted Women and the Family Law of the Poor in New York 
City, 1910-1936,” Journal of Women’s History 11:4 (2000): 59-81. See also Cybelle Fox, Three Worlds of Relief: 
Race, Immigration, and the American Welfare State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012) and Hidetaka Hirota, “’The Great Entrepot for Mendicants’: Foreign Poverty and 
Immigration Control in New York State to 1882,” Journal of American Ethnic History 33:2 (Winter 2014): 5-32. 
37 Natalia Molina, “Constructing Mexicans as Deportable Immigrants: Race, Disease, and the Meaning of ‘Public 
Charge,’” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 17:6 (2010): 641-666. 
29 
 
enduring grip on the public imagination of immigration control, it is important to recognize that 
its nature as a system and enforcement mechanism of labor control has been both more mundane 
and central to its operating logic, and perhaps, therefore, all the more menacing. While migration 
control and deportation have been critical to the determination of the nation for well over a 
century, their centrality to the reinforcement, endurance, and functioning of modern capitalism 
and the nation-state have received relatively little attention.   
By the 1890s, additional exclusions were added, including “paupers,” people suffering 
from “loathsome or dangerous contagious diseases,” polygamists, and “persons whose ticket had 
been paid for by another.” The inclusion of paupers, physically impaired, and those dependent on 
others for travel expenses reflects the abiding concern with the exclusion and removal of those 
who might become dependent on public welfare within the nation. The 1891 act also provided 
legal grounds for the removal or post-entry deportation of those who were “liable to become a 
public charge,” or had become public charges after their arrival. By 1903, additional classes 
included epileptics, the insane, professional beggars, anarchists, prostitutes and procurers, and in 
1907, the list grew again with the inclusion of “imbeciles,” “feeble-minded,” persons with 
tuberculosis, persons found mentally or physically defective, persons having committed a crime 
of moral turpitude, persons whose tickets had been paid for by a private organization or foreign 
government, and unaccompanied children. In other words, anyone deemed unfit to be a 
productive, compliant member of the burgeoning industrial workforce was unwelcome. 
Subsequent legislation during the 1910s and 1920s extended the period of time after entry within 
which deportation could be effected, creating an even more elastic and vulnerable migrant labor 
force.  
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As the periodic mass removals of Mexican-Americans during periods of economic 
downturn have demonstrated, deportation, as a tool in the arsenal of the state, provided an 
important state mechanism for ensuring the labor pool of the nation could contract and expand at 
will. This served both corporate interests by guaranteeing a cheap, but vulnerable labor force that 
faced removal if they spoke out or demanded higher wages, but also government interests by 
making sure that migrants could be removed when they became public charges, attempted to 
draw on government services or benefits, or became entangled with governmental institutions 
such as prisons or hospitals. Beginning in the early twentieth century, the federal government did 
not just wait patiently for deportees to be rounded up in mining towns, lumber camps, or 
agricultural fields when economic needs dictated. In fact, it actively reached out to local 
governments asking for lists of potentially deportable public charges that could be made ready 
for the next regularly scheduled deportation transport. Deportation has never merely been an 
enforcement arm of immigration restriction or extended border control. Instead, it has always 
maintained a more central function at the heart of regulating and maintaining the authority and 
smooth operation of the capitalist nation-state.38  
For many decades, deportation drew little attention in the general scholarship on 
immigration control in the early twentieth century, with one very notable exception: anti-
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radicalism and political deportations of communists, anarchists, and free speech activists. While 
political deportations were never, even at the height of the so-called “First Red Scare,” more than 
a small minority of total removals from the nation, they have had an enduring and highly 
disproportional representation in deportation scholarship until recently.39 Perhaps it is because 
few deportees make more heroic protagonists than activists fighting for their beliefs, or because 
the suppression of dissent through exile provides one of the most striking and obvious 
illustrations of a repressive state.40 However, the reality is far less sensational. Most deportees 
were not victims of free speech persecution captured in dramatic raids. They were men 
imprisoned in county jails for petty theft, children receiving treatment for illness in public 
hospitals, and women receiving public aid to keep their families fed.  
While particular rationales for deportation have drawn the greatest attention among 
scholars, it is important to remember that many potential deportees met a number of different 
criteria for removal. Rather than fitting into orderly boxes, deportees frequently blurred the lines 
between “criminals,” “public charges,” and “diseased” or “insane.” The case of one 1923 
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deportee returned to Canada for a variety of causes, including unlawful entry, likelihood to 
become a public charge, and arson, demonstrates the overlapping exclusionary criteria faced by 
unnaturalized immigrants throughout the country. The malleability and potential for 
discretionary pursuance of these deportees is notable in the immigration official’s comment in 
his case file that along with all of these other issues, “he is reported to bear a poor reputation in 
the place of his residence.”41 The year before, another deportee was sent to Canada for a 
combination of violations including unlawful entry, hospitalization for a chronic nose infection, 
and imprisonment for riding a freight train without paying fare.42 Another Canadian deportee 
around the same time met his fate due to unlawful entry, likelihood to become public charge, and 
bigamy (a major worry of immigration officials of the era, who were alarmed by already-married 
foreign-born men taking American wives after immigrating), reflecting another set of 
overlapping concerns about immigrant threats.43  
Within each of the major criteria for deportation, the precise guidelines remained 
expansive and flexible, and apprehensions reflected a wide range of interpretations of 
deportation law. One of the most visible arenas for this was in apprehensions and removals for 
crime.44 In a single set of INS files from 1923 and 1924, deportations for crime ranged from the 
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very serious: murder of one’s fiancée, manslaughter (described more specifically in the 
deportee’s file as “the crime of cutting to kill”), and attempted rape, to the far more mundane: 
“carrying burglary tools,” “the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses,” and receiving 
stolen property. More puzzling perhaps, is the range of crimes that fit under the highly elastic 
and easily manipulated category of “crimes of moral turpitude.” Within the same collection of 
cases, the crimes that fell under this deportation criterion included forgery, “taking an 
automobile without the consent of the owner,” larceny, and benefitting from the earnings of a 
prostitute. As the deportation state solidified its power, and imposed a looming reign of terror 
over immigrant populations, this capacious, ill-defined, and flexible criterion for deportation was 
one of the most important tools for creating a newly vulnerable and insecure immigrant 
population.  
While the category of “moral turpitude” was nebulous and encompassing, for many 
immigration authorities, it was particularly salient when dealing with threats in the form of non-
normative sexual behaviors and identities, including homosexuality and adultery.45 While 
scholars have fruitfully explored the effort to regulate prostitution through immigration control, 
there has been less exploration about how this effort intertwined with other forms of sexual 
exclusions and expulsions in creating a system of morality policing through deportation. 
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Immigration officials assessed and removed immigrants not only for prostitution, but for 
profiting off of prostitution, being supported by prostitution, and procuring an individual for 
prostitution or other “immoral” purposes. Beyond that, deportations were also enacted for 
pregnancy (which was often used to demonstrate that an unmarried woman would be unable to 
support herself financially and thus likely to become a public charge), bigamy, “gross 
indecency,” and the distribution of pornographic images. Through its most flexible and ill-
defined provisions, such as likely to become a public charge, “defective,” or crimes of moral 
turpitude, the immigration bureau was able to effectively police sexual behaviors and enforce a 
code of sexually normative behaviors as a condition of remaining in the country. As Moloney 
and others have explored, this was particularly harshly imposed upon women, whose sexual 
behaviors were guarded more closely, and even more harshly upon non-white women. Concerns 
about the sexual morality of female immigrants intersected with concerns over their economic 
roles in the new industrial economy,” Moloney explains, and “when immigrant women did not 
conform to such American social norms, they became highly vulnerable to exclusion or 
deportation proceedings.”46 
In fact, Marc Stein observes, “until recently, the fields of U.S. immigration history and 
U.S. queer history seemed content to ignore each other.”47 Stein focuses on later intersections 
between immigration and sexuality, but he notes that prior to legislation allowing for the 
deportation of aliens with “sexual deviations,” the “psychopathic personality” provision had been 
used to exclude homosexuals. However, most treatment of homosexuality and immigration 
control focuses on mid and late twentieth century practices of removal. One notable exception is 
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Margot Canaday’s Straight State, which addresses “perverse aliens” and immigration law in the 
first quarter of the century. Canaday explains how prior to an official category for 
homosexuality, immigration officials found flexible avenues for deporting those deemed 
“undesirable” on the basis of sexuality. “State authorities relied on the public charge provision to 
deport aliens who either committed perverse acts or had bodies that were considered perverse,” 
Canaday writes, and this category derived its efficacy, “in large measure, from the belief that 
sexual deviance and economic dependence were intertwined.”48 As Canaday explains, this 
provision and its elasticity allowed for policing sexuality in other ways under the veneer of 
controlling dependency, including “adultery, fornication, or prostitution.”49 
 
To explore all of these areas of deportation and begin to uncover its actual practice, rather 
than policy, this project relies on extensive archival research at a number of different sites, as 
well as research in digitized newspaper collections and government documents. Much of the 
material was gathered at the National Archives in Washington D.C., researching in the records of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Services, whose case files, correspondence, and extensive 
agency records allow for a greater understanding of the actual practice and pragmatics of 
deportation as they were negotiated by agents on the ground around the nation and through their 
interactions with local officials of all sorts, as well as into the experience and trajectory and 
reactions of deportees themselves. To expand the scope of the project beyond government 
holdings, I supplemented that material with organizational records at several sites. This included 
work in New York City researching at a variety of relevant archives, including the Tamiment 
Library, the New York Public Library, and the YIVO Institute, which include the records of a 
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range of relevant organizations, such as the American Committee for the Protection of the 
Foreign Born, International Labor Defense, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, and records of 
individual deportation lawyers and activists.  Exploring the various organizations and individuals 
who protested the growth of a stronger and more invasive deportation regime in the 1920s 
emphasizes the ways in which the government was not able to exercise its will without 
challenge, but was instead met by many forms of immigrant agency and activism and outside 
support.  These archives were critical to developing a greater understanding of how varied local 
and national organizations and communities converged in debates and discourse around 
deportation.  I also completed research at the Immigration Research History Center at University 
of Minnesota, whose collections include the Immigration and Refugee Services of America and 
Foreign Language Information Service records, which provide greater insight into the institutions 
and organizations outside of the INS which played a role in negotiating deportation.  Additional 
research has been completed at the records of the Immigrants Protective League in the Special 
Collections at UIC, and in local and national newspapers from the period, including foreign 
language press sources from immigrant communities.   
 In order to highlight the interlocking scales of space in which deportation was negotiated 
throughout the decade, this project is organized around the nesting levels of spaces at which 
deportation was enacted: global, national, local, institutional, and bodies in detention and transit. 
While deportation has primarily been told as a national story, and was, in fact, critical to the 
development and evolution of the modern nation-state, I argue that this process was shaped 
through a multitude of levels of experience. Examining these diverse spaces allows an 
understanding of how deportation reflects the observations of scholars such as Katherine Beckett 
and Naomi Murakawa who argue that the penal state has gone beyond criminal justice 
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institutions to become far “more legally hybrid and institutionally variegated.”50 In critical ways, 
the coordinated efforts to enforce and grow the deportation regime by officials in each of these 
spaces demonstrates that the punitive reach of the state toward its non-citizen residents expanded 
far beyond the explicitly carceral.  
The first chapter of the dissertation addresses the deportation from a global perspective, 
and examines the challenges faced by a nascent deportation regime seeking to create its imprint 
on a complex, messy landscape of migration. This chapter explores the networks of coordination 
and communication that the U.S. participated in to enact deportations, both formally and 
informally, the complex shifting borders and imperial landscape that U.S. officials struggled to 
make sense of while deporting, discourses of emulation and repudiation of other nations’ 
deportation practices, and the struggles to make sense of deportees whose trajectories did not fit 
simple migration patterns. While the U.S. immigration service aimed to use deportation to clarify 
and reinforce national border, they frequently discovered that their ability to determine and 
define their own population was constrained by forces outside of their control. As they 
endeavored to impose control over incoming and outgoing migrant bodies, and create neat, 
orderly categories of removal, officials increasingly faced a whole host of unimagined obstacles: 
individuals made nationless by war and redrawn borders; the frequent conflict between ethnicity 
and nationality, and the confusion over whose responsibility for deportees from imperial 
holdings around the world ought to be placed upon. Therefore, while deportation has been 
written about largely as a national and an abstract process, this chapter investigates how the 
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determination of the national body was profoundly impacted by more pragmatic and global 
considerations. 
Chapter Two, on deportation and the nation, addresses the various ways in which 
deportation served to both reinforce existing borders and to create boundaries and delineations of 
potential citizens and undesirable immigrants all over the interior of the nation. I also stress how 
deportation from sites of American empire was part of the national project of consolidation 
control and power over these contested spaces. While I argue that deportation was not only, nor 
even necessarily primarily, enacted or enforced at the national level, its impact for the nation 
certainly loomed large. Discussions of deportation prominently figured a thoroughly national 
imagination of what deportation could mean for the United States, and paradoxically, while I 
argue for looking outside the nation, I also insist that deportation was critical for the 
strengthening and expansion of the powers of the modern federal state.  
Furthermore, while the impetus to deport did not always emerge at the national level, the 
budget on which it relied did. Without congressional appropriations for the work of deportation, 
the expansion of its infrastructure would have been an impossibility. Thus, even as local 
immigration officials and institutional authorities vented their frustration at the federal Bureau 
and the Labor Department throughout the decade, they never ceased to beg for more 
appropriations to make that work possible. I also examine how the national shifts in deportation 
also reflected a shifting relationship between the state and business, and how deportation 
increasingly became utilized, and recognized, as a means for controlling the labor force more 
broadly.  The chapter goes on to explore another largely unstudied aspect of deportation 
practice—its ramifications in spaces of American empire, where the state-building through 
expulsion of deportation collided with a different, but intertwined project of state building.  I 
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insist on the importance of not reifying the category of the American nation as simple or clearly 
defined.  Instead, I emphasize how deportation from sites of American empire was part of the 
national project of consolidating control and power over these contested spaces. As the 
government expanded the boundaries of the nation, in uneven formations of colonial control and 
governance, they were forced to find ways to export and enact immigration control and national 
determination through expulsion within these imperial spaces. Thus, the ability to deport 
unwanted foreigners while also displacing native populations was part of the systemic violence 
enacted against imperial possessions as part of the state-building project of American empire. 
The third chapter, on the local level, traces deportation into the heartland of the nation, 
arguing that while the law was federal, the enforcement was intensely local. Examining how 
deportation was shaped by local political agendas, ethnic and racial biases, and labor issues will 
expand deportation beyond a process of selection at the edges of the nation, but one enacted by 
communities all over the country. The chapter begins with a more generalized discussion of the 
frequent tensions, collusions, and inquiries between local actors and the federal Immigration 
Bureau over deportation and deportability. It then analyzes the role of local vigilantes in creating 
an atmosphere of public, but localized, awareness of immigrant threats and the possibility of 
removal. In doing so, it examines how the state interacted with such local initiatives, how local 
actors determined the actual implementation of deportation law on the ground in their localities, 
and what factors were pertinent to this process in a variety of regions, from Arizona, to Utah, to 
Minnesota. One of the limitations presented by the scholarship on immigration control and 
deportation in particular is the tendency to collapse regional and municipal differences into 
generalized accounts of the nation. The second part of the chapter hones in on one locality in 
greater depth in order to provide a more thorough depiction of how local agendas and conflicts 
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shaped the realities of deportation enforcement. By looking at the deportation drives against 
Chicago’s Italian-American communities in 1926, I explore how a local police force, and 
overeager press, and an intensely local set of nativist concerns could serve as the driving forces 
behind expulsions. This section particularly examines the very local logistic concerns of policing 
immigration on the ground: identifying threats, raiding and apprehending deportees, arranging 
detention, assessing legal deportability, interacting with public perception, and ultimately, 
seeking and carrying out deportation warrants. 
The fourth chapter, on the institutional dimensions of deportation, explores the different 
spaces in which deportees were apprehended, surveilled, categorized, and studied, such as 
prisons, hospitals, juvenile reformatories, and asylums, and show how deportation was an 
important process for bringing together the agendas of these different institutions for social 
control and policing.  In this way, all of the developing institutions of modern American society 
in the early 20th century, from explicitly punitive institutions like jails and reformatories, to 
public welfare institutions like hospitals, were brought together as part of the carceral arm of the 
government-corporate deportation agenda. The steep increase in deportations demonstrates more 
than a fervent public sentiment against immigrants—it reflects the development of an 
unprecedented capacity to surveil, apprehend, and remove unwanted non-citizens.51 In spite of 
the emphasis on dramatic raids and violent repression of radicalism, most of deportation was 
about a far more pedestrian, and, I would argue, a more ominous, form of social control. This 
chapter traces the evolution of various rationales for deportation: crime, disease, mental illness or 
disability, and dependency, alongside the institutions that made their apprehension possible: 
prisons and reformatories, hospitals, asylums, and public welfare services. In the process, 
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examines how deportation brought diverse stains of social control into communication and 
coordination with one another and will explore how even the potentially benevolent or beneficial 
institutions of the state increasingly fit into the punitive function of the deportation regime.  
The final chapter centers on bodies in detention and transportation and descends to the 
level of individual experience. I discuss the practices which made deportation a logistic 
possibility, but also a pragmatic challenge which got worked out over the course of the decade—
long periods of detention, which put local and federal officials in conflict; long train journeys 
across the nation to get to the ports for removal, and the complications of eventual shipping to 
other nations. The chapter begins with an exploration of early detention practices. While 
immigrant detention has garnered considerable academic interest in more contemporary 
periods,52 and scholars have explored detention in the nation’s most prominent points of entry 
and exit (most notably, Ellis and Angel Island), there has been relatively little attention to 
detention practices and conditions elsewhere in the nation in the early twentieth century.53 
Detention in the 1920s, in fact, was no single set of practices and federally mandated procedures, 
but a haphazard assemblage of local solutions to the seemingly insurmountable challenge of 
                                                          
52 For literature on contemporary immigration detention practices and the creation of the modern deportation-prison 
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History, Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Renee Feltz and Stokely Baksh, “Business of 
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Situating Immigrant Justice and Carcerality in the 21st Century,” Social Justice 36:2 (2009-10). 
53 For scholarship on Angel Island, see Erika Lee and Judy Yung, Angel Island: Immigrant Gateway to America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Robert Eric Barde, Immigration at the Golden Gate: Passenger Ships, 
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keeping up with the appetite for removals. Throughout the decade, authorities worked toward 
establishing an infrastructure that could house the growing number of immigrant detainees (far 
greater number than the deportation statistics reveal), but the project proved daunting and the 
source of major conflict. 
The rest of the chapter focuses on deportation trains and the logistics of moving detainees 
to the ports and borders for removal. Although transportation is rarely discussed in the 
scholarship, deportation, at root, is the process of putting immigrant bodies in transnational 
motion. This project addresses the complexity and contestation of the physical act of transporting 
deportees, revealing much about scales of local and national authority, prioritization of threats, 
budgetary concerns and legal restrictions. Once an individual was deemed deportable, officials 
needed a practical plan for moving them to the country’s border and beyond. This necessitated 
complex deportation parties of trains traversing the nation’s dozens of immigration stations and 
gathering deportees for travel to the appropriate coast for reshipping. These trains, roaming the 
country for weeks, picking up immigrants of varied nationalities and locking them into specially 
designed inescapable cars, were themselves a site of exposure to America. Furthermore, 
immigrant bodies came under new forms of surveillance and public gaze, as deportation trains 
passing through towns became a form of public spectacle, with locals gathering to gawk at the 
expelled immigrants. 
 Together, these chapters explore the expansion of the deportation regime throughout the 
period, and illuminate the layered levels of authority which were asserted upon each individual 
ensnared by the deportation machinery of the state.  In doing so, I address the evolving 
relationship between migration control, the policing of mobility, and the rise of the modern 
bureaucratic nation-state. Even as deportees were immobilized by the government at the point of 
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detention, coordination and communication was occurring at each level of space to ensure the 
reversibility of their migration into the United States. Throughout these chapters and the spaces 
they represent, I will illustrate what was behind the immense rise in deportations over the course 
of the decade, and, in doing so, demonstrate how that rise in deportations shaped American 
society, relations between the state and its residents, and the perception of immigrant belonging 
within the nation.  
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Chapter 1- National Expulsions in a Transnational World: The Global Dimensions of American 
Deportation Policy 
 
 
A 1925 Nation article entitled “Italy’s Idea of Housecleaning” discussed political 
expulsions and Mussolini’s exile of criminals from the nation and criticized the widespread 
persecution and political oppression of dissenters.54  Meanwhile, right at home in the United 
States, government officials were embarking on their own housekeeping mission, which was 
frequently compared to such projects abroad.  By the following year, not only would local press 
argue in the midst of a deportation drive in Chicago that Mussolini’s tactics of exiling unwanted 
residents ought to be lauded and emulated for the safety of the worthy citizens of Chicago, but, 
in fact, the exact same language of “housekeeping” would be used to describe raids against 
Italian immigrants in Chicago.55  Looking across the ocean for a model of how to create social 
stability through exile of criminals, the author went on to proclaim of the Italian case that “the 
task of completely cleaning them up is nearly at an end… when the opposition was wrecked and 
Premier Mussolini could laugh at his rivals, the task was again undertaken,” and argued that the 
immigration authorities in Chicago stood to learn from such practices.56 
Deportation has been largely understood as the process of a single nation-state asserting 
and enforcing its borders through the expulsion of “undesirable” non-citizens. But as the 
example above shows, during the 1920s, as beyond, it was never executed without one eye 
looking outward. The policy enacted in this period, which provided a foundation for the rest of 
the twentieth century, was shaped not in national isolation, but within global networks of 
communication on immigration restriction, with the collaboration of officials stationed around 
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56 Ibid. 
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the world, and with a fundamentally global imagination. Those responsible for turning 
deportation law into a reality during the 1920s and early 1930s both repudiated the practices of 
some nations and aspired to those of others. At the same time, they struggled to identify, 
document, and enforce the national belonging of immigrants who were often thoroughly 
transnational individuals whose lives, families, and experiences could not be compartmentalized 
into any single nation. The nascent deportation regime faced severe criticism, which was framed 
in a language of internationalism. As the U.S. government sought to enforce its political will and 
police its own borders, it gradually became clear that it could not accomplish this merely by 
stationing guards at the ports and patrolmen on the border—it would be required to send officials 
abroad, coordinate with foreign governments, and communicate with a wide range of global 
actors. Furthermore, the U.S. discovered, it would not be able to enact its laws as they were 
written on paper; it would have to develop coping mechanisms of flexibility and discretion to 
deal with the untidy global realities outside their borders. 
As with this project as a whole, this chapter delineates the wide and critical divergence 
between deportation as policy, and deportation as practice.  Deportation as a plan on paper 
already bore the imprint of a broader global reality, if only in the obvious fact that deportation 
might have begun in the United States, but it required a receiving nation to be completed.  
However, deportation in its implementation was a much more complex terrain of transnational 
actors, discourses and politics.  Congressional figures, though undoubtedly informed by global 
conversations and the development of parallel legislation abroad, have been the most noted, and 
also the most unambiguously national, figures in most scholarship on deportation.57 However, a 
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multiplicity of other actors, both state and non-governmental, were undeniably shaped by their 
era of great migration and emerging networks of communication and debate.  A wide range of 
factors shaped the actual implementation of deportation as profoundly as legal outlines ever 
could. These factors included, among many others, foreign citizens who turned in neighbors as 
previously deported individuals abroad in order to prevent their return to the U.S., the 
governments denying passage of deportees through their borders, the weather patterns in Latvia 
and Esthonia preventing deportation for many months of the year, the non-governmental 
organizations conducting extensive public opinion campaigns spanning many nations, and the 
deportees themselves, with their complicated, non-linear, transnational lives 
Because accounts of deportation are so often studies of national policy, they have tended 
to overemphasize federal power and to characterize deportation as a process which is determined 
solely within the borders of a single country.58  The practice of deportation in the early twentieth 
century, however, presents a much more complex set of decision-making authorities, practical 
considerations, and ideological frameworks for expulsion.  Because deportation is about placing 
constraints around who can belong and remain within a nation’s borders, it has been easy for 
historians to assume that the process of marking out those constraints has been predominantly a 
national one. This chapter complicates that assumption and reveals the ways in which the global 
                                                          
international nature of deportation laws, but stays so concretely within the framework of federal state actors and their 
policy development that she neglects the wide range of formal and informal global discourses touched upon in 
deportation practice. While Deirdre Moloney’s National Insecurities makes the broadest claim to placing U.S. 
deportation policy within a global context, she often relies simply on comparing developments in U.S. immigration 
policy to parallel developments in settler nations around the world. 
58Mae Ngai provides a compelling presentation of transnational border relations and deportation policy with Mexico 
and Canada, arguing that deportation drew on racial knowledge and imaginations about national communities.  While 
she makes critical claims about the development of deportation policy in the American borderlands region, and argues 
that “Immigration restriction was part of a new global age. World War I marked the consolidation of the international 
nation-state system, based on Westphalian sovereignty, hardened borders, state citizenship, and passport controls,” her 
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often unsuccessful such efforts to manage the international nation-state system through immigration restriction were. 
See Mae M. Ngai, “The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the 
United States, 1921-1965,” Law and History Review 21:1 (Spring 2003). 
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context, by way of policy and legislation, exchange of ideas, transnational individuals, 
communities, and organizations, and the shifting imperial landscape, was crucial in determining 
the operation of America’s nascent deportation regime.   
While immigration might seem to be among the most transnationally shaped aspects of 
American history, scholars of the subject have been slow to embrace the possibilities for 
examining the networks of communication, contact, and political engagement which have shaped 
its trajectory. As late as 1990, Robert Tucker argued that “the dogma that the regulation of 
immigration was solely the prerogative of the sovereign state went unquestioned. In 
consequence, the tradition of unilateralism with respect to immigration was if anything, even 
more pronounced than it was in U.S. foreign policy generally.” Indeed, he claimed, this remained 
true throughout American history up until the 1960s, an assertion that this chapter seeks to 
undermine with an exploration of how global immigration policy and its implementation were 
from at least the late nineteenth century.59 In recent years, there has been a growth of scholarship 
engaging with the realities of migration as a complex and multi-directional process, focusing on 
subjects such as return migration, the global economy of remittances, and cultural continuity and 
hybridization across nations. Additionally, there has been an increased interest in the relationship 
between foreign policy and the ostensibly, though not truly, domestic policy of immigration.60     
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One of the most important developments in migration history for the understanding the 
global aspect of deportation history has been scholarship on the development of passports and 
other forms of institutionalized record keeping on the movement of individuals across global 
spaces.  At a very basic level, deportation is about the physical transportation of a migrant from 
the state of his or her current residence to another state, most commonly that of his or her 
birthplace or nation of citizenship. While exile and other forms of forced removal have existed 
for centuries, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century represented an important departure 
in states’ abilities to track the movements of individuals, and to record and trace their legal status 
from nation to nation. Scholars in recent decades have emphasized the rise of the passport system 
as an important marker in the rise of transnational deportations, and argued that the new capacity 
for tracking, surveillance, and documentation led to an unprecedented use of exclusion to 
construct the desired population of the national body.   
Daniel Turack explains that while it is commonly accepted that a state has the “right to 
expel aliens through deportation”, this process, which may seem like a “unilateral act” because 
the power to deport is in the hands of a single state, is actually a much more international 
quandary.  Stating the obvious, but remarkably overlooked, Turack explains, “Of consequence, 
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the deportee has to be deported somewhere… In any case, the consent of the country to which 
the deportee is to be sent must be obtained before the act of deportation can be consummated.”61 
This emphasis on the point at which deportation is consummated, rather than just decided upon, 
is notably absent in most scholarship on American deportation.  Too often, scholars of 
immigration restriction and deportation have focused almost exclusively on the process within 
the United States, therefore reifying the state’s presentation of itself as an all-powerful 
determiner of who may remain in its borders.62 This chapter will detail how immigration 
authorities grappled with the sometimes insurmountable challenges of actually placing 
immigrants in other states after determining they were unwanted within the borders of the U.S. 
Another recent development in the scholarship on deportation has been the shift towards 
placing it within a globally comparative framework of various kinds of forced removal or exiles.  
Richard Bessel and Claudia Haake make the claim that the encompassing term “forced removal”, 
as opposed to traditionally used terms such as “expulsion, deportation, or forced migration” 
suggests “that these very same processes have often been shaped by actors and agents other than 
just the state.”63  Furthermore, they explain, the motivations for the involvement of non-state 
actors “often diverged significantly from those of governments,” and were also part of a 
discourse in which targets of removal were more than passive victims.64  The essays highlight an 
important, and often overlooked aspect of deportation—across the globe, the modern world was 
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marked by a rising concern with delineating the boundaries of the population through physical 
transportation of unwanted individuals and communities in its midst.65   
While such works represent an important departure from the tendency to see American 
practices of exclusion and exile within a national vacuum, they continue to focus largely on a 
comparative level of analysis.  This chapter seeks to do more than just compare American 
deportation practices with those in other nations.  At every level from public opinion to federal 
law, American deportation practice was the product of an already global world.  It reflected 
global labor migration patterns, an expansive and growing international system of documentation 
and tracking, and contentions around state sovereignty and national borders. I assert that 
deportation practice in the United States was a collaborative process between government 
authorities, a wide range of non-state actors, including the press, independent commissions and 
researchers, political activists, and potential deportees themselves and their immigrant 
communities. At each of these levels, not only were these individuals and groups acting in ways 
that ran parallel to other nation’s actions, they were acting with an eye upon them, defining their 
own actions in terms of them, and shaping their discourses around the realities of the world 
outside American borders.  From the intense and unexplored set of global realities which 
constrained the early enforcement of newly stringent deportation laws, to the powerful outward-
looking language of anti-deportation protestors, to the complex, transnational lives of immigrants 
themselves, deportation, in practice even more than in its explicit legal conception, was a 
massively global undertaking in the early twentieth century.  
It is a misrepresentation of deportation to think of it as a process that is primarily or 
exclusively rooted in the creation of stronger American borders, and the implementation of 
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American political will regarding who could belong within the national body.  While the rise of 
deportation during this period certainly represented a renewed desire to cordon off the 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion along lines of race, class, sexuality, political orientation, 
and morality, this goal had to be effected in a global reality in which American authority was 
internationally challenged and redirected.  Even as American officials, ideologues, business 
interests, and nativist organizations pushed for more expansive deportation laws aimed at 
creating their idealized American populace, their goals repeatedly fell short because of global 
constraints. Sometimes, this inability to control deportation was rooted in something as basic as 
not being able to acquire a passport from the receiving nation for the deportee to be sent back. 
Other times, the difficulty rotated around confusion in even identifying the nation of origin of the 
immigrant or family in question.  Transportation was another complication, and authorities faced 
the reality that even if a nation agreed to receive deportees, it was not always possible to effect 
their deportation because of the nations they would have to cross through en route to their 
ultimate destination. While the American immigration service stubbornly continued to imagine 
migrants as national subjects, they continued to be plagued by the realities of migrants as 
thoroughly transnational individuals and communities in a global world.   
 However, the global ramifications of deportation in this period were not only apparent in the 
practical struggles over how to enforce new policies. They also captured the imagination of the 
American public, immigrant families and communities, and activists of all sorts, who understood 
deportation within its broader global context. While such advocates and commentators 
recognized that deportation was about expulsion from the nation’s boundaries, they were also 
aware and concerned with what happened to potential deportees beyond the borders, and much 
of their discourse rotated around the fate of deportees after leaving the United States. Examining 
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the challenges faced by the global application of national laws, as well as the debates and 
discussions around the broader context of deportation undermines traditional depictions of 
American deportation as a nationally determined and enforced policy.  In exploring these 
complications, this chapter demonstrates the insufficiency of a national narrative in which the 
American government believed itself to be the sole and all-powerful arbiter of its own 
immigration policy, and reveal how heavily constrained by global realities this policy has always 
been.   
 This chapter, along with the project as a whole, will contest and challenge the category of 
the nation as the proper and only scale at which to examine the practice of deportation.  Looking 
at the various ways in which the United States was constrained, inspired, contested, and 
communicated with other nations in the process of enacting new deportation legislation reveals 
how deeply deportation reflected America’s striving to map its power onto the rest of the world, 
and how imperfectly this goal was realized.  I begin by tracing the complicated global landscape 
in which Americans struggled with the fact that deportees had to be sent somewhere.  Because of 
this, officials encountered unexpected, confounding, and often embarrassing cases in which they 
either could not determine the proper nation to send an individual, or, for a wide variety of 
reasons, they could not get the international cooperation required to turn their will into action.  
Beyond a practical challenge, however, I go on to explain that the global element of 
deportation was also about self-definition and national imagination.  Though seeking to define 
and delineate their own borders through deportation, Americans could only understand their 
actions as a deporting nation through frequent engagement with a language of foreignness—and 
the most powerful discourse used to denounce deportations was that it resembled foreign regimes 
and tyrannies. Furthermore, deportation was also a way of informally enacting foreign policy 
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through discretionary implementation of national law. Facing complaints that deportation acted 
as a danger, or even a death sentence, officials and the public weighed such claims for reprieve 
differentially based on whether the supposed danger came from fascist nations they faced with 
ambivalence, socialist regimes which they sought to discredit, or imperialist states whose 
interests they shared. Early deportation historian Jane Perry Clark wrote in 1931 that while “the 
power of the United States in deportation cases cannot legally extend across the seas,” there were 
still “serious questions of policy… on humanitarian grounds.” In fact, she explains, the U.S. was 
in “grave danger” of using deportation as a sort of “back-handed extradition process” which 
operated outside of the law regarding political extradition.66 While deportation was ostensibly 
about removing people considered dangerous to national purity and security, this vision of 
controlling what was within the nation was both a reaction to an increasingly global world, and a 
grasping attempt to maintain authority over the boundaries of the nation.  In this attempt, 
deportation officials ran up against other nations’ security concerns about returning national 
subjects (many of whom had tenuous ties to their “homeland”), about transports of deportees 
crossing their borders, and about deportation's potential use for abdicating national responsibility 
for dangerous or burdensome individuals.  
 
Delineating Belonging, Enforcing Policy: The Challenges of Transnational Subjects and the 
Limitations of American Political Will 
 
One of the many challenges of enforcing deportation in the early twentieth century was the 
geopolitical reality of a rapidly shifting world in which national borders were unclear, 
permeable, and often impermanent.  Determining which individuals could be expelled from 
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America’s borders required determining where those individuals belonged, often a formidable 
feat.  As the United States sought to reiterate its borders and their exclusivity through 
deportation, they repeatedly ran up against immigrants whose national origin were impossible to 
pinpoint. Some migrants either refused to share their residence history with immigration 
officials, lacked sufficient knowledge of their origins, or hailed from nations who refused to 
issue passports for deportees to be returned. In other instances, individuals, particularly those of 
European heritage, protested against efforts to deport them to their nation of ethnic origin, 
instead of to their nation of prior residence (often in Latin America) in order to avoid return to an 
unfamiliar or hostile nation. 
At other times, immigrants pleaded for special permission to be sent to join family in other 
nations, or begged for political asylum outside their nation of birth. In the 1923 Board of Review 
report for Andrew Mazzone, who was under deportation proceedings after a three-year 
imprisonment for grand larceny, the layers of global negotiation were clearly visible.  Mazzone, 
who had been born in France, claimed to immigration officials that he held Italian citizenship by 
virtue of his father, who had never renounced Italian citizenship in spite of moving to France as a 
child. However, when faced with deportation, Mazzone introduced an entirely new wrinkle for 
authorities to grapple with when he requested special permission to be sent to Brazil, where his 
wife resided. Ultimately, unable to prove Italian citizenship and unwilling to deport according to 
the immigrant’s own choice, officials sent Mazzone back to France, although they allowed him 
to reship as a foreign seaman in order to save the immigration service money and expedite the 
process of removal.67  
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In other cases, multigenerational families of labor migrants struggled for the right to be 
deported together despite the fact that members of the different generations had been born in 
entirely different countries as the family traveled across the globe for work opportunities. The 
1922 case of a family arriving from Honduras reflected the complex paths taken by many 
migrants, and revealed the deep confusion about the application of quotas. They were a “rather 
high class family of Russians,” made up of adults who had been naturalized as citizens of 
Australia, and two minor children born in Australia, before selling their property there and 
moving to Tegucigalpa for the opportunity to settle on free land. After deciding the U.S. would 
be “a more satisfactory country to live in,” they attempted to migrate, with $7,500 and a plan to 
buy and operate a dairy farm. However, in spite of the officials’ note that “the aliens are far 
above the average European immigrant in point of education, native intelligence and general 
appearance and bearing,” they ultimately departed voluntarily to Honduras rather than appeal the 
deportation order.68 While the grandparents, Alexandria and Nicolas Illin, and their son Romelio 
were considered eligible under the Russia quota (immigration officials made note that while 
Romelio was born in Siberia, unlike his parents, this fell under the same categorization within 
the Act), which was not yet exhausted for the year, Romelio’s niece Nellie McKay and nephew 
Hector McKay had been born in Australia and the hearing board thus ruled that they should have 
been initially excluded. This was in spite of a testimonial from the Sergeant of Police at 
Atherton, Australia, vowing that the family had excellent character, and “take no active part in 
any political matter, but they are very antagonistic to Bolshevik ideas.”69 The family’s case was 
further complicated by the fact that the children’s parents were residing in Colombia with their 
two younger children. While the case of the Illin family is unusually complex, it demonstrates 
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the deep challenges that immigration officials met with in attempting to effectuate deportations 
during a period of great mobility.  
The insufficiency of national policy was often a frustration, or even an embarrassment as 
officials regularly discovered they could not make sense of where individuals fit into geopolitical 
boundaries, and therefore struggled to administer their expulsion from the United States. For 
instance, immigration authorities debated during this period how to make sense of immigrants 
from imperial sites such as Rhodes, in which case officials questioned whether immigrants 
should be considered part of the quota for Italy or as part of “Other Asia”.  In 1921, the Assistant 
Secretary of Labor turned to the Secretary of State for assistance in sorting out the matter, 
explaining that while “several aliens claiming birth at Rhodes and carrying Italian passports,” 
had demanded that they be allowed in under the Italian quota, the Department of Labor believed 
that Rhodes had not been definitely transferred to Italy under the Act of May 19, 1921, therefore 
“the classification of the island as a part of Other Asia is correct.”70 Facing a deportee from Zara, 
officials pondered the unconsidered question of how to handle expulsion from the city, which 
had gone from Dalmatian to Italian jurisdiction in 1920.  However, as officials realized, the 
situation was even more complex, as immigrants from the District of Zara outside of the City of 
Zara actually fell under Jugoslavian jurisdiction. 71  
These confusing cases were far from isolated outliers, but were indicative of a fundamentally 
flawed deportation system unequipped to handle a world where war and empire caused such 
rapid shifting of borders and control.  More fundamentally, this system rested on flawed 
expectations about identifying legible national identity, and controlling people’s movements 
within clearly bounded nation-states. As the United States attempted to impose simple 
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definitions of citizenship (often relying on the incorrect assumption that other nations adhered to 
the same system of birthright citizenship as the U.S.), national identity, and ethnic belonging, 
they repeatedly ran up against cases which proved just how indecipherable national belonging 
could be. 
Sometimes action was blocked by an immigrant’s refusal or inability to provide the 
necessary personal history. In the 1926 case of Eushebio Jimenez, in custody at Sing-Sing, the 
Immigrant Inspector from Ellis Island complained that the immigrant was unable to give any 
information about his date or place of birth, and had no known relatives or visitors to give 
information. All they could determine, he explained, was that according to the immigrant’s own 
testimony, “when 6 years of age, following the death of his parents, he was taken to Cuba by his 
uncle, who has since disappeared, and for this reason the alien is unable to state precisely the 
name of the locality where he was born.” 72 Even in a new age of documentation, the debates 
over belonging continued to be messy, complex, and dependent on individual disclosure, multi-
step processes of migration, and unclear determinations of origins. As Turack has explained of 
the constraints upon state power to deport, both the individual deportee, and the potential 
receiving state could thwart efforts at expulsion.  He posits that “states may intentionally 
frustrate the deportation through deliberate procrastination.  If the deportee refuses to render 
sufficient information regarding his nationality, he can cause the deportation to be delayed 
indefinitely.  The inability of a state to secure a passport to effect a deportation order against a 
stateless person might result in complete frustration of the deportation.”73 
In other cases, it was not the movement of migrants which complicated their legal status, but 
the movement of nations-- or at least their borders. Particularly in the post-WWI period, 
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immigration agents often encountered migrants from nations which no longer existed in their 
pre-war form, or whose borders had been significantly shifted by the outcome of the war. For 
instance, those from certain cities, such as Danzig, faced a home which as of 1920 was no longer 
part of Germany, but instead an independent quasi-state under the leadership of the League of 
Nations with mostly Polish controlled external affairs. While deportation scholarship largely 
leaves the category of the nation-state as an unchallenged and unchanging entity, the turbulent 
reality of the early twentieth century demonstrated how little control the United States had over 
determining citizenship and national belonging of individuals from other parts of the globe. 
One of the most striking examples of how geopolitical instability during the post-WWI 
period impacted the enforcement of American deportation law resulted from the movement of 
the Curzon line, which served as the post-war boundary between the Second Republic of Poland 
and Soviet Russia. As the dividing lines between nation states shifted, American officials 
fumbled to deport immigrants who fell under the confusing status of no longer belonging to the 
nation state in which they had been born. In other cases, immigration officials found they could 
not return Turkish-born, ethnic Greeks to Turkey because “Turkey will not issue passports to its 
citizens of Greek race to return there,” leaving such deportees at the mercy of the INS for 
removal to Greece (for many, an entirely unfamiliar homeland) instead.74  
Not infrequently, after the upheaval of Europe during the war, deported migrants faced 
returning to an unfamiliar homeland with a new language, a government hostile to their political 
orientation, and an unknown social and political environment. The seemingly simple category of 
nation of origin became blurrier at times, and called into question the meaning of “home” for 
immigrants in a tumultuous world order. Did it mean birthplace, regardless of what nation that 
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place was now officially part of? Did it mean the nationality one was born into, even if that 
nation no longer encompassed the location of birth?  
In the 1922 case of Jacob Wolwelski, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) was 
contacted by the Baltic America shipping line for help in deciphering proper action in the 
individual’s case. They explained that after arriving in the United States, Wolwelski was 
excluded by Ellis Island authorities and deported on the S.S. Lituania, but upon his departure, 
they discovered that “the passenger was erroneously deported, he having been born east of the 
Curzon line.”75 A letter from the Ellis Island representative of HIAS explained that as a native of 
Yanowa, in the county of Kobrin, Wolowelksi, aged 27, actually should have been admitted 
under the Russian quota, in spite of the fact that the territory he came from was now claimed by 
Poland. Indeed, they explained, “this alien had little opportunity to have his rights properly 
defended… we strongly feel that every effort should be made to have authority obtained that this 
alien should be returned to the United States.”76 HIAS, a transnational organization, advocating 
for migrants on both sides of the Atlantic, pressured the American government to come to terms, 
and adjust its policy as necessary, with the rapidly shifting global terrain onto which they sought 
to execute deportation orders. Such global shifts, so completely out of the hands of American 
officials, were often at the heart of the most successful efforts to fight deportation, and were a 
serious constraint on the ability of the government to enforce its will in selecting the population 
allowed to stay within the United States.   
Even where officials were able to successfully ascertain the national origin of an individual, 
they were not automatically able to transport that person, even in the not infrequent instances 
where the individual was willing and volunteering to go, in order to escape the prospect of 
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indefinite detention in the United States. For instance, officials found themselves thwarted in 
some instances to deport to Norway, after discovering that “the Norwegian Government holds 
that a citizen who has been absent from Norway more than ten years forfeits his citizenship and 
deportation could doubtless not be effected.”77 The challenges of passport procurement were 
most notable with the Soviet Union during this period, because of the lack of diplomatic relations 
between the nations in this period. In 1923, authorities responded to an inquiry by Judge Samuel 
H. Sibley, explaining that the unfortunate delays in deporting immigrants were due to the lack of 
passports.  It was difficult to establish proof of citizenship, the official explained, and that 
because there is no treaty between the Soviet and American governments and “As a result, 
neither country issues passports for its nationals to travel to the other. Rare exceptions are made. 
Quite often, the Russian Soviet Government issues passports for deportees, upon showing that 
such deportee is an adherent of the Soviet Government and in harmony with its principles.”78 
While small numbers of Russians were deported to the Soviet Union throughout the decade, and 
others were allowed to voluntarily depart for other sites outside of the United States, most 
Russian citizens (including those from other Soviet-controlled regions) were essentially 
undeportable.  
However, while officially the lack of diplomatic relations precluded deportations to the 
Soviet Union except in special cases, the confusion over this policy left openings for 
manipulation and deceit, most commonly of immigrants, but sometimes extending to 
government officials. In 1924, the Secretary of Labor was in conversation with the American 
Civil Liberties Union about the “Ukranian Diplomatic Mission,” a fraudulent organization 
issuing false passports for the return of deportees to the Soviet Union. This transnational 
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organization had offices in New York and Washington D.C., but also in Canada, where their 
agency office had recently been discovered and closed. The Director of the ACLU wrote to the 
Secretary of Labor to explain that the Department of Labor had deported numerous people to 
different European countries with these fraudulent passports, and that “All persons so deported 
have either been returned or in a few cases are in desperate straits in European countries where 
they do not belong,” a fact which he went on to explain “put the Department of Labor in a very 
unenviable light before the country.”79  This embarrassing instance of official failure 
demonstrates that while deportation authority was consolidated on paper during this period, it 
remained a chaotic, uncontrolled terrain in which international criminal elements could still 
undermine the authority of federal officials.   
Immigration officials hoped that once they managed to acquire passports for individuals 
to be deported back to their countries of origin, their struggles over transporting these bodies 
would be completed. Travel arrangements, however, were often complex and multilayered 
authority struggles. In 1923, the U.S. Commissioner of Immigration at Montreal received word 
from the Canadian Pacific Railway Company that their Hamburg office had advised them on 
behalf of the Hamburg passport authorities that “in the future, all deports landing at a German 
port of other than German nationality, will be turned back if they are not in possession of the 
German transit [vise].”80 This multi-step transfer of knowledge about international regulations 
reflects both the transnational nature of the transportation corporations benefitting from the rise 
of deportation, and also the difficulties officials faced in trying to enact deportation to eastern 
European sites.   
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Among the many complex transnational subjects whom immigration officials struggled to 
property identify, document, and remove were seamen and stowaways, whose transnational life 
experiences and lack of national identity papers made them difficult to deal with. Undermining 
simplistic narratives of singular migration and clear uni-directional travel patterns, such lives 
revealed the confusion of an era defined by global migration. As the Commissioner-General of 
Immigration wrote to the Commissioner at Ellis Island on November 5, 1920, “These men, as 
you know, are not admissible.  They have no passports and we deport at the first opportunity… 
Stowaways are the source of a great deal of anxiety.”81 However, the global economy of 
shipping was not always a hindrance for immigration officials. By the end of the 1920s, 
authorities were engaging in the process of “reshipping foreign” instead of officially conducting 
deportation transportation in the cases of many of the young, healthy men they sent away. By 
sending deportees back as seamen on vessels looking for laborers, they often prevented longer 
waits for deportation transports to be ready. Because it relieved the government of the need to 
pay for the return passage of the deported migrant, this option was seen as financially 
responsible. For immigrants themselves, because the actual logistics of deportation were 
extremely complicated, and often required long periods of detention waiting for the next 
deportation transport heading their way, reshipping foreign was often a way to get out of prison 
more quickly and to earn a bit of money before going to live in their country of origin. As the 
Director of Immigration at Galveston wrote to the Commissioner General in 1924, “In reshipping 
deportees foreign one way in lieu of deportation, we are disposing of aliens whose deportation, 
in many instances, could not be effected, as passengers, because passports could not be obtained 
for them, and without cost for trans-Atlantic transportation, in addition to which the cost of 
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maintenance terminates with their departure foreign.”82 To prevent escape, he explained further, 
deportees on vessels which would touch again at American ports before leaving for foreign lands 
would take special precautions to ensure that deported seamen would not be able to disembark.  
As the rise of documentation and more official guidelines for international travel began in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the possibilities for the United States and its 
ability to design its own national population both increased, and became more complicated. 
While the centralization and institutionalization of Immigration Service power increased, as 
scholars have noted, the need for official evidence of citizenship, legal migration status, and for 
passport permission for deportation to other nations impeded the U.S. authorities from enacting 
their will freely upon their immigrant population.  In a period of rapid industrialization, frequent 
labor migrations, shifting and unstable imperial expansion, and increasing mobility, agents for 
the enforcement of deportation struggled at every level to identify and comply with national 
boundaries and to delineate them on their migrant populations.   
 
Deportation at the Borders: The Enforcement of American Boundaries in Transnational 
Spaces 
 
Where scholars have paid attention to the international dynamics of deportation policy, it has 
largely focused on the border regions between the United States and other nations.  Although 
scholars have demonstrated the fluidity of American national borders, and the ways that 
deportation practice was carried out differently at the Mexican and Canadian land borders, such 
scholarship has largely implied that these border actions were merely the intersection point of 
two sets of national subjects and interests, while in reality, border disputes and policing were part 
of a far more global landscape. Deportees were disproportionately apprehended at the nation’s 
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borders, but immigration proceedings at the nation’s land ports were indicative of far more than 
America’s international relations with its nearest neighbors. Throughout the early twentieth 
century, as quota restrictions narrowed immigration from Europe, but exempted the Western 
hemisphere, many immigrants crossing at the nation’s land borders came from beyond Mexico 
and Canada. Like other migrants whose paths to the United States were decidedly non-linear, 
labor migrants often spent time in multiple nations before working for a time in Mexico or 
Canada in the rapidly developing industries or extractive processes, and then eventually striking 
out across the land border into the United States. Others never fully committed to a single nation, 
carrying on lives of seasonal labor and family relations in both nations simultaneously, and 
making the crossing regularly (sometimes with the assistance of deportation proceedings, which 
provided them with free passage back if they were able to manipulate the system to their 
advantage).  
During the 1920s, officials encountered new anxieties about the use of Mexico, Cuba, and to 
a lesser extent Canada, as “back doors” for European and Asian migrants who would otherwise 
have been excluded at the nation’s ports.83 In his 1922 annual report, the Commissioner General 
of Immigration discussed these circuitous routes into the country, and explained the particular 
ramifications of recent policy changes. In light of the common practice of European immigrants 
entering Cuba with the “assumptions that when they had lived there one year they would be 
exempt from the quota act,” he explicated, the length of residence required for exemption had 
been changed to five years, leading to a great deal more surreptitious entry from the island. In the 
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previous year, the Commissioner explained, as many as 7,000 European immigrants had gone to 
Cuba when “the real and ultimate destination of most of whom was the United States,” but only 
2,500-3000 remained in Cuba. The rest had “disappeared,” he asserted, and many had likely 
gone to Mexico, “apparently in the hope of working their way to the border and smuggling 
across.”  The depth of this problem was evident in his assertion that, although “to the uninitiated 
it may seem strange that aliens are not subject to the operation of special exclusion legislation (as 
are the Chinese) would adopt this roundabout, expensive, and somewhat uncertain method of 
reaching their objective—the United States,” quota act and other migration regulations made this 
the only option for many.84 For immigration officials seeking to impose clear national origins on 
transnational subjects, these circuitous, “roundabout” paths posed challenges, delays, and at 
times, even unsurmountable obstacles. The discourse around deportation at the Mexican and 
Canadian borders reflected these patterns of multiple migrations and indirect entry. While 
apprehension at the border sometimes thwarted back-door entrants, many European immigrants 
lived for years in the United States before being caught and admitting to having crossed illegally 
through Canada, Mexico, or Cuba.  
 The process of deportation at the nation’s borders caused considerable tension between 
the United States and both Mexican and Canadian authorities, who often expressed resentment at 
the practice of expelling people over the land port they entered, even if they had no national 
resident status in that location. In November of 1922, the Assistant Commissioner of 
Immigration in Charge of Appeals wrote to the Commissioner General to explain that permission 
was often given to European deportees to go to Mexico if they did not want to go to Europe, and 
that “In some instances the alien was refused admission to Mexico upon his arrival and not only 
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was this office subjected to considerable work and inconvenience but the alien suffered from 
great inconvenience.”85 While the federal government seemed unconcerned with the 
inconvenience or insult to Mexican authorities, the Mexican government’s anger comes through 
in extensive correspondence between American and Mexican officials, and they fought for a ban 
against the landing of any deportees except Mexican citizens in the country. 
U.S. immigration officials in the 1920s increasingly revealed their stress over the 
apparent permeability of the Mexican border and their inability to clamp down on border 
movements, which severely interfered with deportation practice. In 1923, the Immigration 
Inspector in Charge at Tucson, Arizona carried out extensive correspondence with the 
Commissioner at El Paso, discussing the challenges of policing the borderlands.  In one 
November letter, the Tucson Inspector argued that Mexican criminals deported at Nogales 
actually used deportation to their benefit for cross-border criminal activities, “slipping back and 
forth across the international line for that purpose.”86 Furthermore, he argued, these deportees 
actually sought repeated imprisonment in the Arizona State prison, due to the high standards of 
clothing, food, amusement, and the lack of manual labor. He went so far as to explain of this 
captivity “that the environment and conditions are rather inviting compared with the conditions 
of aliens of this class in their native country.”87 Shortly before, the Immigration Inspector in 
Charge at Phoenix expressed the same sentiment, arguing that “these people have no special fear 
of imprisonment on account that their lives within the prison is easier than freedom in their own 
country, and a deportation across the land boundaries of the United States means nothing to 
them.”88  Immigration officials envisioned a world in which detention and deportation in the 
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United States were preferable to freedom elsewhere, and in doing so built on the rhetoric and 
myth of uni-directional migration in which American belonging was the only goal. 
The frequency of such claims reflected both the racialization of Mexican migrants as 
used to subhuman conditions and criminal by nature, as well as the messiness of policing 
borderlands where new deportation laws meant very little against the realities of a landscape in 
which the border was so immensely porous.  In extensive discussions on this subject, local 
officials from border immigration stations, national immigration authorities, and the Mexican 
government quarreled throughout the 1920s about where Mexican deportees would be sent.  
Local border officials and Mexican authorities agreed that the INS should be responsible for 
sending Mexican deportees to wherever they originated in Mexico rather than simply the border 
town at which they crossed, in order to make their repeat crossing more difficult.  Mexican 
officials added that the tendency to return deportees from all over the nation to a handful of 
border towns led to overcrowding, joblessness and high crime rates in these areas, while Arizona 
and Texas immigration officials complained of how frequently such deportees returned, often as 
early as the day following their deportation.  However, U.S. government officials, aligning 
themselves against their own local officials, argued that the practice of sending Mexican 
deportees into the interior was far too expensive.   
In spite of the considerably more respectful relationship between U.S. immigration 
authorities and Canadian officials, Canadian representatives also felt the strain of unequal 
expectations between the nations.  Reflecting frustration about the assumption that Canadian 
institutions would continue to support American immigrant residents, while their Canadian 
counterparts would be deported from the United States, the General Medical Director of the 
Hospitals for Insane, Reformatories, and Industrial Schools in Montreal wrote to the Secretary of 
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Labor in 1923.  “Very often I am asked by the United States authorities to receive in our 
Hospitals for the Insane persons who have become insane, even after these persons have lived 
twenty-five years in the United States,” the Director explained.  His complaint was a common 
one among international figures who felt that it was wrong of America to blame other nations for 
the deficiencies of individuals even after they had spent most of their lives being shaped by 
American residence.  He went on to inquire incredulously, “Do I have to understand that any 
alien living in the United States, no matter what length of time, is always deportable unless such 
alien has acquired citizenship through naturalization[?]”89 
Throughout 1927, the United States and Canada debated, collaborated, and maneuvered 
their policies in relation to mentally ill immigrants in conjunction with one another.  The United 
States, complaining of the expense of maintaining mentally ill Canadian migrants in American 
institutions, demanded passport permission to deport numerous individuals from American 
hospitals, asylums, and mental institutions.  In response, Canadian officials pointed to the 
numerous American citizens residing in Canada and argued that if the United States would no 
longer take responsibility for the support of immigrants of Canadian birth, many of whom had 
lived in the United States for decades, Canadian institutions could no longer be expected to 
support Americans with mental illnesses requiring public support.  This led to the establishment 
of diplomatic relations with Canada in which the United States executed what amounted to the 
swapping of deportees from Canadian and American mental institutions, and each nation agreed 
to take particular lists of individuals in return for the other doing the same with their own 
citizens.   
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The Commissioner of the Canadian Department of Immigration and Colonization wrote 
to the United States Commissioner General in June of 1927 regarding the case of a man named 
Jolicoeur, stating that the inability of the Canadian authorities to effect the return of this U.S. 
citizen and others had become “embarrassing for the Government of the province of Quebec.”  
Indeed, he went on to threaten, “…if this United States citizen cannot be returned to the United 
States the Provincial authorities will be inclined to deal with similar cases where institutional 
treatment is required in the Province of Quebec on the same principle.”90  In the midst of these 
debates, the United States was forced to grapple with a number of the same complexities of other 
receiving nations for deportees, and a number of new questions arose. If an American citizen had 
lived in several states before migrating to Canada, which state bore responsibility for their 
institutionalization and expenses upon their return through deportation? If the American citizen 
under deportation proceedings from Canada was a naturalized citizen, rather than a native born 
one, did the government bear the same responsibility for accepting and supporting the 
individual? Which government’s procedures of testing and evaluating the mental fitness of 
individuals was to be accepted? If the immigrant institutionalized for mental illness in Canada 
being returned to the United States was a veteran, did the social services responsibilities differ 
from an ordinary citizen, and did more responsibility rest with the federal government in such 
instances? The need to grapple with these questions demonstrates that no matter how desperately 
the American state wanted to view itself as only a deporting nation, rather than a place that could 
be a punishment to be returned to, in truth, it was neither as powerful in its relations with its 
neighbors as it hoped to be, nor as unquestionably the prized destination it imagined.91 
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Deportation as Foreign Policy, Deportation as Death Sentence: Uneven Enforcement and 
the Use of Deportations as an Informal Tool of International Relations 
 
While deportation in the early twentieth century was not officially an arm of foreign policy, 
or an explicit referendum on the human rights abuses of other nations, in practice, it often 
operated as one. Through selective application of seemingly neutral immigration legislation, 
government officials, not only nationally, but also locally, took foreign policy into their own 
hands and used expulsion to demonstrate their respect for, disdain for, or cooperation with other 
nations. The lenience expressed toward migrants seeking to avoid repression or state violence in 
Soviet Russia took on an entirely different tone, for instance, than the generally rigid rejection of 
claims of persecution and human rights abuses in Fascist Italy. Because deportation allowed for 
such a great degree of discretion on the part of individual immigration officers, often low level 
governmental agency employees had the power to enact their own commentary on foreign 
governments through their deportation decisions. As scholars have noted, the Immigration 
Service had a large amount of discretionary leeway in comparison to other governmental 
agencies of the early twentieth century, and the decisions of local outpost offices acted as an 
informal referendum on what immigrants deserved mercy, what foreign states posed true threats, 
and what geopolitical conflicts were worth protecting people from.   
In an extensive “Document on Deportation”, one politically radical author identified only as 
“Honig,” elaborated the argument that the United States selectively enforced its own laws as an 
informal commentary on global politics, and through discretionary power, demonstrated 
sympathy or disdain for foreign governments based on who they deported. Explaining that 
honest labor activists were deported to dangerously oppressive nations, while the government 
spared others, he stated, “Notice, again, how the bill protects the white guardists, enemies of the 
Soviet Union, the rats who ran away from Russia because they [night] have to work for a living 
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instead of sponge on the toiling masses.”92 In contrast, he observed of the government’s uneven 
implementation of deportation law, in other cases, “It sends them back to countries where the 
fiercest fascist terror holds sway, where imprisonment, torture, and death awaits the brave 
working-class fighters…”93 
It was understood by many opponents of the system that in ordering deportations from the 
United States, the United States was not merely protecting its own national security or interests, 
but was reflecting its investment in broader networks of imperialism, capitalism, and global 
racism and inequality. In 1919, a group called the Friends of Freedom for India published a 
pamphlet entitled “Doing Britain’s Dirty Work,” in which they accused the United States of 
deporting Indian agitators for the benefit of their alliance with British colonial power.94 
Indictments of the immigration service for punishing foreign dissidents were common 
throughout the era, coming from immigrants themselves, political groups, immigration advocacy 
organizations, and at times, even from self-declared conservatives who nevertheless found the 
deportations overreaching.  
As one observer commented regarding the case of Li Tao Hsuan, the immigrant was 
penalized at Ellis Island with solitary confinement after joining a protest against terrible 
conditions and segregation and discrimination against Chinese deportees on the Island.  However 
the broader cause for the deportation was his radical speech, although “Li refuted all these 
charges and declared that his persecution was only due to his propaganda against imperialism.”  
Furthermore, his attorney argued that “deportation was a literal death sentence for the prisoner”, 
and requested that the prisoner be allowed to depart for the Soviet Union if he was to be deported 
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at all.95  An even harsher assessment of the case concluded that the interests were not merely of 
the government, but that “Wall Street wanted to hand Li over to the Kuomintang butchers in 
China”, for his anti-imperialism work.  The observer noted the international outcry over the case, 
explaining that “meanwhile floods of telegrams from workers and workers organizations poured 
in to Secretary of Labor Doak.  These protests forced the Department of Labor to grant Li the 
right of voluntary departure to the Soviet Union, and thus save him from death at the hands of 
the Kuomintang murderers in China.”96 
For activists and protestors, deportation policy which endangered the lives or freedom of 
immigrant subjects was not merely unethical, it was a violation of the American creed.  Instead, 
they argued, if the government was to insist on deportations, a right which some, though not all 
protestors conceded, it was their duty to global standards of civilized societies to arrange for 
shipment to a neutral nation where the deportee’s safety would not be in jeopardy.  In certain 
instances, the United States did attempt to find ways to circumvent deportation to an individual’s 
nation of origin, but these efforts led to their own set of complications and geopolitical 
maneuvering: decisions about whether to honor the deportee’s own choice of nation, navigation 
of paperwork demands, and growing international resentment over the United States treating 
foreign nations as a “dumping grounds” for their “undesirable aliens.”  
Most often, deported individuals who successfully claimed danger, and escaped deportation 
to their own nation of birth were sent to locations throughout Latin America or the Caribbean 
upon their request. In particular, conflicts reemerged throughout the 1920s with officials in Cuba, 
who resented U.S. authorities for allowing a variety of European nationals, to be deported to 
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Cuba, where they had briefly resided as a jumping-off point before migrating to the United 
States. F.E. Menocal of the Cuban Department of Immigration reported in 1924 that he had been 
frustrated by the arrival of four more immigrants expelled from the United States, and reminded 
U.S. officials that from Cuba, they would only attempt reentry.  Indeed, he stated, “it is the best 
practice to return them to Europe.”97 In another instance, the Commissioner in Charge of 
Immigration at New Orleans was severely chastised by the Commissioner General of 
Immigration for allowing a family to be sent to Cuba rather than be deported to Mexico in spite 
of explicit denial of permission. The 1922 letter to the Commissioner at New Orleans states 
sternly that “the assumption indulged by you was entirely unwarranted, and has placed the 
Bureau in a decidedly embarrassing position,” demonstrating the pressure officials were under to 
avoid international conflict with receiving nations.98 
Many immigrants were not successful in their efforts to stake out their own chosen national 
belonging, but were instead bound by administrative process to their nations of birth.  An Indian 
man who entered the United States through Mexico, and claimed to have been naturalized there, 
though a British citizen, requested to be returned to Mexico after he was detained for 
deportation.  However, Mexican authorities objected to his being sent there, and he was 
eventually deported to India, in spite of extensive efforts to establish a claim to belonging in 
multiple other national bodies.99 The instability of national identities for many migrants of the 
period demonstrate the insufficiency of reducing deportation policy to a simple equation of 
transporting an immigrant from one location to their rightful nation of belonging, as scholars 
have tended to do. 
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In the 1928 case of an Italian citizen by the name of Girambolo Cimbalo, or Cimbolo, 
Congressman Sol Bloom intervened to assist the family after his voluntary departure from the 
United States.  Cimbolo left prior to the date set for his official deportation, voluntarily, for 
Mexico, after having “received information that his life was in danger if he returned to Italy, on 
account of the information he had furnished the immigration authorities with reference to his 
having been smuggled into the country.”  Having come under danger for cooperation with the 
immigration authorities, Cimbolo assumed that “the main intent of the deportation order was to 
insure his leaving the country,” and therefore was startled to find that in spite of his arrival in 
Mexico being verified by the American Consul there, he was not being returned his $500 bond 
for reporting for deportation.100  While Bloom bolstered Cimbolo’s claim that he deserved to 
start a new life in Mexico with his life savings intact, the authorities refused, causing Cimbolo to 
remark in an angry letter to the Commissioner of Immigration at Ellis Island that his case 
brought to mind a tale, noting, “As you recall, Shylock was insistent upon having his pound of 
flesh and wanted to cut it himself from Antonio’s body and nearest to Antonio’s heart.”101  The 
intense reaction of immigrants unable to negotiate and maneuver their own solutions to 
deportation and the transnational dangers posed to their bodies and livelihoods demonstrates the 
vulnerability and uneven footing upon which deportees themselves attempted to use their own 
migration to fight the constraints of American law.  
By the mid-1930s, while some cases of deportation which posed a danger to the individual’s 
safety were still being carried out in spite of protests, increasing attention was being paid to 
demands for sensitivity to the political atmosphere across the globe. This shift was facilitated in 
part by progressive political figures who added their voices to those of protestors and political 
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activists in demanding that deportation consider the world outside American borders, and who 
demanded that the United States held a global responsibility not to subject deportees to undue 
threats to their well-being.  In response to an appeal from Congressman Vito Marcantonio, 
Deputy Commissioner of Immigration Shaughnessy agreed in 1935 that in the case of Srul 
Goldband, since it appeared if he was deported to Poland he would indeed be subjected to 
persecution, the department was going to permit “his voluntary departure, without expense to the 
United States, to any country of his choice, except to contiguous territory or adjacent islands.”102 
Throughout the 1920s and beyond, as deportation increasingly became a common 
government tactic for handling political protest, challenges to authority, and ideological dissent, 
immigration officials and public figures were forced to reckon with the global repercussions of 
their acts.  While deportation was ostensibly, according to the letter of the law, not a form of 
punishment, but merely an administrative process, many onlookers and subjects of the 
deportation regime were quick to argue that it was in fact, a highly punitive process.  In 
particular, many activists, potential deportees, and legal representatives argued that deportation 
in many cases actually served not only as punishment through removal, but actually as 
extradition.  The fervor of U.S. officials to deport political dissidents often led to the removal of 
people who would run up against hostile authorities in their countries of origins after return, 
including those who feared that the requests for their deportation visas put them on the radar of 
these authorities before they even arrived.  Radicals, communists, anarchists, free-speech 
advocates and other activists were often at great risk for persecution, imprisonment, and even 
death in their home countries, and this created a great deal of discourse in the United States over 
the ethics of their return.   
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Though deportation was not legally deemed a punishment, lawyers of potential deportees 
argued, in many cases, it could mark a sure death sentence for the deported individuals, and in 
some cases, consisted of the return of individuals who had fled persecution for the supposed 
liberty of the United States already.  Furthermore, the perception that deportation could 
potentially endanger lives was not isolated to the arguments of legal professionals, but frequently 
made its way into public discourse and press discussions of deportation.  In a novel based on the 
experience aboard a deportation train, one of the protagonists dramatically utters to his fellow 
passengers, “And in this country it is said that deportation is not a punishment.  No, of course 
not!  But for me it is a death sentence, all right.”103  This critique was a common one of the era, 
and many declared that deportation could serve as an endangerment of lives on both ends, both 
putting the deportee at risk for persecution abroad, and, in many cases, leaving his family 
destitute and unable to provide for themselves in the United States.   
These discourses again often revolved around the foreignness of this form of expulsion, 
arguing that extradition was something unimaginable in an American democracy, but typical of 
tyrannical foreign regimes.  In the highly publicized 1935 case of Italian deportees Vincent 
Ferrero and Dominic Sallitto, public outrage centered on the danger to these two men in Italy, 
and argued that deportation was against the ethical obligations of an American democracy.  One 
appeal to the Department of Labor exclaimed that, “…If they are deported certain execution 
awaits them on their arrival in Italy.  May I ask, is this government, which is at least theoretically 
just, allowed special criminal privileges that it can break the spirit and letter of its own law in 
order to cause the brutish disposal of innocent individuals?”104   
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Among the many accusations that these deportations represented a barbaric form of 
extradition, one flyer argued the case in terms of global examples, explaining that in recent and 
parallel cases of deportation to Italy, “Political exiles from Argentine were immediately seized 
upon arrival in Italy and sentenced to long terms in various islands.  The most recent case is that 
of Hugo Fedeli, deported from Uruguay.”105  Further highlighting both the accusations of 
foreignness as well as the global nature of these discourses, the International Bureau Against 
War and Reaction wrote from the Netherlands to argue that, “Except in fascist countries, 
nowhere in the world persons, who belong to the class of political refugees, are exiled on account 
of their opinions.  And we do not know of any democratic country where an extradition order of 
political refugees to the home country, where their lives would be endangered or where they 
would be prosecuted, would not raise a storm of public indignation.”106  
Accusations of fascism in deportation practice were among the most powerful rhetorical 
attacks levied on immigration officials by activists and radicals, but they also reflected a genuine 
collaboration with fascist governments to repress political activity of foreign nationals living in 
the United States. As scholars such have Fraser Ottanelli and Kenyon Zimmer have examined 
more recently, there were in fact transnational efforts to control the Italian population in the 
United States.  Ottanelli explains that, “Mussolini’s takeover of Italy was followed by a 
concerted campaign orchestrated by Fascist authorities directed toward the United States to gain 
the support of and establish control over the Italian American community, ensure a sympathetic 
public opinion, and repress antifascists and their activities.”107  These measures, Ottanelli points 
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out, could include controlling passports of family members attempting to reunite with relative in 
the United States, a set of circumstances which severely impacted Italian radicals in the United 
States.  The potential danger for the deported Italian is confirmed by Ottanelli’s assessment that 
“On specific orders from Mussolini, the Italian consulate in New York routinely provided U.S. 
immigration officials with names and whereabouts of any politically active illegal immigrant, 
who would then be arrested and held for deportation back to Italy… a practice that had tragic 
consequences for many.”108  Thus it is clear that the experiences and anxieties of Italian 
American detentions and deportations were not happening within the national frame alone, as 
they have often been pictured, but in a context in which domestic concerns over immigration 
were intertwined with political developments, state authority, and transoceanic movements of 
ideology, political power, and people.  
While government officials, public leaders, and the press showed ambivalence towards 
Mussolini’s Italy, denouncing him as a tyrant and a danger to the world order on one hand, and 
as a beacon of competence on the other, others took a much more determined stance of 
opposition.109  Instead of taking a congratulatory stance towards Mussolini’s repressive measures 
against criminals, dissenters, and others, and calling for American emulation of his hard stance 
against crime, many Italian Americans and other Americans expressed concern that actions like 
the deportation drive could quickly deteriorate into Fascist repression in America.  Ottanelli 
argues that for antifascists in the United States, critiques of Italian fascism were often based in 
“denouncing it as threat to U.S. democracy and to the acculturation of Italian migrant workers.” 
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These critiques, he explains, were further applied by antifascist activists to what they deemed to 
be repressive and “Fascisti” deportation practices.110  Still others focused on the fact that 
deportation back to Italy would only release detained immigrants to certain death or brutal exile 
in Italy and pled for protection for America to protect even its undesirables from the reach of 
fascism.    
Sometimes, attempts to plead the danger to the health and wellbeing of deporting particular 
individuals were successful, and demonstrated the wide leeway for administrative discretion 
within the deportation process.  In 1922, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) intervened 
on behalf of young Sora Zezombek, aged 14, arguing that due to the “white plague”, and the fact 
that she had no relatives left to care for her abroad, “deportation might possibly prove fatal.”  
Both the relative wealth of the family which was to receive her and her youth served her case, as 
did the fact that her older brother served the American army for 16 months in France during the 
war.  As a result, HIAS reported, her brother “now prays that the Government show him some 
courtesy by permitting his sister to obtain the required treatment in the United States, and which 
she cannot possibly obtain abroad.”111  In this case, appeals based in patriotic service abroad 
were strong enough to convince authorities, and her deportation was stayed by Harry Landis, the 
Assistant Commissioner in Charge of Board of Special Inquiry and Appeals.   
Other appeals succeeded because of their arguments about the dangers of conditions in the 
old country, but again, were bolstered by pointing out the wealth of their families in the United 
States.  In the 1922 case of 16 year old Moische Zeltzer, who had a limb amputated en route to 
the United States, HIAS argued on his behalf that with his artificial limb and restored good 
health, he was sure to be employable anyway.  It is hard to know what was more convincing for 
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the immigration agents who granted his appeal, the fact that he was coming to join his “mother 
and grandparents as well as other near rich relatives”, or the reminder of the dangers of his home 
country, of which they explained, “it would therefore be a tragedy to deport him back to the old 
country [Russia] where social and economic conditions are at their lowest ebb…”112  Likewise, 
in the case of 35 year old Beila Zilberman and her three children under the age of 6, her legal 
representative was able to convince the Board of Appeals that because the husband and father 
had died, and the parents of the woman had been killed in Russia, “It would be a tragedy to 
deport these aliens back to dark Russia, where they have no surviving relatives left…”113  As in 
so many other instances, expressions of sympathy for victims of “dark Russia,” amounted to a 
form of de-facto foreign policy through deportation, as officials implemented the increasing 
power of the state deportation machinery to serve global political agendas of the nation. 
 
Understanding American Deportation Through the Outward Gaze: Networks of 
Communication and International Discourses on Deportation  
 
While scholars have explored the growth of concern over family reunification and 
immigration policy over the twentieth century, the impact of deportation on families has been 
largely neglected.  In the wake of deportations, which often disproportionately were enacted for 
men, particularly when the rationale for deportation was political or criminal activity, the results 
were broken families and transnational struggles for reunification, whether in the United States 
or abroad.  Following the infamous Buford deportation “ark”, in which Emma Goldman, 
Alexander Berkman and hundreds of other political agitators were suddenly deported after long 
periods of detention, struggles emerged over the fate of their families.  Dismayed at the prospect 
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of women and children abruptly deprived of their main financial support, as well as their family 
stability, the American Women’s Committee appealed to Immigration Commissioner Byron Uhl, 
for the reunification of these suddenly international families, exclaiming that “the suffering 
among the wives and children, deprived of the bread-winner in the dead of winter, is beyond 
words.”114   
Meanwhile, radical activist Elizabeth Gurley Flynn engaged in extensive correspondence 
about the tragedy of families split by thousands of miles, and political figures such as Norman 
Thomas argued that deportation proceedings were not only a betrayal of civil liberties, but 
argued that they were the emulation and repetition of mistakes made by other, less democratic 
nations.115  By the following decade, this practice had been so thoroughly condemned as un-
American that the government itself began to withdraw.  As Jack Wasserman explained in “The 
Challenge of Our Immigration Laws”, published by the American Committee for the Protection 
of Foreign Born, “In 1936 the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization found close to 
three thousand cases pending in the department which were of such ‘incredibly cruel family 
separations… so repugnant to every American principle of justice and humanity’ that deportation 
was temporarily stayed so that Congress might take some action.”116 
Speaking to the role of deportations in perceptions of America abroad, Flynn highlighted the 
injustice of the process and argued that it would shape opinion abroad, as well as at home.  
Addressing the case of a New Orleans deportee detained for over six months as a socialist and 
labor activist, she wrote to the Commissioner General of Immigration, disparagingly pleading, 
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“Mr. Caminetti, I wish you would begin to realize that American justice the world round, is 
being weighed through your Department and is being found wanting.  I realize, of course, the 
flood of cases that your office has to handle.  I realize that your machinery moves slowly, but it 
also grinds exceedingly small…  Apparently jails of America are to break the health of 
individuals as the wheels of old were to break their bones.”117  Protestors of deportation, both at 
home and abroad, repeatedly reminded authorities that the world was watching (and judging) as 
a supposedly democratic and inclusive society stripped the rights of individuals, subjected 
communities to invasive raids and separation of families, and stifled dissent and free speech 
through expulsion.   
Activists such as Flynn also operated outside of national boundaries as well as within them, 
and organizations designed to fight deportation often stressed their international nature.  The 
labor and radical activist Rose Pesotta, residing in the United States, was frequently in 
correspondence with the “Mutual Aid Group of Paris,” whose members included such 
transnational protest activists as Alexander Berkman and Mollie Steiner, whose continued work 
against deportation even after their own expulsion from the United States speaks to the global 
nature of challenges to the American deportation regime.  Explaining that national boundaries 
frustrated the need of helping exiled individuals who would be endangered in their own 
countries, the group disparaged the national constraints of some relief organizations, 
complaining that, “The Russian Relief Fund, for instance, is intended only for the aid of 
Anarchists and Anarcho-Syndicalists imprisoned or exiled in Russia.  Therefore that Fund cannot 
help the refugees in France.  The same refers to the Italian, Bulgarian and other prison funds.  
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Thus we are compelled to turn for help to you, comrade… in our efforts in behalf of our 
Anarchist refugees from the countries of white and red terror.”118 
Flynn may have been approaching the question of international perception of American 
deportation practice through her experiences with global networks of radical activists, but 
radicals were far from the only observers to declaim the unfortunate impact of deportation on 
America’s image in the rest of the world.  A 1921 letter from the American Consulate at 
Melbourne, Australia to the Secretary of State reported that “there has been much, [altho] 
unorganized and friendly, criticism of the administration and effect of the provisions of the 
recent Immigration Act.”119  Further highlighting the tension with territories of the British 
Empire, the Melbourne Age feature an article entitled “American Exclusiveness” in the same 
year, which proclaimed that “Much indignation has been caused by statements of the scandalous 
treatment accorded South African families on Ellis Island.” The secretary of the YMCA of South 
Africa expressed rage at being treated like a common foreigner rather than a respectable traveler 
from the British empire and explained that he was “herded for three days with a horde of filthy 
aliens… His wife said she felt like committing suicide to escape the horrors.  Finally, through the 
good offices of the Canadian representative, he managed to get deported.”120  Departing from the 
self-congratulatory narrative of America as an inclusive haven of the oppressed, it became 
apparent in international discourse throughout the period that foreigners looking in noted not a 
sanctuary, but a horrifying system of detention, exclusion, and uncivilized brutality. 
After asserting her credentials by stating that “I am not an imperfectly assimilated alien,” 
and explaining to the members of the congressional hearing before which she appeared that “all 
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of my ancestors came over here at least 50 years before 1776, so I feel that I have a right to speak 
as an American citizen,” Edith Spruance explained her perspective on the stakes of deportation 
proceedings by saying that it was for the protection of American values that she opposed 
deportation proceedings as they had been occurring. 121  A representative of the Women Voter’s 
League, American Civil Liberties Union, and the National Society of Colonial Dames, Spruance 
argued that what was endangered by deportation proceedings was American respect for 
freedoms, stating: “The reason I have come here is less on account of the alien than on account 
of our own American citizens,” and proclaiming that the recent drives in her eyes seemed “to 
shovel and generally push the country into what I can only term Prussian and Latin and general 
Fascisti methods of government.”122  Similarly, the Reverend W.L. Darby, Secretary of the 
Federal Council of Christ in America, spoke out against the repressive elements of U.S. 
deportation proceedings, likening them to those of another tyrannical regime.  Speaking as the 
representative of the council’s 28 denominations and their 20,000,000 million constituents, 
Darby argued that “there should be no taint of a ‘star chamber’ in connection with deportation 
proceedings.  This provision of the proposed law is too reminiscent of the universally 
condemned practice of the czarist government of banishing to Siberia objectionable individuals 
by secret bureaucratic procedure.”123  
However, it is also critical to examine the way in which discourses around deportation often 
focused on other nations not only as negative reference points for American practices, but also at 
times as models for emulation.  As circulation of knowledge and expertise about the policing of 
non-citizen populations spread during the early twentieth century, the United States joined in 
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global conversations and study about the most effective mechanisms for keeping subversive 
elements (foreign born and otherwise) suppressed.  To build their arguments for more stringent 
deportation enforcement, advocates of the practice often pointed to examples from abroad of 
other governments who successfully eliminated threats to their own national body.  For instance, 
as the opening of this chapter suggests, when local officials and police commanders in Chicago 
sought to rid the city of supposed Sicilian “gangsters” and “mobsters” in 1926, they repeatedly 
referred to the success that Mussolini had in “cleaning” up Italy through exile of similar agents, 
and urged the federal government to act more quickly to emulate his tactics.   
Observers pointed out during the 1926 deportation drive, from various standpoints of 
approval or disapproval, the consequences that deportation to Fascist Italy could hold for 
Chicago’s Italian-American immigrants.  The Deputy Chief of Police in Chicago stated 
approvingly that, “the terror of deportation will be the greatest deterrent of crime that could 
happen to them,” because, “when they are sent back to Sicily they are kept under surveillance 
there for ten years.  Every night a gendarme goes to their home and they must come to the 
window with a light to show themselves.”124  Others recognized that for certain deportees, a 
deportation order could be synonymous with an execution order and appealed to the United 
States for recognition of the tyrannical treatment of such prisoners in their own lands.  The Anti-
Fascist Alliance of North America wrote to Albert Johnson, head of the Congressional 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization pleading with him to spare political refugees from 
the violent repression of Mussolini, writing of one prominent political refugee currently held at 
Ellis Island for deportation, “His deportation means sure death.  We appeal to you in order to 
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stop this murder by Mussolini Government.”125  Even Chairman Johnson, one of the prominent 
leaders in the struggle for immigration restriction, seemed swayed by such appeals, and stated in 
questioning that, “We are met right now with cases of men complaining that if they should be 
deported to certain countries, to Italy or to Mexico, they would be sent to probably execution.  If 
there was a matter like that, it should be considered, and leeway provided.”126 
Other restrictionists and proponents of deportation expressed far less sympathy to the 
conditions in the home countries of deportable aliens and argued that should have no bearing on 
American treatment of them.  Walter H. Shaffer, writing to Chairman Johnson regarding a 
petition which had been sent to him on behalf of Italians detained for deportation argued that, 
“personally, I do not believe these Italians are political refugees at all… They should be made to 
understand that the Anglo-Saxon asylum for political refugees does not apply to scores of men, 
but only to certain individuals.”127  Responding to a petition by a large number of Italian 
detainees which “states that they are in danger of being executed by Mussolini if the deportations 
are carried out,” Shaffer concludes that it would be a dangerous precedent to spare them this fate, 
because “there are also thousands more in Italy waiting to break our laws.”128  Others agreed that 
the United States had no responsibility to treat deportable aliens with any greater leniency 
because of the political system within their own nation of origins and the possibility of political 
execution upon return.  Madison Grant, the famed restrictionist, proponent of scientific racism, 
eugenicist, and author of The Passing of the Great Race, wrote in to Chairman Johnson to 
express his dismay at such proposals of reprieve.  Grant asserted that “These foreigners are not 
                                                          
125 “Deportation of Alien Criminals, Gunmen, Narcotic Dealers, Defectives, etc,” Hearings before the Committee on 
Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives, Sixty-Ninth Congress, First Session, March 25, 26, April 
13, 1926 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1926). 
126 Ibid 62.  
127 Ibid, 168. 
128 Ibid. 
87 
 
allowed to carry deadly weapons in their own country, but do so freely here.  I believe that the 
alien who has been caught repeatedly carrying a dirk or a revolver should be deported without 
regard to the length of his sentence,” echoing the sentiments of many, who stated that Italy’s 
harsher policies towards criminals were not in fact a reason to protect Italian criminals, but a 
reason to send them away to their proper punishment in Italy.129   
Whether or not individuals supported the right of asylum in deportation cases, whether 
their images of expulsion and imprisonment abroad reflected accurate information or 
propaganda, it remains salient that to describe the threat of deportation in America, the public 
looked outward, and held a well-formed if heavily disputed imagination of affairs across the 
Atlantic, which informed their beliefs about the enforcement of American policies.  In a 
fascinating twist in the transnational relationship between deportation in the United States and 
Italy, the Commissioner of Immigration in 1931 went so far as to speculate that the troubles with 
Sicilian gangsters in Chicago were actually the result of the efficiency of exile procedures by 
Mussolini’s government.  Commissioner Doak’s stance was explained in an article which 
detailed the situation: “The second factor is the widespread racketeering of the gangster type…  
The Chicago racketeering game, he suspects, is peopled largely by Sicilians expelled from Italy 
by Mussolini”.130 
Beyond simple comparisons to Fascist Italy, the most compelling way protestors found to 
describe American deportations continued to require looking outward beyond the nation itself. 
Not only was deportation conducted in conjunction, conflict, and cooperation with other nations, 
it was also understood by many in America by using a discourse of foreignness. When critics of 
the deportation regime sought to highlight its cruelty, the separation of families, endangerment of 
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dissenters, and police-state features, their most salient language for conveying these aspects was 
to say that the United States was acting as a foreign power would. Arguing that the practice of 
deportation undermined the American national creed of personal liberty, tolerance to difference 
and dissent, and opportunity for outsiders, activists and immigrant spokespeople often couched 
their criticism by labeling deportation as a practice typical of a more “tyrannical” nation, most 
often Soviet Russia, or Fascist Italy. The common language of why deportation was wrong 
centered on the claim that it resembled the practices of a foreign tyranny. As a reporter aboard a 
deportation special observed, “Hundreds of humans gathered up as if by a gigantic continent-
wide net, herded into prison cars and ridden under guard to Ellis Island and other Government 
stations, there to be place on ships bound for their natal-homes. How like Russia that 
sounded!”131 
At a 1926 “Conference in Opposition to the Registration of Aliens and Deportation Bills,” 
held in New York, Governor Alfred Smith delivered a statement in which he argued, “This 
proposed law would give the kind of power to an administrative body that would inevitably lead 
to tyranny and abuse,” and like many of his co-critics, referred to the “tyranny of czaristic 
Russia” as the potential outcome of such legislation.132  Mirroring his sentiments, the stated 
position of the Immigrants’ Protective League to the conference was that, “First, we oppose such 
legislation because we believe it to be un-American in principle, since it introduces into our 
American life the discredited Russian and Prussian Imperial systems of espionage....”133   
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In other instances, the public outrage over the dangers of deportation focused not on the 
actual political death sentences signified by deportation orders, but the deadly process of 
transport and what it would mean.  For instance, the dangers of the Soviet transport by “etape,” 
or guarded walking transport, greatly captured the imagination of American activists, who traced 
the geography that deportees would be subjected to cross once reaching the Soviet Union, and 
argued that the United States could not in good conscience allow deportees to be subjected to 
such a trek upon return to their nation of origin.  George Kennan, a noted explorer of Russia, and 
the distant cousin of diplomat George F. Kennan, expressed his dismay in a public letter on the 
subject.  He decried the fact that deported immigrants being sent from arrival at Archangel to 
their places of origin in Southern Russia would “would have to go on foot at rate of fifteen miles 
a day.  They would march under guard with common criminals and would be herded with the 
latter in dirty infected prisons at night with inevitable delays.  Journey would occupy three to 
four months and would be attended with great hardships privations and risks.  Most of weaker 
members would probably die from exposure and disease.”  While the American government 
might have the legal capacity to deport these individuals in spite of their fate on the other side of 
the globe, he implored that “I doubt very much our moral right to subject human beings to such 
an experience.  We are trying to relieve suffering and prevent death in Russia but by returning 
those people we should increase both.”134  The outward looking sympathies that compelled 
activists and immigrant communities to protest against the ramifications for deportees once they 
reached their foreign destinations demonstrate that while immigration historians have often 
ignored global dynamics of deportation, contemporaries were brutally aware of them.   
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Strong consternation was also expressed by Progressive era social service and immigrant aid 
organizations, who saw the excesses of American deportation practice as tarnishing their 
reputation abroad, and departure from civilized, reformed modes of institutional control over the 
population.  In their insistence the American state could be organized, rationalized, and 
perfected, Progressive era thinkers and social service advocates were dismayed at the disarray 
and disgrace brought on by extreme enforcement of deportation policy.  Read Lewis, the 
Director of the Foreign Language Information Service wrote in 1929 that new deportation 
measures were becoming “unjust and contrary to American traditions,” and remarked that “After 
an alien has resided in the United States for a certain period of time, deportation amounts to 
exile, a punishment abandoned by all civilized peoples,” going on to quote the Circuit Court of 
Appeals in its statement ‘That our reasonable efforts to rid ourselves of unassimilable 
immigrants should in execution be attended by such a cruel and barbarous result would be a 
national reproach.”135  In a 1933 letter received by Lewis regarding the enforcement of 
immigration practices, the fear that the world’s opinion of the United States would be colored by 
deportations was stated even more explicitly: “Ellis Island represents to immigrants, visitors and 
deportees their first and often their last contact with the Government of the United States.  The 
impressions they obtain there color their opinions of our Government and its institutions and 
spread widely exercise an influence on world opinion as to the equity of our laws, the humanity 
of our Government and the efficiency of its administrators.”136  Similarly, progressive-era 
agencies and individuals of the period commonly denounced a system which failed to approach 
immigrants with reason, moderation, sympathy, or consideration for family structures.  Many 
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such figures supported deportation in theory for worthy rationales, but attacked its excesses, 
particularly with respect to their role in tarnishing opinion of American abroad. 
Both protesting activists, who tapped into international solidarity networks to raise funds and 
pressure public officials, and governmental officials themselves, who engaged in international 
communication networks, participated in the global circulation of knowledge about potential 
deportees.  With the growth of communication between nations in the early twentieth century, 
the United States became part of various networks of communication regarding migrants and 
their dangers to the global community.  Sometimes, these took the form of explicit conferences 
and meetings among diplomats about immigration restriction, as scholars like Lake and 
Reynolds have noted.137  At other junctures, international communication took the form of 
messages between nations that shared the same individual immigrant threat as deportees moved 
through multiple borders.  In October of 1920, the State Department wrote to the Bureau of 
Immigration to warn of a criminal, in the process of being expelled from Sweden, who it was 
believed would need to be apprehended next in the United States.  Tovia Uusoiksa, aged 25, 
“described as a pianist, but who is really by profession a plumber, is understood to be the chief 
agent for the smuggling of Russian jewelry into America,” the State Department official wrote, 
going on to explain that “I send you this information in order that you may balk any plans which 
he may have to enter this country.”  Through the global transfer of knowledge about individual 
cases as well as broader potential threats, officials around the world participated in the policing 
of thoroughly transnational subjects, who traversed multiple borders, took part in varied 
economies, both legal and illicit, and faced expulsion across a range of nation-states.138   
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The American government was not satisfied with spreading knowledge of its legal 
structures throughout international official circles, but also wanted its deportation regime known 
to the general public, and it made efforts to spread broader warnings. In a December 1923 letter, 
the Commissioner of Immigration at Montreal wrote to the Commissioner General noting that, 
“If we were only able to disseminate the information throughout Canada that imprisonment and 
fine awaits those apprehended after violating our Laws, I am sure such publicity would have a 
wholesome effect.”139 While the U.S immigration authorities successfully created a regime of 
terror and threat nationally, and achieved a discourse around the criminality of immigrants, 
individuals in the system also aspired to spread this threat as an international reputation of 
exclusivity and legal restriction. Efforts to create global awareness of the limitations of American 
inclusion included stationing of American officials abroad, release of foreign language press 
dispatches, and the cultivation of relationships with state agents around the world. 
Scholars of immigration history have begun to take note of the fact that the migrant 
population which reached the American ports was itself a globally pre-determined group, having 
been selected through inspection and screening at ports of exit in European nations.  As Congress 
ramped up immigration restriction and deportation legislation throughout the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the immigration officials responsible for turning these laws into 
enforceable practice were daunted by the task of policing immigration both at home and abroad, 
and realized that to simplify their jobs at home required taking a more active intervention in 
migrant departures abroad.  During the early twentieth century, and particularly after the advent 
of stricter restriction laws in the 1910s and 1920s, a system for screening immigrants before they 
reached American shores became necessary.  For years, the United States debated in the courts 
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who was responsible for the cost of reshipping immigrants who were marked for restriction, 
either for various deficiencies, or, later, merely for being in excess of quota.  As a result of the 
turmoil caused by the returning of excluded immigrants from America, European nations began 
creating their own screening points before departure of would-be migrants, often in conjunction 
with American officials and shipping representatives.  As Donna Gabaccia points out, the 
transportation of migrants to the United States, was, in addition to being a cultural and political 
process, an economic transaction firmly rooted in a transnational shipping industry, and 
immigration policy was not immune to the concerns of this industry’s interests.140   
However, what has gone largely unacknowledged and unexplored is that the functioning 
of the growing American deportation apparatus also required contact with overseas powers for 
the maintenance of its success.  The sheer difficulty of documenting and institutionalizing 
records of who had already been deported from the United States was an immense challenge, and 
immigration authorities found themselves creating new tactics for tracking deportees after they 
left the country.  Indeed, by the end of the 1920s, a practice had been put into limited use 
whereby the U.S. Bureau of Immigration would send out “black list cards” to European nations 
to ensure that they not allow these previously deported migrants to attempt to depart to the 
United States again.  As the American Consular Office in Bremen, Germany explained to the 
Commissioner General in early 1930, the black list cards had “proved of great value”, but 
required a quicker transmission of information.  “From two to six months elapse between the 
date of an alien’s deportation and receipt of his black list card by consulates,” they deplored, 
continuing on to state, “it is obvious that a deported alien who intends to attempt reentry is most 
apt to make such an attempt within that period of time.”141 
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The need for this kind of systematic global transmission of deportation records was 
argued by the Office of the Technical Adviser in Belfast to the Commissioner General in 1928 as 
well.  In this instance, the correspondence related to several deportations which were only related 
to the office by family members or acquaintances who exposed them as deportees.  The officer 
wrote that while it was lucky to have informal reporting, “such an unreliable safeguard is all we 
have to insure our knowledge of such deportations” when the deportees attempted to reapply for 
a visa.  Playing into some of the worst fears of American officials regarding the types of 
deportees who needed to be prevented from returning, they cited an example of an immigrant 
deported a month earlier for having committed bigamy in the United States, whose first wife had 
called to inform the Consul of the deportation, thus halting his chances of securing a return 
visa.142  Attempting to seek non-governmental solutions to the failure of authorities to prevent 
deportation of migrants coming over quota, the Vice President of the Inter-Racial Council wrote 
to the Secretary of Labor in 1921 to inquire of how they could be of service in informing 
potential migrants abroad about quota fulfillment.  As an organization, he explained, “We are in 
a position, through cooperation with the foreign language papers, to issue a warning to the 
immigrants in the own language, urging them to make certain that the quota is not complete 
before they arrange to bring their relatives to the United States.”143  Such examples reveal the 
centrality of global communication and information networks, the rise of international migration 
restrictions, and the global cooperation required for deportation enforcement.   
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Conclusion 
H.T. Tsiang, in his 1939 “Deportation (A Poem)” written during his detention on Ellis 
Island, expressed the transnational realities of many of the immigrants caught up in the 
machinery of the deportation regime in the haunting lines:  
“Polish Passport, Portuguese visa, Italian ship, no landing at Lisbon.   
Brought here.   
No visa, no parents, no home, no country to go to.”144 
Tsiang’s words encapsulate the inadequacy of a national frame to examine the lives of 
individuals whose experiences did not fit neatly within categories of statehood and belonging.  
For families and individuals facing deportation, migration had often been a multi-step, 
transnational process and affinities did not always neatly line up with citizenship or nations of 
origin.  For those seeking to exile those individuals from the national body, the practicalities of 
passports, visas, shipping permission and numerous other challenges impeded their ability to 
impose their will of simple belonging and foreignness upon people whose statehood status was a 
complex and sometimes undecipherable map of experiences.  Deportation was a key site of 
clashing between national desires and global realities in a period of upheaval, mass migration, 
imperialism, and war.  Examining this demonstrates that deportation has always operated as far 
more than a simple enforcement tool of immigration policy, and has instead been a fraught 
battlefield between levels of authority, modern regulation and recordkeeping and continued 
unmanageability of controlling movement of peoples, and divergent uses of discourses of 
nationalism within a broader global context. Instead, it is revealing of the limits to national 
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power, as well as the densely networked world within which the state sought to exercise this 
power through migration control.  
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Chapter 2- Defining the Nation Through Removal: Financing and Expanding the Growing 
Deportation Apparatus 
 
 
In a February 1925 congressional hearing over a proposed deportation bill, which would 
expand the length of time after which an immigrant could reside in the country and still be 
deportable, Congressman William Bacon Oliver highlighted much of what made deportation 
such a central topic for the time. Congressman Oliver, of Alabama, added another layer to many 
of the critiques raised in the hearing, arguing that deportation provided more than a restructuring 
of the punitive relationship between the state and the non-citizen. Instead, he explained, 
deportation also represented a renegotiation of power between the legislative and executive 
branch of the government, and granted an unprecedented and dangerous degree of power to an 
executive agency. He stated: 
“I am opposed to this bill because I believe it will create a reign of terror among the 
aliens out of whom we are trying so hard to make good citizens… a man might be ripped 
out of his home, from the bosom of his family, ripped out of his business, and sent back 
to his own homeland, no matter how long a time has elapsed between his offense and his 
so-called trial. 
Now, we often argue here about the autocratic power we are giving to the executive 
power of the Government. I say that when you give autocratic power, give it reluctantly 
to responsible officials, give it to men high in the departments; but here you are giving it 
to the lowest kind of official you can find in the department, and you are giving him a 
greater power than that given any of the judges of the United States, the power to banish 
men from this country of ours.”145 
Deportation, as Oliver and many of his contemporaries noted, did more than regulate 
immigration. Instead, it restructured the administrative powers of the state, and acted as an 
impetus for the evolution of a powerful, centralized agency, often quite independent from 
oversight, which established itself with an unprecedented presence throughout the nation. Indeed, 
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as Oliver noted, the impact of deportation, far outweighing what can be understood by its 
statistics, lay in the imposition of a reign of terror—a pervasive identity of deportability among 
the non-citizen population. But the rise of the deportation state did more than this. It also 
reaffirmed that the rights, protections, and benefits provided by the state were to be the exclusive 
privilege of its citizen populations, and that the state was going to invest its resources into 
drawing stricter delineations between denizens and citizens. The expanding national project of 
state-building through removal must be seen not simply as the enforcement arm of existing 
immigration policy, but as a distinct and aggressive agenda, one facilitated by a rapidly growing 
infrastructure for its enforcement.  
This chapter begins by exploring the establishment of this growing power, and a 
discussion of its vast and growing reach across the nation. It then traces the reach of the state and 
the areas where it exercised these growing powers, as well as who it exercised them against. 
Following that, I explain the economics of deportation, and the immense strain over the 
financing of the deportation state. As many of the immigration officials of the time argued, 
deportation held almost endless promise for reshaping and controlling the national population—
if only sufficient funds were made available. The chapter then examines the expansion of the 
national project into the imperial peripheries of the country, explaining how deportation 
transcended the borders of the continental United States and became part of the process of 
claiming and consolidating sovereignty in ambiguous territorial spaces. Finally, it will explore 
resistance against these developments, particularly focusing on the critique that deportation 
practice was an integral tool of modern American capitalism by providing an elastic and 
expendable labor force.  
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While much of this project emphasizes the critical necessity of looking beyond the 
national frame to understand the broader project of enforcing deportation policy, this chapter 
interrogates the category of the nation. Deportation practice did more than simply enforce and 
strengthen the existing borders of the nation during this period. It both reified understandings of 
national sovereignty and the power to exclude, and acted as a conscious form of state-building 
through removal. Responding to inquiries over the proposed Deportation Act of 1926, Albert 
Johnson, head of the House Committee on Immigration explained, “The courts have held that the 
United States has that right; that it is our sovereign right to decide summarily as to who among 
the alien peoples of the United States may be thrown out.”146  In a different hearing on the matter 
of deportation, Johnson warned against allowing notions of “tolerance” to conflict with the 
assertion of state authority, arguing that “you can be sure that if we get so tolerant in the United 
States that we lose all ideas of sovereignty,” the nation will be overtaken by foreign 
ideologies.147  
As the Bureau of Immigration knit together an increasingly coordinated web of 
participants in the project of deportation, from sub-district directors to institutional wardens to 
local police, it simultaneously grew the power and reach of the federal government into the lives 
of individuals and communities throughout the nation. This growing power was far from 
uncontested, even from within the federal government. In the same 1925 congressional hearing 
on deportation, several congressmen both reiterated and critiqued the power of removal. 
Congressman Dickstein argued, “I recognized the wisdom of having a clear or unambiguous 
codification of the law on this subject,” and explained that despite impressions to the contrary he 
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supported deportations at times, but explained, “it should not be harsh or tyrannical or contrary 
to the best traditions of America.”148  
In hearings before the House Committee on Immigration about the proposed 1926 
Deportation Bill, Chairman Johnson’s inquiries highlighted the shifting basis of the deportation 
state, explaining the Committee was looking not for how to eliminate specific threats or racial 
groups, but, more simply, to “greatly enlarge the number of deportations.”149 This major 
reframing of the agenda of deportation represented one of the greatest departures from previous 
decades. The idea of increased deportation as a goal in and of itself, rather than as a means to 
respond to a more specific threat or social problem, is a critical shift which requires more 
examination. As Gary Gerstle argues of the growth and unprecedented autonomy of the 
Immigration Service, “Unrestricted control of immigration and naturalization gave the federal 
government the power to profoundly shape the composition of the American population and 
polity.”150  
Within a matter of only a few decades during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, the regulation of immigration transformed from being a small-scale, state controlled 
effort to one of the most powerful and far-reaching bureaucracies of the era. This growth, and the 
establishment of the practical mechanisms to support it, stands as one of the most notable and 
long-lasting legacies of the period. Gerstle notes that “the central government was making full 
use of the free hand it possessed in designing immigration and naturalization laws,”151 and I 
would add, in designing the enforcement mechanisms, institutional networks, and labor force 
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required to make these laws matter.  In her examination of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service during the later period of the Bracero program and the mass removals of guest laborers, 
Kitty Calavita highlights the unique authority and autonomy of the INS, explaining that it had 
long held far more power than most federal agencies. The story of immigration control, she 
explained, was “a story about informal lawmaking and the ability of one federal agency not just 
to interpret and implement the policy agenda handed down by Congress, but in fact to set the 
agenda.”152 Throughout this project, I examine the various ways that immigration authorities and 
other interested parties on the ground set the agenda of the early deportation state, but it is 
critical also to note what this meant for the early expansion of the centralized administrative 
nation-state. Although deportation scholarship has long been dominated by an emphasis on 
policy debates and congressional or judicial decision-making, it is clear that for many 
governmental figures of the period, what was striking about deportation was how thoroughly 
within the hands of the executive agency it was.  
To understand the new centrality of deportation to the evolving American nation during 
this period, it is necessary to examine what the power to examine, control, and remove 
immigrant bodies from the nation truly meant. Amy Fairchild touches on the increasing power of 
immigration control during the Progressive era and beyond and argues that this shift “is 
dependent both on a physical ordering of bodies, creating hierarchies of belonging and worth, 
and on a very practice, real-world need to control bodies, to make them perform as demanded 
and expected. Finally, it is dependent on excluding bodies…” While she powerfully explores the 
immense control the immigration authorities had to impose their visions of fitness and worth on 
individual immigrant bodies, she also notes that this effort held not only “coercive” elements, but 
                                                          
152 Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S. (New York: Routledge, 
1992): 1. 
102 
 
in fact “productive,” ones, in the establishment of a norm of industrial fitness and health that was 
easy to police through the removal and exclusion of those who deviated from it.153  
However, this expanded federal power went beyond even the effort to control immigrant 
bodies and to examine and regulate them within established hierarchies. Eithne Luibheid 
highlights this eloquently in her study of exclusion on sexual grounds. “Immigration control is 
not just a powerful symbol of nationhood and people,” she states, “but also a means to literally 
construct the nation and the people in particular ways.” Immigration control, she argues, has 
been critical to both the production of the “racial, ethnic, and class compositions” of the United 
States, but also “equally integral to the reproduction of patriarchal heterosexuality as the nation’s 
official sexual and gender order.”154 While Luibheid focuses only on border control, rather than 
post-entry social control deportations, I would argue that it was these conjoined projects that 
were so vital for the expansion of federal power in the 1920s. The growth of the deportation state 
provided the immigration service to engage in a perpetual policing of that composition, not only 
at the borders, but after entry. Between the imposition of the Quota Acts (with their clear 
authority for selecting the desired ethnic and racial composition of the nation), and the 
development of a more powerful, stringent deportation regime with new enforcement strength, 
the federal government gained an unprecedented set of powers during the 1920s, with 
tremendous ramifications for the future of the nation-state. 
To explore what this meant for the state during the 1920s requires examining how it 
actually wielded these expanded powers. As I will explain, the immigration service was always 
strapped for cash at this moment, and whom it chose to deport reflects a great deal about its 
priorities. When questioned before Congress about how deportation officials confined 
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themselves to “emergency cases” because of the lack of funds, Assistant Secretary of Labor 
White explained, “we must live within our appropriations.”155 As such, we might ask—why were 
these the cases officials attempted to pursue with their limited funds? The rationales for 
deportation, particularly health (both physical and mental), crime, sexual transgressions, and 
economic dependency are addressed in Chapter 4, but it is also critical to explore the racial 
dynamics of deportation priorities. Because deportations were tracked by both the nation to 
which an immigrant was sent, as well as the “race or people” of an immigrant, it can be 
challenging to get a full understanding of the actual racial project enacted by deportation. Thus, 
for example, in the chart below, it should be noted that large numbers of the English and French 
populations deported were not removed to England or France, but to Canada, which was the 
largest recipient of deportees for much of the early 1920s.  
 
Figure 2: Number of Immigrants Deported by “Race or People” and Percentage of Overall 
Deportees, 1921-1929 
“Race or 
People” 
1921 % 
1921 
1923 % 
1923 
1925 % 
1925 
1927 % 
1927 
1929 % 
1929 
African (black) 99 2.2 70 1.9 167 1.8 266 2.3 247 1.9 
Armenian 8 0.2 9 0.2 26 0.3 27 0.2 19 0.1 
Bohemian and 
Moravian 
(Czech) 
17 0.4 7 0.2 30 0.3 14 0.1 53 0.4 
Bulgarian, 
Serbian, and 
Montenegrin 
28 0.6 47 1.3 105 1.1 76 0.7 148 1.1 
Chinese 341 7.7 224 6.1 261 2.8 214 1.8 121 0.9 
Croatian and 
Slovenian 
65 1.4 16 0.4 117 1.2 152 1.3 88 0.7 
Cuban 3 0.1 7 0.2 8 0.1 33 0.3 20 0.2 
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Figure 2 (cont.): Number of Immigrants Deported by “Race or People” and Percentage of 
Overall Deportees, 1921-1929 
Dalmatian, 
Bosnian, and 
Herzegovinian 
5 0.1 4 0.1 22 0.2 20 0.2 12 0.1 
Dutch and 
Flemish 
43 0.9 24 0.7 249 2.6 264 2.3 236 1.8 
East Indian 19 0.5 51 1.4 67 0.7 67 0.6 40 0.3 
English 389 8.6 401 11.0 1072 11.3 1744 15.0 938 7.3 
Finnish  56 1.2 17 0.5 94 1.0 92 0.8 79 0.6 
French 179 3.9 302 8.3 469 4.9 490 4.2 750 5.8 
German 252 5.6 121 3.3 750 7.9 847 7.3 72 5.6 
Greek 82 1.8 83 2.3 279 2.9 162 1.4 158 1.2 
Hebrew 134 2.9 99 2.7 250 2.6 184 1.6 153 1.2 
Irish 139 3.1 137 3.7 554 5.8 600 5.1 572 4.4 
Italian (North) 30 0.7 30 0.8 152 1.6 192 1.6 125 1.0 
Italian (South) 216 4.8 188 5.1 644 6.8 540 4.6 458 3.6 
Japanese 71 1.6 109 3.0 83 0.9 58 0.5 120 0.9 
Korean 0 0 1 (1) 6 (1) 4 (1) 2 (1) 
Lithuanian 20 0.4 9 0.4 23 0.2 20 0.2 26 0.2 
Magyar 32 0.7 21 0.6 72 0.6 112 1.0 97 0.8 
Mexican 1268 28.1 1012 10.2 1751 18.4 2701 23.2 5407 41.9 
Pacific Islander 0 0 0 0 3 (1) 6 (1) 1 (1) 
Polish 138 3.1 63 1.7 169 1.7 211 1.8 234 1.8 
Portuguese 46 1.0 37 1.0 65 0.7 63 0.5 70 0.5 
Rumanian 16 0.4 21 0.6 82 0.9 74 0.6 95 0.7 
Russian 380 8.4 37 1.0 93 1.0 141 1.2 81 0.6 
Ruthenian 
(Russniak) 
28 0.6 27 0.7 44 0.5 57 0.5 47 0.4 
Scandinavian 
(Norwegians, 
Danes, Swedes) 
93 2.0 78 2.1 512 5.4 584 5.0 506 3.9 
Scotch 105 2.3 149 4.1 463 4.9 487 4.2 390 3.0 
Slovak 16 0.4 20 0.5 97 1.0 169 1.4 191 1.5 
Spanish 94 2.1 151 4.1 324 3.4 504 4.3 265 2.1 
Spanish 
American 
15 0.3 22 0.6 67 0.7 101 0.9 175 1.4 
Syrian 33 0.7 20 0.5 116 1.2 72 0.6 51 0.4 
Turkish 6 0.1 3 0.1 18 0.2 10 0.1 7 0.1 
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Figure 2 (cont.): Number of Immigrants Deported by “Race or People” and Percentage of 
Overall Deportees, 1921-1929 
Welsh 7 0.1 2 0.1 42 0.5 60 0.5 37 0.3 
West Indian 
(except Cuban) 
7 0.2 3 0.1 7 0.1 7 (1) 8 0.1 
Other Peoples 36 0.8 39 1.1 150 1.6 243 2.1 160 1.2 
*Compiled from the Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1921, 1923, 1925, 1927, 1929. 
Immigration scholars have tended to assume that the patterns of post-entry deportation 
followed those of exclusion during this period, with a strong emphasis on curtailing Southern 
and Eastern European migration, Mexican migration (of the more permanent variety), along 
with, more fully, Chinese migration. In fact, however, the deportation statistics displayed above 
suggest a quite significant divergence from these patterns. While Mexican immigrants were, 
especially by the end of the decade, a high proportion of the number of total deportees, they were 
also a very high proportion of the overall number of immigrants. Furthermore, the years in which 
their removals were highest corresponded closely with the years of economic downturn and 
large-scale layoffs of laborers, and in the middle of the decade, dipped to only about 10% of 
overall deportations. Notably, while it has received so much less attention in the scholarship on 
deportation, for the first half the decade, Canada was the largest recipient of deportees in most 
years, not Mexico. By 1925, Canada still surpassed Mexico in number of deportations, with a 
total of 1,914 Canadian nationals removed that year.156 
Furthermore, as the chart reveals, some of the groups which nativists, eugenicists, and 
many in Congress felt posed the greatest threat to the national well-being were in fact, not 
particularly large proportions of the overall population of deportees. Italians, for instance, even 
in combination between Northern and Southern, never surpassed 9% of total deportations, even 
as their policing gained particular attention in the press and public eye. Polish deportations 
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ranged between 1.7 and 3.1% throughout the decade, while Greek deportations never rose above 
3%, and neither “Bohemian and Moravian (Czech)” nor Lithuanian deportations ever crept past 
0.4%. Particularly considering that these groups were often the most deeply connected in the 
public imagination with perceived threats of crime, mental inferiority, and economic 
dependency, it is striking that their removals never occurred at a higher rate. 
Simultaneously, the high rates of deportation among many of the “worthy” Northern and 
Western European populations which many restrictionists championed (and which the Quota 
Acts had been rewritten for 1924 to favor), are also noteworthy. Scandinavians, who were so 
often celebrated as superior “Nordic” peoples, were more than 5% of deportees by mid-decade, 
while German deportees composed nearly 8% of total removals at the same point. Perhaps what 
stands out most is that English deportations remained high throughout the decade, ranging from 
7.3% to 15.0% of total removals, and in 1923, even composing a larger percentage of the total 
deportations than Mexicans. When combined with relative high rates of Irish and Scotch 
deportations (peaking at almost 5% by mid-decade, quite considerable for a relatively small 
overall immigrant population), the total deportations for nationals of the British Isles were high 
indeed. 
While it is impossible to know with certainty what the removals of these populations, 
generally deemed “desirable” and fit for contribution and commingling with the American 
public, actually can be attributed to, these patterns demonstrate the need for more study.  They 
also suggest that more established immigrant populations with more English-language skills and 
more knowledge of the services of the nation might have been more likely to end up in the 
institutions of the state, where they could be more readily apprehended for deportation.  What 
these number also might denote is an increasing concern with perfecting the populations that had 
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been accepted as worthy citizens-in-waiting. By that I mean, in order to more fully integrate 
these populations into the national body, they had to be cleansed of their social problems—their 
insane, their criminals, their deviants, while other populations needed a more blanket rejection. 
By removing those who threatened the well-being of the accepted segments of the social body, 
immigration officials paved the way for their more complete integration into a particular vision 
of the American nation, and protected the very “desirability” of these populations. Perhaps most 
importantly, these numbers demonstrate quite clearly the critical importance of not mapping the 
agendas and priorities of immigration restriction more generally over the practice of post-entry 
deportations. 
To understand the priorities of the growing deportation state, it is also necessary to 
examine where immigrants were deported from. Immigration control is so commonly told as a 
story of Angel and Ellis Islands, of the Mexican Borderlands, and perhaps, on occasion, of the 
northern border. In reality, however, the expansion of post-entry deportations broadened that 
story to include the entire nation, involving local, state, and federal officials, institutional 
employees, and the broader public, in to the project of determining the population of the nation. 
The following chapter more thoroughly explores the local dimensions of the deportation regime, 
but it should be noted here that one of the most remarkable achievements of the deportation state 
in the 1920s was in connecting and streamlining communication between the different 
immigration stations around the country. As post-entry deportation increasingly became a viable 
option for controlling and disciplining immigrant populations during and after the 1920s, the 
infrastructure of the newly empowered immigration service expanded. It is particularly notable 
that this happened alongside the development of the Border Patrol in 1924, demonstrating the 
parallel concerns with excluding and removing unwanted peoples. 
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In 1923, to keep pace with the growth of the internal policing of migrants, the 
Immigration Service underwent a major reorganization of its field service. “In order to effect a 
closer cooperation between the Bureau of Immigration in Washington and its field service,” the 
Commissioner General explained, “a readjustment of district boundaries was made on January 1, 
1923, based upon a careful consideration of geographical aspects and transportation facilities.” 
This reorganization led to the creation of new district offices, and, notably, of a new supervisory 
staff, tasked as “representatives of the department and bureau in visiting the various districts,” to 
make recommendations on creating a more streamlined and efficient service.157 After the 
reorganization, the district had 35 districts, plus a special district in New York and New Jersey 
for “Chinese matters only.” Of these 35 districts, two were in Canada, one was in Alaska, one in 
Puerto Rico, on in Hawaii, and the rest throughout the continental United States. The map below 
suggests the ways in which the federal immigration service had gained a remarkable reach, and 
visually traces the network of spaces in which deportees were apprehended and gathered to await 
deportation. Within each of these marked districts, smaller sub-districts operated, which sent 
deportees to the attention of the district offices for investigation. 
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Figure 3: Map of District Offices of the Immigration Field Service, 1923 
 
*Compiled from the Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1923. 
1. Montreal, Canada  
2. Portland, ME 
3. Boston, MA 
4. Ellis Island, NY 
Harbor 
5. Buffalo, NY 
6. Gloucester City, NJ 
7. Pittsburgh, PA 
8. Baltimore, MD 
9. Norfolk, VA 
10. Jacksonville, FL 
11. Detroit, MI 
12. Cincinnati, OH 
13. Atlanta, GA 
14. Chicago, IL 
15. St. Louis, MO 
16. Memphis, TN 
17. New Orleans, LA 
18. Winnipeg, Canada 
19. Minneapolis, MN 
20. Omaha, NE 
21. Kansas City, MO 
22. San Antonio, TX 
23. Helena, MT 
24. Denver, CO 
25. El Paso, TX 
26. Spokane, WA 
27. Salt Lake City, UT 
28. Seattle, WA 
29. Portland, OR  
30. San Francisco, CA 
31. Los Angeles, CA 
32. Ketchikan, AK 
33. San Juan, P.R. (To 
include the 
Territory of Porto 
Rico and the Virgin 
Islands) 
34. Honolulu, HI 
35. Galveston, TX 
36. Special District, 
NY and NJ- 
“Chinese matters 
only” 
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Examining this map, it is possible to see that the immigration service played a critical 
function not only in ensuring that “undesirable” immigrants could be identified, detained, and 
removed from all over the interior of the nation, but also that these processes could occur at some 
of the farther reaches of the nation, as is explained later in this chapter. Furthermore, the 
apprehension and deportation of immigrants from all of these disparate national spaces was not 
so telling in isolation as is the increasing coordination and centralization within which this was 
made possible. By initiating networks of reporting and documentation not only with these district 
offices, but with all public and private charitable, medical, and carceral institutions within these 
districts, the immigration service established a massive bureaucracy which surveilled and tracked 
immigrants in a previously inconceivable way. As Commissioner Hull himself noted, the work “I 
hardly think any one has yet been able to visualize the magnitude of the problem that confronts 
the Immigration Bureau,” which faced the immense challenge, he explained, of over 5,000 miles 
of land border, and 10,000 miles of water borders.158  
It is also necessary to examine, as best as the available sources allow, where immigrants were 
actually departing from after their initial apprehension in these districts around the country. 
Unfortunately, the Immigration Service did not keep statistics of the number of deportees at the 
district offices around the country before they were transferred to a port or border station for 
removal. Thus, there is no record of the number of immigrants ordered deported under the 
jurisdiction of the various interior districts (i.e. Omaha, Chicago, Denver, etc.). However, these 
statistics do give some sense of the distribution of deportees around the country, and certainly 
undermine the tendency in scholarship to think of immigration control as something that 
occurred at Ellis and Angel Islands alone. Deportations took place not only through the largest 
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ports of entry, but all around the edges of the country. The expansiveness of the deportation 
state, I insist, brought the project of deportation into the public eye in this way, as did the trains 
discussed in Chapter 5, which brought deportees from the interior to their many points of exit. As 
the following section details, one of the greatest challenges of this expanded infrastructure was 
its expense, which often thwarted the accomplishment of the Immigration Service’s full 
aspirations
Figure 4: Immigrants Deported by Port or District, 1929 
Port or District Aliens 
Deported 
After 
Landing  
Port or District Aliens 
Deported 
After 
Landing 
Atlantic Total 2677 Other Gulf 5 
New York, NY 1839 Pacific Total 582 
Boston, MA 165 San Francisco, CA 246 
Philadelphia, PA 191 Portland, OR 48 
Baltimore, MD 139 Seattle, WA 125 
Canadian Atlantic 18 Canadian Pacific 20 
Portland, ME 12 Mexican Border Seaport 143 
New Bedford, MA 14 Canadian Border Total 3401 
Providence, RI 34 Montreal District   
Newport News, VA 12 Buffalo District  
Norfolk, VA 45 Detroit District  
Savannah, GA 17 Grand Forks District  
Miami, FL 31 Spokane District  
Key West, FL 39 Mexican Border Total 5618 
Other Atlantic 121 San Antonio District  
Gulf of Mexico Total 595 El Paso District  
Tampa, FL 37 Los Angeles District  
Pensacola, FL 6 Other Total 35 
Mobile, AL 35 Alaska 5 
New Orleans, LA 267 Hawaii 7 
Galveston, TX 245 Porto Rico 23 
*Compiled from the Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1929.
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Financing Removal: Federal Appropriations and the Debates over the Cost of Deportation  
Although few aspects of deportation figured more prominently in the minds of 
immigration authorities during the 1920s, scholars have largely neglected a deep discussion of 
the economics of the growing deportation state. As the department responded to congressional, 
local, institutional, and public pressures to increase deportations, they strained against budgetary 
limitations, and throughout the 1920s, Congressional records are filled with hearings over 
increased appropriations for the Bureau of Immigration. Particularly after the creation of the 
Border Patrol, the Bureau struggled to balance the costs of securing the borders against the 
unauthorized entry of migrants, and of removing “undesirables” after their entry. In a 1926 
appropriations hearing, Commissioner General Hull was asked directly whether deportation or 
border work was more important, and waffled on his response, unwilling to say one took 
precedence over the other. “Sometimes you can make a good argument that the most important 
work is the border-patrol work, and it is very important because it is cheaper to keep people out 
of the country than to let them come in and send them out,” Hull explained, but concluded, “On 
the other hand, the importance of deporting people is very pressing.”159  
Throughout the decade, officials began to reconceptualize deportation as more than a 
selective mechanism for ridding the country of specific threats and “dangerous” individuals. 
Instead, officials discussed what would be required (in terms of infrastructure, coordination, and 
budget), in order to remove all identifiable unauthorized immigrants from the nation. Robe Carl 
White, the Assistant Secretary of Labor made a highly revealing assessment of the situation in a 
hearing before the House of Representatives Committee on Immigration and Naturalization in 
1926. Speaking on the proposed Deportation Act of 1926, White explained deportations were 
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limited primarily not by insufficient legislation on the matter, but in fact by limited funds for 
enforcing that legislation. Asked by a congressman whether there could be a “tremendous 
increase in deportations” even without new legislation, White responded “Oh, yes. We could 
make the deportations almost anything you wanted, until we rid the country of the aliens who are 
illegally here.” In fact, he explained, the department had already begun to study the calculations 
of what “complete deportation” might look like, and had reached a “conservative” best estimate 
that there were between 250,000 and 275,000 unauthorized aliens in the country, the “greater 
proportion” of whom would be deportable.160 
As the Bureau of Immigration set out to exercise that “power to banish men,” they 
encountered a number of challenges, including the logistics and expense of actually enacting this 
power. One of the most under examined aspects of deportation practice in the early twentieth 
century is the economics of what Commissioner Hull called that “very pressing” agenda. One of 
the many ways that deportation practice was fundamentally reshaped in this decade was 
budgetary, as the Department of Labor negotiated for greater and greater appropriations to 
bolster the project of expelling unauthorized immigrants from around the interior of the nation. 
The rise of the border patrol in this period has received attention, but there has been less focus on 
the attendant rise in funds for policing immigration beyond the edges of the nation, and well after 
initial entry. Of the many logistical facets of creating and enforcing the growing deportation 
regime during the 1920s, arguably none were more squarely within the power of the national 
government than its budget. Deportation appropriations were determined by Congress, after 
which the Bureau of Immigration, within the Department of Labor, would allocate resources to 
the various sub-districts of immigration, and after 1924, to the Border Patrol.   
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 By 1924, the Immigration Bureau was becoming more insistent in its reports to Congress 
about the centrality of post-entry deportation of immigrants, those guilty of crimes, but also those 
in violation of immigration law, signaling a broader agenda of deportation. “The deportation of 
aliens found to be unlawfully in the United States,” the Commissioner General explained in his 
1924 Annual report, “is rapidly becoming one of the most important functions of the 
Immigration Service, and as the laws governing the admission of aliens become more restrictive 
in character the deportation problem becomes more difficult and exacting.”161 Because of this, he 
went on to report, the Bureau had deported 6,409 aliens the previous fiscal year, which number 
was “far in excess of any previous year.”162 In the following year’s report, the Commissioner 
again boasted, “this is the largest number that has been deported in any one year in the history of 
this service.” He explained that just under 9,500 immigrants had been removed, of which, nearly 
2,000 were sent to Canada, and over 1,800 more to Mexico, and that “minus a small percentage 
of South Americans, Asiatics, and Africans,” the rest were sent to various European countries.163  
Hull again urged Congress to recognize the difficulty and immensity of deportation in a 
1926 request for greater appropriations, declaring “It is a very difficult and wonderful work.”164 
Hull’s request reflects the logistical challenges presented by escalating to such a massive 
infrastructure for removal over such a short period of time. In response to congressional 
pushback against allotting the requested funds, he asserted, “You can not build this service up 
and build it up economically and efficiently in so short a time,” reflecting the intense balancing 
act immigration officials felt between their goals of greater removals and their budgetary 
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constraints.165 The 1920s thus clearly represented a critical turning point in the construction of 
the modern deportation state, not only in its ideological underpinnings, but also in the negotiation 
of its pragmatic application. 
However, as the frequent frustrations of the Bureau of Immigration reflected, this project 
was far from completed and it continued to face major budgetary obstacles. When facing 
Congress to demand greater appropriations for deportation, the Commissioner General was sure 
to highlight what the project of deportation could achieve if it only had sufficient funding. The 
department was taking such on such an active program of deportations, Hull explained in 1926, 
that they ran out of funds within the first seven months of the fiscal year, and were forced to 
suspend their work until more funds became available. When asked by Chairman Johnson 
whether he was “obliged at any time to delay the matter of deportations for lack of funds,” Hull 
stated, “Why, we certainly do,” and detailed these delays in greater depth. As of January 15th of 
1926, he showed, there were at least 2,835 immigrants waiting in detention because of the lack 
of funds to activate their deportations. By later in the year, in a hearing requesting further 
appropriations, Hull reported that the number awaiting deportation had surpassed 5,000, of 
which roughly 800 were detained at government expense, while most of the others were detained 
in state and local institutions.166 
These limitations were echoed by Assistant Secretary of Labor Robe Carl White, who 
explained that in addition to those already served with warrants of deportation who could not be 
removed physically for lack of finances, there were so many more immigrants throughout the 
country who could be searched out and apprehended. The Bureau of Immigration, he explained, 
had never been able to fulfill its promised goal of going out to all of the Immigration Districts of 
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the nation and surveying to determine how many “aliens are in that district unlawfully.” Instead, 
he lamented, in spite of frequent requests from around the country for them to come do surveys 
and identify deportable immigrants, the Bureau has been forced to limit itself to “what we call 
the emergency work—the work that is right in front of them, the deporting of aliens who are 
reported to the Immigration Service through various sources, civil authorities and individuals.”167 
While Chapter 3 delves more deeply into the local reporting of this “emergency work,” it is 
critical to note here the ongoing conflict between the state’s desire for increased deportation and 
its inability to keep pace through a fully funded apparatus for carrying out these aims. 
When negotiating for additional funds, immigration authorities were careful to 
demonstrate that they were being thrifty and making the most of the funds that they had. The 
Commissioner General reported that the Immigration Bureau’s efforts to reduce costs while 
increasing deportations through the practice of allowing aliens to reship one way foreign as 
seamen were wildly successful. This practice gained in popularity throughout the decade, and 
often served the interests of both the government and the deportee. The Bureau saved money by 
not having to pay the deportee’s passage, while for many immigrants, it provided an opportunity 
for a quicker departure for detention and also allowed them to earn some money before having to 
start their new lives in their home nation. While many worried about the possibility that aliens 
could escape or desert their ships and reenter the U.S., the Bureau insisted that its protections 
(most often not letting deportees travel on ships which would dock again in the U.S. before 
transatlantic passage) were strong enough to make the benefits of the system worthwhile.168 By 
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1925, the Commissioner reported that 958 immigrants chose this option, which saved the 
government over $148,000 in shipping expenses.169  
 
Figure 5: “Aliens Permitted to Reship One Way Foreign in Lieu of Being Deported,” 1925 
Port Number of Aliens Saving 
Montreal 5 $575.00 
Boston 5 $515.00 
Ellis Island 146 $16,060.00 
Philadelphia 268 $51,716.48 
Baltimore 7 $1,078.13 
Norfolk 25 $6,575.00 
Jacksonville 20 $2,678.51 
New Orleans 33 $4,900.00 
Galveston 355 $48,635.00 
Los Angeles 27 $3,798.44 
San Francisco 27 $5,800.00 
Seattle 40 $5,950.00 
Total 958 $148,281.56 
*Compiled from the Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1925. 
Throughout this period, in addition to the savings created through allowing immigrants to 
reship foreign upon the execution of their deportation warrants, there was also an increasing 
trend toward the use of “voluntary departures,” or “repatriation.” By employing repatriation, the 
government saved itself a great deal of money on detention, warrant proceedings, and labor. 
Additionally, they were able to pressure the departure of many immigrants who would not have, 
legally speaking, been eligible for deportation. Deportation increasingly became integrated into a 
broader range of opportunities for expulsion from the nation, which reshaped the state by 
establishing a permanently vulnerable class of non-citizens. While not reflected in the official 
statistics on deportation, practice of encouraging potential deportees to return voluntarily rather 
                                                          
169 Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1925. 
118 
 
than undergo formal deportation warrant proceedings was one of the most critical initiatives for 
financial expediency (as well as a powerful way to circumvent the inconvenient limitations of 
deportation law.  
 
Figure 6: Forms of Deportation and Removal, 1928 
Deported at 
Government 
Expense 
Deported at 
Steamship 
Expense 
Reshipped 
Foreign 
Departed 
Voluntarily 
Total 
7,313 2,032 887 1,393 11,625 
*Compiled from the Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1928. 
This practice was particularly common for Mexican immigrants, partially because of the 
ease of removal over the border. Although its use in the 1930s has garnered most attention, it 
was already frequently employed by the preceding decade. Zaragosa Vargas notes this in his 
study of Mexican workers in the Midwest, stating, “A total of 21,400 Mexicans were deported 
[repatriated] by the Immigration Bureau in 1921. The government deportation drives undertaken 
in January of the previous year, which targeted radicals, had been a dress rehearsal for these 
removals.”170 While I would argue that these statements ignore the broader growth of the 
deportation state and its agenda, which stretched far beyond targeted removals of radicals, the 
point that deportation practices served as a training ground for more flexible, unrestricted forms 
of removals remains salient and critical. As Assistant Secretary of Labor White explained before 
a hearing on new deportation legislation in 1926, during the previous year, over 3,000 Mexicans 
had been “voluntarily” returned to Mexico from the San Antonio district of the Bureau of 
immigration alone. Congressman Box of Texas inquired about how this practice work operated, 
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“You carry them back across the Rio Grande in truckloads, then?” and upon receiving an 
affirmative response from White, crudely joked, “A sort of holiday trip.”171 
Repatriating immigrants and reshipping immigrants foreign as seamen was not, however, 
the only form of economy practiced by the Bureau. Other tactics included careful coordination of 
deportation parties “with a view to maximum economy,” a practice which states argued only 
shifted the burden of expense to the detaining locality, rather than truly eliminating costs. As 
Commissioner Hull explained before Congress, when a deportation could not yet be effected, the 
immigrants were held “at the points of deportation, or they may be detained back in the country, 
or they may be left in jail. We do not start after a party, that is all; we just let them stay.” 
Therefore, by January of 1926, he stated, there were at least 2,835 readily deportable immigrants 
waiting for deportation in detention around the country because of insufficient funding, a fact 
which frustrated institutional officials burdened with their care to no end.172 However, the 
increasing power of this administrative agency of the executive branch is visible in the Assistant 
Secretary of Labor’s assertion at this point that although “the courts repeatedly have held we 
have no right to hold an alien an unreasonable amount of time,” the service had been able to 
ignore that in many cases. “It is true that we have held aliens as high as two years,” White 
explains, but lists a variety of reasons that would occur, including passport and nativity issues. 
Most tellingly, he states, “or we carried them on because they were generally bad ones and we 
figured they should be confined.”173 
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Other attempts to save money included the use of the port of Galveston instead of New 
York, which provided cheaper transatlantic rates, saving the department almost $21,000 in 1925 
alone.174 In order to maximize deportations, the Bureau actively encouraged competition 
between different railroad and shipping companies, and companies rose to the occasion, offering 
incentives such as free guards and complementary passage for officials and matrons. By 1926, 
the average cost of deportation per individual was $87. This number included a variety of 
expenses for detention, rail, and water transport (all of which depended on site of apprehension, 
complexity of case, and destination of removal), but which did not include the departmental 
overhead, which as officials pointed out, was significant, even with a severely understaffed 
Bureau.175 
Delaying deportations until a larger party was ready for removal did not truly reduce the 
cost of deportation as much as the Bureau claimed. Instead, it merely shifted the burden onto the 
state and local institutions which were forced to detain them longer until their removal could be 
effected. Chapter 5 explains the costs of rail transport in greater depth, and explores how the 
ability to deport in bulk by running fewer and larger deportation parties was one of the most 
critical bureaucratic innovations of the period. While some deportees were detained in facilities 
operated by the Bureau of Immigration, most were left waiting for transportation at the point of 
their apprehension in prisons, hospitals or asylums, or were detained in local jails. This issue 
became hotly contested over the course of the decade.  
Local officials reported tremendous costs incurred either by deportees whose travel was 
stalled by the federal Bureau, or institutionalized immigrants who never even were put into 
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deportation proceedings because of a lack of funds. A 1925 census of the Penal Institutions of 
New York revealed startlingly high costs. Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization in 1926 revealed that “the State Hospital offered to the immigration authorities 
400 insane for deportation, and that of that number only 241 were deported... the cost of 
confining the criminal and insane aliens in this State is running close to $7,000,000." The range 
of institutions involved is visible in the fact that beyond the high number in the hospitals, the 
New York Institution for Defective Delinquents alone housed 85 potential deportees, while the 
New York State Reformatory held 41, and the Matteawan State Hospital for the Insane reported 
317 male and 33 female aliens.176 
As critics of the day noted, the actual mechanics of deportation were enacted by private 
companies, who were contracted and overseen by the federal government, and deportation was, 
from this early moment, a profitable business.  Its growth, they recognized, would aid companies 
from the perspective of having easily disciplined, controllable and terrorized labor forces, but for 
some companies, would also bring the much more direct profits of government contracts for 
transportation.  From early on, transportation companies realized that the rise of deportation 
would mean potential income, and throughout the 1920s, such companies increasingly competed 
for government contracts for detaining, feeding, and moving deportees.  Within the criticism of 
the private profits of deportation, complaints also emerged about the tendency of private 
companies to provide substandard food, unsanitary conditions, and the hiring of unprofessional 
or abusive guards for detention and transport in order to save money.  Throughout the period, the 
allotted meal budget for deportees was generally 50 cents a head per meal, but because 
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provisioning deportees was outsourced to private companies, efforts to cut costs and profit at the 
expense of deportees were rampant.177   
While the for-profit prison industry in its modern incarnation is a new phenomenon, the 
profit margin in immigrant removal has deep roots, and expulsion has long been an enticing 
business opportunity for private companies. Throughout the 1920s, railroad lines, steamship 
companies and food suppliers competed for the growing government appropriations for 
deportation, and in doing so, established deportation as a tantalizing business endeavor. The 
particular combination of racial nationalism and economic competition involved in enforcing 
deportation practice in the 1920s is evident in the 1928 correspondence between the 
Commissioner General of Immigration and the Panama Mail Steamship Company, in which the 
Commissioner states that “The Bureau acknowledges receipt of your letter of the 24th ultimo, 
requesting that aliens destined to Mexico, Central and South America, be deported on vessels of 
your line or other American vessels when available, even though the rates are higher than either 
the Mexican or Japanese Lines which are now utilized.  While the Bureau would be glad to 
patronize American Lines in deporting aliens, it must of necessity effect deportations at the 
lowest rates and unless you can compete with foreign lines, it is regretted that nothing can be 
done in the matter.”178  
In other cases, companies realized deported immigrants would make convenient 
replacement workers for deserting seamen, and asked government officials to keep them 
informed of immigrants who might be allowed to ship foreign as laborers upon vessels in lieu of 
deportation.  Throughout the 1920s, the Immigration Service took advantage of this system, 
which saved the government the cost of shipment, and provided cheap labor for transportation 
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companies.  In August of 1923, the Lloyd Royal Belgian Line wrote to the Immigration 
Commissioner of New Orleans, complaining of their labor shortages on steamers currently 
loading in Galveston and New Orleans, and stating that “Should it be possible at any time to 
assist this company in procuring necessary seamen and which might also be a matter of saving in 
the expense of deporting these aliens, we would be glad to cooperate with you.”179  The 
frequency of such requests demonstrates how quick both government officials and individual 
corporate interests were to see the potential profitability of their collusion around deportation. 
 
Policing Migration in the American Empire: Deportation and the Determination of 
National Belonging in Contested Spaces  
 
A 1923 article with the headline “EDITOR BANISHED” in the New York Amsterdam 
News told a story which was by then familiar to American readers in the aftermath of radical 
repression during the post-World War I period.180  The radical editor of a labor newspaper had 
written against the administration and by doing so, had landed himself in deportation 
proceedings.  What was less familiar about this editor’s banishment, however, was the setting- 
the Virgin Islands.  Morgena Bonaparte, British subject from the Island of Tortala and editor of 
the labor paper The Emancipator in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands had been “charged with 
criticizing the Naval administration of the Virgin Islands.”  In the debates that followed, the 
American Civil Liberties Union and the NAACP intervened to fight Bonaparte’s deportation 
order, arguing that it was American Governor Captain Hough’s “dirty plans of revenge” against 
protest to the administration of the Islands.  In a striking response to repression from the 
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government, one commentator argued on behalf of Bonaparte’s case, stating, “Americans respect 
fighters.  They hate weaklings.  It pays to be men.  Never be door-mats.”181 
As this chapter has emphasized, deportation served, in many ways, a very critical state-
building function throughout the period, in which it acted not only to shape the population of the 
nation, but to expand the powers of its government. This section focuses on the role of 
deportation practices in spaces of American empire, such as Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico, 
during the 1920s.  I argue that the process of determining the borders of “American” belonging 
through exclusion, detention, and deportation of migrants, in spaces still tenuously national (both 
legally and in the popular imagination) reveals the power of immigration to reflect as well as 
reshape national identity and political imagination of United States borders.  Immigration 
officials on the ground at I.N.S. stations in Ketchikan, Alaska, federal immigration authorities, 
and Japanese labor migrants deported from Honolulu all sought to negotiate the complex and 
shifting terrain of immigration policy to their strategic advantage, but also to construct their 
particular vision of American identity and the boundaries of belonging.   
Examination of such spaces demonstrates the instrumentality of immigration policy as 
not only a bureaucratic process intended to determine the composition of the national population, 
but also as a tool to assert national identity over contested spaces.  By exercising the power to 
police migration in territories where American identity and authority was far from established or 
unchallenged, immigration policy helped the state to consolidate a sense of national imperial 
dominance and to expand the scope of the American national body, in both physical space and 
the national imagination. Ejecting unwanted migrants from the margins of the United States was 
more than an immigration priority, it was an act of state building and self-definition. 
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Throughout the 1920s, debates raged through congressional hearings, public protests, and 
the press over the agenda of the emerging deportation machinery, and how deportation should be 
implemented and for whose interests.  Congressmen, judges, immigrant advocates, and 
community leaders fiercely questioned the role of deportations expanded range- Was it about 
policing the racial composition of the national population in response to the demands of 
nativists?  Was it about controlling the workforce of the nation and creating a transient, easily-
expelled excess labor pool for capitalist interests?  Was it intended to help expand the 
administrative and executive power of the American nation-state?  Furthermore, while 
deportation law was federal, who really wielded the power to enforce deportation on the ground, 
and who bore the responsibility and expense of its implementation?  Deportation from American 
territories was central to each of these questions, and such debates are central to our 
understanding of deportation as a state function and administrative process, the policing of race 
and immigration, and the 1920s as a time period. 
Frequently, American officials seeking to implement deportation laws ran up against 
practical complications and the realization that multiple levels of authority and interest were 
involved, and nowhere was that more true than in the case of imperial deportations.  The interests 
of the federal government, federal immigration officials in territorial field offices, territorial 
officers, and the business community of colonial territories often clashed over the goals of 
deportation.  The 1920s was a critical period for the redefinition of deportation as a central 
function of the state, as the numbers shot up throughout the decade.  Spaces of American empire, 
while at the periphery of the nation, were important, if partially symbolically, in the 
renegotiation of deportation from a small, selective state function for identifying unwanted 
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individuals to a broad, encompassing power that swept the interior of the nation and both created 
a regime of terror for immigrant communities, and controlled the flow of labor migrations.  
As the federal government debated the future of imperial spaces, and struggled to 
ascertain how these holdings and their indigenous people could fit within the American nation, 
they simultaneously engaged in disputes over the terms of belonging for foreigners.  These dual 
discourses were in interplay in debates over the nation’s power to delineate its own boundaries, 
in terms of both territory and population.  Although scholars have begun to fruitfully explore the 
relationship between U.S. empire and controlling and limiting the national population through 
immigration restriction, they have largely failed to conceptualize how deportation intersected 
with American empire.  At the heart of anxieties of integrating new territories into the America 
nation, scholars have explained, was the tension over the “dangers” posed by being forced to 
integrate their “inferior” peoples alongside their profitable resources. As Matthew Frye Jacobsen 
explains of the various territories acquired by the United States at the end of the nineteenth 
century and the start of the twentieth, “In each of these cases then, where it was tempered at all, 
the impetus to acquire new territories and their peoples was tempered primarily by a pervasive 
fear among American whites that the people themselves, by their very degeneracy or savagery, 
held the power to bring the self-governing republic down in ruin.”182 While the threat of these 
peoples abroad loomed large in the public imagination, perhaps nothing seemed more menacing 
was the possibility that after incorporated as territories, they would migrate to the continent 
republic and disturb the “white” republic.  
As Mae Ngai has explored, the contours of the American empire also played an indirect 
role in determining immigration restriction and deportation through the determination of national 
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quotas. Because the quota counts “left out the populations of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Alaska, 
which American immigration laws governed and whose native-born inhabitants were United 
States citizens,” she explains, the quotas reflected considerably smaller non-white populations 
that their inclusion would have reflected. In effect, she concludes, the delineation of the quota 
count by only continental United States inhabitants “excised all nonwhite, non-European peoples 
from that vision, erasing them from the American nationality.”183 However, with the exception of 
limited scholarship on labor deportations in these spaces, historians have been slow to examine 
the impact and symbolic meaning of immigration restriction within these imperial spaces. In 
spite of the small numbers, territorial deportations reveal that immigration officials believed that 
they could not only protect the center of the nation from particular immigrant threats through 
deportation, but the periphery as well. 
While immigration officials lamented the fact that they could not, officially, deport 
imperial subjects from the continental United States, this did not mean that these spaces were 
exempt from the reach of the expanding deportation regime. As the Commissioner General 
reported in his 1920 annual report, immigration from the insular possessions had been tracked 
yearly since 1914. “It will be understood, of course,” he explained, “that these figures do not 
include citizens of the islands themselves, who are not classed within the meaning of the 
immigration laws.”184 One of the major concerns was that immigrants were migrating from these 
territories into the United States. In 1920 alone, the Commission General of Immigration noted, 
2201 immigrants had arrived from the insular territories—1004 from Hawaii, 891 from Puerto 
Rico, 137 from the Philippines, 169 from the Virgin Islands.185  
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 Furthermore, while citizens of the imperial territories could not be designated as “aliens,” 
and thus could not be deported from the United States, foreign nationals could be deported from 
these imperial spaces. While the numbers of deportees removed from Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands are harder to track because the immigration service did not keep 
statistics of removals by district office, it is likely that these numbers were never large in this 
period. However, the case files of the service suggest that while low in numbers, these removals 
were a significant enough concern of the service to generate a fair amount of debate and extra 
effort for coordination. In the case of the Philippines, however, the Immigration Service tracked 
removals throughout the decade, which in some years reached significant levels. These removals 
were largely of Chinese nationals, with a small number of “East Indian” immigrants, and 
assorted other nationals. The service did not document the rationales for their removal 
consistently throughout the decade, but in 1923, the year they were most thoroughly tracked—of 
the 234 total deportees, 184 were removed as criminals, while another 20 were removed for 
narcotics violations. Such removals may well have contributed to anxieties over the dangers of 
integrating the Philippines into the national body, particularly because of the recognition that 
immigrants were migrating to the continental United States after time in the insular territories. 
 Alfred McCoy discusses earlier deportations of Chinese “criminals,” from Manila in 
1909, and explains that this identity demonstrated the divergent understandings of the local 
community and the imperial government. In the raids against supposed members of the 
“Highbinder Tong,” Governor General Forbes, McCoy explains, rounded up deportees “in the 
name of security.” “While the colonial government depicted the deportees as lethal Chinese 
criminals who could plunge Manila into dread tong warfare,” he asserts, “most of the press 
portrayed them as respectable merchants who had been branded criminals, secretly and falsely, 
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by their rivals in Manila’s Chinese community.”186 Though McCoy focuses largely on earlier 
deportation drives, he mentions that by 1921, deportation was still being utilized as a way for 
individual criminal disputes to be settled within the Philippines. He describes the case of Gan 
Yong, who was deported after he was unable to pay a protection fee and was therefore arrested 
by authorities on drug charges that led him to be deported to China.187 
 
Figure 7: “Aliens Deported From the Philippines Islands” 
Year Total Number 
Deported 
Breakdown of “Races or Peoples” 
1920 117 100 Chinese, 17 East Indian 
1921 454 424 Chinese, 25 East Indian, 1 Japanese, 1 
Scandinavian, 3 “Other Peoples” 
1922 53 51 Chinese, 2 East Indian 
1923 234 230 Chinese, 3 East Indian, 1 Japanese 
1924 103 Not Available 
1925 66 66 Chinese 
1926 25 25 Chinese 
1927 28 28 Chinese 
1928 28 27 Chinese, 1 English 
1929 37 37 Chinese 
*Compiled from the Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1920-1929 
Immigration historians have addressed the fact that as a U.S. territory, the Philippines had 
been exempt from the Quota Acts in 1921, and 1924, and discussed the tensions between the 
integration of territorial spaces filled with “undesirable” bodies, and a growing immigration 
regime designed to exclude such bodies. Most who discuss deportation jump ahead 
chronologically to the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act 1934, which created a ten-year path 
Filipino independence, but immediately transitioned Filipino-born migrants from “nationals” to 
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“aliens” in the eyes of immigration law. This allowed for their inclusion in the quota system, 
being brought in at a paltry 50 immigrants per year. Furthermore, as scholars have explained, the 
government was not satisfied with excluding potential future Filipino migrants, but conducted an 
active campaign to coerce the departure of those who had already resided in the United States 
before the passage of the law. As Erika Lee explains, “The new policy of treating Filipinos as 
aliens rather than nationals worked in concert with the U.S. government’s new use of 
repatriation, or removal, of undesirable immigrants in the country, as another method of 
international immigration control.”188  The Filipino Repatriation Act, passed the following year 
in 1935 stated that any Filipino-born resident of the United States could have their repatriation 
expenses to the Philippines paid by the government, on one very large condition: they could 
never enter the United States again.  
 While these repatriations were ostensibly voluntary, Mae Ngai demonstrates that they 
were in fact, highly coercive, and a continuation of the deportation practices of the period. INS 
officials targeted Filipinos who had ended up in state institutions, attempting to round up 
“convicts, the insane, and persons with leprosy, tuberculosis and other illnesses.” In spite of the 
criticism this practice received from observers, some of whom argued that it turned the 
Philippines into “a dumping ground for parole prisoners,” these practices were quite in keeping 
with the institutional emphasis of deportations more broadly in this period, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. “The inclusion of inmates from state institutions in the repatriation program reflected 
the historical practice of the INS and state authorities in matters of deportation,” Ngai explains, 
“and indicated the extent to which officials conflated repatriation and deportation. If the country 
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could be rid of Filipinos, so too would the institutions be relieved of the burden they 
imposed.”189 
Looking at this practice alongside that of mass informal deportations of Mexican 
Americans during the Great Depression, Rick Baldoz observes that lawmakers “got creative in 
their efforts to facilitate a mass exodus of Filipinos.” “Lawmakers came up with a novel 
legislative solution that might achieve the result of a large-scale deportation without the political 
fallout,” he explains, which featured “federal policy aimed at convincing Filipinos to leave the 
country voluntarily, with Uncle Same providing financial and logistical assistance to facilitate 
their departure.”190 While opponents of this bill viewed it as “a thinly veiled deportation act,” the 
practice solidified the understanding of imperial subjects as cost-effective and easily displaced 
laborers who nevertheless presented a racial threat to the nation if allowed permanent 
residence.191 Over time, this removal of Filipino subjects from the United States became a source 
of conflict between the U.S. and Philippine officials, who were concerned with the cases of 
Filipinos being threatened with legally unfounded deportations.192  
In the case Puerto Rico as well, even as foreign subjects were being deported out of 
contested sites of American empire, it is important to note that natives of those territories, 
marked by their insecure status within the national body, were also being removed through 
unofficial means from the continental United States back to such sites.  A 1929 report by the 
Immigration and Refugee Services of America expressed concern that of the 500 “deportable” 
Puerto Ricans in New York, less than 200 were actually repatriated.  Arguing that because of 
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their citizenship status, which prohibited their outright restriction from the country, careful 
attention to their migration was needed, the organization explained their fears that “in addition to 
all the other social problems they present, including the language problem, the colored Porto 
Ricans present a racial problem.”193 As it practiced forms of non-deportation removal of imperial 
subjects, the United States claimed its sovereignty both at home and in the territories—
demanding both the right to enact expulsions from such spaces, but also the right to continue to 
treat natives of those spaces as expendable national outsiders. 
Although scholars have explored the importance of Chinese and Japanese deportation 
from Hawaii for understanding the broader story of Asian exclusion policies and racist nativism 
in the United States, there has been little study that places these practices within the broader 
context of deportation from imperial holdings during the 1920s.  Doing so reveals that Hawaiian 
deportations were formative and central to much more than Asian immigration policy, but were 
part of a much broader effort to enforce racial exclusivity for belonging by deportation. They are 
also critical to understanding the growth of the nascent deportation state in the 1920s, the 
renegotiation of state power in relationship to immigrant bodies, and parallel efforts to re-
delineate the national body both geographically and demographically.194 While the public 
debated the place of the territories within the nation, and many bemoaned the racial 
unassimilability of their populations, they simultaneously culled through their populations and 
deported those deemed to create even greater threats to integration of these spaces. They also 
reflect the deep and growing power of deportation as a tool of labor regulation, both within the 
                                                          
193 Report on Porto Rico, Folder 14, Box 36, Immigration and Refugee Services Archives, Immigration History 
Research Center, University of Minnesota.  
194 Gary Okirhiro, Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865-1945 (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1991); Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of the Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-
1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Dennis M. Ogawa and Glen Grant, Kodomo No Tame 
Ni-For the Sake of the Children: The Japanese-American Experience in Hawaii (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1980).  
133 
 
continent United States, but also in its non-continental territories, where labor-heavy extractive 
and agricultural industries created a particular premium for cheap, vulnerable, and easily 
expelled workers from around the world.  
Scholars have briefly examined deportation practices in singular imperial locations, 
generally in discussions of the creation of an exploited and repressed labor force in new colonial 
industries.  Gary Okirhiro argues in his work on the anti-Japanese movement in Hawaii that after 
the 1920 strike of Japanese sugar workers, strategies for a controllable workforce included 
introducing Chinese laborers under terms of easy deportability.  In The Canal Builders, Julie 
Greene points out the utility of deportation for both corporate and government interests in the 
Panama Canal Zone, where it was logical to choose expulsion over hospitalization or 
institutionalization because, “the U.S. government had unlimited powers of deportation; if a 
laborer or family member proved troublesome, it would be far easier and cheaper to deport 
him.”195  However, such plans must be understood within the broader context of shifting 
American deportation law. In the interior of the nation, as well as spaces at its edges, deportation 
was intimately connected with labor needs, economic conditions, and the burden immigrants 
posed to public financial assistance.  
As federal officials sought to crack down on foreign-born migrants in the nation’s 
imperial possessions, territorial officials possessed a more complex vision of the immigrant 
threat. Not only foreign-born immigrants, but U.S. citizens from the continental states raised 
questions and challenges from territorial government agents. The chain of correspondence 
between the Commissioner General of Immigration and the Territorial Governor of Hawaii in 
early 1927 indicates the frustration with unwanted residents of the islands, not only from foreign 
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nations, but also from the U.S. itself. After inquiries from the Commissioner about reporting 
foreign-born charges in public institutions within the territories, the Governor asked about the 
feasibility of not only expelling foreign-born public charges, but U.S. citizens. Governor W.R. 
Farrington questioned the Commissioner on the “prospect, not only of returning those alien 
public charges to the countries of which they are subjects, but also of the return to the separate 
states of United States citizens who are public charges in Hawaii.”196 This exchange was 
prompted by a January 12 letter from the Secretary of Hawaii, Raymond C. Brown to Governor 
Farrington describing the state of public-charges in the institutions of the territory, and 
explaining that it would serve both the states and the territory to rectify this situation. This 
arrangement of forced removal of U.S. citizens would be “highly desirable,” he argued, as the 
“territory undoubtedly will find a number who belong to states of the Union.”197 Thus, while the 
federal project of deportation in the empire was designed to remove unwanted foreigners and 
claim firmer power over these spaces, resistance against U.S. citizens continued to mark the 
incomplete success of this effort. The territories had been successfully incorporated into the 
duties of the Bureau of Immigration, but this governmental jurisdiction did not preclude a 
territorial perception of the continued threat posed by U.S. citizens in the territory. 
Deportations from the territory of Alaska, as from Hawaii, were deeply intertwined with 
broader negotiations over the place of the territory within the nation and the navigation of new 
administrative powers.  Federal officials, who called for increasing deportations around crime, 
race, and illness clashed with advocates for greater labor migration to the territorial outposts of 
the nation. Boosters for new industry and development in Alaska recommended that deportees 
from elsewhere in the nation ought to be “directed to Alaska, to participate in the exploitation of 
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her natural wealth and in building up of her industry, railroads, etc.”198  Indeed, as a 
representative of the Foreign Language Department for the Republican National Committee 
argued in a letter to the Governor of Alaska that in light of the Quota Acts, “It seems to me 
particularly of great importance… there should be left fully open door to the immigration to 
Alaska, so that the immigrants who want to leave Europe at any price, might go there in quest of 
new life and new prosperity.”199 While smuggling and surreptitious entry in Alaska were 
prominent anxieties for federal authorities, officials on the ground negotiated their own strategies 
for taking advantage of migrant labor.  Arguing that most illegal entrants crossed over from 
Canada in order to work in highway construction, the Director of the Alaska District of 
Immigration explained these men were dealt with by the Inspector at Hyder who generally 
allowed them to depart voluntarily.200  As Washington debated the merits of voluntary 
deportation, with immense ramifications for Mexican laborers in the 1930s, immigration agents 
in the territories were already enacting such policies on their own initiative. 
While scholarship on migration to Alaska has largely emphasized European labor 
migrations, migrants from throughout the western hemisphere, as well as Asia, were also 
apprehended by the nascent deportation machinery in the territory.  The 1921 case of Frank 
Reina, a Mexican citizen who had entered through Canada and resided several years in Alaska 
before being arrested for deportation, is demonstrative.201  While Reina’s trajectory shows the 
trans-hemispheric migration patterns that brought immigrants to spaces of American empire, the 
fact that he was not deported until after being “in trouble with the city and federal police 
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authorities a dozen times on charges of violating the liquor law, assault and battery, drunkenness 
and petty offenses” also indicates the difficulty, and even the unwillingness of local authorities to 
deport from the labor-starved remote corners of the newly expanded American nation.202   
Federal officials, however, were more deeply concerned with the economic burden that 
institutionalized immigrants in the territories posed for the government. They not only removed 
foreign “aliens,” when possible, but also engaged in “deportation” of migrants to Alaska from 
other parts of the United States or American empire. In a 1926 “Second Deficiency 
Appropriation Bill” on the “Care and Custody of Insane, Alaska,” officials noted that $5,400 had 
been appropriated for the care and custody of insane individuals from the Alaskan territory, as 
well as the “expense attendant upon deportations,” for those for whom that was possible. 
Because there were no insane asylums in the territory, they needed to be brought to Oregon for 
institutional detention. In the past, the officials noted, they had been successful in removing 
immigrants not only abroad, but to the states and territories whose financial burden they 
officially were—2 patients to California, 2 to Washington, and 6 “insane Filipinos to Manila,” 
the total cost of which was approximately $850.203  
Immigration officers in Hawaii and Alaska clashed frequently with federal authorities 
over competing agendas for territorial deportations, but, it seems, relations in Puerto Rico were 
more closely aligned.  Explaining that “In so far as the Insular Police authorities are concerned 
there has always existed the closest cooperation,” the Commissioner of Immigration at San Juan 
reported in 1923 that information on deportable aliens “has always been cheerfully furnished, 
especially from distant places in the interior or the neighboring islands of Vieques and Culebra.”  
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Pleading for more funds and officers for investigations, the San Juan Commissioner detailed the 
efforts underway to comb local jails, hospitals, and other institutions of the island for potentially 
deportable residents.204 There were a variety of interactions with colonial authorities, ranging 
from antagonism towards plans for mass deportations, to welcome encouragement of removals, 
and these responses were colored by local political dynamics, labor needs, and individual 
officials. 
Even as a way station for deported immigrants, territories figured prominently in the 
efforts of immigration officials to make sense of the new deportation regime and its limits.  
During the 1920s, officials often offered deportees the option of reshipping foreign as seamen on 
a ship in lieu of actual deportation, which both saved the government money for transportation 
and allowed deportees to earn money for return.  However, among the many cases of official 
befuddlement about where colonial possessions fit into immigration enforcement, the 1921 case 
of Jen Young was revealing.  When Young was ordered deported at Gloucester City, New 
Jersey, local INS officials had to inquire of the federal government whether he would be able to 
reship foreign on a ship stopping in Honolulu.  Responding to the request over whether Honolulu 
was to be considered “a foreign port or place’ for these purposes, the Commissioner General 
responded that in this instant “the word ‘foreign’ includes the insular possessions and the Canal 
Zone in all cases and also Hawaii in Chinese cases.”205  In these ambiguously ‘foreign’ or 
‘domestic’ spaces, the United States sought to impose processes of determining the foreign and 
domestic onto individual immigrants.   
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While the rise of the modern deportation state in the 1920s was contingent upon a 
simultaneous rise of documentation and bureaucratization to trace immigrant movements and 
legal status, the increasing paper trail required for deportation was particularly critical in 
territories, where few local officials were clear on either the exact dimensions of the laws, or the 
exact national identities of many of the transnational subjects whose movements they policed.  A 
1924 letter from the ACLU to the Secretary of Labor decried the fact that “the Virgin Islands are 
a part of the United States,” but natives of the Islands who had migrated to the US prior to the 
transfer from Denmark in 1917 were now considered deportable.206  As Martha Gardner notes, 
Japanese women suspected of prostitution remained indefinitely deportable from Hawaii even if 
they had migrated to the territory before its annexation in 1898.207  Therefore, deportation was 
about more than just asserting expansive state power over still not fully national spaces in the 
present.  Instead, it was also about creating a broader, if imaginative, historical and cultural claim 
to such sites. 
The relationship between deportation and empire was both a reality of the 1920s, and 
figured prominently, and sometimes surprisingly within the national imagination.  At a 
November 1919 lecture responding to Alexander Berkman described the role of the American 
Sugar Refining Company in the war with Spain over Cuba and Puerto Rico, and explained that 
this, along with the exports of the Philippines, were major factors in controlling labor and 
migration.  Then he went on to conjecture, in line with a common trope among radicals of the 
time, that when the American government had solidified and exhausted their powers of 
deportation of the foreign-born, they would move to deporting citizens to sites of American 
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empire, specifically the Philippines and Alaska.208  Berkman’s fears, while extreme, were a 
response to existing congressional proposals and debates about exiling Americans to the 
Philippines.  In October 1919, Senator McKellar of Tennesse introduced a bill providing that 
anyone found guilty of advocating overthrow of the government would not only be subject to 
heavy fines or imprisonment, but “a jury may order such a persons deported to a portion of the 
Philippine islands set off for this purpose.”209 He dismissed this plan as the end goal, saying that 
because it was a warm climate, they sought “merely not to antagonize very much the liberal 
element and the people at large, not to create too much resentment all at once”, but would soon 
proceed to exiling to “a Russian Siberia in Alaska”.210  At another mass meeting, anarchist 
speaker Cassius Cook echoed these concerns about the potential uses of territories for exile, 
stating his fears that “I might wind up in the Philippine Islands or be banished to Alaska.”211 
American immigration officials were not only confounded by their own national 
boundaries when it came to enact deportations, but were also continuously struggling throughout 
the 1920s to make sense of the broader imperial landscape of the early twentieth century. While 
Progressive era initiatives like the quota acts sought to regularize and clarify permissible 
immigrant groups and quantify the desired composition of the national immigrant population, 
those implementing these laws on the ground regularly ran up against much messier imperial 
realities. One of the biggest challenges presented by the shifting empires of the era was the 
question of what passports and permissions were required for subjects of European empires, as 
well as determining which quotas these migrants fell under. As borders changed rapidly, 
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particularly following World War I, officials sometimes found themselves baffled what to do 
about migrant from nations with different boundaries or sovereign powers than at the time the 
migrant departed their homeland. For many deported migrants, empire and war meant expulsion 
to an unfamiliar homeland, an unknown language, or a new ruling power. Though this section 
largely focuses on the expansion of American empire in the Pacific and Caribbean, we should 
also begin to conceptualize how the history of deportation fits within the history of American 
settler colonialism and expansion across North America. The process of moving large numbers 
of “undesirable” peoples deemed to be racially unfit for the American republic across large 
expanses of the country cannot help but resonate with earlier practices of widespread forced 
removal. As scholars have begun to explore, deportation functions as a specific state mechanism 
for the enforcement of immigration laws in the service of specific social and geopolitical 
agendas, but it also relates to other forms of forced removal, including the displacement of 
indigenous populations under settler colonialism.   
 The spaces of American empire, while in many ways the spaces most marginal to the 
nation-state, were in other ways, critical markers of the expansive development of the modern 
American deportation regime during the 1920s.  Deportation in these spaces helped consolidate a 
sense of U.S. federal authority, control, and state reach over distant territories.  But these sites 
also demonstrated the reach of deportation as a modern, federal form of forced removal. Even as 
debates raged over whether the territories and their populations could fit culturally or racially 
within the space of the nation, deportation provided a prospective opportunity to regulate and 
curtail the boundaries of these populations. This chapter only touches upon some of the ways in 
which deportation operated in conjunction with national efforts to establish and reinforce claims 
of legitimacy and national control throughout America’s empire. Territorial sites were 
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instrumental to the growth of the nascent deportation state, and suggest the need for further 
exploration of the relationship between the dual processes of determining which territories could 
fit and remain within the national body, and which individuals and groups of people could.   
 
“An Important Spoke in the Capitalist Wheel of War”: Anti-Deportation Discourse and 
Critiques of the Deportation Regime 
As the practice of deportation reached new prominence in the actual functioning of the 
nation-state, it gained a simultaneous prominence in public discourse and debate, and 
increasingly became the site of intense criticism. I trace resistance to deportation in many of the 
individual deportation cases discussed throughout this project, and explore in Chapter 1 how a 
language of globalism was used to elaborate some of the harshest critiques of deportation, but it 
is also important to note how deportation led more broadly to critiques of the modern American 
state.  Describing the efforts of immigration authorities to terrorize unemployed seamen in New 
York, one deportation critic described the following scene: 
They are kicked and punched to waken them.  They are grilled.  They are accused of 
being [some] criminal for whom the dicks and police pretend they are searching.  The 
birth certificate of a South American seaman is examined by a dick.  ‘That ain’t yours!’ 
the dick shouts.  ‘Whose is it!’  ‘When did you get out of jail!’  All this is punctuated 
with blows.  This goes on all that particular day up and down the waterfront.  As much as 
5,000 in a particular day are ‘given the works’ by the dicks and police.  Then the dicks 
and police take in the seamen’s boarding houses before they call it a day… This mass 
deportation terror is intended to drive the seamen to accept jobs at any terms or to drive 
many of the unemployed seamen out of the country…  It is a weapon forged by 
government, to make it a lot easier for the bosses to reduce the workers standards, as a 
way out of the crisis.  It is an important spoke in the capitalist wheel of war.212 
 
While this colorful description likely draws on unsubstantiated rumors and speculation about the 
volume of raids, it reflects the growing sentiment among working-class immigrants by the start 
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of the 1930s that deportation was a critical tool of labor control. Throughout the period, critics 
reflected a growing concern that deportation would be used not only for the narrower aims of 
eliminating radical immigrant voices, but also that it would be used to keep the labor force 
regulated and pliable. While previous activism against deportation had centered on government 
tyranny and the effort to stamp out “subversive” political identities, increasingly, throughout the 
1920s, anti-deportation discourse attacked deportation as a strategy of business and corporate 
powers, facilitated by government.   
In the commonly studied period from 1919 to 1921, often referred to as the “First Red 
Scare”, deportations have been perceived as being centered on communist, anarchist, or labor 
activism.  However, while these were by far the most visible and discussed deportations of the 
era, they were not the most numerous. Even in peak years, deportations for political activity were 
a relatively small fraction of total deportations, and broadening our understanding of how class 
itself was targeted through deportation is more revealing. Actually proving and enacting a 
deportation based on subversive ideology could be legally challenging, but what became 
increasingly common was the use of the “likely to become a public charge” criteria to remove 
individuals who had ceased to be deemed valuable laboring members of society. Far beyond the 
numbers who were successfully deported, the amplified local and federal efforts at searching out, 
raiding, detaining, and catch-and-release policing of immigrant communities made deportation a 
looming reality in the lives of everyday working people in far greater numbers than enacted 
deportations. 
Over time, activists moved away from simpler denunciations of deportation as attacks on 
civil liberties and free speech, and began to identify deportation as a variation on capitalist 
attacks on working-class people, connecting it with other racialized oppressive tactics such as 
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lynching.  Deportation, they argued, was more than just the enforcement arm of immigration 
law—it was part of something broader, indeed, “another spoke in the capitalist wheel of war,” or 
another arm of the oppressive capitalist state. Even beginning in the early 1920s, it is important 
to recognize that while scholars have largely focused on the fear of subversive political 
ideologies, workers themselves often insisted that a larger national project of controlling labor 
was transpiring.213  In discussing the proposed removal of laborers, the Workers’ Defense Union 
argued that deportation was primarily for the benefit of corporate interests, rather than 
government: “The forces of greed have found in the deportation laws a whip of effectiveness 
against dissatisfied foreign workers.”214  Critics argued that government officials, working in 
tandem with corporate interests, made a calculated decision that deportation could be a tool for 
the strengthening of capitalism, not only through the curtailing of labor dissent, but also by 
providing a mechanism for controlling the flow of labor in and out of the nation.   
By the start of the 1930s, resistance against the corporate-led push for deportation was 
beginning to take on a more clearly anti-corporate language, concerned less with free speech and 
ideological liberties, and more focused on the use of deportation to control the labor flow. A 
1931 letter from the Seattle Unemployed Council to the Labor Secretary argues that the 
deportations were motivated by corporate interests, who “are concerned only with their profits, 
proven by the $12,000,000 wage reduction in 1930.”  They argued in their letter of protest that 
deportation in fact were not motivated by government needs, crime, or threats to national 
security instead, but were prompted by the needs of capitalist leaders, stating, “It is these very 
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bosses who lured the foreign-born workers to this country with promises of prosperity, who hired 
them to build, mine, and raise the crops while they reaped profits from their toil, who are to-day 
backing the drive of registration, finger printing, autographing and deporting these workers.”215 
Furthermore, they explained, while the bosses had successfully convinced many American-born 
workers that deportations were designed to protect their interests as laborers, that was not the 
case. Instead they argued, “It is not a means of bettering the condition of the American workers 
by creating more jobs thru the deportation of aliens, but rather it is a means of weakening the 
labor organizations and struggles of the working class. Thereby the bosses can more easily carry 
out [their] program of wage-slashing and mass lay-offs…”216 
Repeating the argument of a government for the bosses, enforced through deportation, 
another advocate against deportation, Honig, argued that “Deportation, it is thus seen, has 
become one of the main weapons of the bosses and their government…”217 Discussing 1929 
raids in Hackensack, New Jersey, Honig asserts that “the deportation and terror campaign in its 
sharpest form arose out of the fear on the part of the boss class.” The Hackensack raids were far 
from an anomaly, he argued, listing other deportation raids held on behalf of Singer Sewing 
Machines, Standard Oil, Western Electric, Bethlehem Steel, Sparrow Points, and Locowana 
Mills.  The collusion went so deep, Honig claimed, that it was U.S. Immigration Authorities who 
attempted to force textile workers in New Bedford to take a wage cut in April 1932, upon threat 
of deportation should they refuse it.  The belief that individual capitalists so thoroughly 
controlled the entirety of the INS permeated protests of the early 1930s, and reflected a shifting 
consciousness of the agenda behind deportations.  In “The Case of Edith Berkman,” Emanuel 
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Pollack argued that Berkman’s arrest was part of this control.   Asking why she was arrested by 
immigration authorities rather than the ordinary police during the 1931 strike against American 
Woolen Co., he answered, “Because the textile barons of Lawrence, New Bedford, Pawtucket, 
Central Falls, Paterson, dealing mostly with foreign-born workers, have long called in the 
immigration authorities to act on their behalf.”218  If corporations could use deportation to thin 
out their work force as needed in slow moments, to effect wage cuts, and to ensure a docile labor 
pool, critics pointed out, they were gaining a new control over society as a whole. 
Those opposing the ramping up of deportations also commented on deportation as a 
commercial transaction, decrying that profits were being made at the expense of people being 
ripped away from their families.  Vito Marcantonio, a New York Congressman who was active 
in advocating for immigrant constituents under deportation proceedings throughout the decade, 
argued of a bill for the deportation of alien seamen that, it “is a dangerous piece of legislation 
fostered by ship-owner interests to perpetuate indecent working conditions and starvation wages.  
The purpose of the bill is to drive these seamen into the hands of greedy ship-owners.”219 
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, one of the most vocal anti-deportation protesters throughout the 1920s 
often argued that if deportations were to take place, they needed to provide time for individuals 
to consolidate their financial interests, sell needed property, remove money from accounts, and 
settle debts and lawsuits, rather than being exploited (and left penniless in their new countries) 
by the government’s hasty removal plans.220  
Perhaps even more troubling, critics noted, was the fact that the government appropriated 
large amounts of immigrant property because of rushed deportations and a lack of time for 
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settling of legal matters.  Emma Goldman, famed anarchist on the Buford deportation ship 
declared that, “Our good American democracy refused them even an opportunity to take their 
personal effects, and deliberately robbed them of the few hard-earned dollars they had saved by 
year-long toil and strict economy.”  She went on to explain the efforts to tally up the total 
confiscated by the government by virtue of unclaimed assets of deported individuals and 
concludes astoundingly that, “The list prepared by the Committee, a copy of which was turned 
over the representative of the Immigration Department on the Buford, shows that $45,470.39 in 
Postal and Bank Savings, and in pay due, was left by the deportees in the United States.” 221 If a 
single ship of a few hundred deportees netted such a large loss of personal property, the 
uncalculated totals left behind by deportees over the course of the decades might well equal a 
staggering sum.  
 
Conclusion 
 In response to a 1921 inquiry from Joseph Saulnier, a concerned citizen, about the ways 
the immigration law was applied differentially, Assistant Secretary of Labor B.J. Hennings 
explained, “so far as I am concerned, all the people of the world are divided into two classes”: 
aliens and non-aliens. In fact, he claimed, while his department housed the Bureau of 
Immigration, it had “no control” over policy regarding immigrants. “Our function,” he went on, 
“is merely to administer the law as Congress gives it to us… with strict impartiality as against all 
foreigners and playing no favorites except the United States of America.”222 So what did an 
immigration and deportation policy which played no favorites except the United States look like 
in the 1920s? The topics throughout this chapter belie how untrue Hennings’ statement was—as 
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the growth of a newly powerful agency expanded the reach of the federal government with quite 
a great deal of partiality, and to serve a wide range of agendas. Furthermore, as the complicated 
debates over immigration control and deportation in regards to the insular territories and Alaska 
demonstrates, the divide between “aliens” and “non-aliens” was far from crystal clear. The final 
section demonstrates that while Hennings claimed to “play no favorites,” critics of the 
deportation regime sharply denounced what they saw as favoritism toward corporate interests.  
 In the period following WWI, when the national government had gained what was in 
some ways, an unprecedented degree of power, as well as repressive reach into the lives of both 
citizens and non-citizens, deportation was central in determining the disciplinary capacity of the 
state. As Gerstle explains of the changes brought on by WWI, “these initiatives, in combination, 
amounted to an extraordinary effort to reshape the nation in ways that would exclude the 
unwanted reform those regarded as social and political degenerates, and punish those who 
continued to engage in un-American behavior.”223 Each of these initiatives, I would argue, were 
powerfully illuminated by deportation practice, which reshaped the nation in critical ways 
throughout the 1920s.  As Nathalie Peutz and Nicholas De Genova explain, deportation has 
never been merely about removing particular unwanted. Instead, they insist, it is about the 
“reformulation and emphatic reaffirmation of state sovereignty itself.”224 Deportation, they 
argue, normalizes the divisions of nation states and the exclusive rights of their citizens as 
members. The goal, in this process, is not merely deportation itself, but the creation of the 
condition of deportability. This condition, I argue, was not created merely by federal policy, but 
by a laborious and evolving effort on the ground by a wide array of state actors, and by the 
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(unfinished) development of an infrastructure and bureaucracy for its enforcement. The growth 
of deportation allowed the modern nation-state to do more than simply police its own boundaries 
(although it continued to struggle to do that). It also, allowed it to aspire to compose its own 
population, control its residents, and enact discipline on those who did not fit within given 
parameters of American belonging. In doing so, deportation impacted far more than those several 
thousand immigrants deported during each year, and instead, took on a central role in the heart of 
the modern nation-state. 
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Chapter 3- Local Agendas, Contested Enforcement, and Deportation Administration on 
the Ground 
 
 
In a 1923 letter to the Commissioner General of Immigration, the Supervisor of 
Immigration at El Paso made a stirring call for maximizing local cooperation for the project of 
expanding deportations. In doing so, he encapsulated the stakes of creating a system of 
enforcement for federal law, and reflected the frequent commodification of deportable migrants. 
He explained of his local approach that: 
“…Our officers have been impressed with the necessity of carrying on our propaganda; 
they become missionaries and never let up in endeavoring to sell the Service to the public 
generally… Police officers must be given to understand that by helping us, they help 
themselves; they rid themselves of troublesome problems, and in return secure much 
valuable aid from immigration officers. Institutions generally are glad to be rid of 
maintenance expenses.  In other words, if we cannot appeal to a man’s patriotism, 
loyalty, etc., we appeal to his self-interest… Our officers go even further; they cultivate 
the good will of ranchers, stage drivers, garage keepers, automobile service station 
owners; in fact, there is almost no limit to the propaganda… 
 
If the Bureau will regard the Immigration Service as having something to sell and the 
immigration officers in the field as salesmen, and other officials and the public generally 
as customers, it will have the idea that the writer has in mind.” 
 
Local cooperation was more than a convenience for immigration officials, it was a necessity for a 
young and perennially underfunded immigration service. Even as the federal bureaucracy 
exhibited an unprecedented capacity and infrastructure for removal, they continued to rely 
heavily on voluntary assistance from localities around the country to do their work, and the 
varying cooperation and motivations of these localities determined the range and impact 
deportation ultimately had. Immigration officers recognized that they would be unable to 
apprehend potential deportees without the participation of many local actors, and in many cases, 
they pursued this assistance actively. To do so, they sought to create a sort of public stake in the 
deportation project, an effort which met with varying success depending on the locality. From 
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police officers to garage keepers, the work of identifying and apprehending potential deportees 
integrated a wide cast of locals, and cannot be reduced to an arm of federal immigration policy. 
The work of “selling” the growing deportation regime was a complicated and intimate project, 
reliant on deep local relationships.225 
Daniel Kanstroom notes that starting in the Progressive era, “deportation completed its 
transformation from a primarily instrumentalist tool of extended border control into a ‘major 
public policy in its own right.’”226 What has often escaped the attention of deportation scholars, 
however, is the fact that such public policy was not necessarily or always national, but in fact, 
could manifest as intensely local public policy, in line with highly specific local agendas. Deidre 
Moloney’s work notes that deportation has been “shaped at multiple and often conflicting levels 
of government: local, state, federal, and international, as well as the competing interests and 
agendas of government agencies and federal branches,” but her study of policy and rationales for 
deportation is limited in its close examination of these local, on-the-ground dynamics.227 Ethan 
Blue has noted that deportation was, critically, a process by which “undesirable aliens would be 
filtered,” from within, and thus distinct from than debarment, but focuses largely on immigrant 
transportation and shipping.228 As such, the scholarship on early twentieth century deportation 
leaves unanswered a number of important questions: How did this “filtering from within” take 
place? Who initiated the filtering, and who carried it out on the ground? What factors motivated 
the filtering, and why did it begin at particular points? Who challenged this process, and what 
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local factors impacted their success? How did it draw public attention and reframe the 
relationship between the state, citizens, and denizens? 
While the 1920s was marked by an unprecedented growth of federal infrastructure and 
bureaucratic machinery for the apprehending and removing of “undesirable” immigrants from 
the nation, this project would have remained out of reach if it had not been for the cooperation 
(and in some cases, eager initiative) of local governments and communities. Throughout the 
decade, new deportation legislation played out unevenly across the country, as some localities 
took active advantage of enlarged legislation to get rid of their own local “burdens” or “threats,” 
while other localities were slow to act and, at times, required prompting from federal officials to 
gather and report potential deportees to the immigration bureau. These local efforts were a 
shared project of a wide variety of local actors, from the local press (in cities like Chicago, the 
media played an important role in stirring up sentiment in favor of deportation), to doggedly 
persistent individuals who saw themselves as vigilantes protecting their local communities from 
dangerous outsiders, to district immigration officials who came up with creative strategies for 
reaching out to local institutions and creating cooperation amongst local figures. Very often, 
their motivations were not those of the congressmen passing deportation legislation, or the 
federal commissioners of immigration. Instead, they were driven by diverse impulses, including 
racial hostilities, overcrowding at local institutions, personal vendettas, and public image 
maneuvers.  
The rise of a hyper-local network of policing practices designed to target deportable 
immigrants gained particular traction in the southwest, where anti-immigrant sentiment was 
high, and local law enforcement and civilian vigilantes played an active role in tracking down 
deportees.  After a request from the Inspector in Charge at El Paso for cooperation from officers, 
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sheriffs, deputies, and state rangers for their “every aid” to “apprehend any alien unlawfully in 
the United States,” the Inspector in Charge at Tucson reported the strength of local efforts.  
Officials from the Phoenix INS office, he explained, would travel monthly to the state prison at 
Florence to check for deportable immigrants, and the local peace officers at the sub-stations of 
the region had “at all times expressed themselves to be willing and anxious to be of assistance.”  
However, it was not only law enforcement officials who played a part in these intensive local 
roundups. Instead, the Inspector explained, in the mining camps at Globe, Miami, and Ray, 
Arizona, the project was undertaken by employment agents and special mining company 
employees who had aided in identifying and reporting “various contraband Europeans.”229 The 
sub-station at Douglas, Arizona reported even closer attention, reporting that the Mounted 
Guards of the INS call at the local jail “at least once daily” to check on whether there are new 
immigrants. Belying how insufficient official deportation numbers are for understanding the 
reach of the service as far back as the early 1920s, the Douglas inspector goes on to explain that 
“practically all of the aliens that can be handled from jail are permitted to voluntarily return to 
Mexico from this Port.”  
Throughout the decade, the Mexican border region was under particular scrutiny, not 
only for control of Mexican migrants, but also of European and Asian laborers using the border 
as a “back-door” into the nation, particularly after the passage of the Quota Acts increasingly 
created obstacles for seaport entries. While labor-motivated deportations of Mexican migrants 
have been most visible after the onset of the Great Depression and throughout the 1930s, the 
practice of deporting unwanted Mexican agricultural laborers reached further back.  What was 
often at stake in the debates over their deportations was who was responsible for footing the bill 
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for deportation, which was cheaper in the case of land border deportations, but still an expensive 
undertaking for the government. In a 1923 case, the Arizona Cotton Growers’ Association was 
held liable for the costs of deportation.230 While historians have provided a great deal of insight 
into the unique circumstances regarding labor deportations in WWI-era Arizona, particularly the 
Bisbee deportation of 1917, there has been less attention to the continued local initiatives for 
expulsion throughout the 1920s.231 
From a geographic standpoint, the actual enforcement mechanisms of the growing 
deportation agenda were a particularly local challenge in the southwest, and public officials in 
Arizona were among the most regularly in contact with the federal government about the subject. 
In response to queries from the Department of Labor about pardons and the potential efficacy of 
early conditional release from prison for immediate deportation, Governor George W.P. Hunt of 
Arizona argued the uselessness of deportation in the unique geography of the southwest. Hunt 
echoed the frequent complaints of immigration officials in border states when he explained “our 
principal difficulty here of course comes with the deportation of Mexicans who reside so close to 
the border. Your department, in deporting these men, as a rule sends them to Nogales or some 
other border town, and all they have to do is to walk across the street to re-enter the State.”232 
Throughout the 1920s, as officials weighed the expense of deportation against its effectiveness, 
the practice of transporting Mexican deportees just over the border rather than to the cities and 
towns of the interior where they originated from, was one of the greatest obstacles. As discussed 
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in the second chapter, the ambitious deportation agenda of the period was often at odds with the 
limited appropriations available for deportation, and as such, localities were constrained in both 
their numbers and their tactics.  
Throughout the decade, perhaps no organization outside the immigration service was 
more aggressive in pursuing vigilante activities against potentially deportable immigrants than 
the Arizona Peace Officers’ Association (APOA), a group of sheriffs, deputies and police 
officers throughout the state. As the decade progressed, state and federal Commissioners of 
Immigration found themselves alternately aided and plagued by correspondence from leaders of 
the APOA, particularly John Crowley, Chief of the Jerome, Arizona police force, and J.B. 
Wilkie.233 The organization did not limit its contact merely to officials of the Immigration 
Bureau, but finding their demands unmet, escalated to lobbying congressmen and even the 
President. In a disdainful May 1930 letter to President Hoover, the President of the APOA 
shamed his record of deportations, stating that “Inasmuch as you were elected to the presidency 
on a rigid law enforcement plank… I cannot but feel that it would be your personal policy to 
pursue a stringent course in seeking to effect the deportation of alien communists.” Instead, he 
accused, “The high officials of the Department of Labor quite obviously choose to pursue an 
entirely opposite course of action—or perhaps inaction, as it might more properly be termed… 
Throughout the past three years the Arizona Peace Officers’ Association has waged a continuous 
effort to induce the Department of Labor to assume a more definite policy as regards the 
deportation of alien communists.”234 
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Crowley and the APOA cast their nets wide, and angled to bring in as much political 
support as they could for the local project of deporting suspected radicals in the southwest. In a 
letter to Davis of the Labor Department, Crowley expressed his frustration that “your department 
is not in sympathy with the idea of deporting alien Communists.” By the end of the decade, their 
persistence had clearly grated at the nerves of federal officials, who found themselves answering 
not only to Crowley, but to Congressmen he had engaged on his behalf. Senator Carl Hayden 
reached out to the Secretary of Labor on Crowley’s urging to find out why the department had 
been so inactive on deportations, and received the response that “The Department is not 
unmindful of communistic activities in this country… we have not however, believed that it 
would be the part of wisdom to adopt spectacular methods merely with a view to making a brave 
showing when the circumstances clearly indicate that such efforts would end in failure.”235 
Similarly, the Commissioner General was forced to reassure Congressman J.V. McClintic that 
“that the Department is not unmindful of communistic activities,” but that various practical 
challenges were posed in Arizona, including the impossibility of deportations to Russia and the 
secrecy of radical organizations.236 
Crowley and the rest of the APOA crusaded for greater deportations for years, but it is 
revealing to note the particular threats they identified. Indeed, Crowley argued, the Department 
“ignored” alien communists while “preferring at the same time to deport large numbers of 
harmless peasants and peons, who, though they may obviously be subject to deportation, do not 
constitute a definite menace to the peace and tranquility of our industrial and political life as does 
the alien communist…” It is notable that the peace Crowley advanced first is the “industrial,” 
and indeed, in other correspondence, the concern with preserving labor order from the influences 
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of “outside agitators” becomes clear.237 The desire for preserving industrial order and a steady 
supply of cheap labor without the threat of protests and workers organizing is evident in 
Crowley’s letter to the Secretary of Labor. Specifically, he explained of local conditions that “At 
the present time many of our Mexicans are engaged in both agricultural and mining work in 
Arizona. We feel that they are given a living wage… and we do not feel that they should be 
bothered by outside communists.”238 As the head of an influential local law enforcement 
organization, Crowley’s positions signal the deep collusion between industrial interests and 
immigration policing from early on in the decade. One of deportation’s most important and 
enduring functions throughout the early twentieth century had been to ensure that labor 
organizing could not gain traction in immigrant-heavy industries and localities, and Crowley’s 
words demonstrate a firm unwillingness to let this function fall aside at the local level, even 
when federal cooperation was hesitant.   
In fact, the APOA was not content with staying within the boundaries of the state, but 
took its unofficial immigration investigating efforts to Los Angeles in 1930. A letter from the 
Commissioner General to Hull explained that Wilkie had taken a trip to the area and found that 
there was no cooperation between local police in Southern California and the Los Angeles 
Immigration office, which was affirmed by the head of the radical squad in the L.A. police 
department. Wilkie reported back that, as a result, “Southern California is virtually alive with 
alien communists and unless the United States government takes some steps towards curbing 
their activities, this locality will soon experience grave political and industrial disorders.” 
Although Crowley had clearly begun to wear on the patience of the federal officials, his 
accusations gained traction, and the Commissioner General demanded a response from the 
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District Director of Immigration at L.A. Commissioner Hull explains that after discussion with 
the Assistant Secretary of Labor, it seemed “that there may be some truth or foundation for the 
complaints made,” and requested that the Director respond to Crowley’s accusations and make 
changes as needed.239 
What is more noteworthy, perhaps, than that an association of fervent local vigilantes 
pestered the government for greater deportation activity, is the extent to which the government 
responded earnestly, and in many cases with action on the basis of tips and warnings from local 
private citizens. Crowley’s letter to Senator Hayden begged that he “take this matter up and 
endeavor to ascertain the reason why the Department of Labor refuses to concern themselves 
with the cases of aliens who are active in affairs of the Communist Party,” and Hayden 
responded by doing exactly that. Throughout the decade, the government continued to take 
action based on tips from random private citizens, and to show a strong willingness to trust the 
local public’s word on potential treats to the nation. While the avid activity of Crowley and his 
associates certainly shows some tendency to paranoia and exaggeration (as well as to 
manipulation and self-interest), it is important to note that there was some basis for concerns 
about labor organizing and radical activity in the southwest. There were, in fact, large numbers 
of IWW organizers throughout Arizona, and there had been multiple IWW-led strikes in Globe 
alone. During and immediately following the war, hundreds of Wobblies were arrested 
throughout Arizona.240 These organizers, scholars have explained, seemed to pose a particularly 
dangerous threat to the nation because they often brought together Mexican laborers with white 
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workers in their actions, giving some credence to the APOA’s panic that the Mexican workers of 
the area might be influenced by “outside communists.”  
While these tips came most urgently from residents of the southwest, private individuals 
around the nation saw themselves as an integral component of the growing deportation regime. 
In regards to Finnish immigrants in Minnesota, both private citizens and the government 
investigated the possibility of a threat. William Leppala of Ironwood, Minnesota contacted the 
immigration authorities to question whether the bureau was “reliable enough to investigate Finns 
arriving to America.” His question, he explained, was shared by “many Ironwood residents” who 
were concerned by the suspicion that Finnish Bolsheviks in the region were interrogating and 
intimidating not-radical Finnish immigrants upon their arrival. The acting Commission General, 
I.F. Wixon wrote to Hoover in 1922 regarding “alleged Finnish Communist organizations 
operating in the State of Minnesota,” and requested assistance from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation as the Bureau of Immigration didn’t possess the capacity to conduct such 
investigations on their own.241 As was the case in Arizona, while the individual reporters may 
not have been drawing on reliable evidence for their identification of deportable radicals, these 
anxieties were rooted in the realities of local Finnish political activism. By 1918, Rhoda Gilman 
explains, there were nearly a thousand members of the Socialist Party in Duluth alone, which 
also was home to a Finnish Socialist Federation.242 By 1924, she notes, as much as 40% of the 
Communist Party Membership of the state was composed of members of the Finnish Socialist 
Federation.243 Finnish radicals in the United States were a tiny fraction of those deported, even in 
areas like Minnesota where they were prominent in the public eye and anxieties (and the real 
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source of conflict between “red” and “white” Finns in the region). But, like radical labor 
organizers in the southwest, they had a disproportionate impact on public pressure for escalating 
deportation.244 
Washington state also drew attention for local investigations of Finnish immigrant 
communities, and a spate of correspondence in 1928 reflected how a local tip could compel an 
entire immigration investigation. On the tip of John Finta, “a loyal Finn and reputed good 
Finnish citizen of Winlock,” immigration officials engaged an investigation into local Finnish 
radical organizations in Winlock, Washington. Finta had informed the immigration service that 
the organization was receiving money from the Soviet Union for its work, but after an 
investigation into the group, with the cooperation from Lewis County peace officers, the 
Commissioner of Immigration at Seattle decided there was insufficient evidence for any 
deportations. However, he wrote to the Commissioner General, “the inquiry and investigation… 
has evidently had a wholesome effect and I am sure that the tendency to circulate propaganda 
and advocate radical remedies will be much less in the future in this particular community.”245  
Not only private citizens, but political officials from other branches of government took 
an active interest in the work of the Bureau of Immigration, and often wrote to the Commissioner 
General or the Secretary of Labor to advocate for a deportation policy which would reflect the 
local needs of their constituents. After receiving contact from Mrs. M.M. Ruffor of Donna Texas 
in 1928, regarding mass deportations of Mexican laborers from the Donna area, Representative 
John M. Garner contacted the Commissioner General in the matter. He explained that “with a 
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tremendous cotton crop coming on,” if this deportation was actually occurring, it would be 
“ruinous.” Upon receipt of the correspondence, the Commission took up the matter with the 
District Director at San Antonio who investigated the matter and shared his findings that the 
conditions at Donna were normal and that they were just expressing their “usual annual 
complaint about anticipated shortage of cotton pickers.” Indeed, he said, none of the people he 
interviewed would make a statement to identify the source of the rumors, and concluded that 
“this office is convinced that the Border Patrol men at Donna have not been unduly active in 
their operations in that vicinity.” The Commissioner thus relayed that message and let the 
Congressman know that a thorough investigation revealed this story to be “very largely rumor 
and hearsay.”246 The growing concern, both supportive and anxious, about deportation as a tool 
for regulating labor migration was reflected in the attention paid by both politicians and the 
general public, and contributed to the discourse around repatriation at the start of the Depression 
era. 
The high profile tensions in Arizona notwithstanding, in many cases, the local spaces 
where deportation became heavily contested were not those along the border, or even those 
generally identified with immigration. With enforcement of federal deportation law largely in the 
hands of local enforcement, a particularly vigorous anti-immigrant sentiment could transform 
even a small town or city into a hotspot of deportation activity. Saginaw, Michigan was one such 
town during the 1920s, and local police took an energetic and proactive approach to the control 
of local migrant labor. As Linda C. Noel notes in Debating American Identity: Southwestern 
Statehood and Mexican Immigration, the city and county of Saginaw coordinated to send 200 
Mexican laborers not all the way to Mexico, but “to the border in the hope that the Mexican 
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government would pick up the cost and administration from there.”247 While scholars such as 
Rodolfo Acuña have noted the prominence of repatriation efforts from industrial and agricultural 
hubs in the upper Midwest, including Saginaw and other towns in Michigan during the 1930s, it 
is important to recognize that the mechanisms and political will for apprehending, gathering, and 
transporting such migrants had begun even earlier.248 By early 1921, the Wabash Railway 
company was advertising its rates to the Bureau of Immigration for the movement of Mexican 
laborers from Saginaw to the Mexican border, and arguing that their experience in sugar 
transportation made them well-qualified to transport human cargo.249 
While scholarship on immigration policy and deportation have often neglected the reach 
of the Immigration Bureau throughout the interior of the nation, some historians have provided 
critical attention to the policing of immigrant communities throughout the Midwest, including in 
the Michigan sugar fields. As Zaragosa Vargas explains, the efforts to remove laid-off sugar beet 
workers from Michigan began during the 1920 season, when the sugar companies refused to pay 
the return passage of the more than 4,000 Mexican workers who had been brought in for the 
season. This process, he explains, was very locally grounded, as local relief officials refused to 
offer aid to the migrants, and the federal government largely denied responsibility for their 
removal. Indeed, he explains, “government removal of destitute Mexicans was for the most part 
minimal despite repeated demands by city officials… this federal inaction resulted in locally 
initiated plans in lieu of relief.” One of these local initiatives took place in Saginaw, where 
roughly 200 beet workers were repatriated to Mexico in early 1921, outside of official 
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deportation proceedings.250 Kathy Mapes echoes the designation of these efforts as locally-
driven, explaining that the first major repatriation drive after the war took place in rural 
Michigan, where “local residents sough to import and deport Mexican workers according to their 
own racist ideals as well as their alleged economic needs.”251  
These locally-initiated removal campaigns, emanating from the rural Midwest, Mapes 
and Vargas explain, were formative to the much broader repatriation campaigns of the 1930s, 
which scholars have documented more extensively.252 Vargas argues that while unprecedented in 
their scope, these repatriation drives were a “preview of the methods the United States would 
later use to rid itself of these surplus workers.”253 By 1931, Mapes describes the local enthusiasm 
over the removal of 300 Mexicans from the area (and notes the lack of concern over the fact that 
only fifty had entered the country without authorization), part of which was driven by the fact 
that many had been on the city’s poor list.254 “By linking the right to employment and the right to 
receive relief with perceived citizenship and race,” Mapes explains, “communities throughout 
the United States blurred the lines between legal and illegal immigrants, turning all Mexicans 
and Mexican Americans into ‘outsiders.’”255 
Appolonio Ramires and his family were among the Mexican migrants who became well 
acquainted with the Saginaw police force’s racial project of deportation. The Ramires family had 
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crossed the river into the country at Laredo in 1922, after previous deportation proceedings in 
1921. They worked for some time “for some sugar concern,” in Iowa, and then went to Saginaw 
to visit relatives and seek work. The INS report reveals the strain between the deportation agenda 
and the limited local appropriations for detention, stating that local officials were in contact with 
the Inspector in Charge at Port Huron about the possibility of releasing the immigrants until their 
deportation could be effected in order to save the expense of detention. By this point, a system 
for deporting not only male laborers, but entire families had clearly been established, as evidence 
by the fact that Appolonio and his son Concenciano were being detained in the County Jail, 
while his wife and minor children were detained in a facility referred to as the “Homestead.”256 
Police vigilance in Saginaw clearly acted as a form of racial profiling against Mexican laborers 
in the region, but ethnic discrimination was not the only pertinent component of local anti-
immigrant sentiment.  
In late 1927, the Commissioner General of Immigration responded to a recent inquiry by 
Emanuel Rusch, citizen of Saginaw. Rusch had notified the Commissioner of a purported recent 
“mass meeting… of the Communist Party wherein they advocated the overthrow of the 
Government of the United States,” and inquired as to their deportability. The Commissioner 
referred Rusch to the nearest regional district office in Chicago, and suggested he bring them any 
available evidence. The blurred boundaries between perceived racial, labor and political threats 
are visible in the anxieties of small cities across the interior threatened by expanding and 
diversifying immigrant populations. By the end of the 1930s, Saginaw was still a common 
migrant destination, particularly for sugar beet workers, and by 1939, as many as a quarter of the 
beds in the Saginaw Tuberculosis Hospital were occupied by Mexican migrant sugar beet 
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workers.257 Along with other small cities far from the border, these hospitals and town 
governments demonstrated the importance of an infrastructure designed to identify deportable 
denizens not only at the point of the workplace, but through a broad practice of institutional 
coordination. 
Vigilante reporting, however, sometimes emerged from a more intimate, personal set of 
motivations, and in some instances, families used the immigration service as a mechanism for 
settling familial disputes or reuniting with family members across borders. D. Edmond Leblanc 
of Canada called the U.S. immigration authorities in 1922, seeking to report his daughter’s lover, 
C.J. Ruggles, and in the process, gain her deportation back to Canada. The officials intervened 
and after discovering that “it would appear that Ruggles induced the girl to have sexual relations 
with him, in Canada and also in the United States, under promise of marriage, although 
apparently he is already married,” they referred the case to the INS office at St. Albans, 
Vermont, at which point officials apprehended the couple in Burlington. Although it was 
presumed that Ruggles himself was a U.S. citizen and therefore only subject to a jail sentence, 
rather than deportation, Annette Leblanc was detained at the Franklin County Jail in St. Albans 
at the expense of the immigration service. Satisfying both her father’s wishes to have her out of 
the clutches of the adulterous, possibly bigamous Ruggles, and the INS proceedings, Leblanc 
was scheduled for deportation to Canada, although the authorities requested that her deportation 
be “held in abeyance, however, until such a time as her services as a witness against her importer 
are no longer needed.”258 While deportation is often understood as a massive, impersonal 
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apparatus of the state, such tales remind us that behind the legislation and statistics were deeply 
local and even intimate, human mechanics at work.  
Local vigilantes did not always intervene only to assist with deportations, but at times, 
reached out to the Immigration Bureau seeking to prevent removals. Though there has been 
greater attention to the networks of radicals who organized on behalf of political deportees, often 
both within the U.S. and abroad, individuals advocated for deportees for a wide range of reasons. 
While most advocates wrote in on behalf of friends, acquaintances, and community members, 
and INS case files often featured unsolicited testimonials from individuals close to the potential 
deportees, sometimes complete strangers sought to intervene. The 1923 letter from G.C. Urlin of 
Columbus, Ohio to the Secretary of Labor about the repeated deportation of Canadian citizen 
Leo Castle demonstrates the extent to which deportation proceedings had become a visible part 
of public discourse by the early 1920s, and how even relatively mundane cases could capture the 
imagination of citizens with no personal stake in the removals. Having read of Castle’s repeated 
efforts to reside in the United States in his local newspaper, Urlin felt compelled to intervene on 
his behalf. “I do not know, and have no interest in this man,” Urlin explained, “but because of his 
persistency, feel that he would make a good citizen.” He further offered to pay the immigrant’s 
entrance fee, his transportation expenses to Columbus, and to maintain him financially for a 
month or until he found him employment, and requested permission from the Secretary to do so. 
Not only was Urlin’s offer a remarkable sign of public engagement with deportation 
proceedings, but it actually garnered a response from the Second Assistant Secretary of Labor, 
who explained that it would not be consistent to allow him reentry because he “has shown a 
disregard and contempt for law.”259 The project of demarcating the boundaries around those with 
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the potential for good citizenship went beyond congress, and was in fact something that 
unrelated individuals took an active interest in. 
In other instances, an even more locally specific set of criteria shaped how deportation 
was enforced on the ground, and prevented the more widespread and even-handed application of 
the laws on the books. After being asked to report back on the cooperation of local institutions 
and law enforcement officials, the Acting Inspector in Charge at Salt Lake City wrote to the 
Commissioner General in 1923 that deportations were very low because of the influence of the 
Mormon Church.  He explained that in Utah and parts of Idaho, the Church “is dominant and 
controls the public officials,” and that their policy had been not to report its converts for 
deportation.  However, he went on, if a “Gentile,” or non-Mormon, was a drain on local public 
institutions, then officials cooperated for their removal. Relating a conversation with a local 
church official in which he was told that “We don’t have public charges among our people,” this 
officer’s experiences reflect the fragmented nature of deportation in its early era of growth, when 
local political or religious concerns could determine either an exceptionally jealous, or a 
remarkably lenient deportation practice. While scholars have tended to treat varying deportation 
numbers around the country as a reflection of immigrant density and racial hostility, a more 
expansive set of criteria shaped its regional and local impact.   
While Utah elicited frustration among immigration officials for its unwillingness to expel 
immigrant residents, it also captured the attention of the national press as the potential recipient 
of unwanted migrants.  In 1922, stories circulated about British debates over the potential 
deportation of Mormon Missionaries at work in London.  As many as 7,000 missionaries were 
reported to be resident in Britain, attempting to gain converts to move to Utah, particularly 
among young women. In particular, the Bishop Savage came under scrutiny, and as one 
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journalist explained, “marked antagonism is developing and deportation is being urged as the 
only remedy.” While American immigration officials sought to deport for “crimes of moral 
turpitude,” including polygamy and bigamy, officials in Britain attempted to sort out whether 
Mormons in England were deportable on the basis of encouraging women to emigrate for 
immoral purposes. The Bishop attempted to fight the charges of immoral behavior and argued 
“we have nothing to hide… if this country can show a single case of wrong doing by a Mormon 
here we will help you to turn him out of the country.”260 
At the same time, Utah repeatedly grabbed the national spotlight around deportation, as 
Democratic Senator William H. King of Utah weighed in vocally and fiercely debated the 
practice of expulsion. Deportation again acted as a proxy battlefield for foreign policy debates, in 
the case of the deportation of Ludwig C.A.K Martens, and King became one of the principal 
combatants. In a heated public debate between King and Senator Joseph France of Maryland in 
March of 1921, the congressmen battled over foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union, with a 
prominent deportee as one of their main bantering pieces.261  While France advocated for an 
opening of doors in regards to trade with Russia, King denounced the value of cooperation with 
Russia and argued that the United States should not interact with a Bolshevik nation. As to 
Marten’s deportation, King argued that because he was a representative of a non-recognized 
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government, he ought to have been granted no protection from expulsion.262 Martens, who was 
deported in January of 1921, was part of a deportation party of 45 Russian citizens being 
expelled to Russia by a long, complex journey from New York to Gothenburg, Sweden, to 
Libau, Latvia, then overland to Moscow. King argued against France and others who called the 
deportation un-American, insisting that “Martens was ordered deported because he had engaged 
in spreading dangerous propaganda in the United States and not because he was a trade agent.”263 
Several years later, King once again drew attention in the debates over expulsion, though 
this time arguing for more lenient practices of deportation and political asylum. In the heavily 
contested 1926 case of General Torres, a leader of the Mexican Revolution, King condemned the 
plan to deport Torres back to Mexico for entry without examination. Accusing Federal officials 
of sending Torres back to a certain death, King was reported as having called the deportation a 
“violation of the American policy of 100 years which has made this country an asylum for the 
politically oppressed.”264 The Torres case, in which the Secretary of State wrote that “deportation 
to Mexico constitutes an indirect method of bringing about the extradition from this country of 
political offenders,” and in which the Commissioner General of Immigration admitted the 
deportation proceedings had been “unfair,” brought King into the fray as one of the most vocal 
critics of the act.  He denounced the deportation as a “cowardly act” and demanded a full-scale 
investigation of immigration officials on the border.265  Indeed, King asserted, the deportation 
was done secretly at night, and the behavior of the immigration officials, especially the head of 
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the San Antonio office, “was reprehensible in the highest degree,” and that these officials ought 
to be held responsible for collusion with this “cowardly, brutal murder.”266 
While many local officials and directors of institutions were eager to get rid of their 
immigrant charges, and thus eagerly cooperated with INS authorities for their removal once 
prompted, others were hesitant to engage, for less spiritual reasons than the Mormon officials of 
the Salt Lake City area.  A 1923 letter from the Inspector in Charge at Portland, Oregon to the 
Commissioner General reminded the service of the need to pay attention to the more pecuniary 
motivations of local officials.  Explaining that local officials often showed a level of indifference 
about reporting deportees, he explained that their practice had been that “officers who go out of 
their way to serve us are, when possible, shown our appreciation,” in some cases by being given 
lucrative attendant positions on deportation parties, and in other cases, posting a $25 reward in 
collaboration with shipping agencies for the apprehension of smuggled Chinese or Japanese 
migrants. “This has been a great incentive,” he argues, “not only to police officers but to 
civilians to report such cases.” However, the profit margin for participating in the project of 
deportation was not always limited to the individual levels. Not only were law enforcement and 
local citizens in the area benefitting from reporting potential deportees, but local institutions 
were profiting from failing to report such migrants.  The Morningside Hospital, a private insane 
asylum in the Portland suburbs, was criticized by the inspector because “this institution is 
operated for profit and we cannot depend on whole-hearted cooperation therefrom.” The 
hospital, he explained, was the repository for the insane rounded up in the territory of Alaska, 
who were maintained at Morningside at the expense of the U.S. Department of the Interior. 
Without INS efforts to investigate the alien insane periodically, it would have been impossible to 
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deport immigrants who “otherwise would have been charges upon the government for the 
remainder of their lives.”267  
Officials in Ohio also reported a lack of coordination with local authorities, and echoed 
the argument that it was the lack of financial incentive that made this work more challenging. “It 
has been my observation that the Police do not display the same interest in deportation that they 
do in criminal cases,” wrote the Inspector in Charge at Cincinnati, “the reason is that they do not 
get any witness fees in deportation cases as they do in criminal cases.” The inspector continued 
on to assert that rather than spending large amounts of money to care and treat “insane aliens” 
who could be deported “except for the lack of diligence on the part of the municipal officials,” 
the service should incentivize the work of reporting deportees. Because of the unwillingness to 
take on expenses for one’s own department, he explained, the police often choose to allow 
greater public expense in institutions rather than expend smaller amounts of money from their 
own budget for the services of a translator to ascertain whether immigrants are potentially 
deportable. As a result he explains, “rather than pay a few dollars to secure the services of an 
interpreter, (which this Service has to do many times), they prefer to keep the alien for months 
and months in the hospital at public expense.”268 
These enforcement challenges of local coordination crossed national boundaries and led 
the Commissioner of Immigration at Montreal to remark on the communication from his office 
north of the border all the way to Albany, Utica, and Syracuse.  The Commissioner explained 
that although exchange of information on immigration apprehensions between border inspectors 
ran smoothly, incentivizing the work could bear even greater results. He reported that “I have to 
say that if a small fund could be put aside for the specific purpose of compensating peace 
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officers… I should consider such arrangement an important step in the way of strengthening our 
entire border inspection work.”269 Unlike localities in the interior of the nation such as Cincinnati 
or Chicago, district commissioners in border regions faced unique local challenges of 
coordinating with peace officers not only for identifying potential deportees among the residents 
and institutional populations of the area, but also tracking potential deportees at the point of entry 
or reentry. 
In Los Angeles as well, complaints were lodged about the difficulties of enacting 
deportations when government officials stood to profit from more lackadaisical approach. While 
explaining that the relationship between the immigration officials and county and city peace 
officers in the Los Angeles district had been largely pleasant, the Inspector in Charge at Los 
Angeles reported to the Commissioner General that this did not necessarily extend to them taking 
initiative to search for “smugglers or smuggled aliens.” However, he asserted, the Sheriffs’ 
department had engaged for years in a racket profiting from prisoners, and while this “worked to 
the advantage of the Immigration Service,” it seemed a “procedure of doubtful propriety.” 
Indeed, he explained, some sheriffs had even gone so far as to give bonuses to their deputies for 
each immigrant they brought in, due to the fact that they profited tremendously from the feeding 
of government prisoners.270 Government contracts for feeding, housing, and transporting 
deportees were a frequent topic of criticism from anti-deportation activists, and the corruption 
involved in provisioning the growing deportation machinery was lucrative and engaged in by 
both public officials and private companies.   
For some localities, cooperation and success at identifying deportable immigrants was a 
particular point of pride, and many reports to the Commissioner General bragged about their 
                                                          
269 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Record Group 85, Box 4038, File 54941/General. 
270 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Record Group 85, Box 4038, File 54941/General. 
172 
 
outstanding local records of apprehension. In October of 1923, both the Commissioner at 
Portland, Maine, and the Commissioner at Portland, Oregon reported their unparalleled success 
at local collaboration. On October 3rd, the Commissioner at Portland, Oregon reported to the 
Commissioner General, that “it is often said by various officials visiting this location that 
nowhere else in their travels had they found the general cooperation between law enforcement 
officers that existed in Portland.”271 “I feel there is not a State in the Union where State, County, 
City and Town Officials work more in harmony with the Immigration authorities than the 
Officers of the State of Maine,” wrote the Commissioner at Portland, Maine, just one day 
later.272 As local officials sought to distinguish themselves within the Immigration Service, the 
most compelling argument many could pose was that they had set up efficient, synchronized 
mechanism for finding deportees.  
Simultaneously, while localities competed to prove that they could deport rapidly and 
efficiently, the federal government kept tabs on the success of local offices. A 1926 
memorandum from the Chief of the Warrant Division of the Bureau of Immigration to 
Commissioner General described his findings about unserved warrants of deportation throughout 
the country. In total, he explains, there were 2498 unserved warrants as of March 13, but then 
went on to detail where that particular problem offices were. At the top of the list was Chicago, 
which was “farthest arrears with 224 unserved warrants.” Most of these, he noted, were quite 
overdue—123 had been issued more than three months ago-- and their lack of attention reflected 
deep issues within the department. Similar issues were identified at Philadelphia, which was 
noted to be a “remarkable parallel” to Chicago, with a total of 201 unserved warrants, of which 
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152 had been received over three months earlier. While Boston came in third in delinquent 
warrants, the Chief noted that its numbers of long overdue warrants was so much smaller that it 
was in a different league.273 
Naturally cities such as Chicago and Philadelphia, by virtue of their size and immigrant 
demographics were more likely to top the lists, but the Chief also pointed out several smaller 
localities with disappointing deportation records when considered in terms of proportion of 
population. In spite of their boasts about local cooperation and successful apprehension of 
deportees, the office at Portland, Maine was one of the major concerns among smaller locales. 
Thirty-eight unserved warrants were out in Portland, the Chief noted, all of which were over 
three months old. Furthermore, in spite of District Director Howe’s claim that there was a ‘lack 
of help,’ the Chief concluded that he was “not prepared to concede that this excuse is entirely 
valid.” However, the issues were not limited to Portland, and the Chief asserted that there were 
numerous other districts around the country that “are turning in far less work than the size of 
their districts indicates to me ought to be forthcoming,” including Helena, Montana; Spokane, 
Washington; Denver, Colorado; St. Louis, Missouri; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Norfolk, Virginia.274 
State and local governments, however, did more than influence deportation practice 
through the actions of individual local officials or the cooperation or disagreement of local 
institutions. In some cases, in spite of the political will to assist with deportations, local laws 
actually hindered the ability to enact certain provisions of deportation practices. State laws 
themselves could stall or prevent deportations from taking place, and state governments found 
themselves denying the recommendations of the federal Bureau because of local legal guidelines. 
Len Small, Governor of Illinois responded to Assistant Secretary E.J. Henning of the Department 
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of Labor in 1924 regarding his inquiry about early parole for immigrant inmates on the condition 
of deportation. Small expressed that his office was “perfectly willing to cooperate,” but “there is 
no way under the Illinois law to make that condition a part of the executive act, and pardons and 
commutations of sentence once granted are absolute. It is not possible under the Illinois Statutes 
to re-arrest an alien upon his return and incarcerate him to serve out the remainder of his 
sentence for violating the agreement not to return.”275 Thus, even where the will for local 
cooperation with the federal agenda existed, state law might intervene to thwart the expansion of 
deportations in a particular region. In Nevada, on the other hand, the Governor was able to 
reassure Henning that while a pardon for deportation was not an option under state law, parole 
was used to release prisoners for deportation. This process was only put into place when they 
received notice from the Immigration authorities at San Francisco that a deportation warrant was 
in hand, and that because they were able to designate these individuals as parolees, they were 
still subject to return to prison if they were to somehow escape during deportation 
proceedings.276 
As the more extensive examination of local deportation enforcement in Chicago will 
demonstrate, local law and jurisdiction could prove remarkably influential on the deportation 
project. The Chicago police force, for instance, found that it lost the ability to actually round up 
potential deportees to hand over to immigration officials during a 1926 drive because so many of 
the targets of the raids merely crossed city lines into suburban jurisdiction to avoid apprehension. 
Because the early immigration bureau lacked the personnel, resources, and funds to implement a 
full-scale dragnet effort to find deportees, the authorities were forced to rely on both local law 
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enforcement officials, as the remainder of this chapter will demonstrate in greater detail, and 
institutional coordination and a wide network of public employees, as the following chapter will 
explore. Throughout the nation, among the most transformative elements of the growing 
deportation machinery was the constellation of local participants building the project. These 
active agents in the national agenda for removal went far beyond those generally identified in 
deportation scholarship and included suspicious neighborhood busybodies, bumbling local police 
officers, distraught family members, and a wide range of crusading vigilantes and institutional 
employees. 
 
Local Policing and the Chicago Deportation Drive of 1926 
 
On February 23, 1926, the front page of the Chicago Daily Tribune declared that, 
“Strongholds of Sicilian gangsters were crashed without warning last night in a sudden concerted 
hunt for deportable aliens.  It was the zero hour for the city police and United States immigration 
inspectors, and their drive resulted in 121 arrests.  Deputy Chief John Stege of the detective bureau 
commanded the selected squads which within a few minutes after the order was given had brought in 
seventy-five prisoners.”277  Proclaiming the success of the raids, evidenced by both the mass arrests, 
and the flight of many more Sicilians from the area, the article went on to state that, “when their 
labors were over for the night the United States inspectors had designated twenty one men as 
government prisoners, all of them to stand trial for their right to remain longer in this country.  It was 
said most of these would probably soon be on a boat Sicily-bound…”278 In what came to be known 
as the Chicago Deportation Drive of 1926, newspapers featured similar stories for several weeks 
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throughout February and March, with sensationalistic headlines such as, ““Raiders Find Old Haunts 
of Gunmen Dark: U.S. Speeds Action to Deport Gangs,” “Plan to Deport 12,000 Aliens this Year,” 
and perhaps most tellingly, “House to Help in Clean-up—Willingness Shown to Provide Funds for 
Deportation Proceedings Action.”279 
So what form of ‘clean-up’ was underway in Chicago during these weeks of raids, 
detentions, and deportations?  The Chicago drive illuminates the local dimensions of deportation in 
greater depth. To do so, it examines the actual events of the drive, which have received little 
attention, but also the motivations behind the events, the rhetoric used to describe and explain the 
raids and deportations, and the reactions of various segments of the community in Chicago.  
Examining the drive for deportations in a specific urban space provides a vantage point for viewing 
the interactions between various levels of governmental power in the process. I analyze how the 
Deportation Drive of 1926 represented both continuity in its identification and treatment of 
unwelcome foreign-born outsiders with the years preceding it, but also shifts and changes in 
attitudes toward immigrants which reflected changing national circumstances, the development of 
new immigration legislation, and complex transformations in the perceptions of race, crime, and 
radicalism in the course of the 1920s.  This process did not occur solely in policy debates in 
Congress, but in fact played out on the streets of Chicago, in the holding cells for detained 
immigrants, and in the local courts, newspapers, organizational activities, and public discourse, and 
can be seen more fully by attention to these sites.  
Ngai argues, “the application of the deportation laws gave rise to an oppositional political 
and legal discourse, which imagined deserving and undeserving illegal immigrants and, 
concomitantly, just and unjust deportations.  These categories were constructed out of modern 
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ideas about social desirability and particularly with regard to crime and sexual morality, and 
values that esteem family preservation.”280  In Chicago, these constructed ideas were in a state of 
formation and flux throughout the period, particularly in regards to notions about political 
radicalism, criminality, and race, and came to a head under very particular local circumstances 
and agenda in 1926.  I argue that constructions of criminal foreign-born danger and political 
ideology, each of which were often informed by assumptions about race, did not function 
separately from one another in public perception or policy, but were instead tightly intertwined. 
Together, they contributed to the processes by which un-Americanism was identified, projected 
onto immigrants, and used to police their degree of belonging and freedom.  From early on, the 
suppression of radical political thought has been justified and rationalized as a suppression of 
dangerous criminal thought.  Hong brings this collapsing of ideology and criminality out in 
quoting Theodore Roosevelt’s 1903 state of the union address in which he asserted, “Anarchy is 
no more an expression of ‘social discontent’ than picking pockets or wife beating.  The anarchist, 
and especially the anarchist in the United States, is merely one type of criminal, more dangerous 
than any other because he represents the same depravity in greater degree.”281  The deportation 
drive of 1926 functions as a particularly sharp example of the ways in which those utilizing this 
legal machinery manipulated immigration policies to serve the interests of local political figures. 
While the primary intervention of this work is in the scholarship on deportation and its 
progression, it is also necessary to position it within the extensive literature on Italian Americans, 
particularly in regards to crime and the locality of Chicago.  Many of the major works in this 
field, such as Humbert Nelli’s classic The Business of Crime: Italians and Syndicate Crime in the 
United States pay a great deal of attention to the ways in which local setting and politics shape 
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the experiences of immigrants, but very little to the ways in which the enactment of immigration 
restriction and deportation policies impacted the populations which they studied.  Even while 
discussing the measures taken by the city of Chicago and the Chicago police to interfere with the 
activities of the Italian-American gangsters and bootleggers of the city during the 1920s, Nelli 
does not recognize the role that police terror of the broader Italian American population through 
the threat of deportation played in shaping the experiences of this community.282  Likewise, 
while scholars such as John Diggins have examined the political dynamics of Italian American 
communities, and in particular, their interactions with the ideology and state mechanism of 
Fascism,283 it is not until recently that scholars have begun to examine the ways in which the 
movement of Italian people between Italy and America, through both voluntary migration and 
forced deportation, impacted these political currents.284 
Indeed, scholarly attention to the transnational migration of both Italian workers and their 
political ideologies around the world highlights their forced migrations through deportation. In 
the growing literature on global migrations of Italians, Donna Gabaccia, Fraser Ottanelli, and 
Kenyon Zimmer and others have examined the unique mobility of Italian workers as they 
migrated throughout the work in a range of transitory and permanent patterns.285  Thus, as both 
Italian and American officials were quick to explain during the deportation drive, it was difficult 
to provide evidence for the entry conditions of the Italian American immigrants being examined 
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for deportability, because they often migrated to the United States not directly from Italy, but 
from Mexico, Latin America, or Canada.  This made deportation proceedings complicated for 
U.S. immigration authorities and led to a series of exchanges over the origins, arrival, and 
deportability of many of the immigrants detained in Chicago’s deportation drive. 
In February of 1926, the month in which the deportation drive and its attendant rhetoric 
of immigrant danger and expulsion began, the number of deportations nationally was 342.  By 
the following month, the number had jumped to 938, by April it had reached 1052, in May, 
deportations numbered 1063, and by June, the number had made the tremendous leap to 1924, 
the highest in history at that point.286 As growing legal categories of “illegal” immigrants became 
prominently visible, as immigrants from a variety of nations sought to circumvent restrictions by 
a variety of means, debates and discourse over how to deal with these immigrants became fierce 
sites of contention. In the case of Italian American deportations, in particular, the international 
context also holds a critical potential for answering, why now?  As fascist forces under Mussolini 
increasingly silenced their enemies, often through detention and deportation, Americans watched 
and alternately admired and vilified such actions.287 
The mid-1920s also present an important juncture for an examination of the rhetoric of 
crime in deportation policy and practice.  Following the intense persecution of radicals in the 
post-war period, crime, along with mental disability, public charges, and illegal entry became 
dominant criteria in public debates over deportability.  While arguments regarding crime had 
always marked hostility toward immigrant groups, particularly of certain nationalities, in the 
1920s, prohibition-era bootlegging, syndicate crime, and sensationalistic journalism featuring 
chilling tales of murder, violence, and sexual deviance hastened the utilization of accusations of 
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criminality as a primary motivation for deportations.  Substantial evidence disproving rationales 
about higher crime rates among the foreign born had been available at least since the research of 
the 1911 Dillingham Commission reports. But it was not until the early 1930s, in particular with 
publication of the Wickersham Commission findings and a variety of Chicago-based studies of 
crime among foreign and native born populations, that arguments regarding criminality as the 
predominant basis for deportation became more untenable in public perception.  As the 1920s 
progressed, the idea of the “illegal” immigrant became more solidified, and increasingly, the 
distinction between criminal behavior and criminal identity became blurred. 
To explain the origins of the deportation drive, mainstream newspaper accounts pointed to a 
single quote in regards to a single incident, but in reality, the origins lay in a complex web of anti-
immigrant sentiment, changing immigration policy, local and national political agendas, and 
international developments.  According to contemporary accounts, the raids were inspired by the 
growing realization that Sicilian criminal power had grown so great in Chicago as to terrorize the 
citizenry and prevent the enactment of legal justice.  In an article entitled “City Asks End of 20 
Years of Gun Terrorism Here,” the Chicago Daily Tribune declared: “When Orval M. Payne of 
Maywood told Judge William V. Brothers that he believe he would have to carry a gun the rest of his 
life if he were accepted as a juror and should vote for the conviction of John Scalisi and Albert 
Anselmi, the machinery of government was set in motion…”288  This claim is indicative of the 
popular rhetoric about the need to protect citizens from criminal Italians, and more specifically 
Sicilians, “gangsters,” “gunmen,” and “murderers,” which concealed the larger project of 
deportation efforts during this drive: that of demarcating and policing the boundaries of un-
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Americanism, foreign danger, and undesirability along lines of ethnicity and race, and political 
ideology.   
In her extensive report on the deportation drive of 1926, Adena Miller Rich, director of 
Chicago’s Immigrants Protective League, concluded: 
Whether raiders from the offices of the States Attorney and Sheriff were really looking 
for crime and attempting to apprehend law-breakers; whether the anti-alien drive partially 
diverted attention from really deep seated sources of trouble in the community or whether 
the ‘foreign-hunt’ was not rather an ‘emotional release’ for those who participated and 
those who watched it with admiration, was something of an open question as the raids 
progressed.289 
 
Rich encapsulated a number of the major issues at stake in the deportation drives of 1926, which 
they took a central role in defining social boundaries, political dynamics, and power relations 
between the local, national, and international authorities, beyond the actual number of 
deportations carried to fruition in the drive. The question of whether the drive was really, as it 
claimed, aimed at discovering true criminals and rooting out their hold in American society is a 
necessary one, for the targets of the drive went far beyond actual suspected criminals as police 
engaged in door-by-door invasion of particular ethnic neighborhoods.  Reports on the raids 
remarked with frequency that, “all we’ll need to do is to find aliens who are deportable,” a clear 
sign that more was at work than a simple desire to decrease crime, and that in fact, it was not just 
crime that was being policed through the cooperative efforts of the city and the national 
authorities, but immigration and foreignness.290 
 The question of “whether the anti-alien drive partially diverted attention from really deep 
seated sources of trouble in the community” also reveals a great deal about the nature of the 
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deportation drive, which was in some ways as much about proving to the national public and 
national authorities that Chicago’s reputation as a criminal city was undeserved as it was about 
actually solving any real troubles that plagued the city and its inhabitants.  Supposedly begun 
over the trepidation of a number of potential jurors to serve on a particular criminal case for fear 
of violent repercussions, the drive was hatched partially for publicity-seeking drama.  It was, 
among other social agendas, aimed at salvaging Chicago’s national reputation by attempting to 
show that it was not Chicago that was criminal, but a small portion of its population, who were 
outsiders to not only the national, but also the local polity, and could thus be forced out.  
Whether it really addressed the challenges the city of Chicago faced: high crime rates, collusion 
of local political figures with organized crime, or expelled the most dangerous of the criminal 
element in Chicago was fiercely debated.  While national figures initially expressed eagerness 
over joining this cause, as its course continued and its challenges and failures became more 
apparent, Chicago officials were left to their efforts by the Federal authorities who had initially 
rushed to their assistance.  Though supported for a short period by a burst of federal assistance 
and extravagant hopes for future federal funding, by the end, the drive had returned to its roots as 
a fundamentally local process of social control.  While deportation scholarship has focused on 
the determination of national boundaries at ports and points of entry, the course of events in 
Chicago demonstrates that the process of deportation practice also played out in the local sphere, 
shaped only partially and intermittently by interaction with national figures. 
 Who was deportable during the deportation drive of 1926?  In order to more fully 
understand the dynamics of the deportation drive and the series of events by which mass 
deportations were planned, proposed, and carried out, it is essential to understand the legal 
criteria by which an immigrant could qualify for deportation proceedings.  As a number of 
183 
 
observers pointed out, the criteria were often distressingly unclear.  Throughout the mid-1920s, 
officials worked toward clearer and stricter guidelines regarding deportability of aliens.  In the 
Congressional Hearing on “Deportation of Alien Criminals, Gunmen, Narcotics Dealers, 
Defectives, etc.” an attorney from Philadelphia, representing the American Civil Liberties Union, 
pointed out that in fact the strictures on deportability were so vague as to have “embarrassed” the 
Department of Labor in its attempts to define and enforce such criteria as “moral turpitude,” 
which in the words of Congressional Chairman Albert Johnson, “covers a great many things 
other than morality.”291  From the perspective of those pursuing the drive, the task of 
determining the legality of deportations was daunting, indeed.  Regarding the situation in 
Chicago, Secretary of Labor Davis, the ultimate authority of all deportation proceedings in the 
United States, explained, “To what extent Chicago can be delivered from its terrorization by the 
deportation of the alien gangsters will depend on the status of each individual of the gang.  The 
deportation laws are the growth of decades of legislation and are extremely complicated.”292   
In response to this challenge, Chicago authorities identified their target broadly, so 
broadly in certain cases that it encompassed whole neighborhoods, and sifted out the legally 
deportable from those who were not only after the arrests had been made.  Their targets were 
detained, as this process was carried out, for hours, days, or weeks.  Concerned about the 
implications for civil liberties and the disregard for basic rights, Rich explained that, “Wholesale 
dragnet arrests do not wait upon the issue of legal warrants.  The net is cast in the hope that 
within the large numbers caught, those actually sought will be found.”293  However, officials also 
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had to hope that when their desired targets were discovered, hunted out, and captured, they 
would in fact be deportable under current immigration law.  
At the time of the deportation drive, American deportation legislation fell into three 
major categories-- those cases which qualified for deportation within three years of entry, those 
which qualified within five years of entry, and those which qualified “irrespective of time of 
entry.”  For those who had entered the country within the previous three years, the legal grounds 
for deportability consisted of illegal entry by land or water.  The other provision of the three-year 
legal category was for the repatriation of aliens in need of public aid who chose to return to their 
native countries, and thus, qualified to be voluntary repatriation rather than deportation.  For 
immigrants who had entered the United States five years or more previously, the provisions 
allowing deportation included immigrants with mental disabilities (including “idiots, imbeciles, 
feeble-minded epileptics, persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority), paupers or vagrants, 
immigrants afflicted with certain contagious diseases, immigrants physically mentally incapable 
of supporting themselves, or liable to be a public charge (an often contested vaguely constructed 
category), contract laborers, stowaways, underage children without their parents, natives of 
certain Asian nations, illiterates, and polygamists.  While certain criteria only remained relevant 
for deportability within time constraints of three or five years from entry, other criteria allowed 
for deportability at any time.  Such factors included immigrants who had become public charges, 
anarchists (a broad field including a wide range of political ideologies and actions), members of 
organizations which advocate overthrow or violence of the American state, or who write or 
publish on such subjects, “war-time undesirables,” immigrants who have been charged with 
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crimes of “moral turpitude” (including, but not limited to prostitution, slave trading, narcotic 
trafficking, or other felonies), and “alien seamen.”294   
Another fiercely debated point was the deportability of alcohol smugglers, a relevant 
point during the deportation drive, which occurred in the midst of the Prohibition era.  While 
smuggling was widespread and often conflated with immigrant crime during this period, it did 
not constitute legal grounds for deportation.  The lines which demarcated deportability, 
therefore, were both restrictive of the deportation drive, but simultaneously broadly and vaguely 
enough constructed to provide many openings for potential deportability.  During the course of 
1926, legislators battled over the proposed deportation legislation that would eliminate some of 
the temporal restrictions on deportations, remove some of detained immigrants’ legal 
protections, and expand the categories of crimes eligible for deportation.  Such debates included 
the placement of the burden of proof upon the immigrant to demonstrate their status as ineligible 
for deportation, the placement of high bails for detained immigrant facing deportation 
proceedings, and matters of conditions of detentions.295    
It is in this context that Chicago and national authorities not only had to search out 
immigrants for deportation, but also struggle with the lengthy process of determining whether a 
particular detainee met the qualifications for deportability, a process which left detained 
immigrants facing long, uncertain stints of detention.  In planning the raids on Chicago’s Sicilian 
population, Secretary of Labor Davis declared that, “It is my opinion that we shall never be able 
to put an end to the smuggling of criminals and other undesirable aliens into this country until 
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the registration of aliens is required.  It is the criminal class of aliens that has the most to fear 
from registration.”296 While leaders of the drive efforts lauded registration as the best way to 
ensure the safety of the American people, others denounced it vehemently as an oppressive and 
dangerous precedent, which would destroy the democratic and egalitarian foundations of the 
nation.  While debates raged on around the nation, the proceedings of the deportation drive in 
Chicago were shaped both by intensely local dynamics, and by this wider controversy and 
discourse over the future of deportation and immigration policy, and what such a future would 
portend for the definition of Americanism itself. 
 As immigration officials and local law enforcement operated within the constraints of 
particular criteria and restriction on deportations, their positions were also shaped by the shared 
historical memory of previous deportation efforts.  One of the common reference points for those 
arguing for a deportation of Sicilians in 1926 was the deportation of Chinese immigrants during 
the so-called “Tong Wars” the previous year.  Defending the need for appropriations for 
deportation, the Chicago Herald Examiner proclaimed at the start of the deportation drive that, 
“The Department of Justice last summer made a raid in New York on Tong men and arrested 250 
and found that 198 were deportable.”297 Another popular point of comparison as planning for the 
raids progress, from both a perspective of admiration and dissent, was the argument that these 
raids resembled those in which political radicals and dissenters were rounded up in the first Red 
Scare following World War I.  Officials argued that deportation had a strong record of 
eliminating social problems, and could be used to alleviate issues with crime. “Wholesale 
deportations are the best cure for organized alien lawlessness,” Secretary of Labor Davis 
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asserted, going so far as to claim that “anarchy was stamped out when Emma Goldman and a 
whole shipload of her kind were sent back to Russia.”298   
Among the most dominant features of the rhetoric surrounding the deportation drive of 
1926 was the imagery of the drive as being a measure of “house cleaning.”  “He is a poor 
householder who will not get rid of the rats that ravage his larder and endanger the health of his 
family,” wrote one Chicago editorialist in February of 1926.299  This emphasis on municipal 
“housekeeping” was particularly notable in light of the efforts of reformers throughout the 
Progressive era to make “good citizens” out of immigrants through promoting domesticity and 
homeownership. Almost daily during the drive, articles and cartoons appeared calling for a 
clean-up of Chicago’s criminal element through deportation of dangerous or undesirable aliens, 
frequently depicted as rats.  But whose house required protection?  Cleaning house in Chicago 
demonstrated that deportation was often seen as a fundamentally local process, in which local 
motivations sparked a drive, local political dynamics necessitated a cleanup, local police 
authorities carried out the raiding phases of the drive, and upon the disintegration of the drive, 
local authorities were left responsible for their own house-cleaning efforts, deserted by the once-
fervent support of national leaders and immigration services.   
 As the plans for the deportation drive took shape in mid-February, local papers stirred up 
hysteria, pointing to expressions of fear from citizens who refused to serve on the jury for two 
Sicilian Americans accused of murder. In doing so, they initially found a great deal of 
enthusiasm about the clean-up mission from Federal authorities.  President Coolidge himself 
claimed to be “100%” behind the war on foreign crime, and stated that “the American people are 
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facing a national problem of the greatest character.”300  The following week, U.S. Immigration 
Inspector arrived from the capitol with similar declarations, swearing that “I will go to the limit 
in cooperating with the Chicago police… President Coolidge directed that we do everything in 
our power to clean up Chicago, and that’s just what we’ll do.”301 Within weeks however, most 
national political figures were denouncing their involvement in the deportation drive, now seen 
as a failure and decrying any responsibility for its efforts.  Senator King of Utah once more 
weighed in on deportation proceedings, and gave voice to this shifted balance between national 
and local responsibility: “You should take this message back to the people of Chicago and 
Illinois.  They must clean their own house, not ask the federal government to do so.  It is the fault 
of the decent people of Chicago and Illinois if they do not have a decent government.”302  
 The importance of looking at the local framework for understanding the dynamics of the 
deportation drive of 1926 can be seen in the fact that when Chicago authorities were faced with 
the reality that they were not in fact apprehending their most desired targets, but instead were 
only succeeding in chasing them out of the city, they declared their efforts a wild success.  
Deputy Chief of Detectives John Stege commented on the desertion of “Little Sicily,” declaring 
with pride, “If our men can’t find them it’s a good sign they have jumped town… Either the 
Sicilians are afraid to be out or they have gone, and we don’t care which.  If we can chase them 
out, it’ll be a job for some other city to have them deported.  We’ve had our share of Sicilian 
murders.”303  Such statements evidence the local nature of the deportation drive, and demonstrate 
the utilization of national policy for local purposes. They reveal deportation to be a feature of 
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American life which in policy may have existed on a national level, in practice, operated on a 
localized, geographically specific level, a fact neglected by much of the scholarship on the 
subject. 
 Not only were the ambitions of Chicago officials bounded by city limits and a desire to 
chase undesirable aliens beyond them, if they could not be gathered and removed to Italy. The 
legal reach of Chicago’s deportation drive was also bounded by city limits.  Despite the support 
and cooperation of national immigration officials in the raids, the jurisdiction of the Chicago 
police force ended at their own city boundaries.  Although Chicago was part of the District 14 
Branch of the United States Immigration Service, along with the rest of the northern half of the 
state of Illinois,304 deportation practice depended on the actions of the police force of Chicago, 
whose reach only extended throughout the city, leaving the District and Federal authorities of the 
United States Immigration Service largely irrelevant in greater Chicago during the raids so long 
as other municipal governments could not or did not engage in their own raiding activities.  
Although the Chicago police were aware that a number of the highest profile criminal targets 
they sought had gone no further than neighboring Cicero, “In Cicero they are safe from the drive 
that is on in Chicago… The Chicago police are without jurisdiction in Cicero, and the 
government men there have not a sufficient force to make their own raids.”305 
 A February 24 cartoon entitled, “The Pied Piper and the Rats” encapsulates the 
significance of local versus national authority more succinctly than the numerous articles on the 
subject.  While angry housewives labeled “local roundup” do the real work of beating away the 
rats (“alien gangsters”) from the city, the Federal Government stands, idly triumphant, 
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trumpeting the “national campaign to rid America of menacing aliens.”306  Numerous other 
cartoons depict the roles of both the local and federal government, fraught with diverging 
agendas and varied methods.  Thus, the centrality of deportation to American history can be seen 
not only in relation to its role in policing immigration policy, but in its navigation of power 
dynamics between local and federal authorities and in their diverse efforts to effect social 
change. 
 
Figure 8: Cartoon- “The Pied Piper and the Rats” 
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Meanwhile, a dialogue over criminal roundups and the presence of deportable immigrants 
in the midst of American society developed between representatives of the Italian state and 
Americans. The question of who was to blame for the criminal nature of the Sicilian ‘gangster’ 
in Chicago was central to this debate. While many Americans and the majority of the mainstream 
American press depicted the issue as being one of inherently criminal ethnicity, Italians argued 
that those being apprehended for crimes in America could not be taken as representatives of 
Italian nature or traditions.  As Thomas Gugliemo has demonstrated, the conflation between 
crime and Italians in the United States, and particularly in Chicago, was so dominant that by 
1926, this link seemed to be natural in the minds of many Americans.  “Both the type and 
quantity of crime coverage marked Italians unmistakably as racially distinct and problematic in a 
variety of ways,” Gugliemo explains, and in a process of “subtle racialization,” created a 
discourse which “emphasized Sicilian and Italian criminality so unrelentingly that, to many of its 
readers, these undesirable traits must have seemed immutable, and thus, rooted in something 
more constant than customs and culture—something like heredity.”307 
 During and after the events of the deportation drive of 1926, many seemed to subscribe to 
this perception of the Sicilian as an innately criminal other, arguing vehemently that the 
expulsion of these dangerous ethnics was the only way of saving the nation from devolving into 
the hunting-grounds of “alien terrorists.”  While this perspective emerges quickly form an 
examination of the media attention given to the deportation drive, its counterpoint is perhaps 
more unexpected and certainly more revealing of the transnational context in which these events 
played out.  As many Americans pointed across the ocean for the origins of criminal behavior, so 
too did Italians.  An interchange between Ernest Freund of the University of Chicago Law 
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School, and Congressman Samuel Dickstein of New York, in the investigations of the 
Congressional Committee on Immigration and Naturalization provides insight into this debate.  
In questioning by the committee, Freund queried, “Now, the question is where they were made 
criminals—in this country or abroad?  Who is responsible for their being criminals after they 
have been here 10 or 15 years?” Dickstein responded, “You could not charge very well that the 
Government had made them criminals.”  In a response which revealed the growing debate over 
the origins of criminal behavior, a debate with significant implications for deportation in the 
United States, Freund replied, “Well, it is sometimes said that society is responsible for all 
criminals.  That is, of course, a theory.”308 
 The American consul at Rome agreed that the social environment of the United States 
could be identified as the source of criminal behavior, stating, “I want to point out that many 
young Sicilians who grow up in America are products of their surroundings.”309  However, the 
misplacement of blame was not only due to the fact that Sicilians came under the influence of 
“rowdies” when reaching America, the consul argued.  He pointed out that the Italian 
government did not choose the emigrants to the United States, but instead, these populations 
were chosen by American representatives themselves.310  Subsequent reports from the Italian 
consuls expressed similar sentiments, and pointed to the fact of lower crime rates in Italy than in 
the United States as evidence of the lack of foundation of claims against Italian ethnicity and 
nationality as the sources of criminal behavior.  The Italian consul general, Leopoldo Zunini 
incisively critiqued the raids posing the pointed question, “If the Sicilians and Italians are 
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responsible for this criminal situation, why aren’t they responsible for similar situations at home?  
Crime does not exist there on the scale it does here.”311 
 Zunini’s follow-up to his own question reveals another element of the international 
character of the crackdown on crime in Chicago.  While newspapers continued to declare the war 
on crime at home in Chicago, they also provided a revealing glimpse of crime fighting in Italy 
itself.  While there was, in fact, extensive organized crime and violence in Sicily during this 
period, the reason for lower crime in Italy was, Zunini insisted, “because the measures against 
crime in Italy are stern.  When we order life imprisonment, life imprisonment is carried out.”312  
At a historical moment when the American position on Mussolini and the rise of fascism in Italy 
was still ambivalent, and often colored by a fair amount of admiration for the strength and power 
of the Italian state, examinations of the war on crime in Italy were, unsurprisingly filled with 
admiration for its success.  The Chicago Daily Tribune praised the impressive accomplishment 
of the Fascist government in its work against the “Sicilian Mafia.”313  “The task of completely 
cleaning them up is nearly at an end,” the Tribune noted, celebrating that, “when the opposition 
was wrecked and Premier Mussolini could laugh at his rivals, the task was again undertaken.  
This time no mistakes were made.  Sufficient funds were provided to employ army agents… 
Today the power of the Mafia is utterly broken.  The final dissolving of a once powerful secret 
society is only a matter of days.”314 
While political ideology was a less prominent feature of public discourse around 
deportations during the mid-1920s than during the first Red Scare, it retained a great deal of 
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importance in the actual motivations of deportations, even as it lost some of its rhetorical 
significance.  Although they were not the detentions that made the headlines any longer, 
detentions of labor activists and radicals continued in the deportation drive of 1926.  As Chicago 
police raided buildings and sought out deportable aliens, they were quick to apprehend those 
who were associated with labor unions or radical politics, even with no ties to organized crime.  
The story of Giuseppe Caruso provides a compelling example.  Newspaper accounts 
which mentioned him said nothing more of his political activity than a buried reference to his 
being an “anarchist.”   However, an interview with Caruso revealed the full story.  After arriving 
in Chicago, he joined the Socialist Party, and “on the evening of February 22, 1926, while he 
was working with others in the office between 7 and 8 in the evening, police entered looking for 
a man named Martino, and not finding him, took Caruso and two others without warrant.”   After 
two and a half weeks of detention, it took an inordinately high $2,500 bail to gain Caruso’s 
release.  During this time, “He was given no blanket, water ran on the floor… He became ill and 
was refused a doctor.  He complained of treatment and was put in a punishment cell.”315  While 
the search of the offices of the Socialist Party, and the warrantless detention and severe 
conditions revealed enough of the dynamics of the raid, the significance of Caruso’s case does 
not end there.  Knowing the risks of his deportation to Fascist Italy, Caruso sought a visa for 
either France or Latin America in order to engage in a voluntary deportation to one of these 
locations and prevent forced deportation to Italy.316  While it is difficult to identify the full 
motivations behind many of the detentions and eventual deportations, such evidence suggests 
                                                          
315 “An Italian Taken in the Alien Deportation Raids of February and March 1926,” January, 1927, Immigrants 
Protective League, Box 4, Folder 50. 
316 Ibid. 
195 
 
that political activity and radical ideology continued to be significant grounds for the 
identification and attempted expulsion of “un-American” elements during the 1926 drive.   
Although ethnicity was certainly the most dominant criteria for arrest and detention in the 
deportation raids of these months, the publicly-imagined, and inherently local space of the 
Sicilian neighborhood was also a crucial determinant.  In the raids of February and March 1926, 
terms like “Little Sicily,” and “gangland,” or “bad lands” were markers for public mobilization 
of a particular spatial imagination.  Donna Gabaccia illuminates the processes by which spaces 
became marked as Italian, and the complex internal relations, migration patterns, and negative 
sentiment towards Italian immigrants which shaped and named these spaces.317  While the 
category of space commonly known as “little Italy” was generally perceived to be a clearly 
bounded and static phenomenon, it is in fact, Gabaccia argues, a construct which was created in 
the midst of a web of global Italian migrations, and took a wide range of distinct localized 
shapes.  In describing why “little Italies” took hold in the imagination of some localities in 
particular ways, she explains, “A comparative exploration of neighborhoods, Little Italies and 
Italo-phobia within and beyond the English-speaking world helps us to see the complex elements 
that so often led English-speakers to mark urban spaces with national labels, providing us with a 
more nuanced understanding of Italo-phobia itself.”318  The deportation drive of 1926 emerges as 
a clear instance in which what Gabaccia calls “Italo-phobia” was shaped within a spatialized 
understanding of how the ethnic composition of the criminal underworld can in fact be mapped 
onto the street geography of a given section of urban space. 
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 That this space was assumed to be Sicilian and thus the “hunting-ground” for criminals 
was certainly the understanding of many of the leaders of the Italian American community, who 
in the aftermath of the raids expressed their concern at the practice of searching particular 
geographic spaces without any targets beyond the inhabitants of a particular community.  One 
Italian American lawyer stated that, “You can take any house in the Miller Street and Taylor 
Street intersection and ask the people living there, because the whole block was raided.  Every 
home was invaded, without exception.”319  He argued that such wholesale round-ups violated 
civil liberties and proper procedure, and “admitted the guilt of ‘the so-called authorities’… in 
breaking law, disregarding grossly all civil rights of men, their brutality in terorising, torturing, 
and antagonizing people who were innocent, since only a few could be deported.”320  Matching 
these accusations, George Spatuzza, President of the Justinian Society of Advocates, an Italian 
American legal organization, said of the raids, “All the Italian colony between Harrison and 12th 
Street was terrorized.  People were afraid to step out on the street in a fear that they may be taken 
prisoner.  Places where they used to meet for social affairs and recreation were deserted.”321  As 
scholars such as Harvey Zorbaugh have explored, distrust of police among Sicilian immigrants 
was already high, and these round-ups undoubtedly increased suspicion of authority figures. 
Zorbaugh notes that this distrust is rooted in the immigrants’ experiences of danger and reprisals 
when informing on others within the community.322 
Deputy Chief of Police Stege mirrored this assertion gleefully as evidence of the success 
of the raids, stating that “Halsted Street was filled with men carrying carpet bags within a half 
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hour after the police had marched through Little Sicily.”323 Soon afterwards, remarking on the 
success of raiding the “haunts” of Sicilian gangsters, and noting the desertion of an entire 
neighborhood as a mark of accomplishment, Stege asserted that, “North Halsted street is like the 
deserted village tonight.  So is everything west of it and South of Van Buren street to Roosevelt 
Road.  Pool-rooms, coffee shops, cigar stores—everything dark.”324 As Gabbacia and others 
argue, the process of native-born Americans reacting to a foreign born population, and the 
mechanisms by which this produced an “othering” of the spaces which they inhabited in large 
numbers was what generated such understandings of the immigrant neighborhoods in cities like 
Chicago.   
Gabaccia explains that, “the transformation of immigrant neighborhoods into Little Italies 
might seem innocuous enough—it was little more than a spatial expression of the myriad forms 
of ethnic segmentation characteristic of English speaking lands.” “Only recently, Gabaccia 
concludes, “has the burgeoning new research field of ‘whiteness’ studies forced enthusiasts of 
multiculturalism to consider alternative explanations.”325  Thomas Gugliemo shows the ways in 
which this historiographical trend has begun to develop in his argument that, “If most Italians 
arrived in Chicago with little sense of their belonging to an Italian racial/national community, 
constant criminalization, like immigration restriction and neighborhood relations, helped change 
this in the 1920s.”326 Not only did each of these factors shape the creation of an Italian American 
identity, but they were in fact not distinct and separate factors.  When it came to the discourse 
and practice of deportation, they were intensely intertwined.  Certainly, during the deportation 
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drive of 1926, the “othering” of Italian neighborhoods as a spatialized expression of anti-
immigrant sentiment emerged clearly in the targeting and rhetoric surrounding the Sicilian “bad 
lands” of Chicago, alternatively known as “gangland,” or in its most neutral incarnation, “Little 
Sicily”.   
Although the deportation raids were portrayed and generally perceived as being entirely 
focused on Italian or Sicilian immigrants, the nets were in fact cast more widely.  The most 
highly publicized raids took place in the neighborhood commonly known as “Little Sicily” and 
featured building by building invasions of largely Italian homes and business, but Italians were 
not the only population targeted.  The Immigrants Protective League noted that, “The raids were 
announced as an anti-Sicilian move.” But the League added that, “it is known that among those 
apprehended were a few Greeks, and a few more Mexicans.”327 The league’s own interview 
records, however, imply that “few” is an understatement of the magnitude of raiding against 
Greeks and Mexicans.  When Rafael Trejo was interviewed along with a number of other leaders 
of the Mexican American community in December, he revealed that in fact, on the night of 
February 28th alone, 97 Mexicans were taken into custody.  In a raid conducted on Ashland 
Avenue, between 41st and 47th Streets, a largely Mexican neighborhood near the Stockyards and 
of those 97 detained that night, seventeen were eventually deported to Mexico.328 
Completely absent from the headlines of mainstream newspapers are any accounts of 
Mexican American detentions, and though mentions are rare, they appear occasionally in the 
final lines of a long article detailing the raids on Sicilian American “gangsters.”  Because in 
Chicago, unlike elsewhere in the nation, Mexicans posed a less sensational target for 
deportations and were not easily conflated with recent spates of murders, Mexican detentions 
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were almost entirely eclipsed in press coverage of the events.  In one of multiple lengthy 
accounts on detention and dealings with Italian criminals in the Chicago Daily Tribune on March 
3rd, only a small final paragraph, stating, “Detective bureau squads, led by Sergt. John Mc Veigh, 
raided a poolroom at 8923 Burley avenue last night and arrested twelve Mexicans, who will be 
turned over to the immigration authorities for deportation,” exposed the fact that the targets were 
broader than the Sicilian American communities.329 While the experiences of Mexicans at risk of 
deportation were largely overlooked by the media attention during the deportation drive, the fear 
of deportation was prominent within these communities and the events of these raids must be 
contexualized within the reality of the threat.  As Gabriela Arredondo explains, the attempts of 
Mexican immigrants to build communities and find stable working environments in Chicago, 
It is clear from the aftermath that the deportation raids left the city, and specific 
neighborhoods within it, with a far greater impact and atmosphere of fear than what is 
measurable from deportation statistics alone. It is also evident that these effects mapped onto 
specific local populations in unique patterns due to residential concentrations and specific local 
prejudices. The report accompanying the interview revealed that not only had Mexican 
Americans suffered from the raids in large numbers, but that indeed they continued to live in fear 
of unknown authorities as did members of the Sicilian American community.  The IPL 
interviews discovered as they had when interviewing Italian Americans that there was great deal 
of caution and hesitancy to discuss the events of the deportation drive until the interview subjects 
could be fully convinced of the nature of the interviewer’s organization.  The recorder of the 
interview reported that “He was about to go further with our inquiry when suddenly Mr. Trejo 
interrupted us.  He still wanted further proof about who we were.  He had his doubts that Mr. 
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Horak was just a school teacher.  He thought Mr. Horak must be a detective.”330  Trejo’s 
uncertainty about the wisdom of discussion the deportation drives, and the noted discomfort of 
the men with him at the meeting of the Sociedad Mexicana Protectora del Cautivo, of which 
Trejo was Secretary, mirror closely the fear of further persecution that interviewers noted in 
interactions with Italian Americans.331   
In a similar instance of anxiety over discussing the deportation raids with an outsider to 
the community, in an interview with Peter Maggiore, a grocer in the neighborhood of the raids, 
the Immigrants Protective League discovered that, “He could probably tell us much more than he 
did, but the men who were around, evidently argued with him in Italian, telling him not to say 
anything.”  Maggiore tried to claim a lack of political knowledge, and when queried on the 
reactions of the Italian press to the incident, claimed he did not read Italian newspapers, though 
the major Italian daily was spread open in front of him.  Maggiore, like others interviewed, 
attempted to allay the suspicions of his peers and, “explained to the others that we are not a 
governmental organization.  He was showing them our card which the visitor gave him and was 
explaining the word ‘protective.’”332 “The greatest difficulty will be to get people to talk,” Italian 
American attorney Gerard Ungaro explained.  “Even with an Italian interpreter, he thinks, people 
would not give us information.  They were so terrorised at that time that it is almost useless to do 
anything now.”333  Thus, if they were not successful in ridding the city of crime, the raids at least 
accomplished the goal of muzzling the reactions of immigrant communities by imposing an 
atmosphere of fear of repercussion. 
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While Trejo commented upon the drives of February and March more specifically, an 
interview with the Mexican Vice-Consul, A.C. Amador shows a larger picture of the 
circumstances of Mexican American deportation.  He explained that the situation of Mexican 
American deportation was somewhat different than that of other nationalities, because passports 
were not required for deportations to Mexico, thus making tracking the numbers of deportations 
much more difficult for the consulate.  Because Mexican immigrants more often “cross the 
border as ‘contraband’”, Amador said, they do not go through processing at an immigration entry 
point, and thus have no legal documentation to show when detained for possibility of 
deportation.334  While Amador was noted as having no complaints about the maltreatment of 
Mexicans by U.S. authorities, Trejo related bitterness towards treatment of Mexican-Americans 
not only by the police, but also by the Italian American community itself.  In one incident he 
related, an “old Mexican gentleman,” was walking in the vicinity of Halsted and Taylor streets 
when he was attacked by a group of young Italian men who beat him profusely.  When the man 
appealed to a police officer for help, Trejo explained, “he took the man to the nearest alley, and 
once there, he clubbed his head and finished the job which the Italians had begun.”335  Such an 
experience supports Arredondo’s observation that, “Mexican experiences with their immigrant 
neighbors increasingly solidified their positioning outside the ethno-racial hierarchies of 
Chicago.”  She goes on to reflect that it was the same localized law enforcement which shaped 
the practices of deportation during this drive and created this process, noting that, “these 
structures, particularly the police and the courts, influenced the everyday life of Mexicans, and 
they reflected the mounting discrimination against Mexicans at the hands of their immigrant 
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neighbors.”336 These developments, I argue, were profoundly shaped by deportation practice 
itself, which contributed to the evolution of inter-ethnic relations and patterns of violence within 
the city.  
  Trejo’s tale suggests that an understanding of the ways in which deportation practice 
affected Chicago’s Mexican American community would be incomplete without a broader 
understanding of the treatment Mexican immigrants received in interactions with authorities and 
police officers.  Jacob Horak argued that because of their weak political position and lack of 
protections, Mexican Americans were frequently intimidated by the police and forced into false 
confessions.  “When arrested, the police use the third degree and ‘beat them up’ to induce them 
to confess,” he explained.  “A great many receive slight injuries.  Some told the investigator that 
the police stuck guns in their mouths and threatened to shoot them.  It is also customary to put a 
man in a tub of ice-cold water until he confesses… Some were beaten by police on the street.”337  
Though they were less the face of sensationalistic press attention, Mexican Americans were no 
less the subjects of deportation frenzies during the 1920s.  They were in fact subject to even 
greater racialized violence.  Though a substantial literature has developed on the deportation 
efforts against Mexican immigrant workers during the 1930s, as well as on later deportations 
during the 1950s and beyond, there has been much less attention to deportation and the 
surveillance and policing of Mexican immigrant communities during the 1920s.338   
 There is somewhat less information available on the experiences of Greek Americans in 
the deportation drive of 1926, though it is clear that they too, suffered from raiding during the 
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weeks of late February and early March.  Greek deportations did require passport processing by 
the Greek consulate, so the Secretary of the Consulate expressed with certainty that he knew the 
number of Greeks who had been expelled from the country, which he placed at 30, but was less 
certain as to the number who had faced arrest and detention.  However, whether from lack of 
information or distrust of the interviewer, he neglected to explain any of the criteria used for the 
expulsion of these Greek immigrants, claiming that they were all “justified in terms of the 
law.”339  George Spatuzza, attorney for the detained Sicilian Americans during the drive 
commented when interviewed that there were no defense representatives for the detained Greek 
immigrants and that those Greek men who could not speak English were without defense.340 
As the major Chicago dailies continued to blast headlines about the dangers of crime and 
the raids, one major newspaper provided notably little coverage of the subject: The Chicago 
Defender, the main newspaper of Chicago’s African American population.  In the weeks of the 
planning, enactment, and aftermath of the raids, The Defender featured only one article on the 
deportations, which suggests the ambivalence scholars have noted as defining African American’ 
perspectives on immigration legislation throughout this period.  David Hellwig explains the 
multiplicity of perspectives expressed by African American leaders, arguing that the range of 
responses was impacted by a number of factors.  “As Americans,” he writes, “they worried about 
the nation’s capacity to continue to welcome whoever arrived.  As blacks they resisted demands 
that racial criteria be used to select immigrants.”  Most importantly, “they feared the 
consequences of alien labor competition for their well-being.”341  The works of Hellwig and 
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other scholars of the topic of African American viewpoints on immigration restriction and 
nativism suggest the particularly complex political, economic, and emotional investments 
African Americans held regarding immigrants to the United States.342 Deportation, in particular, 
highlighted the punitive nature of the state toward immigrant populations and brought out strong 
sentiments among African American observers.  
 On February 27, 1926, the Defender featured an article entitled, “Plans to Deport Sicilian 
Gunmen,” which presented a viewpoint on deportations which diverged sharply in its logic from 
that of either the mainstream press or radical critiques.  Though too fragmented to be conclusive, 
this evidence and the literature on the subject suggest that African Americans watching the 
roundup of Sicilians in Chicago might have witnessed the events from a perspective different 
than that of Chicago’s native-born white residents.  The article began with what seemed to be a 
condemnation of the raids, opening with the bold assertion that, “One more the United States 
authorities have blundered and sent their government agents barking up the wrong tree.”  What 
followed however, diverged from the arguments of most proponents or most opponents of the 
deportation measures.  Instead, it argued that because of the timing of the raids, they were 
useless shows of authority which did little to address the real social problems inherent to the 
situation.  It argued, “Now that these foreigners have lolled around Chicago to their hearts’ 
content, piling up riches and repaying the city by defying its laws and shooting down its citizens, 
Uncle Sam arrives on the scene to deport them.  Most of them are perfectly willing by now to be 
deported.  Their pockets are bulging…” The article shared the widespread conviction in the 
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criminality of the foreign-born, but denied the popular claim that deportation was the appropriate 
solution for this problem.  Instead, the article made the impassioned cry for a different solution:  
The action that fair-minded Americans want Uncle Sam to take in behalf of those native-
born Americans of darker skin who have never had a chance to pile up fortunes and who 
have no homeland but this to look to, after what little money they do make is acquired.  
Lynched, disfranchised, and discriminated against, these citizens by birth have never had 
a chance.  Before Uncle Sam turns to organizing personally-conducted Atlantic voyages 
for wealthy ex-citizens, why not look to the needs of 12,000,000 citizens, who are only 
too eager to build up American institutions instead of tearing them down, prepared only 
to be given a man’s chance.343 
 
For some African Americans, the primary issue at stake was the distraction such raids created 
from the real social problems and inequalities of Chicago and American society. 
While the predominant discourse around the danger of Sicilian immigrants in Chicago 
was centered around crime and violence, an undercurrent of sexual danger ran through many of 
the accusations.  In addition to the threat these immigrant men posed as supposed gangsters, 
murderers, and bootleggers in the rhetoric of the mainstream press, they also presented a danger 
to normative sexual conventions of monogamy.  The newspaper accounts focused on the lives of 
those rounded up for deportation, or murdered in the midst of the deportation drive, and thus 
legitimate its necessity. Such articles were packed with sensationalistic details about the sexual 
deviance of the “gunmen,” a number of whom were rumored to have multiple wives, or a 
combination of wives and lovers that were used as further evidence of their lack of adherence to 
“American” lifestyles and behaviors.  Women appeared rarely in accounts of the deportation 
drive, imparting the impression that its subjects were entirely male, an inaccuracy which fueled 
media construction of the image of the Sicilian immigrant as synonymous with the “gunmen.”   
In what little historical scholarship mentions the deportation drive of 1926, the role of 
women is overlooked as well.  Gugliemo has argued that “the many popular books, movies, 
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pulps, and newspapers spoke only of male gangsters and continually stressed their masculine 
traits—their aggressiveness, toughness, strength, and virility.  If much of organized crime was 
racialized as Italian, it was just as surely gendered as masculine.”344  Though Gugliemo is correct 
in identifying the gendering of the criminal as male, his determination that the role of women 
within the deportation drives was therefore nonexistent, except as extensions of their male family 
members, reveals that he too fully subscribes to the public rhetoric about crime being the only 
criteria for detention.  Thus he is compelled to conclude, as the popular newspaper portrayals 
would suggest, that, “the local and federal authorities during the deportation drive of 1926 
apprehended only men,” and that the feelings of women regarding the drives were determined 
primarily by the fact that, “After all it was their husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers who were 
apprehended in dragnet sweeps in their neighborhoods.”345 
When they did appear in the mainstream press, women generally played the role of 
bereaved widows of criminals slain in retribution for their own murderous deeds, often not alone 
in their bereavement, but sharing the grief with another wife or girlfriend.  In the case of Orazio 
Tropea, the “imported gangster” was proclaimed to have not only two wives but an additional 
girl he had been living with out of wedlock.346  Though Tropea claimed to be single when 
investigated, the police determined that he was a bigamist.  The perceived deviance of his 
multiple marriages and extramarital affair was likely enhanced by the fact that only his first wife, 
still residing in Sicily, appeared from her name to be Italian, while both his second wife, Helen 
Brown of Buffalo, N.Y., and his current cohabiter, Beatrice Gould of Michigan invoked not only 
fear of bigamy but of cross-ethnic relationships between native-born women and Italian-born 
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“imported gangsters.”347 Similarly in its depiction of the murder of Vito Bascone, an event said 
to have “given new proof to our contention that we must drive the lawless Sicilians out of 
America,” the Chicago Daily Tribune, presented Bascone’s extramarital “sweetheart” Mrs. 
O’Leary as being naively taken in by a man not only criminally but sexually deviant and 
dangerous.348  A so-called “man of two lives,” Bascone was credited not only with giving the 
raids legitimacy for their crackdown on gang violence, but also for their efforts to eliminate those 
who would interfere with sexual order and propriety as well.349 
While newspapers focused on the sensationalistic charges of bigamy and extramarital 
cohabitation, there was another role for women in the deportation raids: that of victims of the 
round-ups.  In an interview late in the year of the raids, Gerard Ungaro explained that not only 
men, but also women and children were targeted in the widespread raids.  “Several mothers were 
taken from their beds, at night with children and driven to the jail, without the police having any 
writ, without any charge being made, and without any slightest cause for suspicion, or 
provocation,” he stated.350  Describing the events of the raids, in which, he explained, the largest 
criteria for detention were ethnicity and neighborhood, women were not protected from police 
detention.  In fact, “The mothers who were captured with children were imprisoned for 12 to 24 
hours in the most abominable conditions.”351 While the raids were represented by the press and 
police to be hunting down a male criminal type: the violent ruthless, unscrupulous gunman, the 
target was in fact much more inclusive.  Such evidence undermines claims by authorities that the 
drives were not in fact against a particular ethnicity, but only the criminal element. 
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The popular construction of the depraved, base, degraded male criminal, dangerous to the 
public, the city, and the nation, found its counterpoint in a concurrent case regarding deportation.   
As newspapers continued to feature daily headlines about criminal Sicilians and the gangster 
menace to society, they heavily publicized the deportation case of the Countess of Cathcart, 
whose femininity, class, and British nationality won her a very different reception.  The subject 
of a scandal over an affair with the Count of Craven, the Countess of Cathcart was found 
deportable under the terms of the ‘moral turpitude’ clause of deportation guidelines.  But when 
the United States undertook efforts to deport her, the indignation of the public demonstrated that 
her behaviors, while more fully within the guidelines of deportation legislation than many of the 
Sicilian detainees, were not categorized in the same manner.  Despite the characterization of 
arrested and detained Sicilian “gunmen” as vile, brutal, undesirable, and un-American, not all 
those facing deportation met with such negative portrayals.  According to the Chicago Herald 
and Examiner, “Chicago, if the comments of a number of its men and women leaders in various 
endeavors, including the church, can be taken as a criterion, looks with strong disfavor on the 
government’s order to deport Countess Cathcart.” 352 The same people simultaneously called out 
loudly for the government to deport Italian Americans, showing the underlying prejudices of 
class, race, and gender which operated to form the nature of the raids.  
Having countenanced the mass round-ups and detentions of Italians, with little regard for 
their civil liberties, many Chicagoans were outraged at the threat of deportation of a single 
member of the British nobility.  Widespread sympathy was mobilized on her behalf.  In fact, to 
help salvage her from what was seen as the unjust and overzealous hand of deportation law, the 
Countess received offers of financial assistance and even marriage proposals to assist her in 
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fighting for her right to remain in the country.353  Not only did the mainstream press extend her 
far greater sympathy, but in fact expressed great shock and dismay that such a high-class, Anglo-
Saxon, emblem of educated femininity could be subjected to the outrages designed for the more 
common deportable immigrant.  “The immigration authorities permit assassins to enter, but, with 
a great blowing of trumpets, exclude for ‘moral turpitude’ a woman like the Countess of 
Cathcart,” the Tribune wrote.  “The immigration bureau is subjecting the country to ridicule and 
worse when it treats her as a moral leper and at the same time neglects to keep out criminals of 
the lowest type.”354 Through photographs, cartoons, articles, and editorials, the media reminded 
its readers that the label of “undesirable immigrant” was one which was to be selectively applied 
and that the boundaries of Americanism ought to be drawn not around strict adherence to the 
legal statures on the books, but according to dominant hierarchies of class, ethnicity, and 
respectability. The idea that this process could be effectively achieved through largescale, but 
targeted, deportations grew throughout this era, and circulated widely in the press.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 “In the past few years,” Deidre Moloney argues, “tensions between federal agencies such 
as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and local authorities have intensified 
throughout the United States.” In fact, she asserts, this trend is rooted in the 1980s, when state 
and local governments became “increasingly unwilling to cede immigration control to federal 
authorities.”355 I would insist, however, that this reality of local importance has been one of the 
most indelible traits of the modern deportation state (and, indeed, one of its most obvious 
                                                          
353 “Writ Halts Cathcart Deportation: Countess to Get Hearing Next Tuesday- US Judge Will Consider Her Plea,” 
Chicago Herald and Examiner, February 20, 1926, 1. 
354 “Alien Terrorism in Chicago,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 12, 1926.  
355 Moloney, National Insecurities, 1. 
210 
 
continuities from earlier, state-based forms of migration control before the creation of federal 
immigration law).  Even as the nation consolidated its deportation machinery under an 
increasingly streamline federal bureaucracy, it continued to be at the mercy of the initiatives and 
assistance of local governments and communities. Officials in localities around the country used 
knowledge to use deportation enforcement to their own purposes, serving the interests of local 
business leaders, local police forces, community organizations, or racial agendas. Throughout the 
1920s, deportation practice reflected a paradoxical tension between the local and the federal.  
The federal government reached into local spaces throughout the country with unprecedented 
vigor, relying on local officials to identify, gather, detain potentially deportable immigrants. But 
at the same time, local officials actively initiated deportation drives on their own and were often 
stifled by the lack of federal appropriations and cooperation in enacting their local removal 
agendas. As in so many cases, the 1920s represented a vast expansion of the deportation state, 
but reflected how this project was far from finished, and, in many respects, aspirational rather 
than achieved. 
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Chapter 4- The Systemization of Removal: Institutional Coordination and the Policing of Class, 
Crime, Health, and Morality through Deportation 
 
 
In July of 1922, Grazia D’Agostino, born in Bagheria, Italy, a mother of seven who had 
moved to the United States in 1920 to join her husband in Buffalo, where he had resided for 10 
years, was deported.  When questioned by immigration officials as to her means of financial 
support, she explained that her husband had been out of work for over a year, and that they were 
a year overdue on rent, and had been receiving assistance from the City of Buffalo for the past 
two months.   Although D’Agostino explained that she had never had any serious illnesses or 
been dependent on assistance before, because she became destitute and required public support 
within five years of entry, she was a deportable immigrant and was removed, while her husband, 
though similarly dependent (and further stigmatized in the official hearing for his inability to 
support his wife), was safe by virtue of longer residence in the nation. Her story was an 
increasingly common one throughout the 1910s and 1920s, as “likely to become a public charge” 
became the most commonly used provision of deportation law.  By the start of WWI, roughly 
60% of excluded and deported immigrants were removed on these grounds. Institutional 
dependency had become a carefully policed status, and increasingly came to be tightly associated 
with the idea of immigrant undesirability. In a very fundamental way, these removals represented 
a new era in the deportation of working people, in which the state possessed the ability to police 
immigrant communities not only for class-based politics, but for class itself. As the state 
expanded certain public benefits, deportations for dependency and institutionalization 
demonstrated that these benefits were, in a critical way, dependent on them not being 
universalized. 
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The evolving deportation machinery of the state was premised on growth of more 
systematized, rationalized communication and cooperation between states, localities and the 
federal government, and between increasingly, but still often poorly, coordinated institutions—
hospitals, asylums, prisons, and juvenile reformatories, where immigrant bodies were evaluated 
and reported for removal.  Coupled with more centralized, efficient networks of trains routes, 
ship schedules, and detention centers for the streamlined gathering and removal of identified 
deportees, the rise of this institutional cooperation allowed deportation to shift from a small-
scale, haphazard practice to a centralized state mechanism for controlling immigrant workers. 
The steep increase in deportations reflects the development of the capacity to remove unwanted 
non-citizens in a newly systematized way.  To acknowledge this makes deportation a far more 
central topic, revealing of the development of new technologies of control, exercised through 
both carceral and (seemingly) charitable institutions, with powerful ramifications for the decades 
to come. 
Throughout the 1920s, as public figures, the press, and the government set goals for the 
expansion of deportations, there was an increased effort to not only wait for deportees to be 
reported to the immigration officials, but to actively go out searching for deportable immigrants. 
The most productive hunting grounds for deportees were, unsurprisingly, the various institutions 
of the state charged with the housing and maintenance of individuals deemed medically, 
mentally, or morally unfit for belonging within the general population. In these spaces, most 
notably hospitals, mental asylums, and prisons, institutional staff could easily search through 
their already assembled populations to find those who might be eligible under one or more 
condition of deportation law. Examining the institutional spaces at which deportation was 
conducted serves multiple purposes. First, it highlights the enduring Progressive era concern with 
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the “scientific” management and categorization of immigrant bodies and behaviors. While local 
poor laws and practices of chasing out public charges and burdensome individuals goes back 
much farther, this period marked a modernized, bureaucratic process for identifying and 
dispensing with these individuals. Second, it illuminates the growing coordination and 
bureaucratic reach of the nation-state. Third, it emphasizes the impact of the modernization of 
documentation and coordination between government and non-state institutions. Finally, it 
demonstrates the rise of deportation as a tool for sorting and castigating non-citizen populations, 
and for the redefinition of rights and social services as the sole purview of citizens and, in some 
cases, of long-term residents.  
This chapter will explore the prominence of institutionalization and discourses of 
institutional knowledge during the 1920s and will explore how deportation operated at the heart 
of these various conversations.  As deportees were culled from hospitals, asylums, prisons, 
reformatories, and other institutional spaces, deportation was positioned at the nexus of 
developing and evolving technologies and ideologies for the surveillance, categorizing, 
disciplining, and removal of “unfit” bodies.  Throughout the period, pseudoscientific studies 
relating immigrants and ethnic groups to various kinds of pathological forms of bodily 
deficiencies and fitness, criminal mentalities, substandard intelligence, and non-normative 
moralities, and deportation united these conversations alongside debates over race, assimilability, 
and un-Americanness.  However, the role of institutions in the consolidation of deportation was 
not merely theoretical or discursive, but happened in a very practical fashion.  Throughout the 
period, immigration officials increasingly communicated and coordinated with these institutions 
at regular intervals to gather information on deportable immigrants residing in them and to set up 
planned schedules to transport them for removal. 
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Although the scholarship on deportation in the early twentieth century has focused 
largely on the so-called “first Red scare” and the deportation of suspected anarchists and 
communists, throughout the first decades of the century, a more extensive apparatus for removals 
emerged, one that did not merely target a small segment of the immigrant left, but instead, 
coordinated removal from across different forms of institutions, making it possible to expand the 
deportation state to an unprecedented size.  Beyond the actual deportations enacted, this period 
represented a new era in the reach of the state into the lives, homes, and communities of 
immigrants around the country, with increased surveillance, tracking, reporting, and 
intergovernmental cooperation designed to ensure deportable immigrants could be identified, 
apprehended, and removed.  The ever-present threat of state action against immigrants ushered in 
a phase in which immigrant lives were shaped more than ever before by fear, uncertainty, and 
recognition of the looming shadow of government action. Looking beyond the political 
deportations of the era allows us to see not only how class was policed through deportation, but 
also the expanded capacity for racialized deportations through a variety of official rationales, 
laying the stage for the racially-based mass deportation of Mexican workers in future decades.   
Scholars of the Progressive Era have explored how the Industrial Commission of 1898, 
the Dillingham Commission of 1907, and other efforts at rationalizing the study of immigration 
shaped the legislation that developed in the first decades of the 19th century and beyond, 
including the 1917 Literacy Act and the 1921 and 1924 Quota Acts.  Faced with a rising and 
rapidly diversifying immigrant influx, leaders and policy makers of the Progressive era viewed 
immigration as another “social problem,” whose solution could be identified and enacted through 
study, reform, and government intervention.  As Robert Zeidel argues of the shift taking place at 
the turn of the century, “Gilded Age nativism had not disappeared—perhaps it had not even 
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abated—but it alone had not been enough to prompt the passage of a general restriction law.  
Even passionate xenophobes were coming to realize that they needed more convincing ways to 
make their arguments.”356  While many of the era’s leading reformers devoted their efforts to 
alleviating the conditions of working-class immigrants, many simultaneously advocated for 
stricter, though ostensibly fairer, immigration policy which would curb the overall numbers of 
immigrants entering the nation.  However, while historians have argued that in the progressive 
era, immigration policy coated its racism and discriminatory aspects with a sheen of 
rationalization, bureaucratic procedure, and scientific study, until recently they have not 
extended their analysis from restriction and exclusion to deportation.   
Kanstroom argues in Deportation Nation that deportation in this period was more than an 
adaptation of an existing policy, but was a “central feature of Progressive state building, and the 
‘recasting of official power relationships within governmental institutions.’”357  He goes on to 
explain that for this arm of the state, like others, “social cohesion, order, and organization,” were 
key, but leaves largely unexplored the actual processes of instituting order and organization to 
implement deportations.358  Examining implementation allows us to see that the on-the-ground 
dynamics and motivations for deportation did not always mesh with official dictates, and often 
took on local motivations, personal vendettas, and institutional priorities. While Deidre Moloney 
has fruitfully discussed the rise of Progressive Era thought in the rationales and discourse around 
deportation, particularly in terms of concerns about ethnicity, public health, and bodily fitness for 
citizenship, she continues to ground her analysis of deportations in the period in policy debates 
and intellectual arguments about the criteria for deportation, rather than in the practical dynamics 
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necessitated to actually make mass deportation a reality.  Her focus on the “classification and 
categorization,” that preoccupied the “scientific and medical communities, eugenicists, and 
Progressive reformers,” fleshes out our understanding of how thinkers and activists of the time 
shaped understandings of deportation, but glosses over the operational mechanisms they 
instituted.359  
Scholars have recently begun to provide more insight into the tight connection of 
attitudes toward the mental and physical health of immigrants, and the concept of economic 
dependency. While much of this work has focused on the process of exclusion at the borders, 
there has also been a renewed interest in how deportation officials found value in the “likely to 
become a public charge” provision. Hidetaka Hirota provides an important dissection of the roots 
of this legislation and explains how it was first used by the states, particularly New York and 
Massachusetts, rather than the federal government, to regulate poverty. The idea of eliminating 
the social problem of poverty through expulsion was not new, Hirota notes, but was based on 
earlier European practices—including, ironically, the practice through which “governments, 
landlords, poorhouses, and private philanthropists had repeatedly sent paupers to the United 
States with minimal cash and clothes to reduce local poverty.”360 As this practice grew, it 
increasingly encompassed a wide range of other threats to the social well-being, and allowed for 
the removal of immigrants who were ill, insane, criminal, disabled, elderly, too young to work, 
or, more simply, racially undesirable.  
While some scholars, such as Cybelle Fox, have downplayed the immensity of the LPC 
provision during the early twentieth century, I argue that its expansion during the Progressive era 
had one of the most critical impacts on deportation policy throughout the 1920s, creating the 
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basis for a state of perpetual “deportability.” “While there were public charge provisions built 
into immigration law that allowed for the deportation of some recent immigrants, such provisions 
were rare until the 1890s, unevenly applied during the first third of the twentieth century, and 
hardly ever enforced after FDR took office in 1933,” Fox writes.361 However, I would argue, 
each part of this statement demonstrates an incomplete understanding of the role deportability 
played in deportation practice. As Hirota, Gerald Neuman and others have explored, early 
deportation statistics elide the full extent of the practice of dependency expulsions because of 
how much these efforts took place on the state level, rather than through federal government 
actions.362 Although Fox is correct to note that there were significant fluctuations in deportation 
for the LPC provisions during the early twentieth century, her work minimizes the reality that by 
World War I, this provision made up more than one half of all removals. By the 1930s, when she 
notes the sharp decline, much of this decline was due to the massive repatriations through 
avenues other than official federal warrant deportations, rather than any decreased effort to 
regulate foreign-born dependency.  
 These tactics for removal, centering around a cynical desire to remove the fiscal burdens 
of institutionalization, did not exist in isolation from the more thoroughly explored racism and 
eugenicist movements of the time, but often worked in close tandem with these ideas. As Fox 
explains, for many eugenicists, “it was never solely about the high costs of dealing with 
defective immigrants; it was also about their biology,” meaning that even as they worried about 
institutional dependency, this did not preclude a genuine concern about the physical and genetic 
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dangers of immigrant populations.363 However, she explains, eugenicists did often employ the 
argument of dependency to bolster their arguments about the “biological costs” of recent 
immigration, which they argued were just as critical as the “fiscal costs of regulated 
immigration.” To do this, “they argued that the foreign born were overrepresented in the nation’s 
institutions for the insane, the feebleminded, the sick, and the poor and therefore represented a 
tremendous fiscal burden to ‘American taxpayers.’”364 Furthermore, as Ian Dowbiggin explains 
in his comparative study of mental illness and immigration restriction of the United States and 
Canada, this concern was deeply rooted in a fear that unwell immigrants posed a danger not only 
in the present as institutional burdens, but because of their reproduction. Eugenicists, 
psychiatrists, and other medical officials warned, he explains, that “the feebleminded were not 
only uncommonly promiscuous but also dangerous because of their hereditary traits,” which 
prompted them to push for immigration control, but also simultaneously, for reproductive 
control.365  
 Emily Abel echoes this point, explaining that when it came to tuberculosis control in Los 
Angeles, the instigators of the drives to deport diseased Mexican immigrants were shaped by 
intertwined perceptions of both biology and dependency. She explains that officials at the 
forefront of the drive truly believed that “the biology of Mexicans… made them especially 
vulnerable to tuberculosis,” and connected this to high incidences of tuberculosis among African 
Americans and Native Americans, which they used “as evidence that they were ‘primitive’ 
people who lack prior exposure and thus never had developed immunity.”366 However, while 
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these “scientific” beliefs in innately inferior biological traits among workers were generally 
prevalent, she explained, they were particularly heightened because the disease often left its 
patients disabled, which led many to describe Mexicans “not as disease carriers but rather as 
economic burdens.”367 Throughout the era, the distinction between a physical or biological threat 
and an economic one became increasing blurred. In the immediate post-World War I era, when 
immigrants had steadily accumulated in state and local institutions because their removals could 
not be executed, there was a fervor among institutional administrators for financial relief which 
often gained popularity as a racial project. 
  Deidre Moloney expands on this blurred line between dependency, race, and health in 
her discussion of the development of diagnoses and ideas of fitness for American belonging. 
While “classification and categorization were preoccupations of the scientific and medical 
communities, eugenicists, and Progressive reformers,” she explains, “concern for immigrants’ 
physical condition was often related to their economic roles and their class status.”368 Joining 
scholars such as Douglas Baynton, who explore the development of the control of disability, 
rather than just disease, among immigrant populations, Moloney points out that over time, the 
immigration service developed new categories for exclusion to provide biological “legitimacy” 
to the efforts to regulate labor and race.  Because of the “intersection of public health measures 
and eugenics ideology,” she argues, there was an impetus for the creation of “new, non-
medically based diagnoses, such as a poor physique and presenility, that were used to keep out 
those perceived to be physically unfit for strenuous manual labor or those who arrived from 
regions where the population was deemed unfit for U.S. citizenship.” Even more importantly, 
she notes, even where diagnoses were “medically well established,” they were assigned “through 
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the prism of racial and ethnic hierarchies… medical diagnoses became an effective proxy to 
regulate immigrants on the basis of racial and religious differences.”369 
While this institutional coordination was often veiled in concern for the care and well-
being of immigrants with physical or mental challenges, many scholars have challenged this 
notion and revealed how economic underpinnings undermine these claims to charity. As 
Hidetaka Hirota explains, while “contemporaries also advanced a humanitarian defense,” in 
reality, the “core principle of policy, however, was to make immigrants bear the expense of those 
institutions.”370 Describing the later efforts to deport Mexican immigrants in the Imperial Valley 
in the 1940s, Natalia Molina notes that while the drives were ostensibly launched with the aim of 
ameliorating disease, “it does not require much analysis to scratch the veneer of the professed 
goal of protecting public health and expose a different, and much less laudable, aim.” In fact, she 
explains, these deportations should instead serve as a “primary on the power that can be wielded 
by industry and government under the auspices of public safety.”371 While the Progressive era 
scientists, institutional officials, and social workers had created a broad interest in the study and 
improvement of social issues including disease and mental health, these ideas were often tightly 
intertwined with hierarchies of bodily and class fitness, and with efforts to control the issue not 
through study, but through expulsion.   
 Some scholars have taken the statements of Progressive era advocates of immigration 
control to be more genuine, such as Robert Zeidel, who explains in his study of the Dillingham 
Commission, that “the nation’s turn-of-the-century response was more than simply a matter of 
institutionalization of national bigotry.”372 Unlike many other scholars, Zeidel is concerned less 
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with finding an economic ulterior motive to the study and policing of migration, than with 
resuscitating the reputation of Progressive era social scientists and reformers. Indeed, he argues, 
“many of those who supported more stringent [immigration] restriction… failed to exhibit 
hostility toward the foreign-born.” Instead, many were genuine reformers, who “exhibited an 
almost religious faith in their ability to engender social betterment, a resolute trust in what they 
considered to be scientific objectivity… they believed that investigation and analysis carried out 
by properly trained experts would equip policy makers with the means to eradicate social 
blight.”373 However, while he draws needed attention to the extensive and carefully orchestrated 
studies that bolstered the creation of restrictive legislation, he fails to recognize the extent to 
which these reformers, while perhaps sincere in their belief in the studies which they put 
forward, in fact were shaped not only by the racial prejudices of their era, but by an agenda of 
institutional control that was premised upon not only social improvement aims, but also 
economic motivations. 
 To understand deportation practice in the 1920s more deeply, it is critical to understand 
that it was not motivated by a single set of motivations or rationales. In fact, one of the greatest 
significances of deportation during this period was its drawing together of a wide range of forms 
of social surveillance, institutionalization, and public policing. Deportation, as a national project 
of state-building and redefining American belonging, brought together seemingly discrete 
threads of social issues: health, crime, mental illness, sexuality, and economic dependency, into a 
single and in many ways, unprecedented, machinery for state control. Its expansion as a tool of 
social control united diverse projects around policing non-citizen fitness for belonging. In doing 
so, it brought seemingly unrelated institutions, such as orphanages, tuberculosis sanitariums, 
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poor farms, and county jails into a conjoined web of communication and coordination. This 
process not only expanded deportations, but in fact, expanded the power of the federal 
government, and gave it new reach and bureaucratic coherence. The immigration service, in 
effect, not only monitored the boundaries of the nation-state, but elevated its powers of social 
control. 
 This institutional coordination grew from the earlier state-based precedents for removal, 
such as the system instituted in New York State in 1880, whereby the State Board of Charities 
could order the return of “’any crippled, blind, lunatic, or other infirm alien paupers’ in 
charitable institutions in New York whose emigration had been financed by foreign 
governments, charitable organizations or landlords.”374 As the Progressive Era evolved, Ian 
Dowbiggin notes, this process became increasingly streamlined within New York. Because 
“New York City was the main U.S. port of entry, and about one-quarter of all insane immigrants 
were hospitalized in New York State,” he writes, “these circumstances triggered a good many 
complaints” from physicians, who were frustrated that “immigrants were steadily filling up not 
only the state’s asylums but its prisons, hospitals, and jails.”375 It is important to note that even 
public health officials fixated on more than their own institutions, but on what they increasingly 
imagined as an interconnected web of institutions for the social control of the population.  
 The coordination of different institutions also enabled a new chapter in the state’s ability 
to surveil, discipline, and enact punitive action upon its residents. As immigration officials 
regularly prompted local officials to report their institutional immigrant populations, they were, 
in a way, prompting them to get on board a much broader project of surveilling, controlling, and 
wielding power over individuals in society. Amy Fairchild thoughtfully notes this process in her 
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study of medical examinations at the border, although she does not extend this analysis into the 
interior of the nation and post-entry removal. “The immigrant medical inspection,” she explains, 
“represented a new technique for discipline in the new social and economic order, signaling a 
transformation in the nature of discipline and power.”376 Her assessment that these new forms of 
regulation marked a shift from “corrective to preventative” state power, and from “violent to 
normative” disciplining of individuals is critical, to understanding the expanding power of the 
state during this period.377 However, her emphasis on exclusion at the borders, rather than 
expulsion from the interior, leads her to underestimate the extent to which “normative” state 
power was built throughout the nation, through the creation of a punitive network for identifying 
and expelling those deemed unfit for the nation.  
As early as 1920, the Commissioner General of Immigration was sending regular 
memoranda to the District Immigrant Commissioners and Inspectors in Charge, requesting lists 
of all of the public and private charitable institutions in their jurisdiction. In part, officials 
explained, this project was needed because of the immigrants who had “accumulated during the 
war,” when deportations were nearly impossible for many locations.378 These institutions, the 
Commissioner explained, included those that cared for “indigents, or other persons, either adults 
or minors, who have become public charges in such institutions,” and explained that this list 
might contain: “hospitals, almshouses, homes, sanitariums, asylums for orphans; for deaf, dumb, 
blind and feebleminded; for juveniles and all other institutions of a charitable nature, public or 
private, except asylums for the insane maintained by the state.” The list should not only provide 
the names of the institutions, he wrote, but whether they were under federal, state, county, 
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municipal or private control, and if under private control and receiving government funding, 
from what source. However, the Commissioner specified, the list should not contain “penal or 
reformatory institutions maintained wholly under Governmental authority.”379  
Within five years, the form of this institutional policing had also changed in notable 
ways, if not the basic impetus behind it. A decisive shift had taken place towards a concern with 
identifying potential deportees among the populations of the criminal institutions of the nation. 
By 1926, the Commissioner General was requesting information not only about “alien public 
charges” in hospitals, asylums, orphanages, almshouses, etc, but also the immigrants confined in 
“federal penitentiaries, state prisons, reformatories, jails, and other correctional institutions.” He 
further suggested that district commissioners and inspectors should search this information out 
with prison commissioners or boards of parole if needed, and that they should consult with the 
department if this search would “incur any unusual expense” in identifying the necessary 
information. 380 It is striking to see how clearly the deportation statistics demonstrate the fruits of 
this process: In 1921, only 51 immigrants were deported as criminals,381 but by 1926, that 
number had reached a remarkable 793 individuals.382 These numbers would only continue to 
climb as the immigration service and the various penal institutions of the state tightened their 
coordination and streamlined their processes of reporting and passport securing.383 By 1929, the 
number of criminals deported had risen to an astounding 1409, far out of proportion with the 
general rise in the number of deportations over the course of the decade.384  
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It is important to note, however, that while the efforts of the immigration authorities and 
local officials during the 1920s far surpassed any previous institutional coordination for 
immigrant removal, it continued to fall short of both official aspirations and the public demand. 
A 1921 memorandum from Leo B. Russell, the Immigrant Inspector in Charge of Transportation 
and Deportation to the Commissioner General highlighted this tension. He celebrated the fact 
that in the previous year, almost 4,000 individuals had been deported, noting that it was over 
1,000 more than the year before. On the prompting of the State Hospital Commission, the matter 
had been taken up in Congress, and appropriations had increased. This helped, he explained, to 
alleviate the “congestion” in institutions, which had put the department in a “very embarrassing 
position on one or two occasions, owing to the fact that on account of aliens becoming public 
charges the State Institutions were overcrowding and so much so that Americans could not be 
admitted to these institutions.”  However, Russell explained, this was far from sufficient. Indeed, 
he argued, Section 23 of the Immigration Law designated that the Commissioner “shall detail 
officers of the Immigration Service from time to time to secure information as to the number of 
aliens detained in the penal reformatories and charitable institutions (public and private) of the 
several states and territories,” a directive which had been woefully neglected due to insufficient 
funding.385  
Russell was not alone in these critiques, which emerged not only from the disgruntled 
local immigration authorities or zealous public observers, but also from the institutional officials 
themselves, who frequently railed against how immense the burden of upkeep of indigent non-
citizens was. The Commissioner of Immigration at Ellis Island relayed a message from the New 
York State Hospital to the Commissioner General of Immigration in 1922, which protested the 
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fact that their hospitals were a shocking thirteen thousand patients overcrowded. While the 
Hospital Commissioner obsequiously explained that “I hesitate to find fault with an official who 
is as helpful and desirous of the speedy execution of the Immigration Law as to deportation as 
yourself,” he explained that the conditions had become truly “appalling.” His commission, he 
explained, received daily contact from hospital superintendents throughout the state, begging to 
release deportable aliens who crowded their institutions. Acknowledging that the Commissioner 
at Ellis Island had been undoubtedly “poorly provided with a force requisite” for the work, he 
nevertheless demanded that “the least” the Immigration Bureau could do would be to “relieve us 
of the incubus of these undesirables as promptly” as possible.386 
Authorities reported the ambitious effort to clear out institutions which had been 
overcrowded with large foreign-born populations since the war as a modest, but incomplete 
success. But by the following year, they were already bemoaning the inability to take that project 
to its logical conclusion, as they saw it, and completely clear the charitable institutions of their 
non-citizen charges. Officials at the highest level of the Immigration Bureau expressed 
frustrations, which were generally levied at Congress for the failure to provide adequate funding. 
“The lack of a sufficient appropriation to carry on the work will prevent a systematic or 
extensive combing over of the penal reformatories and charitable institutions in the present 
year,” concluded the Commissioner General in his annual report in 1921, “although as much 
work will be done in this direction as our limited financial resources will permit.”387  Over the 
course of the decade, despite continued constraints of budget and staff, much work was done 
indeed. Fox explores the collusion between immigration officials and providers of public 
assistance, and argues “in certain times and places, the welfare state may best be viewed as an 
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extension of the Immigration Service, where one of its functions becomes not the provision of 
assistance, but rather the expulsion of individuals or even segments of an entire population from 
the nation.”388 What is particularly critical about this point is the elasticity of this capacity-- at 
different times and places, this nexus between welfare and migration control could be used for 
distinct agendas or practices of expulsion. While Fox very briefly mentions the practice of 
district directors reporting immigrants among the institutional populations of their region in 
1923, she fails to note that this process evolved throughout the decade, noting only that it 
occurred again in 1934.  She makes the important distinction, however, that this process targeted 
only “charitable institutions” where immigrants were in residence, not with “charitable 
organizations” which provided “outdoor relief,” and thus focused on those populations which 
were seen to pose the largest burden financially (as well as those who were most conveniently 
captive for enforcing deportation warrants).389 
As the number of real deportations grew and evolved in nature, the number of potential 
deportees expanded as well, along with the institutional dragnet capable of identifying and 
documenting them. A report for the Commissioner General of Immigration in 1926 included a 
chart of potentially deportable aliens residing in institutions in each of the districts, which had 
reached a staggering number. “The foregoing figures,” he notes, “indicate that there are now in 
the United States (exclusive of the Montreal and San Francisco Districts which have not yet been 
heard from) 57,896 deportable aliens.” While this number included those immigrants already 
under deportation proceeds, he concluded that “this estimate is extremely conservative for the 
reason that at least six Districts have failed to estimate the total number of deportable aliens 
therein.” The fact that the six outstanding districts included San Francisco and Montreal, which 
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were among the largest, suggest that the estimate was “extremely conservative” indeed. 
However, the report explained, this effort to identify removable immigrants was facing a sever 
obstacle—“the depleted condition of the Immigration Appropriation,” which had led to some 
districts being required to defer or even “practically discontinue” their deportation work because 
of insufficient funding.390 However incomplete these efforts were, the mere fact of assembling 
these numbers was a staggering accomplishment for the growing bureaucratic state. The 
unprecedented bureaucratic regime support Foucault’s conclusion that record-keeping and 
documentation cultivate a “means of control and a method of domination.”391 Without the new 
capacity to assemble lists of institutions, coordinate contact with their officials, and match that 
information with the immigration status and history (and thus the deportability under law) of 
each individual, and then to track their movement out of these institutions, across the nation, and 
over borders, the deportation state could never have been solidified into the massive social 
institution it became over time.  
Through both mail and telegraph, immigration officials in Washington checked in 
regularly with commissioners and inspectors at Immigration Service field offices throughout the 
country to request lists of immigrants. Once a case was selected for warrant proceedings, 
officials would trace the immigrants through their own assembled case files from entry, 
voluntarily submitted identity documents, documentation from local authorities or institutions, 
and, frequently would reach out to the consul of the receiving nation for passports and further 
identifying information. Where necessary, the Immigration Service would engage with other 
governmental offices, such as the State Department, to ensure the necessary information was 
assembled to put the deportation warrant into motion. Beyond this, arrangements had to be made 
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with local institutions for detention until transport, between different field offices to arrange an 
efficiently scheduled train pickup, with officials at the ports and steamship companies to secure 
overseas passage where necessary, and with foreign governments when permissions or travel 
needed to be arranged after landing. All of this reflected a tremendous degree of documentation, 
coordination, and institutional tracking, as well as the creation of a massive paper trail for the 
lives of ordinary non-citizens. 
 This institutional coordination did not occur solely in relation to immigration control, but 
was part of a larger trend toward institutionalization, surveillance, and disciplining of individuals 
deemed to be “unfit” for the social body. “The desire to keep out immigrants deemed defective 
was not an isolated development,” Douglas Baynton explains, “but rather was one aspect of a 
trend toward the increasing segregation of disabled people into institutions and the sterilization 
of the “unfit’ and ‘degenerate’ under state eugenic laws.”392 This was true not only of disabled 
individuals, but of those deemed to be racially, intellectually, morally, or economically inferior 
and unworthy of American citizenship.  This process of bringing together these disparate sources 
of social threat and controlling them through institutional expansion can be illuminated by an 
examination of Foucault’s explanation of the discipline and punishment within the social body. 
As Eithne Luibheid explains of how he illuminates immigration control, “Foucault’s work 
particularly contributes to our understanding of how immigration inequalities are institutionally 
reproduced by drawing attention to supposedly neutral, mundane practices of inspection and 
regimes of knowledge that actually discipline and subject immigrants in racializing, sexualizing, 
and other ways.”393 I delve into the various interconnected “practices of inspection” in the 
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diverse institutional spaces where deportees came to the attention of immigration authorities, 
which represented a significant expansion of the bureaucratic capacity. In doing so, I emphasize 
the tremendous power of the mundane (which has been so heavily overshadowed in deportation 
history by the dramatic) in the creation of a regime powerful and expansive enough to greatly 
accelerate the rise of deportations in the nation, and even more vastly increase the spread of a 
shadow of deportability over the nation’s immigrant population. 
 
Deportations for Physical Health and Defects 
 
On May 9, 1923, Menotti Kocioncic, alias George Rocanbold set sail from the New York 
Harbor aboard the S.S. “America” for deportation to his native Italy. The charge against him for 
deportation was that at the time of his entry, he was afflicted with syphilis, “a loathsome, 
contagious disease” and “that he was a person likely to become a public charge at the time of his 
entry.” Kocioncic had been apprehended in Colorado Springs, under the jurisdiction of the sub-
district office at Denver, Colorado before being delivered to Omaha, Nebraska, then conveyed to 
Chicago to be joined to an Eastbound deportation party. The month before, the district office had 
written to the Commissioner General asking for haste in securing a travel plan for the immigrant, 
explaining that “he is being held at our expense and is suffering with some heart trouble which is 
brought on by living in this altitude which might possibly cause his death if he was held here too 
long.” 
 “This seems to be a clear out case,” stated the report regarding his deportation warrant. 
“His different venereal diseases and hospital treatments as well as his imprisonments and 
vagrancy plainly show that he was likely to become a public charge at the time of his entry. The 
only point where there could be a question is that he does not seem to positively know whether 
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he had syphilis at the time of his entry.” In fact, the immigrant inspector admitted, he could not 
definitely prove that Kocioncic was suffering from syphilis when he entered the country. He 
explained that he found “so far as the judgement of a layman can be relied on in such a matter” 
that he had been afflicted with syphilis when he entered the country, and that this finding had 
been based on the fact that he had been treated for syphilis at Gibraltar, where he had been 
deemed cured. However, he had broken out with some disease which had been treated with 
“606” or “Salvarean treatment” within a few months of entry. Though the inspector admitted that 
“it is possible that this treatment is used for other diseases than syphilis,” he was sufficiently 
convinced by the treatment and his medical history that Kocioncic had been afflicted with 
syphilis once more. When questioned during his hearing, Kocioncic admitted that he had been 
giving 606, but explained that his doctor had never specified the disease it was meant to treat, 
stating that “he said my blood was getting bad and he would give me the ‘606’ to keep it from 
getting worse.”394  
Kocioncic’s case was far from unusual during the period, when immigrants regularly 
were charged with illnesses without clear proof of a solid medical diagnosis, and very frequently 
without proper knowledge of their own medical condition. Medical deportations for both 
“loathsome and contagious” diseases and other physical conditions, such as blindness, hernias, 
and a wide range of other deficiencies, were a prominent cause for removal during this period, 
and demonstrate the pervasive influence of what Alan Kraut has called the “double helix of 
health and fear.” Immigrants with health issues posed not only an immediate danger to the well-
being of citizens, but also threatened to undermine the stability of the industrial labor force. 
However, to look at the statistics along during the decade gives the impression that concerns with 
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physical health declined throughout the 1920s. However, as scholars have noted, this reflected 
the permeability of deportation categories, which allowed those apprehended for their health to 
be slotted for removal under a provision that was easier to prove and document according to the 
law.   
While there has been an extensive literature on the medical examination of immigrants 
upon their entry at the land borders and sea ports of the nation, as well as of the racialized 
discourses around the health threat posed by immigrant communities in major cities, there has 
been less attention to how those medical criteria were extended to post-entry deportation 
practices.395 This section looks at how deportable immigrants were identified and selected for 
removal at hospitals, mental institutions, and other health institutions and were referred to 
immigration officials for apprehension. It also engages with the literature on non-native born 
residents, ethnicity, disease and pathology, health and sanitation, and hierarchies of bodily 
fitness. As medical removals were enacted throughout the interior of the nation, as well as at its 
edges, debates ensued over what kinds of diseases and mental deficiencies were deportable, as 
well as regarding at what point in an individual’s medical history the nation of origin ceased to 
bear responsibility and the United States in fact must be held responsible. I also explore the 
invasive, highly questionable physical and mental examination which potential deportees were 
forced to undergo.  
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Figure 9: Deportations for Physical Health and Deficiencies, 1920-1930 
Year Number of 
Deportations  
Percentage of Total 
Deportations during that Year 
1920 80 2.9 
1921 114 2.5 
1922 75 1.7 
1923 56 1.5 
1924 64 1.0 
1925 204 2.1 
1926 183 1.7 
1927 164 1.4 
1928 129 1.1 
1929 17 .13 
1930 312 1.9 
*Compiled from the Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1920-1930. 
 The physical illnesses and deficiencies represented in the chart above changed slightly in 
their wording throughout the decade, but generally included tuberculosis, trachoma, and “other 
loathsome or dangerous contagious diseases,” and the expansive “other physical conditions.” 
The low rates of post-entry removal, never surpassing three percent during the decade, stand 
parallel to Amy Fairchild’s observations about exclusions at the point of entry. The expulsion 
rate for medical causes at the point of initial entry never exceeded 1%, she explains, despite their 
prominence in the historical record and the public imagination of exclusion at the ports of entry, 
but instead, far more medically suspect immigrants were rejected for economic dependency and 
likelihood to become a public charge.396 Deportation officers’ debates around health and the 
dangers posed by immigrant bodies were, in fact, about very real fears about infections disease, 
they were also, as Fairchild explains, about “a very practical real-world need to control bodies, to 
make them perform as demanded and expected,” and when they didn’t they threatened the 
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modern industrial order.397 While they were only successful in rejecting immigrants in a small 
number of cases, the intensive and invasive physical screenings and exams that immigrants 
underwent at ports of entry worked to build the condition of “deportability.” This perpetual fear 
of removal should their health or other characteristics not live up to the standards of American 
belonging would continue to hang over immigrants even after months or years in the country, as 
they recognized that even a short hospital visit could render them vulnerable to expulsion.  
While Kocioncic was fortunate enough to survive his detention prior to deportation, not 
all immigrants destined for deportation were quite so lucky. Vito Santorsola, an Italian 
immigrant who had been detained at the U.S. Naval Hospital in San Diego, California in 
September 1924 had a harsher fate within the system. It took nearly three months after his 
detention for the formal warrant for his deportation to be issued, and after another three months 
of detention, Santorsola died in detention, having been determined by his doctors to be too ill to 
be deported. Santorsola, who immigration inspectors described as having black hair, dark brown 
eyes, a round face, a rather large nose, and a scar on the left side of his forehead, had worked for 
six months at the California Beef Co. in Los Angeles before falling ill. His detention had 
originally been ordered because he was deemed likely to become a public charge, as well as 
having entered over the border at “Tia Juana,” California rather than through a designated port of 
entry. However, the broader case file reveals that it was his medical history which brought him to 
the attention of the authorities after he became afflicted with dropsy and spent a variety of long 
stays at the Los Angeles General Hospital.398 During the last of those stays, he became a pubic 
charge at the hospital, and was shortly thereafter apprehended by the immigration service. His 
story, like that of so many other deportees demonstrates the insufficiency of examining only the 
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statistics regarding what criteria immigrants were deported under.399 While Santorsola was 
ostensibly deported for his unauthorized entry and likelihood to become a public charge, it is 
clear from the paper trail attached to his departure that it is the medical threat he posed that he 
was targeted for removal.  
 Some of the most prominent scholarship on deportations for medical causes has focused 
on Mexican deportations in the Southwest, where public health scares often bolstered broader 
projects of racial control and labor regulation. As Emily Abel explains of the efforts to deport 
Mexican immigrants afflicted with tuberculosis in the Los Angeles area, federal agents saw 
public hospitals, like mental institutions and prisons, as a prime location to search out 
“deportable aliens.” She explains that “just as welfare officials used the threat of deportation to 
encourage voluntary departure, so health authorities used that threat to compel compliance with 
medical regimes.”400 Deportation, like concurrent Americanization efforts, supported the 
regulation and imposition of particular standards of health and daily life among immigrant 
populations. By attaching certain health behaviors and adherence to the demands of the medical 
establishment to the right to stay in the country, public hospitals contributed to the growing and 
ever-more-powerful condition of deportability. In order to avoid the punitive reach of the state, 
immigrants were compelled to obey state-sanctioned public health norms.  
 Unlike exclusions at the border, where immigrant inspectors had only to determine 
whether a particular immigrant was afflicted with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease 
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or a physical condition that rendered them “defective” or unfit for work, immigration officials 
involved in post-entry deportations often had to determine whether their condition had originated 
before their entry into the country. This process often involved vast speculation, as institutional 
officials attempted to cobble together scant evidence to prove that a particular immigrant had 
likely entered the country under false pretenses because of a pre-existing condition. The 1923 
case of a Mexican couple and their two children who were deported because of syphilis (in the 
case of the adults), and likelihood to become public charges (in the case of the entire family). 
“The evidence shows that the adults are afflicted with syphilis,” wrote the inspector in charge of 
their case, “and reasonably indicates that such affliction existed at the time of entry.” 
Furthermore, he noted, “the family has received public assistance last winter, and it appears that 
the man is unable to work continuously.”401 In spite of the uncertainty implied by the assertion 
that this was “reasonably” clear, because the burden of proof fell upon immigrants in deportation 
cases to prove their fitness to belong in the country, the family’s removal was enacted.  
 In other cases, immigrants volunteered the necessary information for officials to prove 
their pre-entry conditions, such as in the case of a 20-year-old Canadian citizen deported in 1920. 
The young man, of the “Irish race,” had been identified as a public charge at multiple different 
institutions over his time in the United States, including having spent 30 days in jail for a 
vagrancy arrest. Prior to that, he had been hospitalized in Troy, New York “because of frozen 
ears.” While his frostbite was enough to render him a public charge, he also had a more serious 
medical strike against his maintenance in the country—epilepsy. Because he admitted that he had 
been suffering from this disease for two years, before his most recent entry into the country from 
Canada, the officials in charge of his case concluded that “the evidence sustains the charges,” 
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and ordered his deportation.402 His case is highly representative, as deportee’s case files often 
featured a wide array of charges and potential immigration violations levied against them before 
eventually narrowing them down for the official deportation warrant to those which could be 
most readily supported by evidence and actual adherence to deportation law. Around the same 
time, other deportees were returned to Canada for similarly eclectic combinations of 
transgressions, including one 1922 deportee who was accused of being mentally defective, a user 
of morphine, receiving public assistance during hospitalization, likelihood to become a public 
charge and having been in jail.403 Another 1922 removal to Canada was enacted for having been 
imprisoned for riding a freight train, hospitalization for a chronic nose infection, and 
unauthorized initial entry.404 Once an immigrant was brought to the Service’s attention for 
potential removal, often by an institutional employee, the Service worked to verify their 
immigration status and often amassed as many possible criteria for removal by examining their 
entry records, other institutional documentation, through interviews with local officials, and 
through the deportee’s hearings.  
As the immigration service groped its way towards greater systemization, such cases 
reveal that paradoxically, the lack of clearly defined and differentiated criteria for removal 
actually facilitated its growth. Local immigration officials often referred deportation cases to the 
federal bureau based on erroneous legal understandings, and even more frequently, maximized 
their chances of success by including anything problematic or potentially concerning about the 
immigrant, in order to ensure that some charge might stick. Perhaps no category of deportation 
embodied a stronger veneer of objectivity, due to the weight of “scientific” knowledge and 
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medical examinations behind it, but as the preceding cases demonstrate, medical deportations 
were often far from clear-cut. Furthermore, while ostensibly about protecting the public from the 
spread of infectious diseases, and preventing the unrestrained reproduction of physical 
defectives, physical health removals were often deeply connected to national economic anxieties 
and the desire to produce a proper and fit laboring body. As the following section will explore, 
this agenda often overlapped with the policing of mentally “unfit” immigrants, who, while less 
represented in the scholarship on health deportations, actually made up a far greater proportion 
of post-entry removals during the 1920s.405 
 
Deportations for Mental Health and Defects 
 
 While the literature on health and immigrant populations in the United States has focused 
largely on physical health and bodily diseases, the deportation statistics for the early twentieth 
century reveal how powerful mental health was as a criterion for evaluating and expelling non-
citizen residents.406 Physical “defects,” were more effectively policed at the border, while mental 
deficiencies were more frequently apprehended after entry. In part this was due to the fact that 
physical issues were more readily detected visually at a quick inspection, while mental 
challenges often took longer to assess. As Ji-Hye Shin explains, “medical inspection at 
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immigration stations was not always successful in detecting and excluding insane immigrants; in 
fact, a majority of the insanity-related deportation cases came from state mental institutions.”407 
From young children deemed to be suffering from “subnormal” intelligence to elderly 
immigrants diagnosed with dementia, mental fitness was in many ways as critical as physical 
well-being for belonging in the nation, and was often policed just as strictly. Like physical illness 
or injury, mental illness or difference was often tightly linked with the “likely to become a public 
charge” criteria, with immigration officials arguing that any disability, either physical or mental, 
made immigrants less likely to be able to sustain themselves through their own labor. As the 
documented diagnoses of mental “inferiority” or illness of many deportees during the period 
reflect, these assertions were often based on scant medical evidence, broad assumptions, or 
language barriers that kept immigrants from making a case for their own well-being and mental 
fitness.  
 Scholars have explained that for many immigrants, one of the major challenges for 
proving themselves to be of fit mentality was language. At the same time as exclusion and 
deportation for illiteracy became law, which was often applied inconsistently depending on what 
the native language of the immigrant was, immigrants were also increasingly being found to be 
“feebleminded,” “insane” or otherwise mentally deficient. These categories overlapped in their 
disadvantaging of non-English speaking migrants, who often lacked sufficient translation and 
interpretation assistance to ensure that their mental state could be accurately expressed. Alan 
Kraut points out that immigration defenders argued the foreign-born did not, in fact have higher 
rates of insanity or mental disability, but that “officers were certifying immigrants of their group 
mentally deficient when the real problem was unfamiliar language or culture.” In fact, he 
                                                          
407 Shin, “Insanity on the Move,” 2. 
240 
 
explains, some doctors went as far as to critique the entire system, such as Dr. Antonio Stella, 
who “denied the validity of intelligence test results on the grounds that such tests were culturally 
biased.”408 As the example below demonstrates, many immigrants turned to outside tests to 
attempt to undermine the bias of immigration service exams, but these appeals were often 
ignored.  
 While many immigrants lacked the financial means, language skills, connections, or 
institutional knowledge to contest their diagnoses or deportations, other cases dragged on for 
months as various experts were engaged to assess the health or mental fitness of the immigrant. 
One particularly grim case was that of an 8-year-old Irish girl who was deported on the grounds 
that she was “subnormal in mental,” an allegation which was contested by her parents and 
various advocates. The girl’s father, James Moran was a member of the Dairy Employees’ Union 
of Chicago, which wrote to the Secretary of Labor on his behalf in 1928, explaining that her 
father “had the child examined by reputable medical men who pronounced the child normal, but 
said she was exceedingly shy.” Furthermore, they argued, her father was employed and able to 
support her care and education “according to the American standard of living,” while her 
relatives in Ireland were not in a position to care for her. In response to pleas and medical 
testimonies, however, the Acting Secretary of Labor responded with regret, agreeing that “the 
case of this little child is certainly most pathetic, and one which is worthy of the most 
sympathetic consideration,” but explaining that the immigration law provided no leeway for 
intervention in cases of mental deficiency exclusions.409  
 As complex as mental illnesses were for immigration officials to identify, document, and 
prove, mental deficiencies provided an even more ill-delineated category for removal. 
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Deportations for “subnormal mentality” or “feeble-mindedness,” like so many other provisions 
for expulsion, frequently intersected with concerns about an immigrant’s ability to support 
themselves financially through their own labor. In the case of one immigrant being deported for 
mental defect, the woman was reported by the Wayne County Psychopathic Clinic in Michigan. 
Her case file explains that she was found to be “definitely feeble minded, about middle grade,” 
and “having a mental age of approximately 9 years.” In addition to this defect, the institution 
reported, there “may be a mild mental disturbance.” Her “abnormality” was described in detail: 
“She tells of queer experiences and peculiar thoughts which are troubling her, but as it does not 
appear that she actually believes these things and, so far, her conduct has not been controlled by 
them, it is probably nothing more than a marked tendency toward romancing which, in itself may 
or may not be symptomatic of something more sinister.” While they noted that the immigrant 
had been suffering from a physical illness, and concluded that it was likely that with physical 
improvement, “there will be more stability and self-control,” they further noted that “the 
intellectual defect is so great, her conduct will continue to be childish and impulsive.” However, 
the most damning assessment she was charged with was the accusation that “she is undoubtedly 
incapable of providing for herself.”410  
As these cases suggest, mental health was an even more flexible category for removal 
than physical health (which often required the diagnosis of specific conditions, and which 
featured a more thoroughly developed set of qualifying illnesses). As Deidre Moloney notes, 
psychological illnesses and developmental disabilities were less clearly defined and reliant on 
relatively recent study and discourse. “The diagnosis and treatment of such diseases was far less 
precise than for many medical conditions,” she explains, and “there was a greater stigma 
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attached to them than exists today.”411 As the above case demonstrates, testing for subnormal 
mentality was controversial and unreliable at best, biased and harmful at worst. Mental illness 
diagnoses also differed from physical in that they often did not follow the familiar racial or 
ethnic patters of physical health removals. An examination of the deportation statistics for 1926, 
when post-entry removals for mental illness and disability peaked for the decade, reveals ethnic 
patterns inconsistent with our common understandings of which ethnic groups were most 
targeted for removal as unfit citizens.  
While the largest number of deportations by “race or people” for insanity and other 
mental illnesses were 138 Mexicans, this was only 5.3% of the overall number of Mexicans 
deported in that year—well below the overall rate of the 9.7% of all deportations that year 
conducted on the basis of mental health.  The 69 Scandinavian (Norwegian, Danish, and 
Swedish) immigrants removed for mental health that year, on the other hand, were 
disproportionately high, at 12.6% of the total number of Scandinavians deported in 1926. Even 
more striking was the rate at which German immigrants were removed for mental illness in the 
same year—a total of 133 deportations for mental health, amounting to 15.6% of all German 
deportations.412 These realities stand in sharp contrast to the aspirations of many of those nativist 
voices who had been at the forefront of the push for greater deportations. Indeed, in his Study of 
American Intelligence, Carl Brigham, an Army testing psychologist came to a very different set 
of conclusions. As Lynne Getz observes, “Using a most extraordinary logic, Brigham reasoned 
that immigrants who had come to the United States since 1900 possessed lower native 
intelligence than people who had been in the United States for several generations… Claiming 
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that the tests offered conclusive proof, Brigham pronounced all Southern and Eastern European 
people innately inferior to Nordic people.”413 
The widespread deportation of Northern and Western European “races” preferred by both 
social scientists and the quota legislation of the decade is startling, and it suggests the need for 
further study of the unexpected and largely unexplored patterns present in the deportation 
statistics of the decade. It also demonstrates that while policy studies have emphasized the goals 
set out by deportation boosters, the realities enacted by officials on the ground were immensely 
different, and critical for understanding the true reach of the deportation state. At the same time 
as the deportation of the “innately” superior Nordic people was jarring, the fact that the highest 
proportion of a single “race” to be deported for mental health in 1926 was “African (black)” at 
29.6% is no less striking.414 In spite of the assumptions (bolstered by suspect social scientific 
studies) that native born Americans or northern and western European immigrants were of 
“substandard” mental capacity, the deportation numbers reflect the extent to which the actual 
execution of deportation law did not always apprehend those who its congressional authors had 
intended. Instead, deportation implementation reflected patterns of institutional overcrowding 
and coordination, as well as local financial and social strains, and specific local and institutional 
prejudices that often diverged from supporting the motivations of the legislation which it had 
been built upon.  
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*Compiled from the Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1920-1930. 
Immigrants suffering from mental illnesses were among the largest institutional 
populations referred to the federal immigration bureau by local institutional superintendents, and 
often their case files noted multiple institutionalizations before they were eventually identified 
and detained as deportable. The 1922 case of a “26-year-old native of Holland, of the Hebrew 
race,” reflects a common pattern of both permeability at the Canadian border and repeated 
entries and institutionalization. He had been admitted in 1920, the immigration authorities noted, 
but had continued to reside just over the Detroit border in Windsor. After being rejected for 
reentry after the expiration of his visa, he entered without inspection, and promptly became a 
public charge at a Detroit hospital on account of his insanity. He was later transferred to the 
Pontiac State Hospital for further care, at which point the hospital certified that the “causes of the 
alien’s condition existed prior to landing” and he was ordered deported to Canada.415 This 
immigrant, previously deemed admissible and desirable as a resident of the nation was cut out of 
the vision of fit for citizenship on account of his mental health, as were many other immigrants, 
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Figure 10: Deportations for Mental Health and Deficiencies, 1920-1930 
Year Number of 
Deportations  
Percentage of Total 
Deportations  
1920 35 1.3 
1921 35 .78 
1922 59 1.4 
1923 46 1.3 
1924 97 1.5 
1925 608 6.4 
1926 1053 9.7 
1927 942 7.8 
1928 959 8.2 
1929 655 5.1 
1930 678 4.1 
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including, notably, many who fit the racial criteria for national acceptance. In her study of state-
driven deportations for insanity, Shin encapsulates the importance of this criteria in her 
conclusion that “insanity became a site not only of cooperation but also of contention for 
citizenship and belonging, and for authority and power. Insane immigrants… occupied a 
precarious position in American society; becoming insane compromised their rights and rendered 
them dependent, unfit, and immobile.”416 
At the overlap of both physical health and mental health, it is important to recognize a 
distinct and yet connected category, that of the “defective.” The development of categorical 
definitions of “defectives” and their relative absence from the historical literature on immigration 
restriction is the subject of Douglas Baynton’s critical article, “Defectives in the Land.” 
Disability, while an important facet of anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States, Baynton 
notes, has “largely held a marginal place in that scholarship.”417 In spite of its largely overlooked 
nature, he explains, immigration officials were ordered to deport anyone with “any mental 
abnormality… which justifies the statement that the alien is mentally defective.”418 Many of the 
provisions around physical and mental health were sufficiently vague and expansive as to 
include those defined as “defectives,” this category deserves attention in its own right. It shifted 
throughout the decade, and sometimes disappeared altogether as a standalone category outside 
various forms of physical and mental deficiencies.  
The category of the “defective,” was particularly expansive, and particularly prone to 
supporting the goals of correcting and curtailing the national labor force. By the 1920s, Baynton 
explains, the category had crown to include arthritis, asthma, bunions, deafness, flat feet, 
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hysteria, poor eyesight, poor physical development, spinal curvature, vascular disease of the 
heart, and varicose veins. Many of those provisions inherently disadvantaged elderly migrants, 
who were less desirable for inclusion in the nation due to their limited capacity for productive 
labor, and their propensity for requiring medical assistance and public aid. As Deidre Moloney 
has explored, the category of deficiency could often be utilized not only to discriminate by age, 
but also by “race” or ethnicity, and notes that Jewish immigrants were particularly susceptible to 
apprehension under the “poor physical development” provision, often on account of the forms of 
labor which they had commonly practiced in Europe.419 Eithne Luibheid explains that this 
category included the rare cases of immigrants with underdeveloped or non-gender-conforming 
genitalia, who were rejected on grounds of physical defects (although, as she points out, the 
immigrants sometimes sought to make the case that these defects, unlike others, would not 
incapacitate them from productive labor).420 Together, these diverse efforts at policing inclusion 
in the national body marked a growing effort to surveil and discipline belonging and the limits of 
citizenship. “The exclusion of disabled people was central to the laws governing immigration,” 
Baynton concludes, citing an Ellis Island medical inspector who reported that his duty had been 
“to detect poorly built, defective, or broken down human beings.”421 By uniting the various 
institutions charged with detecting and (when it came to citizens) repairing these “defective” or 
“broken down” individuals, the growing deportation regime proved one of the most powerful 
tools of the state in this project. 
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Deportations for Crime 
 
One of the most enduring and popular criteria for deportations throughout the twentieth 
century and beyond has been crime, and advocates of stricter deportation laws have often argued 
the need for national security through the targeted removal of threats. This perception of threats 
to public safety has also intersected in important ways with concerns over the expense of 
maintaining foreign-born criminals in the United States. In spite of Progressive era studies whose 
findings on the subject often undermined their own conclusions, the association of immigrant 
populations with increased proclivity for criminal behavior endured throughout the 1920s. I 
outline the kinds of crimes which were used as the basis for deportation, the processes by which 
criminals were identified and selected for deportation while serving their time in prisons and 
reformatories, and the ways that racial assumptions influenced the application of criminal 
deportations.  
Criminal deportations fit into a longer history of expulsions and exile for crime but 
sharpened the lines between citizens who could be either castigated or rehabilitated, and non-
citizens, who could be castigated and then permanently removed. As Ryan King, Michael 
Massoglia and Christopher Uggen explain, “criminal deportations constitute a form of 
contemporary banishment—the systematic removal of an offender from the state.”422 As the 
Chicago deportation drives of 1926 in the previous chapter demonstrated, deportation was newly 
envisioned during the period as a potential opportunity to clean up an entire social threat through 
the permanent expulsion of as many of its perpetrators as could be gathered. The expanding 
network of prisons, juvenile reformatories, and other carceral institutions throughout the country 
allowed for this project to be initiated not only by local officials, as occurred in Chicago, but by 
                                                          
422 Ryan D. King, Michael Massoglia, and Christopher Uggen. “Employment and Exile: U.S. Criminal Deportations, 
1908-2005,” American Journal of Sociology 117:6 (2012): 1788. 
248 
 
the institutions themselves, and by the federal immigration service, who soon recognized that 
criminal deportations gained their work popularity and regard from the public. 
As scholars of the Dillingham and Wickersham Commissions have explained, much of 
the energy of social scientists studying the immigration “problem” was devoted to understanding 
and proving the connection between the foreign-born and crime. Lynne Getz contends that 
eugenicists such as Charles D. Davenport, the founder of the Eugenics Records Office in New 
York, stressed the connection between race and crime. “Davenport began his scientific 
investigation assuming that race determined social behavior and that the ‘darker’ the race, the 
‘more given to crimes of larceny, kidnapping, assault, murder, rape, and sex-immorality,’ she 
writes. Furthermore, “to prevent eugenic calamity in the United States, Davenport advocated the 
restriction of undesirable immigrant groups wanting to come into the country and the 
sterilization of members of those groups already here.”423 These concerns echoed those of other 
prominent restrictionists at the time who worried that the social ills brought by the foreign-born 
would not only damage society in the present, but would be passed along as biological traits to 
their descendants, weakening the very social fabric of the nation. 
As the chart below demonstrates, deportation for crime became one of the fastest growing 
trends of the period, and by the end of the decade, more than a tenth of all deportations were of 
immigrants convicted of crime. Beyond the actual numbers of criminal non-citizens deported, the 
growing deportation regime served to draw public attention to immigrants in criminal 
institutions, as well as to create a tighter association between immigrants and crime in the public 
imagination. Because prisons contained one of the largest institutional populations which could 
be easily inspected for potential deportees, criminals were disproportionately represented in both 
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deportation populations and media attention.  However, it also reflected a particular commitment 
to deporting criminals, both because of a genuine motivation to eliminate foreign-born “threats,” 
but also because of the effort to improve the national image and governmental record on 
suppressing crime (as is visible in the 1926 drives in Chicago, where the city’s reputation 
provided a strong impetus). Prisons also, as Foucault noted, held a critical place in the state as a 
penal detention acted as a “calculated technique for altering individual behavior.” As it came to 
replace public execution as the prominent disciplinary capacity of the state, he explains, it 
morphed into a “carefully articulated disciplinary mechanism,” one which, I argue, critically 
shaped the disciplinary identity of deportation.424 
 
Figure 11: Deportations for Crime, 1920-1930 
Year Number of 
Deportations  
Percentage of Total 
Deportations  
1920 74 2.7 
1921 51 1.1 
1922 48 1.1 
1923 112 3.1 
1924 124 1.9 
1925 637 6.7 
1926 793 7.3 
1927 953 7.9 
1928 1211 10.4 
1929 1409 10.9 
1930 1711 10.3 
*Compiled from the Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1920-1930. 
Unlike many other criteria for deportation that provided more flexibility for immigration 
officials to impose their own values, judgments, and racial assumptions, criminal deportations 
were more strictly bound to the values, judgments, and assumptions of other institutional 
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officials—those who had arrested and sentenced them. The 1923 deportation of an elderly 
Canadian man who was an inmate at the House of Correction in Chicago demonstrates that 
criminal deportations were shaped by the agendas and subjective decisions of the institutions 
from which they were gathered. The deportee admitted to having entered without inspection 
from Canada in 1921, after which he ‘wandered over the United States securing a precarious 
livelihood.” However, he was reported by his employer, who explained that he “was arrested on 
the charge of disorderly conduct… having stolen and wrecked an automobile. A more serious 
charge was not proffered against him on account of his age.” However, it was ordered that after a 
30-day commitment at the House of Corrections, he was to be deported for crime and likelihood 
to become a public charge.425 
Other immigrants were not fortunate enough to receive any leniency in their sentences, 
and thus served longer periods before their removal. As scholars have explained, this was often a 
heavily racialized process, as certain populations were associated with criminality in the mind of 
many public officials. Ahmed Ratis Mouhaddin, or Ahmed Ratib Mouohidden, a young Turkish 
national who was deported in 1929, was one who fell under the provisions for a crime of moral 
turpitude, “gross indency.” Mouhaddin had entered the country in 1924 with the intention of 
joining his brother, who lived in Lansing Michigan, and attending the Michigan Agricultural 
College at Lansing. He enrolled as a student there, but in 1925, was charged with “gross 
indecency” and sent to prison. When asked about this conviction in his deportation interview, 
Mouhaddin explained that “I plead guilty, but I learned later that I did not understand the 
charges.” Mouhaddin, in spite of his lack of understanding, was sentenced to three to five years 
imprisonment at Lansing, which made him susceptible to deportation, and in 1929, on the 
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recommendation of the Supervisor of Paroles, his release was granted and he was discharged into 
the custody of the Immigration Service for transportation to New York and then Turkey.426  
 Immigrants detained for crimes often attempted to negotiate for their early release for 
deportation rather than serve out their full sentences before removal, but some also fought to be 
allowed to remain in the country after their release. This was often an option only available to 
literate, educated, English-speaking immigrants with the resources and knowledge at their 
disposal to pursue these options. Even so, their appeals were rarely allowed. A British deportee 
from London, Ontario, who was imprisoned in Sing-Sing for grand larceny wrote to Secretary of 
Labor Davis, pleading his case: “Please allow me to impose briefly upon your valuable time in 
seeking your assistance… I am rightly detained in Sing Sing prison, for the [perpetration] of a 
crime. It is my first misfortunate of this type and I earnestly seek to pay my debt to Society and 
then enjoy the necessary freedom to adhere to my commercial future. In this respect I am badly 
handicapped by a deportation warrant.” He further explained that he was only 21 years old, and 
would upon release “engage in a profitable and conscientious trade,” and asked if he could have 
assistance in suppressing the warrant for his removal. He was not satisfied in this request and 
was deported in 1926.427 However, the following year, another request came from Sing Sing to 
the Assistant Secretary of Labor, this time from the Christian Science Prison Committee for the 
State of New York on behalf of Mr. E.A. Hastings Till. The Committee requested that rather than 
deportation, Mr. Till be paroled to their committee, because of their thorough conviction that he 
“will make a useful member of society when he is released.” Although they promised to find him 
work and to ensure his well-being, they too failed to gain sympathy.428 
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Throughout the 1920s, anxieties over crime acted as a powerful impetus for the 
apprehension of numerous immigrants, although the boundaries between criminal acts, and other 
criteria for deportation often became blurred, obscuring the true number of deportations that 
were initiated, at least in part, because of crime. Deportation was increasingly recognized by a 
variety of criminal institutions as a potential tool for relieving institutional overcrowding and 
fiscal burdens. At the same time, while wardens, prison superintendents, and other institutional 
figures utilized deportation to serve their own interests, prisoners also increasingly recognized 
the possibility of using deportation law to their advantage. Because many states allowed for the 
conditional early release of prisoners for immediate deportation, prison attendants worried over 
criminals using deportation to shorten their sentences, including American citizens who tried to 
claim deportable immigration status to ensure their own release. 
By 1931, the state and local laws governing the possibility of early parole for the purpose 
of deportation had given way to a House bill to make this policy federally applicable. HR 9674- 
Chap. 371, approved March 2, 1931, stated that the previous Parole Act of 1910 would be 
amended to include the following: 
That where a Federal prisoner is an alien and subject to deportation the board of parole 
may authorize the release of such a prisoner after he shall have become eligible for parole 
on condition that he be deported and remain outside of the United States and all places 
subject to its jurisdiction, and upon such parole becoming effective said prisoner shall be 
delivered to the duly authorized immigration official for deportation.429  
 
However, while the U.S. government may have approved the early parole of prisoners for the 
purposes of deportation, this approach was less than appreciated by some representatives of 
foreign governments, who saw this tactic as dumping of criminals. A 1934 letter from the 
District Director at St. Louis to the Commissioner General reported that “Italian Consuls, with 
                                                          
429 Congressional Record, Seventy-First Congress, Session II, Chapters 368-370.  
253 
 
whom the offices of this district have to negotiate for passports in behalf of aliens under orders 
of deportation, are pretty generally taking the position that they will not issue such passports 
prior to the expiration of the alien’s minimum sentence, if he happens to be serving a term of 
imprisonment.” This was a severe concern, the Director explained, not so much for the 
immigration service itself, which was not required to pay for the detention of the deportee until 
their prison sentence had expired,” but for the “taxpayers of the nation as a whole,” upon whom 
this burden rest. His accusation that this passing of responsibility by the Italian government was 
“unconscionable” is only one small example of the ways that the Immigration service grappled 
with how to alleviate both the taxpayer burden of institutionalized immigrants, and also 
maximize their own limited appropriations.430   
 
Deportations for Sexuality and Morality Criteria  
 
The case of Giovanni Vacca, aka John Vacca or Vecca, demonstrates how crime as a 
rationale often coincided with concerns over sexual dangers and the safety of national morals. 
Vacca, who had been born in Italy and identified his race as South Italian and his occupation as 
laborer, was deported to Italy in 1926 for a crime of moral turpitude—“rape with consent.” 
When questioned in his deportation interview, Vacca explained that he had served in the 
Carabinere of the Italian Army, and that he had never been imprisoned or become a public 
charge in Italy prior to his departure. He had come to the United States via Canada, where he 
deserted the ship he was employed upon as a “workaway.” His traveling companions, he 
explained, had brought him with to Detroit shortly afterward, where he entered without 
inspection. Following this, he explained, he immediately moved to Cleveland, where he worked 
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at a shoe shop continually until his arrest. Vacca, when asked about his criminal record, 
explained that he had been sentenced in 1925 at Cleveland for “rape with consent” and sentenced 
to from one to twenty years for this crime.431 However, while his rather brief immigration case 
file contains extensive information as to his entry, background in Italy, and imprisonment, it 
gives little information about the crime that landed him in the grasp of the immigration service. 
The malleability of federal deportation law, still being negotiated both in congress and in 
the institutions where it was ultimately enacted, reveals how central deportation was to the 
enforcement of social control agendas throughout the period. As Deidre Moloney explains, “the 
regulation of women’s non-marital sexuality at the borders, including prostitution, non-marital 
births, and common law marriage, was a means to ensure that admitted immigrant women would 
become both moral citizens themselves and the mothers of moral future citizens.”432 This process 
is far more momentous when one recognizes that it did not stop “at the borders,” but reached 
aggressively into the interior of the nation, and not only prevented the admittance of “immoral” 
women, but ensured the ever-present threat of their castigation through removal. This section 
explores the ways in which the search for deportable immigrants, while couched in objective 
criteria and scientific terminology, often reflected morality causes of a particular moment or 
locality.  
These apprehensions were facilitated by the highly elastic and ill-defined “moral 
turpitude” clause of deportation criteria. While immigrants seized for deportation from various 
public institutions were often indicted for more straightforward crimes, such as robbery, many, 
including immigrant women, were caught up in more ambiguous accusations. Women were often 
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deported for “prostitution” when the evidence did not necessarily bear out the accusations, but 
revealed a whole range of activities including extramarital affairs, having children out of 
wedlock, or separation from their husbands.  Men’s sexual and moral behaviors were policed 
through deportation as well, with anxieties emerging over immigrant men acting as procurers, 
pimps, failing to support wives and children, and bigamy. Moloney states that “while the moral 
turpitude clause sometimes affected immigrant men who served as ‘procurers,’ those accused of 
adultery or bigamy, and very rarely those engaging in prostitution themselves,” she concludes 
that “efforts to exclude or deport immigrants based on concerns over sexuality had more 
profound effects on women.”433 While this was undoubtedly true, her focus on deportations at 
the point of entries obscures the significant numbers of immigrant men apprehended long after 
entry when they became imprisoned for crime. Although these men were often, at least on 
surface, deported for their likeliness to become public charges, or other crimes, their case files 
reveal a great deal of emphasis on their sexual improprieties and lack of moral fitness. 
As anxieties about foreign-born immorality, as well as the fertility and birthrate of 
immigrant women, gained traction throughout the early twentieth century, the deportation regime 
was strengthened by the eagerness to identify removable sources of non-normative sexual 
behaviors. This effort to control migrant sexuality, scholars have explained, was given weight by 
Progressive era concerns over shifting gender roles and women in the industrial workforce, and 
as Moloney explains, “regulation served as a means to reinforce traditional marital and domestic 
norms among potential citizens and to deny access to those who did not conform to them.434 In 
spite of the increased recognition of sexual policing as a rationale for deportation, this literature 
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has tended to focus overwhelming on the process of excluding sexual deviants at the borders, as 
well as of creating new identification tactics for pinpointing them at the point of entry.  
There has been considerably less attention to the ways that these processes continued 
well after entry, as women (and in smaller numbers, men), were apprehended in the institutions 
of the state and referred for deportation. As Luibheid notes, when women whose “sexualities 
presented a threat to the nation,” were admitted to the country, “immigration procedures ensured 
that they became incorporated into webs of surveillance that disciplined them and produced them 
as ‘good’ citizens, in gendered, sexualized, racial, and class terms.” Though she does not discuss 
post-entry deportations in any depth, this comment gestures to how critical the new era of 
surveillance and documentation was for tracking immigrants after their entry, and how deeply 
the modern institutions of the nation-state acted as a form of scrutiny into the personal, private 
recesses of non-citizen lives.435 
While deportations for crime more generally reflected an intense anxiety about immigrant 
criminology, crimes of “moral turpitude” and sexual deviance were particularly fraught for 
immigration officials, who sought to use deportation not only to ensure public safety, but also 
public morality. The 1924 deportation of Lillian Mary Irene Johnson, alias Irene Johnson, from 
Cleveland, Ohio demonstrates how the designation of “likely to become a public charge” could 
be used to reveal a much broader agenda of social policing. The official deportation warrant for 
Johnson, a 17-year-old Canadian citizen of the “African black race,” states only that she was to 
be deported for “LPC” and entering without inspection. However, her immigration case file 
reveals a much more complicated case than such a simple designation would indicate. The report 
of the District Director at the Port of Buffalo to the Commissioner General of Immigration 
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explains that Johnson had entered the country the year before at Detroit before traveling to the 
home of her uncle in Cleveland. Once she was in Cleveland, she took work as a domestic, but 
was reported to the Cleveland policy “as an incorrigible” by her uncle, after which the police 
then brought her case to the attention of the immigration officials.  
The report goes on to explain that her sexual behavior had come under question, and that 
Johnson “admits that she had sexual relations with two men in Canada, but claims that she was 
assaulted on each occasion.” After entry to the United States, the report states, “the alien admits 
to having sexual relations with one man on three occasions since entering the United States, but 
denies having practiced prostitution.” In a deportation investigation ostensibly about the risk of 
the alien being a public charge, the fact that a great deal of attention was paid to her sexual 
history and impropriety (with no concern for her allegations of sexual assault), accusations of 
prostitution without any evidence or even charge of financial transaction suggests the flexibility 
of LPC as a grounds for deportation. In fact, the only mention of the immigrant’s economic 
standing is in the observation that she acquired work as a domestic once entering the country, 
with no indication that she had lost the position or had become unable to work. In fact, the report 
details the real reason behind her apprehension and deportation: “owing to the fact that she was 
not amenable to discipline, she was forced to leave the home of her uncle in Cleveland, who… is 
desirous of having her returned to her home in Canada.”  
The questioning of Johnson during her hearing revealed that she was a baptized member 
of the Protestant A.M.E. church in Kirchener, Ontario, her father was a traveling Methodist 
minister, and her parents and 4 siblings all resided in Brantford, Ontario. When asked whether 
she had trouble living with her uncle, a garbage wagon driver for the city of Cleveland, Johnson 
replied that “Yes, he did not want me to go out and we had frequent quarrels on that account, and 
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I left his house and obtained employment as a domestic.”  When asked what charge she was 
arrested on, Johnson explained that “they said I was arrested for running away from home, as 
that was the only charge they could place against me.” After being asked whether she was 
employed at a “sporting house,” she denied the allegation, explaining that the woman who had 
kept it before was the proprietor of such an establishment.  
As the inspecting officer continued to press the matter, searching for sexual 
improprieties, including whether she had ever had children, whether she was currently pregnant, 
and whether she had ever suffered a venereal disease, Johnson continued to maintain her 
innocence. When asked whether she had sexual relations since entering the country, she admitted 
that she had on three occasions with a man with whom she had been “keeping steady company,” 
denying that she had ever accepted money from him for sexual intercourse, but explaining that 
he had paid to take her to “dances and picture shows.” In the summary of her hearing, the 
immigrant inspector wrote nothing in the recommendation section regarding her LPC status or 
entry without authorization, but merely reported on her “immoral relations” both before and after 
her entry to the country. The recommendations were followed, and Johnson, who had been 
awaiting the hearing in the Juvenile Court at the Detention Home, was deported to Canada.436 
Johnson was particularly vulnerable due to her age, race, and the fact that her own family 
had reported her for removal, but her case was far from unique during the period. The 
accusations levied against her, though never substantiated or matched with deportation 
legislation, were enough to color the immigration officials’ view of her suitability for residence 
in the country and to encourage them to seek out a basis for deportation which could be backed 
up by evidence and law. Like many women of the era, Johnson was targeted for prostitution, 
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which was often used as a catchall accusation for any woman exercising non-normative or 
“immoral” sexual behaviors, such as sex outside of marriage. Immigrants were inspected and 
excluded, Eithne Luibheid has explained, not only for their “sexual orientation but also on the 
basis of particular sexual acts.” More importantly, however, she states, the regulation of 
sexuality at the border was actually constitutive of imagined sexual identities (which were 
heavily gendered, racialized, and class-based), which were then “treated as evidence that 
undesirable acts would likely occur.” Thus, she argues, immigration control both reflected and 
generated a variety of “peripheral sexual figures at the U.S. border,” who included “the 
racialized prostitute, the amoral and despotic pimp, the fecund woman whose reproduction was 
uncontrolled, the gold-digging hussy intent on snaring an American husband, and the foreigner 
who threatened miscegenation.”437 
 
Figure 12: Deportations for Sexual or Moral Transgressions, 1920-1930 
Year Number of 
Deportations  
Percentage of Total 
Deportations  
1920 165 6.0 
1921 198 4.4 
1922 141 3.2 
1923 200 5.5 
1924 198 3.7 
1925 322 3.4 
1926 384 3.5 
1927 547 4.5 
1928 529 4.6 
1929 394 3.1 
1930 677 4.1 
*Compiled from the Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1920-1930. 
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The most numerous deportations for sexual impropriety were certainly for prostitution, 
although it is clear that clause was used more flexibly than only where proof existed of an 
individual accepting financial remuneration for sexual acts. However, a whole range of other 
sexual behaviors were policed by immigrant officials, both at the borders, and throughout the 
public and private institutions of the state. Some of these are hard to track statistically because 
they fell under broad categories, such as the provision for the exclusion and removal of those 
deemed to possess “constitutional psychopathic inferiority,” which was added in 1917. This 
clause included “various unstable individuals on the border line between sanity and insanity,” 
including those who were assessed to be “persons with abnormal sex instincts.” In other cases, 
the particular diseases which deportation officials fixated on at many of the public hospitals 
around the country, including syphilis and gonorrhea, reflected a concern with protecting not 
only the physical health of the nation, but its moral health as well.  
The 1925 case of a couple, Edna Sullivan and William Edward Troke, who were deported 
to Canada, reflects how flexible the category of “crimes of moral turpitude” could be, and thus, 
how useful in punishing sexual impropriety. Both immigrants were otherwise married, their case 
files reveal, but according to Sullivan’s testimony, Troke’s wife had left him, and her own 
husband had “run away with another woman.” However, she did admit to “having had sexual 
intercourse prior to their entry into the United States, thus committing adultery.” Furthermore, 
she admitted, they had engaged in sexual relations “on several occasions subsequent to their 
entry.” It was not at all uncommon for deportation hearing officers to ask intensely personal 
questions of immigrants, designed to assess the extent of their misdeeds, such as on how many 
occasions a particular sexual relationship had occurred. Sullivan and Troke were found 
deportable, Troke on the grounds of the “moral turpitude crime of adultery,” and Sullivan on the 
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“additional charge” that she was unable to read and thus should not have been allowed to enter 
the country.438 These cases demonstrate the extent to which morality was policed through 
deportation, in tandem with dependency, crime, and gender normativity.  
  
Deportations for “Likely to Become a Public Charge” and Dependency 
 
Throughout the 1920s, the most useful, flexible, and encompassing criteria for 
deportations was the “likely to become a public charge” designation. While it has received 
considerably less attention from scholars than disease or political deportations, the charge was in 
fact one of the most instrumental tools of the young deportation regime. The greatest value of the 
criteria was that it could often be used to deport immigrants who had been detained for other 
reasons, but were found not to fit the official deportation requirements. Thus, for instance, an 
immigrant who received attention from the authorities for a crime which was not a severe 
enough offense to qualify could instead be found subject to deportation as likely to become a 
public charge if he had received public assistance. In other cases, immigrants who lacked the 
medical criteria for deportation could be removed on the grounds that their condition left them 
disabled and unable to support themselves economically and likely to turn to public aid.  
The LPC charge was particularly fraught with connotations of bodily fitness and the ideal 
laboring body, which often were heavily overlaid with racializing assumptions about where 
different immigrants fit within a hierarchy of bodies. As Baynton has noted, disability was 
particularly intertwined with fears about dependency, and the immigration service’s definition of 
“poor physique” reflected concerns with those who might be insufficiently hearty for rough 
manual labor, including those “who have frail frame, flat chest, and are generally deficient in 
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muscular development,” as well as those who are “undersized—markedly of short stature—
dwarf.”439 Moloney notes that often this could be used to deport those who were, in fact not 
unable to work because of their physiques, but those whose physiques were marked by their 
work. This included those as tailors whose frail frames, stooping backs and poor eyesight 
actually denoted the success of their ability to earn a living off their labor, as their disfigurements 
were products of that very labor. The “poor physique” charge was used frequently against Jewish 
men, who often were concentrated in work outside of hard industry, and thus, their advocates 
argued that their physique did not “adversely affect an immigrant’s ability” to work.440 Likewise, 
Baynton notes that many of those who were excluded as LPC had, in fact, been self-supporting 
and regularly employed in their home countries. Importantly, he explains, “the public charge law 
also assumes that the unemployment or underemployment of disabled people is a problem 
centered in bodies rather than in the relationship between particular bodies and the constructed 
physical and social environments in which they live.”441  
Unlike other criteria for deportation, such as crime or radical politics, which skewed 
much more heavily toward male immigrants, the likely to become a public charge category 
impacted disproportionately large numbers of women and children, who were assumed to be 
even more likely than single men to become burdens on the public budget. This category was 
particularly elastic and powerful because it did not require proof that the immigrant had, in fact, 
used public assistance, only that for some reason they might be predisposed to need to utilize it 
in the future. This allowed for the imposition of individual and collective assumptions about 
physical fitness and the earning potential of “unfit” ethnic groups, as well as intensely gendered 
                                                          
439 Baynton, “Defectives in the Land,” 35. 
440 Moloney, National Insecurities, 126.  
441 Baynton, “Defectives in the Land,” 34. 
263 
 
assumptions about the ability of single women and mothers to support themselves. In doing so, it 
drew on the Progressive era efforts to eliminate female dependency by strengthening legal 
obligations of husbands and to ensure that deserted women did not become an undue burden on 
the public.442 For immigrant women, the fact of the pervasive assumption that they were unable 
to sustain themselves financially, in spite of their increasing numbers in the industrial workforce, 
made them perpetually vulnerable to removal. Particularly in periods of economic depression, 
immigrants needing the assistance of charitable organizations or any form of public welfare, 
including medical treatment which they could not pay for, put themselves in line for potential 
deportation. Critically, deportation gave institutions, local officials, and immigration authorities 
the power to impose these assumptions and to police dependency far past the border, and in 
doing so, served both social control and economic aims.  
 
Figure 13: Deportations for Likely to Become a Public Charge Provision, 1920-1930 
Year Number of 
Deportations  
Percentage of Total 
Deportations  
1920 808 29.3 
1921 1293 28.6 
1922 1713 39.4 
1923 1188 32.5 
1924 2092 32.6 
1925 1758 18.5 
1926 887 8.1 
1927 569 4.7 
1928 477 4.1 
1929 373 2.9 
1930 305 1.8 
*Compiled from the Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1920-1930. 
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This charge was not only disproportionately used to apprehend female immigrants, but 
was also utilized as a flexible mechanism for removing racial “undesirables” when no other 
suitable criteria could be determined for their expulsion. As Fox explains of the Depression 
period, social workers and government welfare officials “saw the extension of relief to European 
immigrants as temporary assistance to a struggling new member of the community,” and thus 
were less likely to remove them for economic dependency unless they had otherwise 
demonstrated themselves unfit for belonging in this “community.” When it came to Mexican 
immigrants, however, she explains, social workers “came to see the distribution of relief to 
Mexicans as an illegitimate and possibly permanent subsidy to the agricultural industry.”443 
Molina describes the same process a decade later in California’s Imperial Valley, but argues that 
while some welfare officials opposed the use of deportations on these grounds, many supported 
the process of regulating later through removals. Instead, she explains, “while these deportations 
were officially based on charges of disease affliction and LPC, they were actually yet another 
form of post-entry social control deportation… just one more version of growers calling in the 
Border Patrol to deport workers on payday, as had been done time and time again.”444 This 
process, Molina asserts, might have been directly driven by public health officials, who broke 
confidentiality to share medical histories with the Border Patrol, even when the immigrants 
hadn’t sought charity. 
At times, the justifications of how deportees came to be considered public charges were 
unimpeachable, such as when they became hospitalized and could not pay their bills, or when 
they sought public welfare to alleviate financial destitution. At other times, the assessment was 
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far more tenuously established in the documentation, but, because deportees only had to be 
“likely” to become public charges, the provision could encompass a wide range of accusations. 
One Romanian deportee, removed in 1923 as “likely to become a public charge,” reveals how 
subjective the category could be. The man had first entered the United States in 1903, but had 
most recently reentered over the border at Buffalo in 1921, after a six-year stint in Canada. His 
deportation hearing revealed that “the evidence indicates that he is a common laborer, spends his 
money as fast as he earns it,” and thus “is always more or less likely to become a public 
charge.”445 No evidence existed that he had actually proven himself unable to support himself as 
a common laborer, but his lack of thrift and savings earned him the condemnation of 
immigration officials, who determined that these were deportable offenses.  
 Often, deportations for LPC provisions overlapped with criminal deportations, especially 
when the crime was theft, which supported immigration officials’ claims that a given immigrant 
was unable to support themselves through honest labor, and thus would end up reliant either on 
public welfare, private charity, or immoral and illegal behaviors. One Canadian deported in 1923 
experienced how minor such crimes could be to bring one to the attention of the institutional 
officials—his crime had been that “he recently stole some rope, for which offense he received a 
sentence of thirty days.” Because of this offense, it was recommended that he be deported to 
Canada upon his relief from prison. Just as important as the criminal charges against him, 
however, was his admission at the hearing that “he has been in poor financial circumstances at 
all times in the recent past.”446 In another case from the same year, a Dutch immigrant who had 
arrived as a crew member on the ship “Nieuw Amsterdam” and deserted upon arrival was 
deported when it was proved that “the alien has had considerable difficulty in making a living 
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since entry.” These difficulties, immigration officials explained, had not rendered him a public 
charge yet, but they condemned the fact that “at the present time he is working for a farmer in 
Palymra, New York, receiving no remuneration except his board and room.”447 In becoming 
destitute, or even struggling financially, immigrants became vulnerable to expulsion, as officials 
more sharply defined public benefits as the sole right of citizens.  
In the same vein as the public vigilantes who reported on suspected radicals and other 
potential deportees, individuals also began to report on those who they felt to be an institutional 
burden on the nation. Although these immigrant suspects were less clearly a threat to public 
safety or the protection of American values, they posed a different danger in the public mind: as 
a drain on the financial welfare of the nation. In 1922, on the urging of Mr. E.E. Ellis of 
Spokane, Washington, Senator Miles Poindexter of the Senate Committee on Mines and Mining 
wrote to Commissioner Husband. Ellis had sent him a clipping from the Spokane Chronicle, he 
explained, which made the “surprising” claim that 90% of the inmates at the County Poor Farm 
at Spangle (a town in Spokane County) were immigrants. Most of them, he explained, had not 
even taken out their first citizenship papers. Poindexter wrote, “I will be very much obliged to 
have your advice and suggestions as to the present status of immigration laws as affecting such a 
case as to the liability of alien public charges of this kind to deportation.”448 These residents of 
the local poor farm had become a concern not only to the elected representatives of the state but 
to the press, and private citizens as well. Even before the onset of the depression at the end of the 
decade, the expense of maintaining non-citizens was in the public eye, and contributed to the 
growing identification between public assistance and the exclusive rights of citizenship.  
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Because of the nature of the charge, many of the deportations under the LPC provision, 
were, in fact, deportations about something else as well—whether it was disability, disease, 
gender noncomformity, or mental “inferiority.” Most importantly the LPC clause gave 
immigration officials the opportunity to knit together a network of institutions of the state 
(including asylums, hospitals, prisons, and orphanages), at which any immigrants who had 
resided in the country for less than a certain number of years would be vulnerable for removal, 
by mere virtue of having sought (voluntarily or otherwise) the services of that institution. In the 
process, even the ostensibly benevolent institutions of the state—such as orphanages and 
poorhouses—which were designed to provide care and welfare for society’s most disadvantaged, 
took on a threatening, punitive role. This impact profoundly reshaped the way that non-citizens 
interacted with the state and its institutional services, and solidified an enduring distrust of 
government welfare among the foreign-born. Because institutions supposedly established for aid 
became vehicles for exclusion and expulsion, deportation cast a shadow over the infrastructure of 
the state for immigrant populations. Perhaps no other deportation provision contributed so 
clearly to the creation of what Rachel Ida Buff has called “the deportation terror.”  
Even at the far reaches the nation, in its far-flung territories, institutional coordination 
made policing the territorial populations newly possible. The Inspector in Charge at Ketchikan 
reported in 1923 to the Commissioner General that, while “many of the cases reported to us 
cannot, of course, be taken up because of the length of time the alien has been in the country, or 
the triviality of the offense,” the employees of his service took the measures within their power. 
While there were few institutions in territorial Alaska, the Inspector notes that “splendid 
cooperation exists between the police officials of the territory and our officers. The immigration 
inspectors, he explained, make it their “particular business to interview the marshals, their 
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deputies and the town police chiefs” to gain information about immigrants in the area, and then 
coordinate their apprehension with the central office at Ketchikan. This was possible, they 
explained, partially because of the network of institutions and, just as importantly, transportation 
for conveyance, as there were “no penitentiaries in Alaska, persons sentenced to imprisonment 
being confined in federal jails.” As such, those arrested there served time at the federal 
penitentiary at McNeil Island, Washington, while “persons adjudged insane” in the territory at 
“conveyed by U.S. Marshals to a contract institution near Portland, Oregon.449 
As immigrants were maneuvered through and expelled from various institutions of the 
state, their trajectories required coordination not only within the United States, but abroad as 
well. Increasingly, foreign nations chafed against being asked to receive disabled, diseased, or 
insane deportees with little warning or time for preparations for proper care, and the Immigration 
Service was forced to take additional steps to ensure the safety of institutionalized deportees. In 
her early study of deportation, Jane Perry Clark notes that by 1930, “a beginning has been made 
toward preventing indiscriminate dumping of deportees from the United States, and toward 
international cooperation in social care.”450 By 1927, she explains, the Irish Free State had begun 
to demand that it be notified in “sufficient time” of deportees afflicted with tuberculosis, and by 
1930, of insane deportees. Poland made a similar request regarding those deemed insane, while 
Denmark requested advanced notice for both the insane and criminals.451 While this coordination 
was far from perfected, and indeed, remains a strain between nations at present, this effort 
reflected an even greater expansion of the bureaucratic powers of the nation. At the same time as 
authorities were working to improve the system of screening immigrants before departure to the 
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United States for institutionalizable conditions, they were simultaneously working to coordinate 
the return and institutionalization of migrants who had slipped through the cracks of this system, 
or arrived before its inception. The unprecedented regime of surveillance, tracking, and 
documentation involved both reflected and shaped the powers of the modern bureaucratic nation-
state and its reach across and within borders and institutions. 
A 1925 letter from the District Commissioner at Montreal to the Commissioner General 
explained that several immigrants had been awaiting their deportation to Britain, which was 
being delayed by the Bureau’s failure to secure the necessary passport permission from the 
British Embassy. After waiting nearly four months in the local jail for deportation, he notes, John 
Whitford’s jail bill to date had reached $95.70, and “it will probably be twice that before slow 
moving diplomatic machinery produces a passport.” Even worse, the commissioner explained, 
“the alien has suffered and will suffer a long imprisonment and by the time he leaves the jail he 
will be in rags.” Another deportee from the same group posed even greater challenges, having 
“become violently insane while waiting for a passport,” and thus requiring three attendants to 
transfer him from the jail to the State Hospital at Ogdensburg, New York.  This was not merely a 
problem of institutional burden, the Commissioner insisted, but because he was a war veteran 
whose story was being followed by the press, “his case reflects no credit on this Service.” This 
letter encapsulated many of the tensions faced by institutional officials during the period, 
including prison, mental health and institutionalization, and the limited funds available for 
treating immigrants requiring public welfare.  It also gestured to the challenges of detention and 
transport coordination that will be explored more deeply in the next chapter. The delays incurred 
by the bureau had become not only a financial burden, but a public opinion liability, the author 
explained, stating that “I am sure the Bureau will agree that such long detention of aliens is 
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indefensible from any point of view, either the material one of eliminating heavy drains upon our 
limited appropriation, or the legality of prolonged detention.”452  
The impact of deportation on the relationship between the state and the non-citizen 
reflects what Foucault has noted about the practice of identifying and tracking biographical 
information from people. While traditionally those in power were those most heavily scrutinized 
and recorded, he argues that there was a shift in disciplinary societies to the tracking and 
documenting of society’s “others,” an argument borne out by the tremendous paper trail 
attending America’s undesirable expelled. These biographical details, he explains, “became a 
means of control and a means of domination.”453 Importantly, for deportation practice, these 
amplified forms of surveillance and documentation were what made it possible not only to more 
sharply draw the boundaries between citizen and outsider, but to construct the non-citizen as a 
perpetually vulnerable and punitive identity. This process was facilitated by centralized, 
systematized, and modernized institutions of the state, as well as by newly powerful bureaucratic 
agencies for the organization of these efforts. 
This coordination, immigration authorities discovered, required not only expanded 
communication between the officials of the various district offices, but a broader project of 
informing all public and private employees in the various services and institutions where 
immigrants were apprehended of the laws at their disposal. A 1923 report from the 
Commissioner at Seattle explained that while there was a general willingness to help among 
public servants, there was a variation in how effective this was. “The amount of co-operation we 
receive from the heads of the smaller institutions, either public or charitable,” he explained, 
“depends on how well they are informed concerning the Immigration Service and concerning 
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what constitutes a deportation case.” Furthermore, he argued, it was important not only to 
educate institutional officials, but to cultivate goodwill and loyalty among them, as he had 
observed that when “an alien who has become particularly obnoxious to the head of some county 
or city institution” is deported, that head is “very likely” to begin to report additional cases more 
actively.454    
However, while U.S. officials continued to portray deportation as a one-way process and 
the sole prerogative of the American government, deportations to the U.S. from other nations 
also centered frequently around institutionalized populations. At the same time as the U.S. 
negotiated the conditions upon which they were permitted to deport institutionalized immigrants 
to other nations, they were also forced to reckon with the fact that their own citizens could 
likewise be subject to deportation. This was a particular point of tension in the relationship 
between Canada and the United States over the course of the decade, as each tried to ensure that 
the other absorbed and supported the institutionalized public charges for which they ought 
rightfully bear the financial burden. This became particularly complicated due to the porousness 
of this border, especially prior to the 1920s, and the commonality of families who lived 
transnational lives crossing regularly between the two, or mixed families where some members 
were U.S.-born while others were Canadian citizens. Confused by this reality, the Commission 
or Immigration at Montreal wrote to the Commissioner General in 1928 asking for clarification 
about whether Canada could deport “illegitimate children born abroad of American mothers.” 
These children, the Commissioner General explained, could be accompanied by their mothers 
when deported from Canada only “when it does not become necessary to arrange for their 
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commitment to an institution... our Service has no authority to require state institutions to accept 
aliens as charges therein.”455 
While the Commissioner continued to explain that the U.S. could hardly expect Canadian 
institutions in the reverse situation (where a Canadian child was deported with its U.S. citizen 
mother), to support these foreign mothers, Canadian officials often expressed that they did not 
feel that the relationship happened on equal footing and with reciprocal expectations. The 
Canadian officials commented regularly on the American unwillingness to receive its own 
indigent citizens, as well as their aggressive removal of foreign-born charges. In a 1923 letter to 
the Secretary of Labor, the General Medical Director of the Hospitals for the Insane, 
Reformatories, and Industrial Schools in Montreal bemoaned the fact that “very often I am asked 
by the United States authorities to receive in our Hospitals for the Insane persons who have 
become insane, even after these persons have lived twenty-five years in the United States.” In 
Canada, he explained, aliens who had lived continuously in the nation acquired domicile and 
were thus not subject to deportation after a time, and inquired incredulously, “do I have to 
understand that any alien living in the United States, no matter what length of time, is always 
deportable?”456  
While his question revealed an incomplete understanding of U.S. deportation law—not 
all immigrants could be deportable at any time, although there were a number of categories of 
deportability which had no time limit—his point gets to one of the major questions at the heart of 
deportation practice. When deporting for social and health dangers, criminals, and economic 
burdens, at what point does the sending nation (or nation of birth when those differ), cease to be 
responsible, and the receiving nation take on the onus of caring for its own long-term non-citizen 
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residents?  A 1923 Resolution from the National Society of New England Women in Congress 
assembled at Toledo, Ohio, stated that the immigration service was being “too lax to properly 
control the desires of other nations to pass on to us their undesirable citizens, thereby taxing our 
people for the support of the vicious, feeble minded, insane and paupers, who constitute a large 
proportion of the inmates of our institutions of correction and charity” suggests how many 
among the American public saw the answer to that question.457  
 
Conclusion 
 
It is important to note the blurring of the boundaries in the discourse around institutional 
deportations, between “correction and charity,” and the undifferentiated lumping together of the 
“vicious,” “feeble,” and “paupers.” Increasingly, all identities seen unfit for citizenship were 
combined for the purposes of assessment and castigation, and as such, criteria which might 
merely have been thought pitiable or burdensome contributed to a more expansive identity of 
immigrant criminality. Taken together, these disparate cases, and the disparate spaces at which 
they were identified, denote an immensely important shift in the nature of deportation. As the 
decade wore on, the centralization and documentation of immigrant bodies throughout all forms 
of state institutions represented a fundamental shift in the power of the federal bureaucracy and 
its ability to wield power over its residents. The following chapter will explore how this shift 
relied not only on the institutional networks which allowed the identification and apprehension 
of immigrant threats, but on an infrastructural capacity to detain and then transport them.    
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Chapter 5- Deportees in Detention and Transit: The Physical Infrastructure of Immigrant 
Removal 
 
 
Theodore Irwin’s 1935 novel Strange Passage, chronicling the experiences of a group of 
deportees aboard a train from Seattle to Ellis Island during the Coolidge administration, provides 
the striking description: 
Five thousand feet above sea-level, the cold bit through the paper-thin blankets and their 
clothes. Few of the deportees could find sleep… All the windows had been shut, and the 
odors of ten-day socks and underclothes corked their nostrils. The lights had been 
doused; it was so dark you couldn’t see the face of the man sleeping next to you. Too 
worried to rest, they tossed in their berths. All the weeks and months of uncertainty, in 
jail and detention were behind them. This was the climax, it was happening right now, 
they were being kicked out.458 
 
While deportation is, at root, the process of putting immigrant bodies into transnational 
motion, scholarship has tended to focus on policy formation, congressional debates, judicial 
maneuvering, and public discourse, largely leaving aside the practical considerations of 
strategically moving thousands of individuals a year across vast distances.  This chapter will 
examine detention practices, as well as the “deportation specials,”-- trains carrying deportees 
west or east for eventual removal at the coasts, or south or north for removal over land borders 
were often named.  In doing so, it explores the new networks of incarceration, transportation and 
communication that made previously lofty goals of immigrant removal a strategic reality.459  
From a haphazard practice of occasional small-scale deportations at the start of the decade, 
immigration officials instituted a practical apparatus for the enforcement of new deportation 
laws. This took the form of cross-country scheduled train journeys designed to pick up 
immigrants who had been previously gathered and imprisoned in cities and towns across the 
nation. While officials consistently bemoaned the logistical challenges of the process, by the end 
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of the decade, a more efficient and streamlined process was in place as a result of persistent 
efforts to centralize transportation and maximize limited budgets. 
 
“If You Cannot Deport or Release Us, We Demand Improved Meat”: Immigrant Detention 
and the Rise of the Non-Citizen Carceral Regime 
 
In the investigation of temporary Junior Watchman Ennis N. Isaacks, a number of 
Mexican immigrant women were called upon to testify regarding his behaviors, and one 
provided the following account: “Yes, the first time he took Concepcion Bustamante down in the 
basement and when she came back she told me she had sexual relations with him down there. 
Then the next night he came again and I went down in the basement with him and had sexual 
intercourse with him and he promised to have me sent to Mexico as quickly as possible.” Other 
women echoed her testimony, reiterating that their desire to be released from detention, even to 
be deported to Mexico was so great that they were bribed into sexual relations. “None of us girls 
wanted to have anything to do with him,” one explained, but “then he said that he would send the 
boy with him, who had an automobile, to Mexico with us.” Yet another woman admitted to 
having been duped into an affair with the watchman in return for release from detention, 
explaining, “he offered to use his influence to have us sent to Mexico quickly, if we would allow 
him to have sexual intercourse with us.”  
Isaack’s infractions had been possible, it was determined, because the Matron of the local 
detention center in California had gone away for a week, during which period Isaaks had been 
left alone with the female detainees on the night shift from 12am to 8am. The abuses were not 
discovered until the women were on a train being transported to Nogales, where they were met 
by Inspector Wright, who gathered oral statements, and ascertained that Isaacks was “in fact 
guilty of the acts imputed to him by the witnesses.” Isaacks’ case reflected not only the 
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disturbing lack of oversight and abusive conditions suffered by detainees at the time, but also the 
insular, nepotistic nature of local detention practices. The writer of the report described being 
“surprised—not to say astonished,” by Isaacks’ conduct, largely because his position had been 
obtained by his father, a county jailer in the area, reported to be a “steady, sober-going man.” 
Perhaps because of this prominent connection, it was ultimately determined that in spite of the 
gross misconduct, “it would doubtless be unadvisable to undertake to procure the institution of 
criminal proceedings under the state laws.”460 
While these tragic accounts are perhaps unsurprising in their descriptions of abuses 
common to the carceral system more generally, and immigration detention more specifically, 
perhaps what is startling is that these women were being exploited for the favor of having their 
deportations granted rather than prevented. Throughout the decade, migrants repeatedly called 
upon the immigration service not for relief from deportation, but for relief from long, ill-defined 
periods of detention awaiting their ultimate detentions. The self-named, “Committee of 
Deportees,” from Room 203, Ellis Island wrote to the Secretary of Labor in April of 1920 
demanding recourse, and venting their frustration that in spite of the fact that he had promised to 
either deport or release them, the “promise [was] not fulfilled.” As such, they demanded, in 
partial resignation to their indefinite fate in detention, “If you cannot deport or release us, we 
demand improved meat.”461 Throughout the decade, their pleas were repeated, though rarely as 
pithily, by detainees, lawyers, and members of the general public who balked at the idea of non-
criminal deportees undergoing indefinite detention, often housed in jails along with a general 
criminal population.  
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The organizing efforts of deportees extended beyond Ellis Island as demonstrated by the 
letter from a group of detainees at Salem, New York to the Secretary of Labor. “We 26 
undersigned men,” they wrote, “protest energetically against the situation in which the 
immigration authorities put us,” and demanded their release for deportation as their convicted jail 
time had elapsed.462 One deportee’s attorney described the carceral limbo experienced by the 
detained particularly clearly, explaining that his client, “desires that if he cannot have his 
freedom in this country, he desires to be deported forthwith, so that he may have his freedom in 
another country.”463 Another Ellis Island detainee echoed these concerns in his correspondence 
with Commissioner Uhl, arguing that “Where the alien desires to be actually deported, there is 
no reason for his long custody, which is a deprivation of his liberty.” His accusation carried with 
it a particularly devastating description of “men incarcerated in jails, dotting the broad expanse 
of our country,” and he concluded that the deportee “is entitled to his freedom, either in this 
country or in any other country he is sent to… he should not be allowed to be kept an indefinite 
time in jail.”464 Throughout the decade, this deprivation of liberty resonated among critics of the 
immigration service, even among those who advocated for higher numbers of deportations, but 
found the long postponements of removal to be a miscarriage of justice.  
In the past as in the present, few aspects of deportation practice captured the public 
imagination as powerfully as detention, which became a hotly contested topic. Because detention 
lent a carceral element to what was, ostensibly, an administrative procedure rather than a 
punishment, it has been one of the most powerful forces in creating and sustaining discourse 
around the “illegal” or “criminal” immigrant. In recent decades, the rise of the for-profit prison 
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industry has gained attention, and many scholars note that the earliest for-profit detention center 
in the nation was actually created as an immigrant detention center. Today, immigrant detention 
comprises a massive network of facilities, intentionally shrouded so as to prevent public scrutiny 
of the deportation regime. However, at the start of the twentieth century, the federal 
infrastructure for housing potential deportees was anything but coordinated or efficient. Instead, 
officials relied on an ad-hoc assemblage of cells in county jails, detention facilities in port and 
border cities, repurposed army barracks, and even the homes of private citizens to hold migrants 
under deportation proceedings. As the reach and powers of the Bureau of Immigration expanded 
throughout the 1920s, so too did its physical infrastructure, as new immigration offices were 
stationed around the nation and authorities increasingly recognized the need for more centralized 
detention procedures. 
Legal scholar Daniel Kanstroom has critically addressed the tensions posed by early 
deportation as a procedure which was technically administrative and under the auspices of an 
administrative agency, but was, in the lived experiences of deportees, quite clearly 
punishment.465  Mae Ngai has explored how deportation and the condition of deportability 
served, particularly after the institution of the quota acts to restructure the relationship between 
non-citizens and the punitive state, with resulting discourses of “illegality” and the rise of the 
identity of the “illegal alien.”466 Many deportees, guilty only of violating immigration law by 
becoming ill or dependent on public welfare after residing in the nation for some time, were 
nevertheless criminalized by deportation proceedings, and perhaps at no stage of the process was 
this criminalization highlighted more than in detention. Behind bars and stripped of their 
freedom of mobility, non-criminal deportees increasingly entered the public imagination as 
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shadowy, menacing threats to the national body. As such, deportation detention, particularly 
when it stretched over long periods, was constitutive of the criminalizing of increasingly 
precarious denizens.  
Among the many critical insights which can be gleaned from a deeper investigation into 
early detention practices is a more accurate understanding of the true reach of the deportation 
state. As is explored in other sections of this project, the impact of the nascent deportation state 
far out-stripped the actual numbers eventually removed by warrant proceedings. Instead, the 
imposition of a shadow of deportability and danger over the immigrant populations of the nation 
demonstrated the true power of the deportation regime. While appropriations for deportations in 
this period were never equal to the cost of identifying, detaining, and removing all of the 
potentially deportable immigrants in the nation, the efforts put into assessing and approximating 
the number of non-citizens in U.S. institutions was highly revealing. A survey from the 
Commissioner General of “deportable aliens” detained in immigration facilities, local jails, and 
other institutions around the country in 1926 exposed that, “it is estimated that there are now in 
the United States 57,896 deportable aliens including those actually under deportation 
proceedings, but it is believed that this estimate is extremely conservative.” While this tally 
might seem astonishing next to the number actually deported in 1926 (10,904 individuals, in 
addition to another 1,647 who were permitted to reship one way foreign in lieu of 
deportation)467, it confirms the immense reach of the deportation state, even as the transportation 
infrastructure struggled to catch up to the detention capacity.468 
In the absence of a consolidated modern detention system, immigration officials were 
forced to use creative means to house the tremendous number of detainees in the clutches of the 
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Bureau of Immigration. While some deportees were able to remain in the facilities in which they 
were apprehended and identified for deportation—namely hospitals, asylums, criminal 
populations in prisons, and juvenile offenders in reformatories, other needed to be situated after 
their capture. Among the most common practices was detaining immigrants in the local county 
jails until a deportation transport came through the area for pick-ups, although this often elicited 
criticism based on overcrowding and the mixing of the deportees with general criminal convicts. 
Another tactic was to repurpose government buildings for temporary detention, including former 
military facilities. The Assistant Chief of Staff to the Director of Operations of the War 
Department wrote to the Commissioner General in 1920 to explain that while the proposal of 
housing immigrants at the Atlantic Branch United States Disciplinary Barracks at Governor’s 
Island was impracticable, detention accommodations could be provided at Camp Dix, New 
Jersey to assist with the overflow of detainees from Ellis Island.469 
 Other local officials ventured even further outside of traditional practice when seeking to 
find accommodations for the overwhelming and steadily growing number of migrant detainees. 
In some cities in Arizona, deportees were held in the City Jail, often for a daily fee, while in 
other localities, immigration authorities paid local citizens to house deportees until their 
transportation. In Globe, Arizona, Mrs. Carmen Sanchez housed deportees at a rate of $1.00 a 
day, while in Tucson, the immigration service found an even better bargain—the home of Mrs. 
Chavez, where they paid only $0.65 daily.470 As the immigration service transformed from a 
scattered, disjointed collection of local practices to a more unified, streamlined, planned system 
for maximized removals, few logistic challenges confounded officials more than detention.  
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In one highly unusual deportation case in 1920, the critique of the criminalizing and 
pernicious impact of immigrant detention emanated from an unlikely source—the Consul for 
Guatemala at Mobile, Alabama. The Consul, Mr. Valenzuela, wrote to the Commissioner 
General to intervene in the case of a young boy who had been employed by his wife. After the 
boy, a native of Guatemala ran away from their home in Orchard, Alabama, he was apprehended 
in Lucedale, Mississippi and detained for removal. In spite of efforts by Mr. and Mrs. Valenzuela 
to contact the department for a reprieve, he noted, the boy had “been kept in common guard 
house for over a month, together with men of all ages and nationalities, stowaways, men detained 
for gambling, drunkards, and so on.” Therefore, he argued, in spite of the boy’s violations, he 
would “suffer more morally in those days kept in the guard house than he would if let free in the 
streets… The jailer himself said to me that the place was a mighty poor place for a boy of his 
age. If kept in a children’s detention home or another more adequately fitted for the purpose I 
would have nothing to say.”471  
Detention practices often drew great attention from the general public even where no 
distinct personal stake or clear interest existed. For many Progressive era reformers, the excesses 
and abuses of immigrant detention flew in the face of their conceptions of efficient, rationalized 
institutional practices. For others, unauthorized immigrants posed a public safety menace and 
secure facilities for their segregation from the general public was a high priority. Because 
detention facilities were still inadequate for the demands of the federal government’s amped up 
deportation agenda, many localities struggled to weigh whether releasing deportees on bond was 
a feasible stopgap, but many worried about the dangers to the public and the potential for escape. 
In 1925 a representative of the Republican National Committee wrote to the Commissioner 
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General regarding detention facilities.  “I have had letters from some very influential people of 
Galveston with reference to the establishment of a camp for the detention of immigrants who are 
unlawfully in the United States and who are held for deportation,” the author explained.  “The 
idea appeals to me very strongly” he concluded, “and I believe that it is well worth your serious 
consideration.”472  
Within Galveston alone, disagreement over detention was a hotly debated topic.473 The 
Galveston League of Women Voters wrote at the same time to Senator Morris Sheppard to “call 
your attention to the dreadful conditions which exist in regard to the detention of deportees in 
this part of the world.” Among the abuses cited by the League were the intermixing with 
“ordinary criminals” in the County Jail, and “given no more liberties, no literature, and very little 
exercise, and held under these conditions until the date of their deportation.” Referring to their 
own recent survey about the conditions of Texas prisons, which they concluded were “so 
horrible it is scarcely possible to believe such things could exist in this period of enlightenment,” 
the League went on to explain that while these detained deportees had broken immigration law, 
they were “not in the true sense of the world criminals.” Closing with a call to patriotic instincts, 
should humanitarian impulses prove insufficient, the League concluded with the assertion that 
“One might expect such things in Russia where ignorance is supreme, but surely our country 
should not tolerate such things as this.”474  
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The Galveston League was joined by many other organizations who advocated for a 
humane detention practice for detainees, many of whom echoed their calls for keeping 
immigrants out of the demoralizing conditions of county jails. Mrs. Kenneth F. Rich, Director of 
the Immigrants Protective League in Chicago contacted the Commissioner General to share the 
various abuses in detention that had been reported to the IPL over recent periods. In Crookston, 
Minnesota, she reported, there had been allegations that deportees “suffer physical cold, without 
sufficient blankets; that food is particularly poor; that fresh air is lacking; that physical exercise 
is not permitted,” while in Crown Point, Indiana, similar complaints had been made about food 
and oppressive discipline. Rich joined other critics of the early carceral arm of the deportation 
state in noting that the roots of these issues often lay in the potential for profit. Indeed, she 
explained, “the food ‘rake-off’ by Sheriffs has been, of course, one of the conditions which have 
made jail administration so notorious.” In Chicago itself, she explained, the conditions at Cook 
County Jail were more bearable, but there, as elsewhere, detained immigrants faced other threats. 
“Comparatively few of the persons deported constitute any vicious type,” she argued, but, “the 
County Jail is a ‘school for crime,’” and thus the deportation regime threatened to actually 
increase rather than control criminal elements.475  
In a more detailed account of the findings at Crown Point County Jail, Rich outlined the 
issues, including their “very meager diet” consisting of bread at every meal, with peas at 
lunchtime, and beans at dinner. “In view of the per diem paid by the Government for the care of 
federal prisoners,” she argued, “it would seem to us that the Sheriff of that county is profiting at 
the expense of the Government and of the deportees.” In fact, she explained, the scale of the 
rake-off might be attributed to the fact that the Sheriff was reaching the end of his term limit and 
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“wishes to make all the profit possible before he leaves.” In reply to Rich, the Commissioner 
General reassured her that he shared the concern over the lack of provisions for detention in non-
penal institutions, but stressed that the lack of appropriations had prevented this process. 
However, he explained, Congress was likely to approve appropriations soon for the construction 
or purchase of detention stations, and had, in fact, recently acquired a former marine hospital at 
Detroit which was being retrofitted as an immigrant detention center to relieve the overcrowding 
of local jails.  
There was an undeniable public interest in the question of new public detention centers, 
which for some was profit-driven, as the building, provisioning, and maintenance of new 
detention facilities presented the opportunity for coveted government contracts. INS files from 
the decade reflect a period of vast infrastructural growth, with the erection and renovation of 
dozens of new district and sub-district facilities, and when those facilities also served as 
detention centers, there were additional profits to be made from contracts for feeding detainees, 
as well as the prospect of new jobs for guards and matrons. The District Director of Immigration 
at Galveston argued to the Commissioner General in 1927 that reshaping deportation routes to 
make Galveston a hub for detention and shipping would be a practical, economic plan. In fact, he 
explained, it was cheaper to send deportees gathered in the Salt Lake City, Denver, Kansas City, 
St. Louis, and Omaha districts of the Immigration Bureau by train to Galveston than to New 
York. Furthermore, he insisted, “as the Bureau is aware, the trans-Atlantic rates from Galveston 
are about $20.00 less per adult than from New York,” and by sending them on that route, “it is 
believed that a very substantial savings will be effected.” In order to facilitate the detention of 
such a large number of deportees, he drew the Commissioner’s attention to the Harris County 
Jail at Houston, which had recently been razed to erect a “modern up-to-date structure on the 
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same site,” which he believed would be sufficiently spacious to “comfortably care for all aliens 
conveyed to this District for deportation and reshipment.”476   
The desire for prompt deportation served the interests of the immigration officials and 
local budgets as well, although these considerations were frequently weighed against the 
potential dangers of allowing deportees control over their own travel. “There is no gainsaying 
that the voluntary departure privilege has been productive of a vast amount of good in ridding the 
country of a large number of deportable aliens,” the District Director at El Paso wrote to the 
Commissioner General. However, he concluded, “that the safest method to handle all deportable 
aliens is formal warrant proceedings,” and argued that all other recourses should be tried before 
resorting to voluntary departure. This procedure began years ago, when there was “very little 
money for deportation purposes,” and therefore was outdated for modern deportation needs, he 
explained. Furthermore, he argued, it posed a danger because immigrants in detention 
manipulated the provision for their own purposes, and, in fact, “a number of prison inmates have 
claimed to be aliens in the hope that they could thereby secure an early release.”477 
In correspondence with the Workers’ Defense Union, Commissioner Howe of Ellis Island 
expressed frustration at being blamed for the delays in deportations and balked at being criticized 
by the organization for poor food quality, vermin, and long detention sentences.478 The delays, he 
asserted, couldn’t be held against officials at Ellis Island because between legal proceedings and 
transportation delays, they did not really have control over the timing of departure. While the 
Commissioner arguably exaggerated the extent to which detention conditions were out of his 
hands, there were in fact many sources of delays that were out of the control of individual 
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officials, or even of the United States entirely. As is explained in greater depth in Chapter 1, 
deportations were often postponed or even indefinitely stalled by the lack of passport permission 
or transit coordination from the receiving nation. This was most notable in the case of the Soviet 
Union, where strained diplomatic relations made securing passports for deportation an 
impossibility by the mid-1920s, except in unusual cases (by 1926, for instance, only 125 
individuals of the Russian “race or people” were deported, and of that number, only 26 were sent 
back to Russia).479   
However, even where friendly diplomatic relations existed, a variety of factors could lead 
to prolonged detention periods, and these delays often left federal immigration officials in 
conflict with local authorities who resented the high cost of protracted incarceration or 
institutionalization. After a request by the District Director at Spokane for information on 
expediting deportations to the United Kingdom, the First Assistant Commissioner of Labor 
replied that he had heard many such complaints from around the nation. The British Consul, he 
relayed, required additional information when the deportations involved “alien criminals or 
insane,” which were “the most expensive and difficult to handle.” As such, their detention at 
Ellis Island was an impossibility, as it would be “highly impracticable” for the Psychopathic 
Ward in the Ellis Island Hospital and the Criminal Detention Room to be filled with a glut of 
deportees from around the country awaiting negotiations with the British Consulate. Thus the 
cost of the detention was once more foisted upon the local offices, adding fuel to the growing 
frustrations between state and municipal institutions and the federal immigration authorities who 
demanded increased coordination and reporting of deportable aliens, but claimed inability to 
shoulder the spatial or financial burdens of effecting these deportations.480  
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“I hesitate to find fault with an official who is as helpful and desirous of the speedy 
execution of the Immigration Law as to deportation as is yourself,” began one unusually deferent 
letter from the New York State Hospital Commission to the Commissioner General in 1922. 
However, the author explained, the conditions in the hospitals had reached a point which was 
“appalling,” with over 13,000 overflow in the hospitals, and daily requests from local hospital 
superintendents to parole deportable aliens. “The State of New York feels that the least the 
Federal Authorities can do,” he continued, “is to relieve us of the incubus of these undesirable as 
promptly as is consistent with proper hearings, after we certify them for deportation.”481 Other 
times, intervention from local officials was less cynically motivated by budgetary concern, but 
prompted by concern for the well-being and safety of detainees. While deportees in Crookston, 
Minnesota may have suffered from extreme cold, deportees in Tampa, Florida suffered from the 
opposite problem. “Please expedite orders deportation,” read a telegraph from the Tampa office 
in July of 1924, before going on to explain that the local commissioners and sheriff had been 
protesting against the “acute suffering” of detainees in area jails because of extreme summer 
weather.  
Progressive reformers from mainstream immigrant aid organizations earned perhaps the 
most civil, obliging responses from immigration officials, but they were far from the only 
organizations to register their outrage about the abuses of the detention system. Radical activist 
and anti-deportation organizer Elizabeth Gurley Flynn gave voice to these concerns, labeling the 
treatment of detention and transport as “harrowing,” and full of “physical pain and mental 
misery.” While she highlighted similar concerns to many other critics, such as insufficient food, 
overcrowding in detention rooms, and a lack of contact with their outside supports, she also 
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noted some critical issues that more disconnected, outside observers were less likely to 
recognize. These hardships included the fact that many deportees never got an opportunity to 
retrieve their possessions between their apprehension by the immigration authorities and their 
final removal from the nation. Furthermore, she explained, for many, this meant that their 
savings were left behind in American banks, and that not only were remaining family members 
left destitute, but the deportees themselves were thus forced to arrive at their destinations 
penniless and without their belongings. In other cases, it was more than money in the bank that 
immigrants requested the opportunity to retrieve—immigration case files are replete with 
deportees demanding an extension of stay to collect money owed to them by others or to sell 
property before departing. Such considerations were immensely critical to deportees themselves 
as they sought to tie up the loose ends of long-term lives in the United States and prepare for new 
steps in distant, often entirely unfamiliar lands.482  
Often deportees and their supporters recognized that their own disapproval was not the 
most powerful criticism that they could leverage against the immigration service, and instead 
pointed out that the atrocities of detention were drawing international censure. A supporter of 
one New Orleans deportee, a socialist and labor activist who had been detained for over six 
months pled with the Commissioner, “I wish you would begin to realize that American justice 
the world round, is being weighed through your Department and is being found wanting.” In one 
of the more poetic descriptions of the behemoth infrastructure of the nascent deportation regime, 
the advocate remarked “I realize, of course, the flood of cases that your office has to handle. I 
realize that your machinery moves slowly, but it also grinds exceedingly small… Apparently 
                                                          
482 Tamiment Library, Record Group 118: Elizabeth Gurley Flynn Papers.  
289 
 
jails of America are to break the health of individuals as the wheels of old were to break their 
bones.”483  
Though deportees and their advocates found much to object to in detention conditions, 
immigration service employees had their own qualms with the system, and pointed to the 
dangers of inadequate detention facilities. In 1920, the Commissioner of Immigration at Ellis 
Island sent the Commissioner General not only a summary of concerns about detainees, but a 
package containing a knife that detainees on the island had been fashioning into a file for cutting 
bars, another knife which they had been transforming into a key, and a portion of the window bar 
that the detainees had succeeded in breaking through. These detainees, stowaways from ships, 
had attempted “what looked to be a wholesale escape,” which the watchmen were only barely 
able to thwart. The letter demonstrated a grudging admiration for the “skill” these detainees 
demonstrated in their escape work, and his description of the stowaways in question portrays 
them in an almost superhuman light: “Stowaways are the source of a great deal of anxiety… they 
are smart, agile, resourceful and daring, and can easily scale the walls and swim the channels, 
and seem to have no fear of physical hazard.” So looming were these figures that the 
Commissioner described them as a “menace to the institution,” and concluded that “the quicker 
we can deport, the better.”484 
These fears of revolt among deportees extended throughout the country, including to the 
United States Army Barracks at Fort Wayne, Michigan, where immigration officials reported in 
1920 that they were having trouble controlling the immigrant population confined there. After a 
hunger strike among detainees, authorities resorted to removing some of the population to the 
Wayne County Jail in attempts to curb protest, as well as to stop the spread of disease among 
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deportees. These deportees, falling within the jurisdiction of the Detroit district, continued to be 
a thorn in the side of officials, and became the subject of protests over family visits. The 
Inspector in Charge at Detroit was forced to justify himself to the Assistant Secretary of Labor. 
Louis Post inquired why visits had been curtailed and reminded the Inspector that it was not 
department policy to “impose any hardships” beyond necessity to the families, given that 
“deportation proceedings are not criminal proceedings and it is desired to use as liberal a policy 
in this respect as the circumstances will permit.” However, the Inspector replied, circumstances 
had necessitated the policy on visits, which had been put into place after a number of escapes, 
believed to have been facilitated by visitors.485  
The challenges of keeping ill detainees separated from the general population at Fort 
Wayne reflected one of the most common concerns of immigration authorities, who struggled to 
manage large populations in close quarters. While historians such as Emily Abel, Amy Fairchild, 
and Natalia Molina have fruitfully explored how immigrant health and illness, both mental and 
physical, served as criteria for exclusion and deportation, we know less about how the conditions 
and spaces of deportation enforcement were actually generative of disease and dangers to public 
health.486 For many deportees, threats to their health came not from their homeland or passage 
into the United States, but was contracted at the point of their departure. At the start of the 
decade, correspondence from the Chief Medical Officer at Ellis Island to the Commissioner 
General reflected the high rate of infection, with 80 admittances to the hospital for various 
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illnesses ranging from influenza to measles over the course of only two weeks, and 11 deaths 
within that period.487  
Further correspondence with the Inspector in Charge of the Deporting Division could 
offer not real reassurance, and recommended to alleviate overcrowding of detainees whenever 
possible, to ventilate detention rooms, and to allow deportees time outside for fresh air. 
Furthermore, the Commissioner urged, interpreters, watchmen, and matrons needed to spread 
word among detainees “of the danger of expectorating on the floor and admonish them to desist 
from doing so.”488 In spite of these limited precautions, detention conditions could often prove 
dangerous or even fatal for deportees. In addition to the frequent deaths deported at Ellis Island 
detention quarters, including influenza and a range of other respiratory infections which spread 
rapidly among tightly packed detainees awaiting transportation to their nations of origin, 
authorities around the nation reported fatalities. One of the challenges of local immigration 
officials saddled with high detention costs for long-postponed deportations was the financial 
burden of those who died before transportation could be arranged. Among the many cases which 
came to the attention of federal officials was a dispute over who bore the responsibility for 
covering the back charges for the detention of an alien who had passed away while in detention 
in the U.S. Naval Hospital at San Diego.489  
 For many localities, one of the greatest frustrations of coordinating with the federal 
authorities on deportations was the frequent delays in securing an available deportation transport 
for deportees awaiting removal. Chief among their concerns was the expense of detention, which 
fell upon the local institutions within which the deportees were housed, or the appropriations for 
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the local district within which the deportation case fell. On the federal bureau’s side, the fiscal 
priority was for composing the most cost-effective deportation parties available, even when that 
meant leaving deportees waiting longer in detention until a full trainload of immigrants could be 
gathered. The following section explores the experience of deportation after the individual 
passed from detention to transport. I argue that the systemization of deportation trains during the 
1920s played a critical role in the rapid rise of deportations over subsequent decades, acted as a 
growing opportunity for profit off of immigrant removal, and brought deportation into the public 
view.  
 
“A Trip on the Deportation Special”: U.S. Deportation Trains and the Business of Removal 
Deportation is a process that takes place at the confluence of simultaneous efforts to 
delineate the national body and mark out its boundaries by selecting those unwelcome within the 
population, and to define and enforce the fit and desirable immigrant body. Its expansion in the 
1920s reflected these twin concerns with controlling individual bodies and national composition.  
Deportation trains, which traced long, winding routes across the nation, bringing groups of 
immigrants, often for weeks on end, to their final exit points at the edges of the nation, were 
critical to these new forms of policing the nation and its non-citizen residents.   The sites at 
which these trains did their collecting were, critically, the institutions at which bodies, immigrant 
and otherwise, underwent intensive scrutiny, surveillance, disciplining, and categorization—
asylums, prisons, juvenile reformatories, and hospitals.  As deportation specials traversed the 
nation, they stopped to gather together those immigrants who had been examined, judged, sorted 
and deemed undesirable, unfit, or unassimilable for various bodily or psychological deficiencies, 
and, upon reaching the edges of the national body, forcibly “spew” them out.   
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On a very basic level, deportation trains were what made what Ngai has described as 
deportation’s “coming of age” a possibility during this period.  The rise in planned, cost-effective 
transportation methods not only facilitated the movement of greater numbers of deportees, it 
encouraged local immigration offices and institutions to put forward potential candidates for 
deportation.  The new networks of communication and cooperation linking immigration station 
outposts as far-flung and seemingly insignificant as those in Montana or North Dakota, and 
created a powerful machinery for deportation whose reach extended far beyond the port cities 
and border towns which have attracted the attention of scholars.  If deportees could now be 
efficiently rounded up in rural Kansas and Nebraska, sent by train to Chicago to await an east or 
west-bound deportation special, no immigrants were safe from the reach of this growing 
machinery.  While spaces like Whitewater and Turner, Montana might have been “for all 
purposes, barely more than places designated on a map”, with little more than country stores and 
a few residences, they too were part of the expanding reach and power of the INS, housing 
barracks for border patrols along common Canadian entrance sites to the nation.  Likewise, after 
the closing of the immigration office at Antler, North Dakota, the town contacted the Chief 
Immigrant Inspector at Grand Forks “praying” for its reopening, stating that despite its small 
size, many migrants were crossing into the country through its railway station.490  Each locality 
had its own incentives, political agendas, racial dynamics, and morality causes which led to 
particular patterns of round-ups and reporting to federal immigration officials, but their efforts 
were linked together by a powerful new system for enforcing ever-expanding deportation laws.  
Although scholars such as Ethan Blue, Adam Goodman, Yukari Takai, Aristide Zolberg have 
examined the importance of transportation in the implementation of immigration control, they 
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have largely focused on overseas shipping rather than cross-continental ground transport.491  
However, without first negotiating systems for the mass movement of deportable immigrants 
from the interior of the nation to its ports, deportation’s explosion into its modern form would 
have been impeded. 
As historians have observed, trains and railroads have held both massive practical 
significance for the expansion of the United States settler state, but also a tremendously 
important place in national mythology around “discovery” and “creation” of the country.  
Richard While explains in Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern 
America that “The railroads, in turn, were agents of the expansion of these states.  What these 
railroads allowed the governments of the United States, Canada, and Mexico to accomplish in 
the late nineteenth century was remarkable.”492 Because “railroads poured non-indigenous 
settlers into a vast region that nation-states had earlier merely claimed,” White argues, they were 
critical for the fulfilment of the aspirations of a settler state aiming to assert control over a 
massive spatial entity.493  However, while scholars have examined the importance of railroads as 
they “poured” in non-indigenous settlers across the continental expanse of the country, they have 
rarely acknowledged how important the accompanying ability to remove peoples from around 
the nation, also made possible by rail networks, was for consolidating the reach of the federal 
state.  In a very concrete manner, transcontinental railroads “made” modern America partly 
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because of their ability to remove people at government will, and to expand the reach of 
governance in terms of determining and enforcing the composition of the national population 
through forced removal.   
While much of the work of expanding the United States through railroads was completed 
in the nineteenth century, deportation marks the continued importance of trains for asserting 
national dominance and solidifying control over the American continental empire.  In fact, as 
Kanstroom thoughtfully observes: 
The transcontinental railroad and the U.S. deportation system have much in-common. 
Both started at the coasts and now span the country. Both implicate our grandest national 
aspirations and hide some of our most shameful historical truths. Both have been 
episodically updated but retain many essential features of their nineteenth century 
origins… and both were in large measure built on the backs of Chinese immigrant 
workers who suffered immense hardships in the process of their creation.494 
Kanstroom, however, fails to note that the railroads and the deportation system, both products of 
a modernizing, centralizing nation-state, were not, in fact, merely parallel institutions, but in fact, 
one (railroads) was deeply entwined with the functioning of the other (deportation). 
As deportation trains gathered individuals at the 35 central Immigration and 
Naturalization Services offices around the interior of the nation (each representing up to dozens 
of sub-offices in their districts), these journeys linked together the vast expanse of the nation in 
the project of expelling unwanted and “unassimilable” foreign-born residents.  Included in these 
offices were those in Ketchikan, Alaska; San Juan, Puerto Rico; and Honolulu, Hawaii.  In these 
spaces of American empire, still not fully integrated into the political body of the nation, the 
Immigration Service represented a form of governance that gained its power by its ability to 
exclude, both in terms of immigrants from around the world, and in terms of full participation of 
indigenous people in the territories.  By claiming and exercising the power to deport immigrants 
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from these widespread states and territories, the United States asserted its control over the 
population and composition of these distant spaces.  While deportees from Puerto Rico and 
Hawaii were obviously not gathered by train, those coming from Alaska were brought by train to 
Washington State to be joined with deportation parties, linking the project of policing 
immigrants in this contested space to those within the continental boundaries of the nation.   
Studying the paths of deportation trains also unsettles simplistic narratives of the routes 
immigrants traveled.  While the commonly assumed path of immigrants from Europe tends to 
focus on direct arrival from Europe at Ellis Island, and potentially further movement west across 
the nation, the trajectories of many immigrants were quite different.  For numerous deportees, 
the moment of their removal from the nation was their first time experiencing Ellis Island.  For 
instance, J. Savarino, deported through Ellis Island in 1925, had initially migrated from Italy to 
Mexico in 1923, and had lived there until a few months before his deportation.  After crossing 
the border, he worked in Holtville, California, for some months, before being apprehended, held 
in the county jail for a few weeks waiting for an eastbound deportation train, and then removed 
from the country.  Judge McCormick, who decided his case, was reported to have told Savarino 
through an interpreter that, “The worst punishment I can inflict on you is to send you back to 
Italy, as you don’t want to go back.”495  Savarino’s path, far from uncommon during the era, 
demonstrates that the journey of deportation did not always backtrack along previously trod 
paths for immigrants, but often exposed them to new regions of the country, and new 
experiences of the United States, such as processing through Ellis Island, which may not have 
been part of their encounter with the nation otherwise.   
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Similarly, while most accounts of Chinese immigrants in the United States assume arrival 
through Angel Island and original settling in California, the paths of removal for deportees to 
China reflect that this was not always the case.  Indeed, it was not infrequent for Chinese seamen 
who had deserted from ships in New York to be taken cross-country by train for deportation 
through California, often never having previously gone west of New York City.  Discussing a 
1929 deportation transport taking 23 Chinese to San Francisco, one reporter explained that the 
transport picked up 19 crew members in New Orleans from a recently deserted British 
steamship, three men from New York, and a Chinese resident of Savannah, Georgia who lacked 
citizenship papers.496  These deportees collectively reflect the insufficiency of uni-directional 
accounts of migrant experience, and show how deportation reflected messy patterns of migration 
and exposure to the nation. As Elliot Young, Grace Peña Delagado and other scholars have 
addressed, the routes traveled by Chinese immigrants to the United States often led through 
Mexico due to the extensive restrictions against Chinese migration.497 Young explains that while 
deportations to China from the U.S. only averaged about 500 a year throughout the early 
twentieth century, remaining as low as 461 in 1930, when the total deportations had risen 
immensely, many more Chinese were pushed back over the Mexican border, either through 
official deportation or various forms of coercive repatriation.498  
The sheer act of coordinating the deportation of unprecedented numbers of immigrants 
each year was not only a complicated process, it was an expensive one.  As the deportation 
machinery of the 1920s and 1930s matured from the smaller and more selective procedures of 
previous decades, the government increasingly bemoaned that their “house-cleaning” project was 
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a costly one, and sought new ways to streamline deportation for greater efficiency and savings.  
Therefore, deportation shifted from a haphazard practice of transporting immigrants across the 
nation when they were apprehended, holding them indefinitely at Ellis Island or in San Francisco 
and then deporting them, to a well-oiled schedule of trains criss-crossing the nation to pick up 
deportees in a planned manner.  This shift was critical in the creation and solidification of the 
expanded modern deportation regime.  Indeed, Torrie Hester notes, “The Bureau of Immigration 
was shaped, like all bureaucracies, by the need to balance its budget and maximize its 
efficiency,” and it was from this need that the deportation party system emerged, which, by 
1923, saved the Bureau an estimated twenty thousand dollars.499  In addition to allowing greater 
numbers of deportations to take place, this shift had another important, and highly contested 
feature. By leaving deportees in local detention centers until a full and maximally efficient train 
was ready to pick them up and deposit them for transnational shipment, the INS shifted the 
burden of detention costs onto localities.   
These localities, often overwhelmed by the lack of detention infrastructure for such high 
numbers of deportees (leading to schemes like detention in homes of private citizens), and 
begrudging the high costs associated with waiting for deportation trains to come through, spent 
much of the decade in enraged and frequent correspondence with the central IS office in 
Washington D.C. over the subject.500  When the Commissioner General of Immigration sent out 
a call for information about deportable aliens in jails and other institutions of each regional 
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office, the El Paso District Director responded with indignation.  The overcrowding of jails, 
unequipped to hold not only the criminal population they were designed for, but now detainees 
of all forms being held for deportation, he explained, was causing a crisis of detention space.  
Indeed, he explained, deportees were being held in the houses of private citizens for lack of 
space in public institutions.501   
However, as the Bureau of Immigration sought to institute regular deportation transports, 
they clashed over finances not only with regional and local offices of the IS, who had their own 
set of concerns, but with the Comptroller of the General Accounting Office.  In a November 
1925 letter, the Commissioner General argued that the switch had been made to large 
transcontinental parties to save money over transportation in small numbers, and contended that 
the business was being handled in “the most economical way possible.”  He went on to explain 
to the Comptroller that parties were joined at the most economical point, such as the linking up 
of aliens from Omaha, Kansas City, and St. Louis Districts to the larger parties at Chicago, 
“which alone affects a great savings to the Government.”  However, he asserted, he needed to 
impress on the Accounting Office that these parties included all sorts of dangerous elements, 
“including a very large number of insane aliens, more or less violent, criminals of the most 
desperate character, persons afflicted with loathsome and dangerous contagious diseases.”  
Therefore, the Commissioner argued, “for the foregoing reasons it has proven to be not always 
desirable to take advantage of the lowest available rates, but to patronize lines more convenient 
for our Service, taking into account scheduled time of arrival and departure at certain points, 
equipment furnished and the quality of service rendered.”502 
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European migrants were the most numerous deportees, and therefore, the most numerous 
passengers upon deportation specials for most of this period. The smaller number of Asia-bound 
deportees, however, captured the national focus in different ways.  Nearly always emphasizing 
their “undesirable” and “ineligible” nature, accounts of “oriental” deportation parties focused on 
their racial ineligibility for residence in the nation.  Commentators often lumped them with other 
non-European migrants, and indeed, so did expediency and efficiency in terms of deportation 
transport, as they were nearly always the groups heading west for removal, leading to divergence 
between parties composed of “undesirable Mexicans, Japanese, Chinese and others,” and parties 
of assorted European nationalities.503  After President Roosevelt called for the deportation of 151 
Chinese criminals in 1935, most detained for narcotics-peddling charges, an act which Roosevelt 
claimed would save the government the $1.06 daily charge of maintaining each prisoner, 
deportation of “Orientals” was again in the spotlight.  Citing long-term New York-San Francisco 
deportation special officer Edwin Kline, one reporter noted that each west-bound “prison train” 
trip generally contained about ninety Chinese deportees.504 
 Deportations west to Angel Island for deportation to Asian nations, and east to Ellis 
Island for deportations to Europe had their own calculated fiscal planning, but deportations over 
the nation’s land borders provoked some of the most contentious and ongoing battles between 
local and federal immigration officials over the course of this period. The Inspector in Charge at 
Galveston directed one of many such letters of protest to the Commissioner General in 1923 
complaining that previously most Mexican deportees had been returned via San Francisco to 
Mazatlan, on the west Coast of Mexico.  He conveyed the belief that Mexican aliens from the 
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prison should be deported to remote points in Mexico, and not across the land boundary.  Indeed, 
the Inspector asserted, Mazatlan was not far enough, because it was directly connected to 
Nogales by rail, making return to the Arizona border easy.  Instead, he proposed, deportation to 
Salina Cruz, a seaport further south, “if the expense be not deemed prohibitive” would “rid the 
border of this criminal class of deports.”505  Echoing this sentiment, local immigration agents 
throughout the Southwest kept regional and federal inboxes full of complaints about the futility 
of deporting people by train or foot over the border, only to allow their easy return the following 
day.  At the turning point of mass deportations of Mexican Americans during the Great 
Depression, the question of how to best implement these deportations in a way that was both 
affordable and permanent was a constant struggle.  As one 1933 observer noted, “Many of the 
Mexican workers are taken forcibly to be dumped over the Mexican border.  One ‘Deportation 
special’ it is reported, a train of eight coaches, all loaded with Mexican workers, was made up at 
Denver.  One solid carload of Mexican laborers and their wives and children was sent from 
Pueblo.”506  
Often images of deportation from the early twentieth century bring to mind 
sensationalized, sporadic, and hysterical episodes featuring raids, round-ups, and disruptions of 
political meetings. While such events did on occasion take place, such accounts overshadow the 
more mundane, regularized, and continuous nature of deportation throughout the 1920s.507 
Although vigilantes, nativist organizations, employers, and an outspoken press all played a 
critical role in the development of deportation practices throughout the 1920s, what is often 
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elided by examination of these groups is the increasingly systematic and bureaucratic nature of 
the system, which identified the spaces in which unsound immigrant bodies could be found, 
detained, and collected.  The vitriolic speeches calling for widespread removal of radicals, the 
dramatic scenes of police busting down doors in immigrant neighborhoods must be examined 
next to the pragmatic considerations which made the growth of the nascent deportation machine 
possible: train schedules, tabulated reports, and the ever-present struggle for fiscal 
appropriations.   
Indeed, by the mid-1920s, deportation officials in Washington had developed schedules 
of deportation parties crossing the nation in each direction, and before a given party was to 
depart, they wrote to commissioners around the country asking them to report how many 
migrants they had ready for pickup at the moment.  These reports were then used to coordinate 
the most efficient, streamlined, and cost-effective plans for collecting these deportees and 
depositing them at the ports for shipment abroad.  Using this information, they put together train 
routes, adding on cars midway when deportees became too numerous.  In Chicago and other 
large cities, these transports would collect previously gathered groups of deportees who had been 
brought by train from smaller towns around the region to await the east or west-bound specials.  
Depending on the nation of return for deportees ready for departure at a given moment, smaller 
transports might branch off from the eastbound special at Buffalo to remove immigrants over the 
Canadian border. 
The frequency of cross-country deportation specials grew with both the increased 
efficiency of government officials, and mounting pressure from local immigration stations that 
demanded shorter detention periods.  By 1931, deportation trains were leaving approximately 
every six weeks in each direction, and the number of larger groups of parties sent out rose from 
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48 in 1925 to 174 by 1930.508  This expansion was pushed by appeals from below, and in 1925 
the Assistant Commissioner explained to the Portland District Director that they were 
considering proposals from both the Grand Forks, ND and Chicago offices to be run at least 
eight times a year, rather than the previous six.509   By 1930, the Bureau of Immigration had 
settled into fairly standard patterns, which allowed for maximal efficiency and savings.  
Westbound routes, most often carrying deportees to Mexico by way of El Paso, or Asian 
deportees by way of San Francisco, would depart either from New York to New Orleans by 
water, then to El Paso by rail, or from Chicago to El Paso by rail, and then, in both cases, on to 
San Francisco by rail.  Eastbound trips, which most often carried deportees bound for Europe, 
either took the southern route From San Francisco to New Orleans, then on to New York, or the 
northern route from Seattle to New York by rail all across the top of the country.510  Jane Perry 
Clark, a Barnard Professor who published the first monograph on deportation in 1931 explained 
that due to massive crowding at Ellis Island, deportees would sometimes be held for further 
detention at the end of the train journeys, at Gloucester City, Angel Island, East Boston, Seattle, 
or Galveston.   
In the early 1930s, as economic depression raised pressure for voluntary departure or 
repatriation of immigrants, particularly from Mexico, deportation trains increasingly took on 
significance for people who were not, technically speaking, being forced out of the country.  
These departing immigrants, often pressured, intimidated, or coaxed out of the nation by both 
economic and political forces, often rode alongside deportees on trains out of the nation, 
complicating our understanding of these journeys.  By the 1920s, there were efforts by Congress 
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to negotiate reduced train fares for voluntary repatriates.  While train companies initially agreed 
to this practice, when then government did not pay its agreed portion of the subsidy, the 
agreement dissolved.511  Instead, as the practice of repatriation grew, voluntary associations and 
charitable organizations often subsidized the expense of leaving the nation.  In some cases, the 
local government initiating the push for repatriation would provide passage just to the border and 
no further, so Mexican American associations often gathered money to provide passage from the 
border to immigrants’ hometowns and keep them from being stranded just over the border 
without money.512  As Adena Miller Rich of the Immigrants’ Protective League explained of 
deportation trains, “One of the most cruel effects of compulsory emigration—expulsion—has 
been the failure of the United States government in certain cases to send the deportee all the way.  
To be put off in a place where he is an utter stranger may mean the most abject misery.”513 
In a 1936 article on repatriation of immigrants, Rich explained that when voluntary 
removal was coordinated, these individuals had to be attached to deportation parties along with 
“regular deportees.”  However, she explained, charitable organizations had to make 
arrangements for their expense and maintain these immigrants until their transfer from their local 
communities to ports of departure.  These organizations, Rich wrote, were able to obtain “charity 
tickets” in coordination with the railroads, and the savings were significant.  However, it often 
required the coordination of many groups to make a voluntary departure journey possible.  For 
instance, in the case of one couple, Rich traced the various organizations involved in financing 
their voluntary return by train to Mexico:  
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The Mexican Consul promised a rebate of the railroad fare from the border at Laredo, as 
far as Irapuato.  The Salvation Army secured authorization of half-rate tickets to the 
border.  The Catholic Charities contributed $15 toward the Mexican railroad fare from 
Irapuato to Mexico City.  The Mexican Blue Cross and Mexican Health Center 
contributed the amount necessary for food on the journey.  The man’s English teacher at 
Hull-House, from the Chicago Board of Education, bought them clothing.  The balance of 
the expenses for this couple, $62.61, was met by the Governor’s Commission on 
Unemployment and Relief, acting through the Immigrants’ Protective League.514  
 
Thus, while this chapter focuses primarily on forced, government-funded deportation journeys, it 
recognizes that deportees’ experiences often occurred alongside, or even in the very same train 
compartments as immigrants in the process of other forms of voluntary or semi-voluntary 
departure. 
Deportation required not only negotiating many different levels of authority, practical 
planning, and strategic implementation within the United States, but also required coordination 
with receiving nations all over the world.  As deportation trains set off across the country with 
increasing frequency, foreign nations implored the government to give them advance list and 
notice while migrants were en route to Ellis Island, in order to give them time to prepare the 
necessary documents and entry permits.  Additionally, transport was not over once immigrants 
reached the European continent, but instead involved complicated networks of permits for 
overland transport.  Some nations, such as Germany, refused trains carrying deportees further 
east into Europe to pass through, or applied heavy conditions and required the accompaniment of 
their own guards.  While the government sought to present itself as the sole and all-powerful 
arbiter of who could remain within their borders, the practical reality was that they were 
beholden to a vast range of pragmatic considerations and global constraints, and deportations 
were often stalled or even prevented by their inability to coordinate with receiving or 
intermediary nations across the globe. 
                                                          
514 Rich, “Case Work in the Repatriation of Immigrants,” 601. 
306 
 
 Policy-based studies of deportation give the impression that once the IS made a 
deportation decision about an individual, they were unconstrained by further legal maneuverings 
or practical considerations. This was far from true.  Even if the United States could arrange 
deportation on their end, its success required cooperation with the receiving nation, and often, 
the question of ground transport once reaching that nation was a sticking point for the passing of 
agreements.  Some countries, such as France, insisted upon the deportees being routed on train 
through the country by U.S. immigration officials, rather than being dropped at LeHavre with a 
ticket to go on further, and complained of how U.S. deportation often left them burdened with 
foreign and penniless immigrants.  Other nations, such as Italy, insisted upon taking deportees 
into custody immediately upon their arrival in the nation, and taking them to their final 
destination on their own transportation, while U.S. officials were not allowed to proceed with 
them into the country.515 
As deportation specials traced their way across the American landscape, trains also 
moved large groups of deportees out of their neighboring nations.  Barbara Ann Roberts explains 
that deportation trains in Canada generated similar critiques about conditions and reflected 
Canada’s struggle to create a system which was capable of efficiently deporting in mass 
numbers.  She asserts that by the start of the 1930s, “As larger numbers of deports overwhelmed 
the system, conditions which had always been unpleasant become abominable.  For example, a 
trainload of deports sent in January 1933 from central Canada to Halifax complained that the 
food on the train consisted of sandwiches; they were not given clean blankets; they were not 
allowed to move freely about the train…”516  A New York Times correspondent’s account of his 
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1927 deportation from Mexico to Laredo, Texas demonstrates that high profile deportations from 
Mexico attracted public attention around deportation transports in similar ways.  As with 
deportations that might attract crowds of protestors at detention or train stations in the United 
States, deportations occurred suddenly and without warning or time for organization, and the 
correspondent was taken to a train station slightly outside of Mexico City to prevent onlookers.  
However, the correspondent explained, his fellow United States reporters in the area figured out 
the ploy, and arrived at the station in Tacuba with his family, allowing him to say good-bye.  
Relative to descriptions of American deportation trains, his complaints about conditions seemed 
mild: “The seats in the second-class car were hard and uncomfortable,” and in detention the night 
before the journey, he was required to sleep on a dirt floor.517 It is important to recognize that 
rising coordination of deportation transports in the United States was part of a larger 
development of mechanisms for the policing of non-citizens around the world. 
As the practice of conducting “deportation specials” cross-country became a regularized 
system throughout the mid-1920s, it became necessary for immigration officials to commission 
the construction of specialized train cars for transporting deportees, in what amounted to moving 
prisons.  While gathering individuals from spaces such as asylums, prisons, and hospitals, 
designed for the segregation, surveillance, and control of bodies deemed to be physically or 
psychologically unfit, pathological, or morally lacking, deportation trains reassembled and 
reinscribed these technologies for controlling, but put them on the move.  Early on in Strange 
Passage, the female protagonist, Stephanie, relates the sensation of being transferred from one 
prison to the next at each stage of deportation.  She recollects that, “in the detention room of the 
deportation station, it is damp and cold.  There are other women in the room, some weeping.”  
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Then, she is “marched to a small caged truck that looks as though it were used by the dog-
catcher.  The truck takes her to the train… Now the stupid Montana prairie stretches as far as her 
eyes can see.  The Rockies in the distance, cut by the window-bars into segments, look barren to 
her.”518 
 In order to ensure efficient cross-country transportation for deportees, immigration 
officials strategized and ultimately reached protocols for refitting train cars to hold migrants on 
their way to expulsion.  A March 1926 letter from the Assistant Commissioner to the District 
Director at Georgia describes a well-prepared train car, stating that “you should be sure to have 
the car windows securely fastened down (closed, or so arranged that they cannot be raised more 
than about two inches from the bottom, and also that the toilet room doors are so fixed that they 
cannot be locked… With the doors kept locked and guards on duty, escapes should be practically 
impossible.”519 To reassure concerned officials in Georgia, the District Director explained to 
them that in addition to the normal precautions, bars, and locks, “we take their clothes away from 
them” during the night, to further ensure no efforts at escape will be made.520  Urging caution 
however, officials insisted that stringent searches of immigrant bodies and belongings were 
needed to prevent danger or escape.  In 1927, a warning was issued to all station directors that 
“at one of the stations, an insane male alien was delivered to the party train while in possession 
of an old-fashioned open razor and that another alien delivered to the party train had concealed in 
his hand-baggage nearly a gallon of intoxicating liquor.”521 
Segregation of deportees of differing statuses for transportation was yet another level at 
which deportation officials concerned themselves with the regulation and control of immigrant 
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bodies.  The Immigration Inspector in Charge of Transportation contacted the Commissioner 
General in 1920 regarding a large deportation party from San Francisco with pickups around the 
country.  The inspector explained that “During the trip a good deal of sickness occurred and it 
was impossible to place as many aliens in one car as heretofore.  It was therefore necessary to 
use three cars on account of this sickness which included chickenpox and one of threatened 
diphtheria…”522  Some of the new arrangements were designed with the intent of keeping 
deportees separated from the general public on smaller trips where there were not enough 
deportees for a full deportation train.  The District Director at Atlanta wrote to the Commissioner 
General in 1926 explaining that a private car is preferable because, “it would greatly enhance the 
risk to convey the party (made up of ex-convicts and an insane alien this trip) in an ordinary day 
coach… and no means of segregating the passengers from the prisoners.”  Furthermore, the 
Director explained, his reason for the use of a particular car was for safety, since the prisoners 
could be placed in upper berths, and “with a guard at each end of the car escape is impossible 
and three men can handle a large party safely.”523   
In other cases, special arrangements were required for the transportation of women and 
children, as well as sick deportees, and the commissioner of matrons as well as guards for trips 
with female passengers was an often-bemoaned additional expense.  A.J. Poston of the Southern 
Pacific Company was contacted by Commissioner General Harry Hull in 1927 with instructions 
for deportation trips to include one tourist car and reclining chairs for women and children, as 
well as ill men, at least three experienced guards for each party.  After concern was expressed by 
Agent Kline, the chief conveyer of deportation parties throughout the period that women 
deportees must travel steerage, which would leave women and children with “insane and 
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diseased male deports,” more attention was given to shipping practices.  For deportation parties 
which shifted to ships for the trip from New Orleans to New York, he demanded iron barred 
doors in steerage quarters, and for the staterooms “to be occupied by insane female aliens in 
order that the doors may be securely fastened from the outside by the officer in charge of the 
party for the purpose of keeping such aliens confined to their quarters.”524  However, the 
accounts of Alan MacDonald and Jane Perry Clark, each of whom were allowed to ride aboard 
deportation trains, suggest that the divisions aboard trains were lacking at best.  MacDonald’s 
descriptions feature deportees of all states of physical and psychological states of well-being 
jumbled together along with former prisoners and other criminals.  Clark explains that “Families 
were kept together on the train, but in general there was no segregation, and insane and convicts, 
children, and illegal entries travelled together in the same car.”525 
The process also required close attention to staffing not only aboard the train itself, but 
upon reaching stations.  Concerns over adequate safeguards increased in the case of racialized 
groups such as Mexican deportees, who were seen as being so desperate to stay in the nation, and 
so little controlled, that their transport required special assistance.  A letter from the Inspector in 
Charge at the International Bridge at El Paso outlined the challenges required with safely 
transporting deportees.  Inspector E.M. Kline, he explained, goes both East and West through El 
Paso on Sunday, and therefore, it is critical to know when he leaves San Antonio going West and 
Los Angeles going east, because it would be required to have extra men available for Sunday 
work at the depot.  “The train from the west always arrives at night,” he explained, “usually 
bringing ten to twenty Mexicans, insane, diseased, feeble minded, and hard to handle.  It is dark 
around the El Paso Union Depot and we have lost aliens, after receiving them, out in the yards 
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before we could get them into the trucks.”526  Only with increasing standardization of deportation 
practices, nation-wide communication, and bureaucratic reorganization was efficient and 
uninterrupted transport able to take place, and the shifts of this era facilitated the deportation 
machinery which was to continue growing for the following decades. 
 A focus on the actual enforcement of deportation law on the ground allows for an 
examination of how its practice was negotiated at a pragmatic level, and for immigration 
officials, little mattered more than cost.  A 1922 letter from the Assistant Commissioner of 
Immigration to all District Commissioners and Inspectors chastised their lack of economy, 
accusing them of “more or less reckless expenditure of funds, particularly in connection with 
deportation cases, it not infrequently happening that an attendant is employed to assist an officer 
in conveying a single alien.”  Instead, he urged, “more careful scrutiny” would be required to see 
that “greater economy is practiced.”527  Given limited appropriations, and a groundswell of 
pressure for mass removal, immigration authorities often approached deportation as a business, 
which had to be run as efficiently as possible.  They quickly discovered it paid to deport in bulk.   
In 1929 contracts with the Southern Pacific Lines for trains heading eastbound and 
westbound, the government negotiated a rate of $80 per capita from San Francisco or Los 
Angeles to New York (and vice versa) plus charges for meals and guards, provided the party was 
of 25 or more deportees.  For parties this large, the railroad company would throw in free 
transportation for the immigration officer in charge of the party.  For “westbound alien 
deportees” picked up in Chicago or Carbondale going to San Francisco, the rate for guards and 
meals was $23.75 for groups of 10 or fewer, $20.00 for groups of 11-20, $16.25 for groups of 
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21-30, and for parties of 31 or more, a bargain rate of $13.75.528  However, a 1927 warning from 
the District Director at St. Louis to the Commissioner General provided a grim and calculating 
reminder regarding number of aliens to a party and cost.  “Even when it is thought several aliens 
can be joined or annexed,” to a deportation party, the Director cautioned, “it is not safe to prorate 
the cost of transportation, for one or more may die, abscond, or be taken from us by habeas 
corpus.”529 
 Frequently, railway lines wrote to immigration officials selling their credentials as 
possible deporters, and offered incentives to gain lucrative government contracts.  A September 
1924 letter from the District Director at Kansas City, Missouri to the Commissioner General 
reported that the Katy Road had offered “inducements to the Immigration Service for this 
deportation business”: furnishing of guards and free passage for the Immigration officers, meals 
for aliens at 50 cents apiece, and a special Tourist Pullman car, as well as the right to appoint 
temporary special guards of their choosing.530  In 1927, when the Missouri-Kansas-Texas 
Railroad Company wrote to the Director at Kansas City to notify that they were discontinuing 
their practice of providing accompanying guards free of charge, they included the appeal that “I 
trust however, that this action will have no effect on our former friendly relations and hope that 
we may continue to be favored with such movements as you may have by reason of our short 
line and superior service.”531   
To sell themselves as strong contenders for deportation specials, railway companies also 
relied upon their business records, arguing that if they were efficient transporters of goods, they 
could be relied upon to deport humans.  The Wabash Railway Company wrote to the Bureau of 
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Immigration in 1921 regarding the plans to move a large number of Mexicans from Saginaw, 
Michigan to “the Mexican Frontier.”  Their company, they argued, had “handled a large volume 
of this Mexican business to Michigan, and from letters of commendation received from the sugar 
company, I believe that our service has proved as good, if not better than that of other lines.”532  
Other suggestions for cost-cutting veered away from the use of trains, and proposed greater use 
of ships through the Port of Galveston and other sites rather than full train traversal of the nation, 
or advocated for the use of vehicles rather than railways.  The District Director at El Paso 
appealed to the Commissioner General to consider that transport from Tucson to Nogales for 
departure at Mexico, a common route, could “be conducted at much lesser expense by 
government truck, instead of by train, which requires a holding period at some expense, in the 
county jail.533 
While the primary expense lay in transportation, food aboard was also a concern, and the 
ability to get the best deal on provisions was a major concern. On trips aboard the Southern 
Pacific Lines, for the price, the meals included were a breakfast of “stewed prunes, oatmeal, 
meat order, potatoes, bread, coffee,” a lunch of “soup, meat fish or hash, bread, bread pudding, 
coffee, fruit,” and a supper of “spaghetti or macaroni, meat, potatoes, vegetables, bread, coffee, 
fruit.”  For guards on the other hand, breakfast might include “baked apple, bananas and cream, 
grape fruit, wheat cakes, oatmeal, ham or bacon and eggs, fried potatoes, hot rolls, coffee, tea, 
and milk,” lunch would involve “assorted meats, salad, lamb chops, vegetables, pie, cheese, 
pudding, coffee, tea, cocoa, milk,” and supper contained “soup, steak, roast, potatoes, salad, hot 
rolls, dessert, coffee, tea, chocolate, and milk.”534  Throughout the period, the allotted meal 
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budget for deportees was generally 50 cents a head per meal, but because provisioning deportees 
was outsourced to private companies, efforts to cut costs and profit at the expense of deportees 
were rampant. A letter from the Inspector in Charge at Denver about better ways of feeding 
detainees at a lower cost featured a menu with, surprisingly, a lot of cupcakes.535   
 Alan MacDonald, a journalist allowed to ride aboard a deportation special in January 
1930, observed that the food given to deportees consisted of “beef stew, prunes, vegetables, rice 
pudding, wheat bread, tea, coffee, or milk,” a menu which he noted was “as good and more 
varied than the soldier’s regular fare.”  This was possible, he asserted, because the Commissioner 
“gave the contract to a Chinaman, who profited so much among his own countrymen by boasting 
his business connection with Uncle Sam,” that he could afford to provide good food even within 
the severely limited budget.536  In spite of the speculative, and racialized presumptions of 
MacDonald’s statements, it is clear that competition for government contracts for food, 
transportation, and detention was fierce, and that there was profit to be made off the stomachs of 
deportees.  Mrs. Kenneth F. Rich of the Immigrants’ Protective League wrote to the 
Commissioner General in 1931 demanding investigation of unfit food conditions in county jails 
where deportees were detained before their trains departed.  Citing abuses at Crookston, 
Minnesota, Crown Point, Indiana, and Chicago, Rich decried the notorious “food ‘rake-off’”, and 
requested attention of the plight of deportees who were suffering from a poor quality food, 
physical cold, and lack of medical attention for the sake of profits.537 Because detention and 
transport were moments at which the deportation process was most visible to the general public, 
it provided an opportunity for critics to oversee and object to its operation.  
                                                          
535 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Record Group 85, Box 4026, File 54933/351A. 
536 MacDonald, Alan, “A Trip on the Deportation Special: Unwanted Aliens Headed Home,” The Baltimore Sun, 
March 9, 1930. 
537 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Record Group 85, Box 8335, File 44639/731. 
315 
 
 Itself an instrumental tool for new forms of policing the nation’s boundaries, and social 
control and policing of foreign-born residents, the deportation train was often imagined to be a 
more active and embodied agent.  As the opening quote suggests, language of swallowing or 
gorging was a common feature of descriptions of the trains.  The imagery of an embodied train 
coming across the nation eating whatever was in its path was perhaps most powerfully captured 
in the description of the deportation special as a “great black snake, crawling across the country, 
gorging itself on luckless, unfriended foreigners.”538  Indeed, even the laws implementing 
deportation were given form, as the District Director at El Paso suggested in a 1925 letter.  
“From time to time in my life I have heard the expression ‘Laws with teeth in them,’ etc,” he 
wrote, and continued, “Following this simile, I can almost fancy hearing the legislation referred 
to in some quarters as a ravening beast.”539  
 Irwin’s dramatic and fanciful novel provides some of the most creative imagery of the 
embodied deportation train.  Describing its course over the night landscape, he described, “With 
its huge unblinking eye, the train strode through the darkness—a Cyclop walking in his sleep.”540  
Elsewhere, he depicted deportees, worn down by the endless noise and movement challenging 
the train as if a human opponent, “Roar, train, roar.  Snort and creak, push on, take us for a long 
ride, roar you train!”541 Drawing upon the serpentine imagery, Irwin explained of the additional 
cars being added at Chicago (from Denver, Omaha, Fort Wayne, Kansas City, the South, and the 
Leavenworth and Joliet Penitentiaries), and again at Fostoria, “the Deportation Special was 
growing like a triumphal snake-dance.”542  Critics writing about the novel noted its sensory 
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emphasis on the bodily experience of riding a deportation train, and one observed that “The 
harshness, foul food, discomfort and smells endured on the train across country are vividly 
real.”543 
As the train crept through the “unvarying plains of eastern North Dakota,” the deportees 
aboard the fictional deportation special in Strange Passage began discussing the scenery outside 
their window.  “’This is one damn big country,’ muttered Szuts, the fiery Hungarian radical of 
the bunch.”544  Paul, the Austrian, reminisced about “back where we started,” in Washington 
state, describing the expanse of timber woods and great fir trees, then the mountains, “beautiful 
with the snow on their peaks,” then, farmhouses, cattle, and dairies, then “a big city, with all the 
trains and crisscrosses of railroad tracks, the paved streets, and people driving automobiles.”  
Sharing their experiences and memories about the American landscape, other deportees chimed 
in with accounts of their first time encountering the view of the New York harbor, or the 
stockyards of Chicago.  In a comically heavy-handed scene, the deportees exclaimed about the 
fact that they really were passing through genuine “amber waves of grain,” and sadly reflected 
on the patriotic song which had popularized the phrase.545 
Irwin’s tale provides only a dramatic, imagined version of contact with the American 
landscape, but it provides an important reminder that there was in fact, something ironic about 
deportation.  At their very point of expulsion from the country, many deportees gained their 
greatest contact with its full range, and were exposed to new regions, vistas, and cities.  As 
McDonald quickly reflected riding aboard a deportation special in the dead of winter, what 
deportees could see through their barred windows was “the snow-covered, frozen, interminable 
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prairie which far away on either side merged into the smoky gray of the winter sky.”546  Even as 
the Immigration Bureau removed immigrants from the nation, they exposed them to it in a way 
that few Americans of the era, even native-born, would ever have the opportunity for, leaving 
them departing from the country with a greater acquaintance with the American countryside than 
most could imagine.  Coupled with their exposure to a more variegated and multi-ethnic group of 
fellow travelers than most were likely to ever encounter, this gave deportees something of a 
paradoxically Americanizing experience.  They saw the most of the nation as they left it, 
interacted with a broader cross-section of its populations than they likely did in their pre-
deportation lives, and had unprecedented contact with the range and ever-controlling reach of its 
institutions.   
It was not, however, landscapes alone to which deportees were exposed along their 
journeys.  They were able to observe the political and racial dynamics across the nation at work, 
such as in the case of a 1925 dispute between the Attorney General of Georgia and the 
Immigration Bureau.  The State of Georgia argued that when deportation trains came through to 
pick up alien convicts from the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta, where “it sometimes happens that 
there will be one or two negroes in a party with five to ten white prisoners,” which, by keeping 
them in the same train car, was a breach of Georgia State laws about segregation of interstate 
traffic.  Instead, to accommodate the ban against transporting “Negroes” across state lines by 
train, it became necessary to transfer them to Savannah (technically intrastate transport), and 
then get them a steamship ticket from there to New York, upon which of course, they were 
required to travel in steerage. However, even those accommodations posed challenges for the 
immigration authorities, as state laws prohibited whites and “negroes” from traveling in the same 
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coach, thereby making it necessary to have a white Immigration Officer in the car with them.  
Asking for assistance in smoothing out the situation, the District Director appealed to the 
Attorney General, explaining, “This office finds itself in an awkward position.  Under Federal 
law it is required to convey these alien prisoners to New York City and it is a violation of the 
State law for a white guard to take a negro prisoner on a train, unless you agree with the 
argument advanced…”547  This startling and revealing incident serves as a reminder that while 
deportation law may have been federal, the transportation policies required for it to be 
implemented were not always.  As deportation specials snaked across the nation, they did so in 
patterns shaped by all sorts of local concerns, regulations, racial dynamics, and political agendas. 
Although immigrants aboard deportation transports were some of the clearest victims of 
efforts to constrain the borders of the national body and draw delineations around which 
residents were truly fit to be Americans, depictions of deported immigrants centered on 
“melting-pot” representations.  It was the motley nature of deportation parties that caught the eye 
of many observers, who noted that rarely outside a deportation transport could one find such a 
widely assorted population packed into such a small space.  While many immigrants 
experiencing post-entry deportation proceedings were residents of primarily ethnically 
homogenous neighborhoods, the groups aboard deportation trains struck many as being a 
remarkably diverse.  Picked up in cities and towns all over the interior of the nation, deportation 
trains exposed immigrants not only to new parts of the nation, but forced them into long periods 
in close quarters with a wide range of different people.  One of the odd and unintended features 
of streamlining deportation practices to large train parties was introduction of deportees to a vast 
array of individuals and ethnic backgrounds.   
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Ironically, for many travelers on deportation trains, their greatest exposure to the 
diversity of the national population came at the moment, and as a result of the process of, their 
removal from the country.  Rarely did Americans, immigrant or native born, encounter such 
diverse groupings, and the experience of spending as many as a couple of weeks thrown together 
in what Jane Perry Clark referred to as “the motley assembly,” must have been a strange 
experience for deportees.548  One reviewer of Irwin’s novel noted that there were only a handful 
of other situations, “a prison, a steerage passage, a company of infantry at the front…” where 
such a “mixed group of the human species is gathered together and battened down under 
pressure.”  Indeed, he argued, “they embrace nearly all economic classes of society, all shades of 
political opinion, a motley of races, tongues, religions and conditions of economic service,” and 
share only that they are people “without a country.”549Alan MacDonald described the deportees 
upon the train he observed as “this most strangely assorted company of deportees—a far more 
various company than any I had ever seen or imagined.”  This company, he explained, including 
“worried, broken wives and mothers,” “the pitiful, mumbling, vague-eyed insane,” “the recently 
recovered sick,” “the former convicts, strong-arm men, prowlers and swindlers,” “young girls 
still proud and individual,” were all drawn together only by “virtue of laws most all had, in one 
way or another, defied.”550   
As Paul, the Austrian protagonist of Strange Passage observed while sketching his fellow 
inmates upon the train, “Faces about him were international: cheek bones pressing out against 
fair skins, fat padded jowls that seemed boneless, hair and eyes pigmented from every tone of the 
chromatic scale, lines that captured moods from mania to depression.  Nordic and Latin and 
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Slavic and Semitic—a map of the world, these faces.”551  The cast of characters described along 
the journey were a comically miscellaneous group, featuring almost every immigrant stereotype 
conceivable, from the aristocratic German to the Greek gunman to the grinning “West Indies 
Negro”. Such stylized racist caricatures were not limited to fiction, but appeared in journalistic 
accounts as well.  While less abhorrently described, likewise, in MacDonald’s account, where 
“In these cars was a complete, if limited world, with its valiant ones, its lovers, its 
philosophers—and its confirmed, congenital villains,” a complete set of ethnic stereotypes was 
present.  It was complete with descriptions of the “Stolid Germans and volatile Irish,” as well as 
the “regular-featured, blond blue-eyed Englishman” and then, in Chicago, the “less spirited, 
poorer type of surreptitious immigrant invader,” “sullen” and of a different character.552 
Even the relatively sympathetic account (in contrast to many anti-immigrant tracts of the 
time) of deportees in Strange Passage reflects the pathological assumptions about immigrant 
immorality, and the assignation of stereotypical traits to particular ethnic groups.  The 
Frenchman and the Greek, embodying tropes about hypersexualized ethnicities discuss their love 
of young girls, 10, 11, 12 years old aboard the train, and the Greek, fresh out of prison, goes 
around “mentally raping” the women aboard the train.  Later, the two fight over the young 
Scandinavian boy Tor, recently out of juvenile detention, leading him to a confused wariness 
over their competing desires to have them bunk with him.  Meanwhile, Bertha Bascwicz, the 
“big Polish blonde” suffers from such overwhelming lust and such poor self-control that after 
becoming aroused while dancing, she busts out of her bunk at night, bares her body, and 
demands to be taken by whichever man is willing.  Alongside these depraved individuals, Irwin 
introduces us to the mental inferiors of the train, “Unkempt Ranashad, the Persian lunatic” and 
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Napoleon, the “lank West Indian Negro.”  Portrayed with exaggerated racist tropes, Napoleon’s 
minstrelsy elements can be best seen in the scene in which, “The gangling Negro sprang into the 
aisle, great grin on his shiny face, spotted white ducks flapping about his cowhide shoes.  Flop-
floppety-flop went his big feet, and his long legs began to fly about, clogging, shuffling, doing a 
buck-and-wing, a cake-walk and Charleston, his bellowing voice accompanying in an 
improvised song… His eyes were two white lights, his grin showed teeth like two rows of piano 
keys.”553 In another bluntly racist set of stereotypical caricatures, this time not in a work of 
fiction, one reporter observing the arrival of a deportation special through Buffalo, New York 
described the party as follows: “In the group was a man returning to an ancestral caste and 
romantic family traditions; another returns to an African grass hut with a background of tom-
toms and witchcraft.  Between these extremes, there were criminals, insane, and sick people 
without claim to citizenship, aliens who had overstayed their legal residence and those who 
entered the country illegally.” 554 By bringing the process of removal into the public sphere, 
deportation trains contributed to the creation of a shared (and profoundly racialized) imagination 
of the “illegal” immigrant and introduced and consolidated a recognizable set of caricatures of 
“undesirable” migrants.  
 
Deportation as Spectacle, Art, and Romance 
 
Beyond the clear function of physically removing those immigrants who had been 
marked for deportation, deportation trains provided a critical public function.  Because 
deportation specials went through dozens of cities to pick up aliens, sometimes stopping for 
extended periods to add several more train cars to facilitate the new deportees, they became 
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public spectacles, and reports appear of people using deportation train stops as a destination to go 
and gawk at the departing foreigners.  While INS offices, Ellis Island, and courtrooms were all 
largely shielded from onlookers, deportation trains provided an important outlet for the public to 
observe the fruits of removal campaigns.  Often, they seemed to do so with great relish, 
gathering at the scheduled train stops or as they passed through towns to watch the imprisoned 
immigrants meet their punishment.  Newspapers of the time often featured stories on deportees 
being moved out of their cities, and frequently included photographs of the assembled groups of 
deportees at the train station awaiting departure onboard a deportation special. The shock value 
of groups of deportees, prepared for removal, with the few possessions they were able to take 
with them, seemed enhanced in the press when the deportation party contained women and 
children.   
Aside from those who gathered particularly to see deportations, the large numbers of 
ordinary train travelers must have been struck by the site of large groups of travelers guided by 
guards and police onto specially designated trains.  H. Roger Grant notes that intercity passenger 
trains peaked in the 1920s, and that “Railroad stations, whether in large communities or small, 
were vibrant places as patrons awaited thousands of daily runs.”555  As railroad historians have 
often noted, train stations and depots were important public spaces, often at the center of small 
town life, and a gathering point where people encountered individuals and groups that they might 
not otherwise come into contact with.  Deportations, often invisible except in the cases of public 
and workplace raids, became spectacles at the point of transportation, and this visibility was 
central to how the public understood deportation’s place in American society.   
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Often, cases of infamous deportees drew particular crowds to watch their departure or 
passage through towns.  The October 1929 deportation party pictured below leaving Chicago 
included Giuseppe Accardi, an “important gangster.”  As often occurred in news accounts of 
departing deportation trains, a more general story on the deportation party was followed with a 
picture and detailed life story of its most notorious deportee, in this case, Accardi.556  Anna Sage, 
better known as the “woman in red,” a deportee said to have spotted Dillinger for Federal 
Agents, was transported to New York for deportation in 1936 as the public eagerly observed.  
Even those observers who did not know her reputation might have been able to come up with the 
title, “woman in red,” one reporter stated, noting that her outfit upon the train consisted of a 
“large red artificial rose at the neck of her dress, large red ear rings, dark red lip rouge and her 
fingernails were tinted a deep crimson.”557  That the fashion choices of an individual deportee 
attracted an audience demonstrates the extent to which deportees were on display aboard the 
trains, visible markers of the rising policing of unwelcome immigrant populations.  
Observers of deportation trains could at times cross the line from curious spectators to 
hostile mobs.  On one early deportation special passing through Montana, the inspector came 
through the train and warned the deportees that they had better take down the red I.W.W. 
paraphernalia they had pasted to the windows, seeing as “The cowboys of this State don’t like 
I.W.Ws… If they see you coming through with a lot of racket and find out who you are, the 
might let loose with some fireworks.  These cowboys are mighty quick on the trigger 
hereabouts.”558  While this train made it through unscathed, other deportation trains were met 
with harassment, taunts, and jeers. As Dorothee Schneider makes clear, it was not always hostile 
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observers who came out to taunt the deportation train passengers.  Instead, she explains “In some 
cities, such as Chicago and Detroit, labor rallies were held in support of the deportees as the train 
passed by.  In Butte, Montana, IWW sympathizers even tried to storm the train.  But otherwise 
neither the deportees themselves nor their supporters managed to be heard.”559 The planned 
attempt by IWW members in Butte was averted when immigration officers were warned of the 
plot.  The deportation cars were then detached, and reattached to a regular train, which made a 
wide detour, and avoided potential derailing of the deportation transport at Butte.  Declaring that 
the maneuver demonstrated a reaffirmed commitment to the task of identifying deportable 
immigrants throughout the nation, one newspaper asserted that, “More teeth in the comb that is 
going over the country can be supplied if necessary.”560  
The extent to which deportees were a spectacle for public display and consumption 
appears in fictional representations as well.  At one of the stops in Strange Passage, the 
protagonist bemoans that there wasn’t even a peddler or newsboy around to buy treats from 
through the window bars, but instead, “Just the curious hangers-on they saw at every stop, the 
kind from who you couldn’t grub a cigarette or yesterday’s newspaper… They only tried to be 
funny, yelling, ‘Taxi?’ and ‘Porter? Porter?’ as though they didn’t know you were just like a 
prisoner.”561  Later, the deportation spectators took on a gentler, if still exploitative, role in 
Irwin’s account.  At the stop in Chicago, while waiting for the additional train cars to be 
attached, “A couple of lady-reporters and a photographer came aboard to interview Mrs. Gomez.  
They took notes: nee Ada Frawley, 31, American citizen being deported to Portugal with a three-
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month-old babe in arms… The photographer posed Mrs. Gomez with babe in arms against the 
bars of the window, then shot his pictures.”562 
 As deportation rates shot up throughout the decade, and the public gawked at immigrant 
deportation parties being transported out of the nation, the process came to inhabit the public 
imagination in literature and art in new ways.  Reviewing Strange Passage, one critic argued that 
reading the book was “rather like reading a novel that has several incorporated short stories.”  
“But,” he continued, “sticklers for form may forget their rules in their interest in a problem that 
is new to American fiction.”563  Another literary critic echoed this idea, explaining that while 
overly concerned with the “romantic theme,” Irwin illuminates “the sociological aspects of a 
problem which becomes increasingly important as a rising tide of nationalism threatens to 
inundate the world.”564  This “problem that is new to American fiction,” found its way not only 
into literature, but also into art and film, where others provided their own perspectives on “the 
point that Theodore Irwin wants to make in his remarkable novel, ‘Strange Passage’ is that 
deportation campaigns have a very human cost.”565 
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Figure 14: The Deportation Train, by Leo Kober 
 
While a fictionalized, and at times absurdly romanticized, version of life upon a 
deportation train, Irwin’s work nevertheless takes up numerous realistic elements from 
journalistic accounts in the constructing of his story.  The hunger strike initiated by one of the 
train’s inmates after the food quality on board took yet another dip reflects numerous real 
accounts of deportees striking against inedible food and unethical exploitation of food contracts 
in detention centers and aboard trains and ships.  Though an escape as widespread (and, at least 
temporarily, successful) as the one Paul, Stephanie, and their fellow travelers undertake in 
Strange Passage never occurred, newspaper reports of attempted escapes and rioting aboard 
trains were common throughout the 1920s and 1930s.  Immigration Inspector Gates L. Rapp of 
Washington, who led many of the deportation parties out of the Northwest, was in charge of 
apprehending an attempted escape of deportees being transferred from the Lehigh Valley railroad 
to a Jersey City barge.  “This is the worst bunch of aliens ever brought East for deportation,” he 
stated after the attempt at escape through a smashed window.  In the midst of the chaos, another 
deportee, Beulah Harouk, en route to Syria, “took advantage of the excitement to stab herself 
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with a pair of scissors.”566 Though it is impossible to know if Irwin read accounts of this 
incident, the similarities in Strange Passage, where a pair of released Walla-Walla inmates file 
through the window bars of the train and attempt to flee, leaving an opening for a depressed and 
crippled Lithuanian coal miner to slit his throat and bleed to death in the lavatory, are striking.567  
Likewise, the scene in which one of the deportees steals a fork from dinner is a nearly exact 
replication of Alan MacDonald’s account of being allowed aboard a deportation train as a 
journalist, merely swapping out fork for knife, and having the young lady in question hide the 
stolen silverware in the folds of a newspaper rather than those of a napkin.568 
In his review of Strange Passage, New York Times book reviewer John Chamberlain 
touches upon one of the most striking elements of the novel—the fact that it was constructed as a 
romance novel, with the deportation train itself being the primary plot device to throw the 
protagonists together.  Cramped together in a tiny train car, the two find themselves drawn 
together as a barrier against the disturbing and odd characters on the train, the harshness of the 
guards, the cold and lonely nights, and the prospect of being returned, alone, to a land that is no 
longer home.  Upon seeing Stephanie again, nine years after their first meeting, Paul recollects 
fleeting moments that are hardly conventionally romantic: bribing a man outside the train to give 
her apples and keep her from starvation, helping her dispose of a fork she had stolen as a 
weapon, and debating whether to give her a pair of earrings made by the Walla-Walla inmates on 
board that he won in a game of cards (ultimately deciding she was too classy a young lady to 
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bear the idea of prison-made jewelry).  As Chamberlain notes, “we have the strange picture of 
the deportation squad playing Cupid.”569  
A strange picture indeed, but hardly an uncommon one.  Throughout the 1920s and 
1930s, stories on deportation often structured themselves around romance. Little caught the 
imagination of the public like a heart-wrenching tale of two lovers torn apart by deportation 
(provided of course, that these were the exceptional, worthy immigrants, accidentally caught up 
in a system designed for more dangerous foreigners).  While immigrant aid organizations and 
protestors focused primarily on deportation as a practice that destroyed families and ripped 
fathers and mothers from their children, popular cultural depictions tended to emphasize 
deportation as a possible obstacle to new, exciting instances of romantic love.  In film, as well as 
in novels and newspaper and magazine articles, love stories featured prominently in deportation 
accounts throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and overcoming the threat of deportation to reunite 
with a lover allowed for a gratifying cinematic ending.  In the 1928 film Anybody Here Seen 
Kelly? Mitzi goes to America to be with her love Kelly, but a scorned former lover, now a 
customs official attempts to have her deported before Mitzi saves the day and marries her.570  
The Mystic, released in 1925, features a criminal turned good who follows the young Hungarian 
gypsy he loves abroad after her deportation.571  Delicious (1931) features lovers separated by a 
variety of highjinks and disguises, but ultimately reunited about the ship the young Scottish 
woman is being deported upon.572  While immigration officials struggled with the practical 
dimensions of an emerging deportation regime and mapped out its operations, the American 
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public grappled with new opportunities to engage with the “human cost” of deportation, and to 
make sense of the ramifications of this powerful technology for controlling non-citizens. 
Explaining the reason behind his travel aboard the deportation special, MacDonald wrote: 
Twelve thousand or more undesirables, I was informed, are annually deported by the 
United States; and a large share of them are taken to the coasts by the wholesale method 
of these trains: Deportation specials!  Hundreds of humans gathered up as if by a 
gigantic, continent-wide net, herded into prison cars and ridden under guard to Ellis 
Island and other Government stations, there to be places on ships bound for their natal-
homes.  How like Russia that sounded!  Could such a thing be done without brutality, 
with justice and fairness?  What was the truth?573  
While the “truth” behind deportation specials is an impossible concept, MacDonald’s queries 
make it clear that deportation transportation in the 1920s and early 1930s captured and confused 
the American public.  Examining this process of mass herding aboard prison cars provides a 
critical perspective on deportation practice, not in its pure, legal imagination, but it in messy 
logistical reality.  By looking at the creation, synchronization, and expansion of machinery for 
enacting deportations, it is possible to see how deportation grew into such a massive project of 
social policing and cast such a long shadow into immigrant communities all around the nation. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In October 1954, the Acting Assistant Commissioner of the Detention and Deportation 
Division sent a memorandum detailing the progression of the case of Anna Sali, aka Anna 
Sauerli, aka Annie Able, aka Anna Heineman. Anna had been deported for insanity and ended up 
institutionalized in Germany, where officials were tracking her status. What was striking about 
her case file, however, was that it was a mere continuation of a file that had been started 35 years 
earlier, in 1919. Immigration officials had attempted, and failed, to deport Anna to both Canada 
and then to her native Russia. Anna and four other Russian natives had been deported together in 
May 1923, but the Soviet Government had refused to recognize their travel documents and allow 
them to enter, at which point four were taken to Hamburg, while another was taken to Italy, and 
all had been kept in institutions for the insane at the expense of the Immigration Service. The 
commissioner went on to note that by 1941, the department was still paying for the detention of 
“some or all” of these deportees, but that “only one survived WWII.” Anna, it was concluded in 
1954, should be kept abroad rather than returned to the United States. 
 Anna and Otto Heineman, the father of her three children, had been institutionalized in 
1919 at the State Hospital for the Insane in St. Peter, Minnesota, while their children were put 
into custody at St. Joseph’s Orphanage. The couple and their three children had first entered the 
United States via Canada in 1913, reportedly on a passport issued by the Ukrainian Diplomatic 
Mission. The family entered the country at Pingree, North Dakota and moved to Windom, 
Minnesota (in a common form of unofficial removal of potential burdens from towns) with the 
assistance of the citizens of Pingree, as they had been suffering from “lack of food and frost 
bites.” Otto had been institutionalized for insanity brought on by syphilis and was slated for 
deportation to Canada, but died before it could be effected.  
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Even before Anna’s deportation, the children were returned to Canada as public charges, 
where they were put into a “Children’s Shelter” in Regina, Saskatchewan. Anna, too, was 
scheduled for removal to Canada based on the assumption of her matrimonial citizenship via 
Heineman. In spite of her mental illness, Anna’s deportation warrant, like so many others 
apprehended for deportation at asylums, was officially issued because she was deemed to have 
entered without authorization and to have become “likely to become a public charge.” However, 
as immigration officials discovered, Anna was not the wife of Heineman, a U.S. native and 
naturalized citizen of Canada. She was in fact, the “legal wife” of Nicholas Sali, who had resided 
for a time in Canada, but possessed only Russian citizenship. District immigration officials at 
Minneapolis then reached out to Sali and discovered Anna had deserted him in Canada, but used 
his Ukranian passport to establish a deportation case for removing Anna to Soviet controlled 
Odessa.  
After her failed deportation, by 1926, debate over the fate of Anna and the other Russian 
deportees stuck in European insane asylums was still going strong, and Comptroller General 
himself had intervened to ask whether there was any prospect of their delivery to their countries 
of origin. However, the Immigration Bureau concluded, “it is impossible to fix any date in the 
future when they will be able to deliver them to their final destination.” Subsequent 
correspondence revealed in 1937 that further attempts had been made to appeal for her removal 
to the Soviet Union, but “the Soviet authorities in Moscow have definitely declined to permit the 
return of the above named alien to the Soviet Union,” and as such “the warrant of deportation 
will remain outstanding.” In the 11 years from their initial deportation to 1934, these five 
immigrants in detention in Hamburg and Italy had racked up an expense of roughly $37,000 
thousand, averaging about $670 per year per person. To even continue to leave these individuals 
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institutionalized in Germany, the U.S. Government had to appeal to the Hamburg Senate in 1928 
to allow these migrants to remain in the Hamburg Lunatic Asylum.574  
The paper trail in Anna’s immigration case goes cold in 1954, leaving her fate unknown. 
But as a roughly 62-year-old woman who had been detained in the Hamburg Lunatic Asylum for 
over thirty years (at tremendous cost to the U.S. government), remarkably surviving World War 
II and the mass murder of disabled people in Germany, it seems likely that she died in detention 
in Hamburg. Anna’s path, like so many other deportees of the period, was far from linear. Born 
in a town near Odessa in what was now Soviet controlled Ukraine with her husband, then living 
in Canada, then Minnesota, Anna spent at least half of her life in a sort of deportation-limbo in a 
country that had no connection to her origins or her chosen migration path. Her immensely 
complex case, startling in its twists and turns, encapsulates many of the features of the modern 
deportation state throughout this project (though perhaps it best highlights where they fell short 
of their goals).  
The case reflects the many levels of space and authority Anna had to traverse to reach her 
ultimate destination. It illuminates the transnational paths taken by deportees, as well as the 
(sometimes insurmountable) challenges posed in negotiating with other countries for the return 
of their citizens. It also demonstrates the effort to shape the nation through the removal of those 
who, like Anna, were deemed to be public burdens and unfit for citizenship. Anna’s own 
experiences reveal that the removal project enacted by the state was ambitious, aspirational, and 
ultimately, curtailed by realities outside of what immigration policy makers had been able to 
imagine. Anna’s story also highlights the critical role that the institutional spaces of the state 
(both in the U.S. and abroad) played in the evolution of deportation practice, as well as how 
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deportation initiated new forms of institutional contact and coordination. It also, perhaps most 
importantly, reminds us of the intimate human experiences hidden behind the legislation and 
statistics of immigrant removal.  
Like Anna’s case, this project more generally demonstrates the ironies of the growing 
deportation state in the 1920s. Even as the state sought to exercise an unprecedented degree of 
vigor in seeking out and removing “undesirable” immigrants after their entry, it continued to 
struggle with the tremendous limitations on their practical ability to fulfill their goals. In fact, 
what emerges most clearly from many of the deportation cases discussed throughout this project 
is the confusion, messiness, and fragmentation of this emerging project. The deportation regime 
brought together train companies, prison wardens, city police forces, bureaucratic officials, and 
foreign consuls in a previously unimaginable network for removal, but at the same time, 
struggled immensely to impose order and standardization on this project. The number of 
immigrants deported multiplied five-fold over the course of the decade, and yet, even as officials 
solidified the infrastructural capacity necessary for this escalation, they were frequently thwarted 
in their efforts to deport individuals, and constantly decried the constraints upon their powers of 
removal.  
At the global level, the United States celebrated its powers of sovereignty and its legal 
right to deport any individual who transgressed its immigration laws. They coordinated and 
collaborated with other nations to establish a broader system of tracking and documentation for 
the removal of immigrants, and even used deportation as an informal mechanism of foreign 
policy.  In practice, however, they were constrained by the rights of other nations to deny 
passports and reentry, by the denial of transportation rights through intermediary countries, and 
through complex and confounding shifts in national borders and imperial holdings. However, 
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even more embarrassing was the reality that in spite of the vast ostensible powers of the federal 
government, a deportation could often be stalled or even prevented by an individual’s refusal to 
disclose his/her own nationality or place of birth. At the same time, the government’s policy of 
policing its population through deportation often gained it harsh criticism, which was most 
frequently phrased in a language of foreignness, and with pointed accusations that the more the 
U.S. policed its own population, the less American it became. Deportation both solidified the 
boundaries of the modern nation-state (and their powers of self-determination and exclusivity), 
and yet, often revealed how unfinished this process was, and how illegible national belonging 
continued to be.  
At the national level, the growing deportation infrastructure provided clear evidence of 
the growing bureaucratic capacity of the state, and the nation’s ability to determine the 
composition of its own population. It also allowed for creation of stricter boundaries around 
rights and privileges of citizenship, and the establishment of punitive consequences for non-
citizenship. The U.S. practiced these powers not only within the continental states, but in their 
territories as well, demonstrating their ability to police territorial populations, even as they 
remained uncertain of their assimilability within the nation. However, at the same time, the 
expansion of the bureaucratic infrastructure for deportation was often at odds with the 
Congressional goals in enacting immigration legislation and reflected deep tensions between the 
legislative and enforcement branches of the government. Even as deportation reached peak 
numbers by the mid-1920s, the Immigration Service consistently had to curtail and at times 
entirely suspend their pursuance of deportation cases because of the continued insufficiency of 
Congressional appropriations. Vigorous immigration legislation, it became clear, was not always 
in sync with the practical and logistical needs of vigorous immigration enforcement. 
335 
 
As this project has explained, one of the most critical innovations of this period was the 
coordination and communication between a wide network of Immigration Service field offices 
throughout the nation and the local officials within their districts. In a real disjuncture from the 
past, the federal bureau actively coordinated between field offices on a scheduled basis to 
determine their deportable populations and arrange for their efficient removal. This more 
thoroughly integrated the project of policing immigration throughout the nation, rather than 
solely at its ports and land borders. However, at the same time, this also meant that the Service 
was at the mercy of localities to identify, investigate, and gather and detain their own potential 
deportees, and this played out in uneven and distinct ways all around the country. Because the 
service was perpetually underfunded and understaffed, their work necessitated active local 
initiatives to grow at the pace it did, which meant that the agendas served by those enacting the 
groundwork of deportation were not always those of the federal government. Instead, they 
reflected local prejudices, labor needs, political dynamics, and infrastructural capacity. The 
deportation state could knit together these localities, and link them together on train routes, but to 
a startling extent, the localities and their populations and officials set the tone for deportation’s 
actual implementation.  
At the institutional level, as well, the growth of the deportation state reflected a 
paradoxical tension between expanded power, centralization, and infrastructure, and a flailing, 
inefficient, and at times, ad hoc effort to impose order on chaos. Few elements contributed more 
to the increased deportations of the decade than the regular, scheduled efforts to assess, 
document, and remove the foreign-born in institutions of the state, from prisons to hospitals to 
poorhouses. Because these populations were already assembled, vulnerable, and documented, 
they provided a ripe hunting grounds for deportation officials who culled their lists for 
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deportable immigrants. However, the lack of funding often made these efforts moot, as local 
officials were asked to gather lists of potential deportees, but then perpetually told that their 
funds could not be extended to remove nearly as many as could be apprehended. As the 
Commissioner General of Immigration lamented in 1927, there were over 113,000 “alien 
inmates” of various penal and charitable institutions, and “how many of these were subject to 
deportation could only be ascertained by individual and in many cases, long-drawn-out 
investigations—interview of friends, relatives, and the like, scattered throughout the country.”575 
Even as the deportation state grew to massive proportions, its operations remained “scattered” 
and reliant on voluntary participation and local initiative. Furthermore, the institutional 
coordination led to tension and dispute between local and institutional officials, who chafed at 
having to shoulder the financial burden of detaining deportable immigrants, and the Immigration 
Service, which was unable, due to their limited resources, to shift this burden to the federal 
government in the form of transportation expenses. Although institutional officials hoped that the 
new deportation legislation of the preceding decades would provide them with the opportunity to 
clear their rosters, they were frequently frustrated by specific wording, time limits, and complex 
criteria for removal, and were forced to develop new strategies for using the categorization in 
flexible and expansive ways to effect their goals.  
While it has been remarkably absent from the scholarship, the process of deportation was 
far from over when the order to deport was passed. Deportees had to be housed and eventually 
transported to the nation’s boundary and beyond. Like each of the other facets of the process, the 
experiences of deportees in detention and transit were marked by deep inconsistencies and by a 
messy, uphill struggle to impose centralization and systemization. Throughout the decade, 
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deportation officials made great headway in creating streamlined and regularized train schedules 
for deportation in order to maximize the number of deportations which could be effected within 
budget, and courted competitive bids and handouts like free guards from private transportation 
companies in order to make the most of their money. At the same time, detention sites remained 
insufficient, and deportation officials had to cobble together a range of solutions for holding 
immigrants, from private homes to local prisons. Furthermore, transportation itself was often the 
site of conflict, protest, and public spectacle. 
This project has advanced a number of connected arguments about the significance of 
deportation during the 1920s. Deportation practice did not always mesh with its official policy 
dictates, so the decisions and logistics of its on-the-ground implementation are in many ways 
more revealing. Deportation increasingly provided an opportunity for the project of policing 
immigrants to include a much broader cross-section of the country, both geographically and in 
terms of active participants. Rather than the sole purview of Congressional legislators or Ellis 
Island inspectors, deportation came to integrate and represent the interests and agendas of a wide 
array of actors: municipal police forces, prison wardens and hospital superintendents, private 
citizens, foreign officials, the local press, and many others.  
As post-entry deportations increased, the deportation state also cast an expansive and 
ever-growing shadow over immigrant populations and reshaped the experiences of non-citizens 
as well as their relationship to the state. In doing so, it helped to consolidate non-citizenship as a 
distinctly disciplinary identity. Deportation, particularly in the vast application of the “likely to 
become a public charge” provision and for medical, mental health, and criminal charges, also 
more firmly established the benefits and institutions of the state as being the sole right of 
citizens. These shifts, did not take place through legislative proclamation, but were instead result 
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of practices honed throughout the decade, as modern citizenship was given new meaning through 
new technologies of control and apparatuses of exclusion. However, I emphasize, deportation, as 
the physical process of putting non-citizen bodies in motion, also redefined citizenship in another 
critical way: as the right to space within the nation.   
 The structure of this project also reflects my insistence that while scholars have largely 
understood deportation chronologically and through policy changes, for deportees themselves, 
the experience was largely a spatialized process of uprooting from one location and being 
coercively thrust into another. I highlight the levels of authority that immigrants were subjected 
to throughout their deportations—from the institutions at which they were apprehended, to the 
city streets and ethnic neighborhoods where they were rounded up by local police, to the nation 
they traversed during the expulsion, to the transnational transportation and global politics which 
determined their paths of removal. However, the insistence on the importance of space is about 
more than the experiences of deportees. It also reflects my argument that even as this period 
represented a critical increase in state power over individuals, this power did not necessarily or 
exclusively manifest in the form of federal control, but instead was dispersed through a range of 
institutions, authorities, and governmental agencies. 
I have also advanced the argument that deportation took on a particular and distinctive 
form in the 1920s, as officials aspired to creating a deportation apparatus vaster and more 
encompassing than the small, reactive, and limited one which had preceded it. In spite of the 
common perception of the 1920s as a period when the national state was receding and there was 
a conservative retreat from big government, deportation represented a great expansion of the 
state bureaucracy. Deportation instead grew out of earlier Progressive era efforts to systematize 
the powers of the state and its institutions and the Immigration Service through the decade 
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worked to create an integrated network of bureaucratic employees, local authorities, and 
institutional officials to carry out the work of policing the nation’s non-citizen population. Even 
as the Quota Acts and overseas inspection made exclusion more clear-cut and limited the role of 
the Immigration Service, post-entry deportations provided a tremendous opportunity for 
discretion, and the uneven patterns of application observed throughout this project demonstrate 
how widely this discretion was utilized. No longer was deportation merely the enforcement tool 
of a specific external agenda (such as anti-radicalism or anti-Chinese racism), but deportation 
now served as a goal in and of itself and one which took on different resonance and possibilities 
for different actors across the nation. 
 At a moment of mass migration and unprecedented mobility, the development of the 
deportation state represented a critical new effort to curtail movement. This required and was 
facilitated by modern advancements in tracking and documentation, including across cities and 
states, and even over national borders. It also contributed to a growing administrative capacity, 
an unprecedented degree of state surveillance over non-citizen communities and a shift in the 
relationship between the individual and the powers of the state. Importantly, while the 
development of the expulsion capacity of the government was a critical form of state building 
throughout this period, one of the striking elements is the range of actors who were empowered 
in this process, and how even low-level bureaucratic employees were able to make massively 
important decisions about what kind of people could be Americans and what “threats” to national 
well-being were most dangerous.  While in some ways, the Immigration Service started the 
decade as just a beleaguered, underfunded agency within the Department of Labor, frantically 
trying to capitalize on anti-immigrant sentiment and expand its own powers and funding, it did, 
in critical ways, become a real force to be reckoned with over time. Though the networks of 
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institutions, officials, and governmental authorities which constituted the nascent deportation 
state were perhaps not a full-fledged or centralized bureaucracy by the end of the decade, they 
had made critical steps in that direction. 
The immense chronological span of Anna’s deportation case also prompts an exploration 
of the vital legacy of 1920s deportation practices. As scholars have noted, deportation practice 
continued to expand throughout the twentieth century, accelerating in its final decades, and 
exploding in the early twenty-first century. Average yearly deportations have increased roughly 
200 fold since the 1920s, and the peak number of 438,421 removals in 2013 dwarfs the rates of 
the 1920s, which were unprecedented for their time.576 What has been less fully explored, 
however, is how the infrastructure and machinery for deportation put into place in the 1920s has 
profoundly shaped the practice’s growth in the decades to come. Immigration officials in 
subsequent decades were aided by the initiation of streamlined, systematized practices for 
identifying and tracking deportable immigrants in the nation’s institutions, for negotiating with 
foreign nations to acquire passports and transportation permissions, for coordinating with local 
officials, for detaining immigrants and arranging the transit to the nation’s borders and ports, and 
for securing sufficient appropriations from Congress for funding the entire project. While these 
technologies of control have advanced in ways that would have been unimaginable to 
immigration officials 90 years ago, the same basic impulses motivate the identification and 
apprehension of unwanted immigrant populations at present. 
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In the contemporary moment, when the American deportation has reached its peak 
numbers and far surpassed the rates of earlier decades, we can continue to see how the 
institutionalization and bureaucratization of the Progressive era Bureau of Immigration shapes 
enforcement.  The creation and evolution of programs such as CAP (Criminal Alien Program), a 
“jail status check” which screens federal, state, and local prisons for removable immigrants, and 
Secure Communities, a 2008 information-sharing project between local law enforcement and 
ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), are only modernized, computerized versions of 
systems of coordination, reporting, and streamlined removal consolidated in the 1910s and 
1920s. These programs have attracted attention and criticism from immigrant rights activists and 
some local governments, generating debate strikingly similar to that of the 1920s over the 
appropriate ways to decide which immigrants ought to be removed as threats to the national 
body, as well as the power of non-federal governmental bodies to shape deportation enforcement 
at the local level.  
Over 85 years after the deportation drive of 1926, Chicago again found itself in the 
spotlight in late March of 2011 because of the tensions between local and national authority 
regarding deportation of criminal aliens. This time however, Chicago, rather than pressing for 
deportation for its own agenda and embarking on a plan for mass deportation which the federal 
government only signed onto late, and abandoned early, was taking a stance against federal 
government pressure for deportation. It was one of many local governments that attempted to 
opt-out of the controversial Secure Communities initiative for tracking and deporting of 
criminals. Still at stake, just as before, were the political agendas behind the rhetoric of rescuing 
the country from alien crime, a sentiment expressed by Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, who 
inquired, “The original concept was to get the really bad people out of the country, but are those 
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the only ones you’re getting?”577  In the present, as in the past, deportation remains central to 
American society because of its critical role not only in determining and policing national 
boundaries, and defining Americanism, but also because of its central place in determining the 
balance of power between distinct levels of government power.  
The recent case of Isidro Macario, deported from Boston to Guatemala in early 2016 
echoes a common narrative among contemporary immigrants—Macario had committed a minor 
crime many years ago and had otherwise lived an inconspicuous life with his wife and four 
children, three of whom are American citizens. Despite President Obama’s assertion in 2014 that 
his administration would diverge from its earlier practices and emphasize “felons, not families,” 
immigration activists have pointed to the continued removals of immigrants guilty of minor or no 
crimes. Macario, who fled a repressive and violent regime in Guatemala to which he lost his 
father at the age of 23, settled in Lynn, Massachusetts. As a young man, he was arrested for 
drunk driving and rear ending a car, and was given two years’ probation.578 In spite of his strong 
claims to being a model non-citizen, his twenty-five years of residence in the country, thousands 
of dollars of legal fees, and the extensive efforts of a number of advocates to overturn his order 
of deportation, he was deported in January, 2016. “Mr. Macario is a priority as defined by the 
executive action issued on Nov. 20, 2014,” ICE spokesman Shawn Neudauer explained, “in that 
he is an alien convicted of a significant misdemeanor.”579 
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Following neatly with the now-common trope of the “deserving” immigrant who ought to 
be spared from the gears of the deportation machinery designed to apprehend individuals far 
more dangerous and threatening to the national well-being, Macario’s case relied on his strong 
record as a church leader, diligent laborer, and responsible, heteronormative family man.  In 
recent years, many deportation organizations, particularly those led by youth organizers, have 
called for an end to the reliance on this “good immigrant” narrative. They have argued that they 
shouldn’t have to rely on their “perfection”, their bright, college-bound futures, or their 
contributions to society to be treated with rights and respects similar to those granted citizens.  
As one deportation activist explained in her eloquent response to President Obama’s dichotomy 
of felons versus families, “We protest to reclaim our humanity… that is why we say ‘not one 
more deportation’ and why we won’t fall for the divisions created by politicians that ask us to 
choose between felons and families… Everyone—particularly victims of the international 
predatory economy that pushes us to migrate as well as those who are caught in the prison-
industrial complex—deserves to be here.”580 In spite of these staunch efforts to reclaim the 
deportation narrative, however, the falsely assumed correlation between crime and immigrants 
continues to be one of the most enduring legacies of the early twentieth century, and one of the 
most powerful motivators and excuses for the ever-expanding deportation regime.   
However, while criminal deportations make up a massive proportion of contemporary 
deportations, and remain as one of the clearest legacies of the transformations deportation 
practice underwent during the 1920s, they continue to exist in tandem with other forms of 
institutional removals. Together, these practices demonstrate that the concern with policing the 
national body for those who might be either morally or bodily deficient, has only grown and 
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evolved. There has also been attention in recent years to the practice of “medical repatriation,” 
otherwise known as “medical dumping,” of non-citizen patients who are pressured or coerced 
into removal when they cannot pay for their medical services, often at risk to their health. The 
Center for Social Justice explains of this practice that “acting alone or in concert with private 
transportation companies, such hospitals are functioning as unauthorized immigration officers 
and deporting seriously ill or injured immigrant patients.”581 While occurring outside of the 
formal deportation process (like the repatriations of the early twentieth century), this practice 
echoes the efforts of immigration agents in the 1920s to eliminate any migrants who didn’t 
possess healthy, hearty enough bodies to be considered useful potential laborers. 
Among the most disturbing aspects of the contemporary deportation state is the clear 
profit motive, including the competition of private companies and local governments for 
lucrative detention contracts. Building off of the 1920s businesses who appealed to the 
immigration service for an opportunity to transport or feed deportees, modern corporations have 
escalated deportation into a strikingly profitable endeavor. Deportation activists have joined with 
prison organizers in decrying the damages done by the for-profit prison industry, which thrives 
on the incarceration of citizens and non-citizens alike. While the for-profit prison industry in its 
modern incarnation is a new phenomenon, the profit margin in immigrant removal has deep 
roots, and expulsion has long been an enticing business opportunity for private companies. While 
the massive modern network of detention centers is a far cry from the cobbled together system of 
county jails and rented rooms in private homes, the systematic train networks of the 1920s were 
a major impetus for the development of a broad system for the detention of immigrants awaiting 
removal throughout the country.  
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Deportation practice has become far more focused on a single national group, and thus 
detention and deportation infrastructure are more densely clustered in the U.S. southwest than 
they were a century ago, to correlate with the largest concentration of Mexican immigrants. 
However, as was the case in the 1920s, deportation continues to be a project that reaches into all 
corners of the country, including its outermost and most tenuous reaches, and continues to spread 
the policing of American belonging far beyond the borders. A recent report on the growth of the 
detention industry explains that of the 637 detention centers currently in existence, there is at 
least one or more facility in each of the fifty states, and even more strikingly, in Puerto Rico, 
Guam, the Virgin Island, and the Northern Mariana Islands.582 Furthermore, today, as nearly a 
century ago, deportation reflects the intertwined interests of profit and policing of non-citizens. 
Starting in the early twentieth century, deportable migrants have been increasingly reduced to 
train fare and price-per-bed calculations. As anti-deportation activists have noted, the 
competition of private companies for ICE facilities is “a process that both lines corporate pockets 
with taxpayer money and turns human beings into commodities.”583 As of 2014, in spite of 
claims that DHS was conducting more targeted and selective detention practices, the agency was 
budgeting up to $5.6 million per day for immigrant detention, with a capacity of 31,800 
detainees at over 250 facilities around the country. By 2011, nearly half of all immigrant 
detainees were housed by private prison companies, including the Corrections Corporation of 
America and the GEO group, which have reported billions of dollars in detention profits over 
recent years.584  
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By the contemporary moment, that detention infrastructure has grown into a behemoth of 
incarceration, abuses, and profit. From the creation of the first private prison in the U.S. as an 
immigrant detention center in Houston, Texas, the revenue involved in immigrant detention has 
burgeoned. As historian Greg Grandin explains of the recent resurgence of deportations of 
Central American migrants since the start of 2016, “the deportation regime is completely 
dependent on the interests of privatized detention companies, with an over-militarized and 
arbitrary federal bureaucracy that terrorizes those that live under its thrall.”585  However, while 
the massive network of detention centers looms large over immigrant communities, it has 
managed to stay, as one organization described it, “nearly invisible… vast, ever-changing, and 
shrouded in secrecy.”586  Unlike the relatively inefficient, disorganized, but largely transparent 
detention practices of the early deportation regime, the modern system is “sprawling, 
labyrinthine,” and intentionally designed to be out of the public scrutiny.587  
ICE, the modern incarnation of the Immigration Service, has evolved and extended many 
of the features of deportation practice. In uneven, complex ways, deportation practice had set the 
IS apart as an increasingly modern bureaucratic agency in the 1920s due to its expansive and 
diverse powers, its infrastructural sophistication, and its vast network of connected districts and 
institutions, all of which have grown immensely in the ensuing century. In considering the 
modern functioning of immigration policy making, Oliver Belcher and Lauren Martin note that it 
“is not governed by the constitutional norms that apply to domestic laws and social policies,” but 
exists as “a mix of foreign and domestic policymaking.” This regime, they explain, integrates 
                                                          
585 Greg Grandin, “Here’s Why the U.S. is Stepping Up the Deportation of Central Americans,” The Nation, January 
21, 2016. 
586 Detention Watch Network, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/aboutdetention 
587 Walter Ewing, “New Data Sheds Light on Sprawling, Often For-Profit, Immigration Detention System,” Website 
of the American Immigration Council, April 26, 2016, immigrationimpact.com/2016/04/26/immigration-detention-
for-profit. 
347 
 
aspects of “labor market regulation,” “law enforcement,” “population management,” and “border 
control.”588 These seemingly disparate social functions were in fact brought together by the 
nascent deportations state as early as the 1920s, with tremendous ramifications for the 
development of modern practices of social control and migration regulation. By creating a 
deportation infrastructure both powerful enough, and ambitious enough, to take on all of these 
agendas, immigration officials in the early twentieth century re-centered deportation from a 
peripheral practice of migration restriction to the heart of regulating and controlling the modern 
nation-state, and this centrality has only continued to grow.  
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